POLICY BRIEFING / JUNE 2018 Marginalized youth: Toward an inclusive Jordan Beverley Milton-Edwards1 his policy briefing explores the impact of political, social, and economic marginalization on TJordan’s youth. It highlights the grow- ing tensions between the government and its increasingly agitated young cit- izens over the matter. Those tensions manifest in political apathy, disaffec- tion among tribal youth, and radical- ization. If the issue of youth cohesion and inclusion is not tackled, further erosion of Jordan’s stability and secu- rity will take place. Policies aimed at addressing those issues should avoid approaches that reduce youth to a security threat. The agency of young people and their relationships to their communities must be at the core of government strategy, resource allocation, and implementation. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS • Bolster government-led youth • Promote civic youth through developing initiatives through strengthening the and teaching curriculums that encourage Ministry of Youth (MoY), including civic engagement, allowing youth spaces youth in both the development and for political and civic participation to implementation of initiatives, and flourish, and incorporating a “youth inclu- establishing better coordination between sion” principle in NGO and civil society government institutions, NGOs, registration procedures. and donors. • Ease the school-to-work transition • Foster youth political inclusion through developing employment training through lowering the minimum age programs and enhancing vocational op- for candidacy in elections, introducing portunities in secondary and tertiary level youth quotas in parliament and education in Jordan. Public-private and municipal councils, and accelerating private sector initiatives should be encour- youth voter awareness campaigns. aged to drive the process. The Brookings Institution is a private nonprofit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based Copyright © 2018 Brookings Institution on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommenda- BROOKINGS INSTITUTION tions of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institution, its man- N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. agement, or its other scholars. www.brookings.edu Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar Activities su ported by its donors reflect this commitment and the www.brookings.edu/doha analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. INTRODUCTION: This policy briefing explores the layers of youth JORDANIAN YOUTH SITTING exclusion in Jordan, highlighting the political, AT THE MARGINS social, and economic obstacles facing young Jor- danians and particularly young women.3 It dis- One of the major features of the Arab uprisings cusses the consequences of youth marginaliza- that gripped the Middle East and North Africa tion, which include apathy and distrust toward (MENA) in 2010 and 2011 was the role that existing political institutions and leaders, the young people played in mobilizing dissent and breakdown of the social compact between tribe frustration. Young Jordanians joined their peers and state, and radicalization. If the issue of youth from across the region to call for political reform cohesion and inclusion is not tackled, Jordan’s and protest poor life chances, but with little to stability and security can seriously erode. How- show for their efforts. ever, in addressing those destabilizing factors, it is important to avoid approaches that reduce young Jordan, like other countries in MENA, has a people to a security risk. This briefing therefore young population. The United Nations (U.N.) urges the government, leaders, and internation- estimates that more than 70 percent of the coun- al donors in Jordan to direct more resources to try’s 6.5 million citizens are under thirty. Youth youth programs and policies that foster youth po- make up 22 percent of the overall population.2 litical inclusion, promote civic engagement, and Despite their numbers, young Jordanians have support young people in their transition from been marginalized by the state and society. school to work. Figure I: Population Pyramid Jordan, 2016 Male Female 100+ 95–99 90–94 85–89 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 515 412 309 206 103 0 0 103 206 309 412 515 Population (in thousands) Age Group Population (in thousands) Source: CIA World Factbook 1 Policy Brief • June 2018 THE LAYERS OF YOUTH EXCLUSION They have explored various political avenues, including protests against government-im- Jordanian youth experience multiple layers of posed price hikes and politically sensitive issues marginalization, intimately interconnected with such as normalization with Israel.8 socioeconomic, political, religious, national, sec- tarian, sexual, and gender dynamics. This is ex- Such activism, however, comes with a high price acerbated by poor political, social, and economic tag. Students are constantly monitored. Student prospects in the face of societal pressures to earn protests against issues such as fee hikes have led enough to establish independent homes, contrib- to suspensions and expulsions.9 Security forc- ute to family finances, and marry.4 As detailed in es have also targeted leaders and organizers in this section, youth exclusion manifests in struc- groups such as the National Campaign for the tural barriers to youth political participation, Rights of Students, also known as “Thabahto- civic engagement, and access to economic op- na,” amid claims that their role undermines and portunities imposed by both the state and society. threatens university and governance norms.10 Young women also face a number of additional “They see us as the enemies of the state not the barriers, especially when it comes to their experi- active citizens of our future society,” said one ence of public spaces and social cohesion. such student leader.11 CLOSING THE POLITICAL DOORS Even in terms of the supposedly innocuous music TO YOUTH scene, many, including hip-hop and rap artists, dancers, MCs, and producers, decry the levels of The democracy deficit in Jordan is one compel- control by governing authority. “I was called in ling reason why its population joined the revolts by the ‘mukhabarat’ and they wanted all of my of 2011–12.5 Jordan is not a democratic state, lyrics,” stated one local artist.12 Another claimed and foreign donors have expressed concerns that that restrictions on public space that stop young progress on fundamental rights to improve po- single men from gathering to perform, dance, or litical freedoms are too slow.6 Barriers to politi- be part of an audience “suffocate us.”13 cal participation are higher on young people than other citizens. Jordanian authorities offer little Additionally, structural obstacles to political par- by way of invitation to draw its young popula- ticipation and joining public office persist in ex- tion into participation and civic life. Youth are cluding youth in Jordan. Lower-order decision- marginal in learning and playing a role in Jordan’s making bodies such as civil society organizations, deliberative and governing frameworks. community groups, and school and university student councils, where youth could gain experi- In fact, young Jordanians accuse authorities of ence and engage in activism and stake-holding, actively stifling opportunities for inclusion.7 have long been subject to such severe forms of Public spaces are highly constricted places for control as to render them redundant in this re- youth because of the ways in which local gov- spect.14 One encouraging development was ap- erning authorities police and control them. parent in the decision by the Jordanian govern- Places like schools, college and university cam- ment to lower the minimum age for candidacy puses, and other “social” spaces that should in local elections to 25 years in preparation for welcome youth participation and activism are the August 2017 elections.15 However, the mini- constrained. Despite this, student activism in mum age to run for parliament in Jordan is still Jordan has persisted. Students have formed lo- 30 years and over a $700 deposit is required to cal networks to address their concerns, as well stand.16 Such factors act as effective obstacles to as wider socioeconomic and political issues. youth inclusion. 2 Marginalized youth: Toward an inclusive Jordan LIMITS TO CIVIC ENGAGEMENT extent of intersectionality present among those various groups is rarely recognized. The attitudes of governing authority reduce the agency of youth to a state of passive beneficiary. ECONOMIC MARGINS: There is wide agreement among many analysts at THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM the U.N., the Organization for Economic Coop- eration and Development (OECD), and other The Jordanian economy has failed to expand to al- international organizations on youth issues in low for the number of young Jordanians entering Jordan that state and state-assisted activities are the work force on an annual basis. Youth unem- limited in terms of programmatic approach.17 ployment is one of the most pressing issues facing Jordan’s National Center for Human Rights also Jordan. It was a significant factor in mobilizing consistently reports that the state fails to encom- youth in different forms of protest—from taking pass its youth in the civic life of the country.18 to the street to using bank notes to highlight their This means that youth participation in Jordanian claims.20 In 2017, the World Bank estimated that civil society, including in roles on the boards of youth unemployment stood at 36 percent.21 state-registered organizations, is, again, highly restricted.19 This has attendant consequences for Structural adjustment advocates and neo-liberal the youth’s collective and individual sense of civic advisors have increasingly urged the state to also identity, stake-holding, and empowerment.