e Arab Iti)rld acldresse ,, 111,- most ,Ii Nil and •,10.1 40,00 .1 Middle-East politics, With .1 1,0011;100n tkk I , tiro 1 Gulf states combined, lit rill 0141 t,,i„ ()tied leadership position in th,. , I4II lit sertion, Iran must be a part 01 ,110 hamt k oh k e Middle East in general, `i , i lean, it eneral refusal to disctiss its hoe num, taks through this barrier 01 so, it„ III1 .1,k,h, tions with Syria, 1,ebankm, 11,al, 1 1.N ',midi A1,11.1. 1 . ,110 the Gulf Cooperation Count 11 I he. 1 ,, 1111 , 111 ,- )lating the New World ()Ilk' 11) ill. 111(1 is (chard W. Runlet. Professor of Ilihtoly,, t'olti ^ 10,4 I 1 1 1%1 1 , Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi ,b relations arc crucial tor understanding the kJaileMpOtaty e Middle East. To date, no monograph has nettled this iMptif and Nader Entessar despite the Iran--Iraq war, Iran's role in the Lehrunin, and art for radical Islamic Retires in the Atah 0,111 ban anti the admirably fills this lacuna. In a serot irn 1•,,1 essio Mat imp act of ideology, United States poll, ‘. I.-Imams with ates on Iranian•Arab relations, dies ‘,,Inint. Iii 4 11111 at the prospects for conflict and sulhons in OW / , ‘!■ .1, SO / 1 + 4 n 'ma Iran and the rid is must reading 1 / a those seek nit,' .1 niil‘ 11) 1111 1 1 1 1/1:11' , 1 \ g of Middle East politics.' ■,rie Davis, Professor of Political St is nc r, Rutyci.. i !ffivetsity. Arab World T r• es •• t Plkerta • Also edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar Iran and the Arab RECONSTRUCTION AND REGIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE PERSIAN GULF World Also by Hooshang Amirahmadi Edited by REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION: The Iranian Experience POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN (co-editor) THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST (editor) Hooshang Amirahmadi URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE MUSLIM WORLD (co-editor) Associate Professor and Director, Middle Eastern Studies Program Rutgers University, New Jersey Also by Nader Entessar and KURDISH FRINONATIONALISM MIDDLE EAST POLITICS Nader Entessar POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE Professor of Political Science A STUDY ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY Spring Hill College, Alabama St. Martin's Press New York 138 Iran and the Arab World 9. Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, 'The Government of God' — Iran's Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 8 Iranian—Saudi Arabian 10. R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 11. Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Relations since the Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 108-29. 12. Erik R. Peterson, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Revolution Dynamic Region (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), pp. xviii, 134-7. Hooshang Amirahmadi 13. In 1983, the GCC Supreme Council Communiqué called 'on Iran to respond positively to [the 31 October 1983 UN Security Council] resolution and not to threaten the freedom of navigation in the Gulf and its straits'. In 1985, Until the end of the US-led war against Iraq, the relationship between the however, GCC rulers stated that the war should end 'in a manner that safeguard[ed] the legitimate rights and interests of the two sides'. This was as Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of S'a'udi Arabia remained tense lucid a pronouncement as the GCC would make in venting its members' and unfriendly. While tension also existed between the two nations during displeasure with Saddam Hussein but it was enough. See 'Doha Supreme the reign of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, it was nowhere close Council Summit: Final Communique', FBIS — MEA -V-83-218, 9 November to the essentially antagonistic • relations that developed between the two 1983, pp. C3—C4; and 'Muscat Supreme Council Summit: Final Communi- countries in the aftermath of the Revolution in 1979. que', FBIS — MEA -V-85 -215 , 6 November 1985, pp. C1—C2. 14. Martin Kramer, 'Tragedy in Mecca', Orbis 32:2 (Spring 1988), pp. 232-7. The Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980 and the subsequent 15. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans- eight-year war between the two countries became another turning-point in lated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 196. The anti- the worsening relations between the Islamic Republic and the Saudi King- Shia tract, Al -Khutut al-Arida li- Usus Allati Qama Alayha Din as -Shia al- dom. From that moment, the essentially ideological contest gradually de- Ithna Ashariya (The Broad Lines of the Foundations on which the Shia veloped into political confrontation on several fronts. The relationship Religion Arose) is authored by Muhib ad-Din al-Khatib. First published in 1960, it remains a widely distributed anti-Shia polemic. became even more tense when a Saudi-`engineered glut' in 1985-6 led to a 16. Ali Shariati, Hail (Bedford, Ohio: Free Islamic Literature, 1978), p. 109. sharp drop in OPEC oil prices, with extremely negative consequences for 17. As quoted in Kramer, op. cit., p. 243. the Iranian war economy. 18. Dilip Hiro, Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism (New York: This deteriorating relationship reached its lowest point in 1987 when a Routledge, 1989), pp. 217-19. political demonstration by the Iranian pilgrims in Mecca turned into a 19. As quoted in Kramer, op. cit., p. 245. bloody confrontation with the Saudi police. At that point verbal abuse 20. Le Monde, 25 August 1987, p. 1. 21. Walter de Bock and Jean-Charles Deniau, Des Armes Pour L' Iran: L' Irangate intensified from both sides and diplomatic relations were severed. The late Europeen (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), pp. 214-17. Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini even proclaimed Saudi Arabia as the Is- 22. Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade lamic Republic's main enemy although Iran was in the midst of its war with (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 63-78. Iraq. The Islamic leaders in Tehran also began to call the Kingdom by its old name, Hijaz, questioning the legitimacy of the House of Saud's rule in Islam's birthplace. Iran—Saudi relations improved slightly under the leadership of the prag- matist President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani beginning in 1989. After the ceasefire with Iraq in August 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, the Islamic Republic begin to redefine its foreign policy from the earlier confrontational approach toward a more moderate and cooperative one with the states in the region. This change notwithstanding, Iran—Saudi Arabia relations remained tense and unfriendly until the US-led war against Iraq was successfully con- 139 140 Iran and the Arab World Hooshang Amirahmadi 141 eluded. Since then, some of the most troubling issues between the two including reduction in demand, development of new energy sources, and regimes have been resolved. These include the disputes over the Mecca the engineering of the occasional glut. demonstration and OPEC leadership. Diplomatic ties were restored in March In retrospect, this policy was quite successful. In 1985, demand for oil in 1991. Some very important issues, however, remain unresolved for the time the non-Communist world was 5 per cent lower than it was in 1973. For being. Among them are the future leadership and security of the Persian OPEC, the decline was even more severe. By 1986, OPEC had lost some 20 Gulf and the traditional sources of tension between Arabs and Iranians. million barrels a day of its potential production, of which 14 to 15 mb/d had This chapter presents an overview of Iranian—Saudi Arabian relations been taken away by non-OPEC producers including those in the North Sea. 2 since the Revolution in 1979 and focuses on the factors underlying the In the meantime, the world oil market was flooded by oil from Saudi Arabia tension between Tehran and Riyadh. I argue that three major forces were and the new OPEC competitors, resulting in a major oversupply or glut by the most responsible for the confrontations between the two regimes: ideo- 1985. 3 Within OPEC, Iran was the biggest loser. Its share of OPEC produc- logical and cultural differences; struggle for OPEC leadership, and quest for tion and exports of crude oil declined from 19.1 per cent and 18.2 per cent supremacy in the Persian Gulf. A complex of other forces will be shown to in 1976 to 14.1 and 13.4 in 1985 respectively. Part of this decline, however, have influenced Iran—Saudi relations in the post-revolutionary period, most resulted from the Iran—Iraq war and an earlier deliberate government policy notably the US presence in the region and the Iran—Iraq war. to reduce dependency on the oil sectoil In the following pages, the first section focuses on the OPEC factor. The The shrinking demand and expanding competition combined with mis- next section focuses on the ideological and cultural roots of the tension taken OPEC policies and what I have elsewhere called 'the Saudi factor' to between the two regimes in Tehran and Riyadh. In the third section, the cause the 1986 crash in oil markets; oil prices declined from about $28 per Persian Gulf factor and the US role in Iranian—Saudi Arabian relations are barrel in mid-January 1986 to $10 per barrel by the first week of April 1986. discussed. The chapter is then concluded with a few remarks about recent Indeed, real, that is the inflation-adjusted, prices were even lower, about $4 changes in the relations between the two nations and the prospect for the to $5 per barrel.