www.ssoar.info Henrich, Joseph; Boyd, Robert; Bowles, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Fehr, Ernst; Gintis, Herbert (eds.): Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies Sabbagh, Clara Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Rezension / review Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Sabbagh, C. (2008). Henrich, Joseph; Boyd, Robert; Bowles, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Fehr, Ernst; Gintis, Herbert (eds.): Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. [Review of the book Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, by J. B. R. B. S. C. C. F. E. G. H. (. Henrich]. Sociologický časopis / Czech Sociological Review, 44(6), 1205-1208. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-65298 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. 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By means of a complex Cambridge: Polity Press. laboratory enterprise that included obser- Giddens, A. 1999. ‘Risk and Responsibility.’ Mod- vation of behaviour in both experimental ern Law Review 62 (1): 1–10. and everyday life conditions, the contrib- Pesendorfer, W. 2006. ‘Behavioral Economics utors specifi ed two main goals for exami- Comes of Age: A Review Essay on Advances in Behavioral Economics.’ Journal of Economic nation. First, they aim to refute the homo Literature 44 (3): 712–721. economicus notion by showing that, when Rieskamp, J., J. Busemeyer and B. Mellers. 2006. considering collaboration with others, indi- ‘Extending the Bounds of Rationality: Evi- viduals across different societies are de fac- dence and Theories of Preferential Choice.’ to also guided by social preferences, includ- Journal of Economic Literature 44 (3): 631–661. ing strong reciprocity and fairness. Second, Stebbins, R. 1992. ‘Costs and Rewards in Barber- they aim to identify socio-cultural and eco- shop Singing.’ Leisure Studies 11 (2): 123–133. nomic conditions that shape self-interest and other kinds of social preferences. The homo economicus notion is em- Joseph Henrich – Robert Boyd – Samuel pirically refuted through an ambitious re- Bowles – Colin Camerer – Ernst Fehr search programme conducted by a group – Herbert Gintis (eds.): Foundations of of scholars from different social science Human Sociality: Economic Experiments disciplines, including economics, anthro- and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen pology, psychology, and evolutionary bi- Small-Scale Societies ology. This research programme mainly New York 2004: Oxford University Press, leans on game theory, including variations 472 pp. of the Ultimatum Game, Public Goods Game and Dictator Game. As reviewed in Like the other volumes reviewed in this Chapter 3 by Colin Camerer and Ernst section, this book addresses one of the ba- Fehr, these games generally assume that, sic social science questions: What kind(s) when trying to meet their goals and de- of human motivation underlie social col- sires, individuals weigh different alterna- laboration? Foundations of Human Social- tives (options) and their consequences and ity represents a far-reaching endeavour to maximise a preference function. However, challenge the notion of homo economicus, the book’s research makes a meaningful which has been the cement of many infl u- contribution by elaborating the following: ential social, economic, and political theo- First, it attempts to shed light on the issue ries, as well as game theory, rational choice of human motivation and social collabora- theory, and social exchange theory. This no- tion from an interdisciplinary perspective. tion entails a conception of human motiva- By crossing age-old disciplinary divides, tion whereby individuals are self-interest- the authors attempt to reach a more com- ed agents who strive to maximise their own prehensive understanding of the dynam- utility from a given interaction, expecting ics of relations between the individual and others to do the same. In other words, they society. This understanding is achieved not reveal a ‘self-regarding’ preference, or de- only by integrating different disciplinary sire, to collaborate with others only if the views but also by using different method- collaboration maximises their own utility ologies. Specifi cally, the chapters rely both gains. Against this understanding, Founda- on economic experiments and on ethnogra- tions of Human Sociality suggests that self- phy. This last method, which views culture regarding preferences cannot satisfactorily in a more holistic form, unveils socio-eco- account for frequent instances of pro-social nomic patterns of interaction in everyday behaviour, guided by ‘other regarding’ (so- life and was meant to ascertain to what ex- 1205 Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6 tent they fi t behavioural fi ndings obtained body of literature has been limited to dif- by the ‘artifi cial’ laboratory conditions of ferent types of industrial societies. In con- experimental games. trast, the unique contribution of the cur- Second, existent experimental games rent study lies in its attempt to move the have mainly been conducted among ho- focus of research related to motivation and mogenous populations of university stu- social collaboration from industrial socie- dents across industrial societies (see the ties to ‘truly’ non-Western small-scale so- review by Camerer [2003]). These stud- cieties. ies, which have unveiled relatively similar The book systematically shows viola- fi ndings broadly supportive of the self-in- tions of the self-regarding preference as- terest axiom, are likely to be biased because sumption, indicating that respondents in they characterise the ‘particular’ behaviour small-scale societies also care about fair- of relatively high-status young popula- ness and reciprocity in ways that devi- tions in industrial societies. To overcome ate from university student populations this limitation and ascertain the extent to [Camerer 2003]. For instance, when exam- which these fi ndings can be generalised to ining the dynamics of the Ultimatum Game other type of societies, Foundations of Hu- among responders in a rural foraging/hor- man Sociality adopted a far reaching cross- ticulturalist villages in Papua New Guinea cultural approach that included respond- (Indonesia), David Tracer (Chapter 8) fi nds ents across 15 non-Western and small-scale violations of the self-regarding preference societies which varied along a wide range that seem to correspond to daily life inter- of economic and social conditions. For in- actions in that region. In the Ultimatum stance, foragers go on multi-week forag- Game, the ‘proposer’ (fi rst player) is grant- ing (hunting) treks; horticulturalists rely ed a sum of money and s/he can offer any on agriculture, cultivating small gardens portion it to a ‘responder’ (second per- in combination with fi shing and gather- son). The responder then has the opportu- ing; and (agro)pastoralists rely on small- nity to accept the offer (s/he then receives scale sedentary agriculture and herding. the amount offered and the proposer re- Some of these societies are now seden- ceives the remainder) or to reject it (neither tary, while others are (semi)nomadic, mov- player then receives anything). Respond- ing frequently, staying a few days to a few ers in the Anguganak and Bogasip villag- months in a single location. es were willing to sacrifi ce their own gains The book broadens our understanding by showing high rejection rates (33%) even of pro-sociality by proving that the domi- to generous offers by the proposers (the nant self-interest axiom does not describe mean offer was almost 41%). This fi nding a part of human nature that is determined was interpreted as an outcome of the val- by ‘universal’ psychological and genetic or ues of generosity that players brought to evolutionary mechanisms. Rather, it is a the game from their daily life interactions. socially learned trait determined by ‘par- In these villages, a display of generosity