At the time of the United States’ entry into the world conflict in April 1917, the war in Europe had been going on for some 32 months and no end was in sight. The long, hitter battle on the Western Front had just about come to a standstill. The Russian Front was falling apart due to the Bolsheviks, and the internal revolution going on inside Russia was quickly exploited by the Germans. They hoped to negotiate a separate peace with the Rus- sians, thereby freeing troops for the Western Front. At this same time, on the Italian Front, the Italians were holding their own but with no chance of a decisive victory. On the seas, the life- line of supply and communication for the Allies was being threat- ened. The German submarines were taking their toll; 800,000 tons of shipping were being lost each month, and if the submarines were not contained soon, they might very well lead to a victory for the Central Powers. In order to curtail this excessive loss of shipping and to speed up an Allied victory, every conceivable idea was run through the mill. We would need to protect out troop ships, lines of supply, and communications. We started sailing ships in convoys protected by destroyers that were armed with depth charges, installed deck guns on merchant ships, and employed blimps and planes for anti- submarine duty. But perhaps the most ambitious plan was to de- vise a way to contain the enemy submarines at their bases, or at least to limit their access to the shipping lanes of the Allies. Our allies, the British, had been doing limited mining without much success prior to our entry into the war. They were, however, reluctant to share much of the information on their mines. The subject of mines was little discussed and very well guarded among the Allies during the early part of the war <perhaps much like our missile system of today). In early 1917 the United States had about 5000 mines on hand, none of which were of any value in containing submarines, so we had to start from scratch. First it was necessary to develop a mine and trigger mechanism. It normal- ly takes a year or so to make the models, test them, and put them into operation. This mine had to be manufactured and built upon a new principle in mining along with a firing gear outlined but not perfected. We needed ships for planters and specially trained men to handle, transport, activate, and lay these mines. Along with all of this we needed a time table so the job would get done. The organization which was formed to accomplish this was desig- nated "Mine Force." This Mine Force, along with that of our allies, the British, would have as its primary mission the safeguarding of the shipping lanes of the North Sea. The best way to accomplish this would be to string a minefield from the east coast of Scot- land to the coast of Norway. This was a novel concept at the time (much like putting up a fence to keep the dogs off your bushes). This "barrage" called for 15 strings of mines to cover an area 250 miles long and 30 miles wide, laid at a depth of 30 to 200 feet. This would allow our surface ships to patrol and try to force down any submarines trying to run the barrier if they couldn’t be des- troyed on the surface. With this plan set out in detail, the selection of ships and men had the highest priority. A Mine Force training camp was set up in November 1917 at Cloyne Field Barracks in Newport, Rhode Island. Most of the experience in minelaying was had by a few officers and men, and they were responsible for the training of the rest of the squadron. For the most part, during their training and afterward, these men were kept apart from the rest of the fleet by their com- mander. It was desired to keep secret as much as possible the techniques they were using and the details of the operation itself. Training in the techniques of minelaying was done aboard the USS San Francisco and the USS Baltimore, the only two minelayers the Navy had in service at that time. This was the same USS Baltimore that served at Manila Bay some 20 years earlier; she was now a minelayer with Mine Squadron One. The men would take turns train- ing on these ships while waiting for their own ships to be fitted out. These other ships had to be drafted from merchant ships and refitted as minelayers. They were the USS Quimnebang, USS Housa- tonicj USS Canonicus, USS Canadigua, USS Roanoke, USS Saranac, USS Shawmut, and the USS Arosstock. There were also to be two ships employed as minesweepers; they were the USS Patuxent and the USS Patapeco. The USS Blackhawk acted as tender. We would even- tually have a total of ten planters, a tender, two tugs, and 23 carriers. As the ships were made ready their crews went aboard and finished their training. Once overseas, the mines would have to be set with anchors. Great Britain agreed to furnish us with 30,000 tons of anchors, thus saving us from having to transport them overseas. After these mines were set with anchors they would be put aboard a planter, activated, and then planted in a string that would make up the North Sea Barrage. The mines would be planted approximately i00 yards apart. During the operations in the North Sea, the men had to contend with ice, sleet, snow, and bitter cold along with heavy rolling seas and the threat of enemy submarines. Prior to the war, the American Navy had been a warm-water navy; as soon as winter set in the ships would go south to practice. Consequently, the first ships taking up duty in the North Sea found that they were entirely without suitable clothing for the climate. Not only that, but German "Wolf Packs" were getting bolder. For example, one report states that a large protected convoy off the coast of Norway was attacked and six torpedoes were fired at the ships but missed only because of the vigilance of the crews and the instan- taneous maneuvering of the ships. In the same area, one German submarine had the audacity to try to ram the flagship, USS New York, damaging a propellor badly enough so that a return to port would be required. It is believed that the submarine was sunk as a result of this encounter. Most of the US Navy’s effort in the conflict had been against the submarines. It was events such as these that Mine Squadron One was aware of as it went overseas in April 1918. The USS Baltimore, at the request of the British, had already begun mining operations in the Irish Sea several months before. The Baltimore now rejoined Mine Squadron One, which, a- long with the British, commenced mining the North Sea. Areas of responsibility were designated and the final line to be mined de- cided upon. This was to be a line from the Orkney Islands (just north of Scotland) to Bergen, Norway. The first US minelaying operations were begun on 8 June 1918, and on an average trip 4343 mines were planted. In all, nearly 72,000 mines were placed in the Northern Barrage. The last operation on the barrage was on 26 October 1918, and on that day they placed 5520 mines in three hours, five minutes, covering an area of 56 miles. After they returned to port, they loaded up and were ready to go out on 30 October, but the trip was cancelled, probably due to the pending armistice. In the relatively short time the Northern Barrage was in effect, it is known that at least six submarines were seriously damaged and possibly sunk and that the barrage had a negative effect upon the morale of the German submariners, even to the extent that some returned to their home bases, rather than run the risk of being sunk. Mine Squadron One had a total complement of 6752 enlisted men and 297 officers. Of this number, 4530 enlisted men and 237 officers served afloat. The medal illustrated could have belonged to any one of the 7049 men who served in Mine Squadron One, a unique unit, all of whom probably felt that their contribution helped to shorten the war. REFERENCES: The United States in the Great War, by Willis J. N6~o~-7 The United States Navy Department of Statistics. Northern Barrage and Other Mining Activities, by the U.--~al Library~ The Story of the Philippines and Our New Possessions, B-y-Murat Ha--fst-~d. War in the Philippines and Life of Dewey, by Joseph .i-i-S~-fcn~-K~y. IN MEMORIAM Gleb Ale~androvich popoff, OMSA Member #8, was 81 when he died of a heart attack at Monterey peninsula Hospi- tal in October. He was a Charter Member of OM~A. Mr. popoff was born in 1900 in Orevborg, Russia. A son of a physician, he was a midshipman during the Russian Civil War. As a youthful machinegunner he took part in the Great Siberian Ice Campaign, which he survived, though seriously ill during that long and cruel march. He fled to the United States where he graduated from the University of California as a pharmicist. Is Borld War Two he served as a sergeant iv the US Air Corps Medical Department in the North African and Italy Campaigns.