4 . • -.. --. -..4 ., , ,:.2 :17, - •m i ....... I " • % If -AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT r` 7b ". I-N ,IGA1 ION -REPORT PART I DOCKETED USHRC 2003 JN 17 PH 1: 36 iFFC if-,pT [ ....S AljtlAD TOlNGS SATNAFF FI 6C -SN 86-0275 AND F-I6C SN 87-0335 *' - -.. .. ~..,-ASSIO 0f . ,O I 8TH FIGHTER WING (PACAF),.3 KUNSAN-AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF-KOREA 7J1 27 JULY1 993 CONDUCTED INACCORDANCE WITH AFR 110-14 APPOINTING AUTHORITY: SUBMITTED BY: ROBERT-L. RUTHERFORD THOMAS A. ORAM GENERAL, USAF LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF COMMANDER, PACAF DEPUTY COMMANDER HICKAM AFB, HI 96853-5420 354TH OPERATIONS GROUP EIELSON AFB, AK 99702-1805 p~FS r4xA. &/5- 57754 p/Snaa ---;-, ec v- e -LCV-r SE-cy--6:1 0 0 U, 11 C C) CA '-3 rn -A C, :4 0 F. C-. rm N c c-I q C [Ti I I 0 (A IT -I '2. 0 .1 [Ti 0 I*11 0 '3 C-) VKC -3 I,, 1) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE PACIFIC AIR FORCES 126NOV 1993 FROM: PACAF/CC 25 E Street, Ste G214 Hickam AFB, HI 96853-5420 SUBJ: AFR 110-14 Report of Investigation, F-16C, SN 86-0275 and SN 87-0335 TO: 7 AF/CC The subject report of investigation is approved except for the Investigating Officer's opinions that the pilot of Slap 02 violated the approach procedures contained in Air Force Regulation 60-16 and that the control tower watch supervisor failed to maintain situational awareness since these opnýsu•pported by clear and convincing evidence. RORD, General, USAF Commander 57755 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AFR 110-14 F-16C S/N 86-0275 AND F-16C S/N 87-0335 8TH FIGHTER WING KUNSAN AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA INVESTIGATING OFFICER LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS A. ORAM 1. STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE appointed Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Oram was a. Pacific Air Investigating Officer by General Robert L. Rutherford, on 18 Aug 93 under the authority of Air Force Forces Commander and 110-14, Investigations of Aircraft, Missile, Regulation (AFR) of Space Accidents, dated 15 Dec 89, for investigation Nuclear and on the accident that occurred on Tuesday, 27 Jul 93, an aircraft Republic of end of Runway 36 at Kunsan Air Base (AB), approach 86-0275 and F-16C, Korea (ROK), involving F-16C, Serial Number Five technical advisors were also appointed Serial Number 87-0335. 8 OG/QA, the investigation: Major Douglas W. Freeman, to assist in Flight Advisor; Major Jay A. Clemens, 31 SOS/SGP, Maintenance 80 FS/SELO, and Medical Advisor; Captain Douglas J. Fogle, Surgeon Legal Advisor; Advisor; Captain Deborah L. Collins, 51 WG/JA, Pilot Air Traffic Control and Captain Ricky L. Smith, 3 OSS/DOFC, Advisor. officer and b. The documents appointing the investigating investigation officially technical advisors are at Tab Y. The began 30 Aug 93. according to c. The purpose of this accident investigation, all available evidence for AFR 110-14, is to obtain and preserve litigation, disciplinary action, adverse use in -claims, deemed proceedings, and for all other purposes administrative is not by competent authority. This accident report appropriate with AFR 110-14, privileged and is releasable in accordance paragraph 12. investigation are d. The times addressed in this report of Korean local times unless otherwise stated. is provided at Tab e. A glossary of acronyms and abbreviations FF. 57756 2. SUMMARY OF FACTS a. HISTORY OF FLIGHT Air Force F (1) On 27 Jul 93 at 3:31 PM, a United States call sign "Slap 02," collided 16C, Block 30, Serial Number 86-0275, Block 30, Serial Number 87 with a United States Air Force F-16C, at 35 degrees 53 minutes 30 seconds 0335, call sign "Stingray 01," on 37 minutes 5 seconds east longitude north latitude, 126 degrees the 36, Kunsan AB, ROK, fatally injuring the approach end of Runway a. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Gardner, pilot of Stingray 01. 8th assigned as the Chief of Safety, United States Air Force pilot Slap was the pilot of Stingray 01. Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, ROK, D. LeBlanc, a United States Air 02 was flown by Captain Richard 35th Fighter Squadron, 8th Operations Force pilot assigned to the 2) AB, ROK. (Tabs A-i, C-i, and Group, 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan second flight of the day, a training Slap 02 was returning from his AB at 2:34 PM. Stingray 01 was mission that originated at Kunsan for his second flight of the day, just beginning the takeoff roll V when the mishap occurred. (Tabs a single-shlp training mission, 1, 2, 3, and EE-26) was an intended route of flight (2) Stingray 01's Visual departure to the northeast to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) for then direct to Osan AB, ROK, Meteorological Conditions (VMC), followed by an instrument recovery practice instrument approaches and AA-2). back at Kunsan AB (Tabs V-7, 74, flight on the mishap sortie (3) The route flown by Slap 01 southeast of the base, Kunsan AB to approximately 50 miles was from (MOA) 15 and MOA 16. to Military Operating Area then direct Julop, the Initial the operating areas was direct to Recovery from Launch And Recovery Fix (IAF), for the Aircraft Surge Approach for Runway 36, the active Instrument Landing System (ILS) (ASLAR), was the pilot of the number runway at Kunsan AB. Captain LeBlanc 0 a formation of two F-16s. (Tabs two aircraft in Slap 01 flight, 14, 37, 38, V-i, 2, AA-I, and EE-26) with one 300 gallon and two (4) Stingray 01 was configured AIM-9 air-to-air training gallon external fuel tanks, a captive 370 pod, two TER-9/A triple an acgeleration monitor assembly missile, and 387 rounds of 20 bomb racks, 30 RR-170 chaff bundles, ejector Gross weight at takeoff was millimeter target practice ammunition. 34,439 pounds. (Tab L-1) engine start and taxi for (5) Ground operations to include receiving takeoff clearance from Stingray 01 were normal. After onto Runway 36, accomplished the control tower, Stingray 01 taxied afterburner, and began his takeoff an engine run-up check, selected 2 57757 02 while after brake release on takeoff roll, Slap roll. Shortly injuring the to land, collided with Stingray 01, fatally attempting 47, X, BB-3, and EE-37) pilot of Stingray 01. (Tabs A-i, V-4, 46, with one 300 gallon external (6) Slap 02 was configured an AIM-9 air-to-air training missile, fuel tank, a captive air-to-air monitor assembly pod, two empty LAU-129 acceleration air-to-ground training missile launchers, two CATM-88/A captive chaff bundles, and 511 rounds missiles, 30 M-206 flares, 30 RR-170 ammunition. Gross weight at of 20 millimeter target practice takeoff was 30,760 pounds. (Tab L-2) were uneventful for (7) Engine start, taxi, and takeoff Kunsan AB and proceeded at Slap 01 flight. The flight departed High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile medium altitude to practice site tactics against a surface-to-air missile (HARM) employment Kunsan AB. Weather approximately 50 miles southeast of located were not suitable for the conditions in the briefed training area 01 coordinated with Airedale, the military primary mission. Slap approved for MOAs 15 and 16 to accomplish an radar control agency, at medium mission. Slap 01 flight proceeded alternate training the airspace, to their assigned MOAs. Upon entering altitude between Slap 01 and Slap 02 multiple intercepts were accomplished roles as the target aircraft and the with both aircraft exchanging Slap 01 aircraft. Departing the training airspace, interceptor Slap 02, who led the the flight lead responsibilities to passed ASLAR ILS approach and back through Julop, the IAF, for an flight portion of the approach, landing at Kunsan AB. During the landing Following the collision, the Slap 02 collided with Stingray 01. from his aircraft. (Tabs A-l, pilot of Slap 02 successfully ejected V-i, 2, 64, and 0-30) following the Both aircraft skidded down the runway (8) apart. Stingray and came to rest approximately 1600 feet collision off the runway surface to was totally engulfed in flames just 01 the runway with a small west while Slap 02 was just east of the R-1, S-i, V-36, and 37) fire at the tail of the aircraft. (Tabs data following the collision, the flight (9) Immediately crash net, in the control tower activated the primary controller fire, and rescue personnel initiating the response of base crash, (Tab V-4). / collision were (10) Weather conditions at the time of the scattered deck of clouds at 500 poor. Forecast weather indicated a ceiling and 1 1/2 miles above the ground with a 1500 foot feet taken by base weather visibility with rain showers. An observation mishap generally confirm the personnel within five minutes of the 3 57758 (Tab 0-25) with a slightly higher ceiling of 1800 feet. forecast estimated the ceiling Statements by personnel witnessing the mishap mile (Tabs V-i, 3, 4, 10, at 300 to 500 feet and visibility at 1 and 46). end of Runway (11) The collision occurred on the approach land utilized by United 36 at Kunsan AB, which is Korean government to an agreement between the States Air Force personnel pursuant Korea. Both aircraft were United States and the Republic of (35 FS), 8th Operations Group assigned to the 35th Fighter Squadron Air Force (7 AF), Pacific Air (8 OG), 8th Fighter Wing (8 FW), 7th Forces (PACAF). (Tab A-l) Wing Public Affairs Office at Kunsan (12) The 8th Fighter crash mishap at 3:35 PM, via the secondary AB was notified of the at 4:00 notified 7th Air Force Public Affairs net.