Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 9, Number 20, May 25, 1982 Domestic Politics The Socialist Party loses its mandate to govern by Philip Golub It is not uncommon in leading Parisian circles these days the newly voted National Assembly. to compare the tense and increasingly violent political The image of absolute power was intoxicating, par­ climate in the country to that of the chaotic last years of ticularly to a class of ideologues who still view Marat, the Fourth Republic, or even to the period of sectarian Danton, Roberspierre, Saint Just, and other "radical" violence which followed the liberation in 1945. Jacobin leaders of the French Revolution as their spirit­ Undoubtedly, the left-right political conflict has ual forefathers. The intoxication lasted until this past sharpened to a degree that has surprised most observers, March, which brought a stinging defeat of the govern­ and France is more divided as a nation today than at any ment coalition in local elections. Throughout last sum­ time since 1958, when escalating military crises in Algeria mer, the leading representatives of the Socialist Party brought on endless domestic crises and a political paral­ were, quite literally, calling for "heads to fall." The new ysis which forced Charles de Gaulle out of political president of the National Assembly and close friend of retirement and into executive power. Mitterrand, Louis Mermaz, denied the rights of speech Terrbrism has evoked images of an "ltalianization" of the opposition in parliament, citing Saint Just to of France, repeated purges of the national police and buttress his argument. Mitterrand himself repeatedly security forces have left persisting bitterness among se­ warned the country that a "radicalization" of the govern­ curity forces and have polarized ministers within the ment would occur were the opposition to oppose him. government, all of which has led to intensifying interne­ It is parenthetically useful to note that the continuing cine "police wars"; the French economy is facing its references to the mythology of the French Revolution worst crisis in years, and the government is committing served in the eyes of the Socialists to legitimize their very grave errors of management, which, if pursued, may policies. Yet the new rulers of France truly are heirs to very well lead to economic collapse. the class of populist demagogues and agents of the The most remarkable feature of the national crisis House of Orleans which led the Club des Jacobins. afflicting France is that the predicates of the crisis de­ Threats were followed by action: the police were scribed above, all result, directly or indirectly, from the purged without regard to the consequences this would manifest incompetence of the new Socialist regime to have on the security of the nation; the large banks and rule in times of world crisis. industrial enterprises were nationalized so as to concen­ Unlike 1958, neither military crisis nor institutional trate economic power in the hands <;>f the Socialist state; paralysis resulting from British parliamentary forms are the heads of universities were deposed, etc. attributable causes of the rapid deterioration of political life and executive authority in France. In retrospect, it is Opposition sweeps local elections a simple matter to locate how the combination of parlia­ Today, the real power of the Socialists is much less mentary paralysis, the collapse of executive authority, than their legal power, for although they control the and various bloody and useless colonial enterprises of state, they do not have unreserved popular support­ conquest killed the Fourth Republic. Today, the crisis quite the contrary. The local elections of March 1982 has different institutional dimensions in spite of the fact gave the new opposition more than 51 percent of the that the principal actors in the government are all prod­ vote, and they were preceded by four legislative by­ ucts of the anti-Gaullist Fourth Republic. elections last January which were swept by the UDF Francois Mitterrand was elected 12 months ago with and RPR. a small though relatively comfortable majority. The A careful analysis of the presidential and legislative presidential election was followed by the June 198 1, elections of May-June 1981 shows that the local elec­ legislative elections which crushed both the neo-Gaullist tions results describe social and political trends more Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) and the Gis­ faithfully than the usual voting patterns of 1981: cardian coalition, Union Democratique Fran�aise I) All leading political observers, including the So­ (UDF), giving the Socialist Party an absolute majority in cialists, now concur that the presidential victory of EIR May 25, 1982 Special Report 23 © 1982 EIR News Service Inc. All Rights Reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission strictly prohibited. Mitterrand was solely attributable to a massive and protest government projects to close down private voluntary switch of RPR votes to Mitterrand. At the schools. A mass demo nstration will occur May 15 of time of the elections, leading government officials in­ the French right-to-life organization against the gov­ EIR I formed that over million RPR or RPR-linked ernment's family policy . right-wing votes were "given" to Mitterrand by the Prime Minister Mauroy has seen in this ebullition of Gaullists in an effort to defeat the incumbent President opposition activity a threat of great significance and Giscard at all costs. two weeks ago warned of a "general effort to destabilize The Socialist Party's vote totals on the first round of the government." This counterattack does not diminish the presidential elections on May 10 indicated a very the sense that a crisis is looming. The violence of slight progression of the party, but nothing more. The Socialist language and threats over the summer opened addition of Socialist, Communist, left-radical, and ex­ the way for equally violent retaliatory efforts. If the treme-left-wing votes of the first round did not give Socialist-Communist coalition loses the municipal elec­ Mitterrand the result he achieved on the second round. tions upcoming in 1982, the door will be open for a 2) The RPR, which calculated that while defeating general questioning of the "legitimacy" of the govern­ Giscard it would be able to maintain a major presence ment. Even the eminence grise of the French left and in parliament, then coIlapsed. However, the demorali­ mentor of Mitterrand, Pierre Mendes-France, has indi­ zation of the traditional electorate of the ex-majority led cated his preoccupation over the incompetence of to extraordinarily high rates of abstention of both U OF France's present leadership. Under such circumstances and RPR voters during the June legislative elections. early general legislative elections would probably be­ Hence the overwhelming Socialist victory (the elections come necessary. are not proportional votes where representation is pro­ Circles in Paris are, however, speCUlating about portionate to vote totals, but rather give a marked another possibility, that of early presidential elections legislative surplus to the leading party. Thus the Social­ caused by an early demise or resignation of the Presi­ ists have over 50 percent of all seats in Parliament with dent. Rumors abound about the president's state of only 30 percent of the vote). health, since Mitterrand has shown signs of weakness The recent cantonal elections made obvious that recently. Whatever the truth of these insin uations, large those who had switched their vote on May 10 and then parts of the opposition are calculating this as a factor. in June, �witched back to the former Giscardian-major­ Some hardliners in the RPR have spoken of a ity in spite of the opposition's lack of cohesion and "looming civil war" (Charles Pasqua, chief of the political program. The government, which has shown RPR's senate group), others of civil conflict. Within the itself incapable of dealing simultaneously with labor, Socialist Party itself there is such con fusion and faction­ industry, police, and peasants, found itself nationally al strife, including among ministers, that one gets the discredited. Since March, the government's real power sense of a scramble for power. has no relation to its legal power. Prospects for economic instability Mitterrand's incompetence to rule Ultimately the Socialists will be confronted with the One of the elder statesmen of the opposition and the harsh effects of the international economic crisis which founder with de GauIle of the constitution of the Fifth they so long denied for partisan reasons when Giscard Republic, Michel Oebre, noted as much in an article in was in power. France's economy is extremely fragile the Paris daily Le Figaro. Oebre pointed out the distinc­ and a major shock would throw it on its knees faster tion between "legality" and "historical legitin1acy," the than that of Germany or other Western nations. To latter being a reference to de GauIle's notion of the state fulfill his promises Mitterrand has more than tripled the as representing a nation-state rather than a collection of indebtedness of the state, and doubled external lending different interests. Declaring the Socialist government within a near-zero-growth context. The French econo­ ilIegitimate, Oebre characterized its incompetence to my's expansion is below 0.2 percent this year! Either a rule. vast austerity will follow with inevitable social repercus­ Since March the government has in its own way sions or France will experience a hyperinflation which proven Oebre's thesis: ministers have fought each other will destroy the franc. in the public arena over security policy, and while the One year has largely sufficed to take away virtual Justice Minister, for example, frees arrested terrorists, power from the hands of those who have all power. the' Interior Minister calls on police to "shoot to kill." Their mastery of reality and events in the world is Mass demonstrations of disgruntled citizens have been almost nil.