The Duc de Choiseul and the Invasion of England, 1768-1770 Author(s): Margaret Cotter Morison Source: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 4 (1910), pp. 83-115 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Royal Historical Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3678386 Accessed: 27-06-2016 04:30 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Cambridge University Press, Royal Historical Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Transactions of the Royal Historical Society This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 04:30:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE DUC DE CHOISEUL AND THE INVASION OF ENGLAND, 1768-1770 By MARGARET COTTER MORISON, F.R.Hist.S. Read November 16, 1909. WHEN the Seven Years' War was brought to a close in February 1763, France was too exhausted by a long series of defeats to do otherwise than acquiesce in the terms proposed by England. Those terms would undoubtedly have been harder had Pitt still remained in the Cabinet to direct the negotiations; and Lord Bute and his col- leagues incurred much abuse in England for not turning the recent brilliant victories to greater profit. Yet in France, though peace itself was welcome, the terms of the Treaty of Paris were looked upon as a deep national humiliation, and perhaps no one felt this more bitterly than the man who helped to negotiate it, viz. the Duc de Choiseul, for it meant the frustration of the hopes he had founded on the recently renewed Family Compact with Spain. Since his accession to power at the close of the year 1758, Choiseul had laboured with great patience and diplomacy to bring Spain into close union with France; this, after three years, he finally succeeded in doing by the famous Family Compact of August 1761, which was intended to unite the several houses of Bourbon in the closest alliance for mutual defence. In this treaty was a clause specially levelled against England (Article 8), and when that fact became known in this country, the English ministers, who in October 1761 had driven Pitt from office rather than allow him to declare war on Spain, were compelled to do so themselves in the following January 1762. It is well known that the results of that war were 83 G 2 This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 04:30:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 84 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY everywhere disastrous to Spain and brought fresh losses to France, so that by the autumn of 1762 both countries were earnest in desiring peace, and a treaty was ratified at Paris in February 1763. But though Choiseul looked upon peace as essential to his own country for the next few years, he had no thought of allowing the Treaty of Paris to be the final word between the two countries; the time gained by it was to be spent in nursing the resources of France in order to strike a fresh blow against England. He set to work to reorganise the army, to rebuild the navy, and encourage commerce; while abroad he endeavoured to strengthen French influence among foreign nations, and by so doing to bring about the comparative isolation of England. Spain and the Bourbon rulers in Italy were already pledged by the recent Family Compact to stand by France in almost any event. Austria still held by the policy of a French alliance, which had been begun by the Treaty of Versailles in 1756, and Choiseul thought it possible to strengthen this good feeling by suggesting the marriage of the Dauphin with a daughter of Maria Theresa. Frederic the Great, deeply offended with England for rushing so hastily into peace, was no longer so averse as formerly from a friendly understanding with France. Finally, by a liberal disbursement of French gold among the Diet of Sweden, Choiseul hoped to avert that which he always most dreaded, viz. an alliance of the Northern nations in which England would hold a pre- dominating influence. As he himself stated in a memoir addressed to Louis XV. in 1770, shortly before his fall: 'The Southern Alliance being thus firmly established for France, it was necessary in order to preserve peace, to prevent the formation of a Northern one in favour of England; for it would be a moral impossibility for Europe, divided thus into two great alliances, to preserve peace for very long.' The French navy was in a deplorable condition at the 1 Mdmoires of the Duc de Choiseul, printed at Chanteloup. This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 04:30:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms DUC DE CHOISEUL AND THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 85 close of the late war; it mustered only forty-four ships of the line and ten frigates, and of these more than half were unseaworthy. By 1765 Choiseul was able to inform the King that there were already sixty-three ships of the line and thirty-one frigates, and he hoped in 1769 to have eighty-four ships of the line and forty frigates, all fully manned and seaworthy.' In 1762 (according to the same memoire) the arsenals were empty, and there were no guns to give out to the troops had the army met with any considerable reverse. The artillery returned from Germany destitute of gun-carriages, and there was not even timber in the arsenals with which to replace them; yet energetic steps were being taken to repair all these deficiencies, and by 1768 Choiseul hoped that the worst would be overcome. Similarly the fortifications and harbours, which in 1763 were crumbling to ruins, had been taken in hand; Brest, Toulon, and Valenciennes, which during the war could have offered no resistance, would, according to Choiseul's estimate, by 1767, or 1768 at the latest, be in a state of thorough defence. It is clear from these statements that Choiseul antici- pated, within ten years of the late peace, being in a position once more to take the offensive; and this is precisely the information the English Ministry received, from one who had been accustomed for years to send them secret intelli- gence from the French court. This anonymous informer, whose letters in cypher reached Whitehall through George Cressener, the English representative at Cologne, in a long and interesting communication, dated January 5, 1767, wrote as follows: 'I am persuaded the King sincerely wishes peace, and that the plans formed by the Duc de Choiseul, and the steps taken in consequence, require his avoiding a war for a long time. Ships are built and building, to make a very formidable navy; but there are not sailors to man sixty ships of the line, and many of them are only boatmen. As commerce increases it will make sailors, but even that is a work of time; so that every- thing contributes to oblige and make desirable the continuance 1 Mdmoire justificatif prIsentd au Roi par Choiseul en 1765. This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 04:30:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 86 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY of peace, as necessary to France and to him. In some years, when the debts are diminished, it is certain subsidies will be granted to such Courts as may be of most use; at present the augmentation of the fleet is the chief object. If Spain acts in concert with this Court, it is computed the combined fleets in a very few years will be stronger than the English fleet. His (i.e. Choiseul's) influence at the court of Spain is great and very probably will last as long as the King of Spain lives, so your court must look on France and Spain as one Crown. I have some reason to believe the present plan is to obtain a superiority at sea and to avoid a war till that is done; some extraordinary event may make him deviate from this, otherwise by choice the peace will last at least nine years. If the commerce in that time increases as much as he hopes, there will then be such a number of sailors as will enable him to execute whatever he has in view.' There can be little doubt that the plans which Choiseul had in view, as soon as the resources of France would enable him once more to take the offensive, were to make a direct and sudden attack upon England. This was a scheme which from its very nature would strongly appeal to the brilliant French statesman, but there was also much sound policy to recommend it. France had not recovered sufficiently to contend with England in a long drawn out war; neither her finances nor her military resources were equal to a sustained effort; but in a short and vigorous attack upon her neighbour, there lay some possibility of success. Choiseul was, of course, familiar with the details of previous expeditions against England, particularly with the unfortunate attempt of his predecessors in office in the years 1744 and 1745, but he held no high opinion of their tactics.