Chapter 14. Assessing El Salvador’s Transition From Civil War to Peace Charles T. Call (from Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, & Elisabeth Cousens, Ending Civil Wars, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 2002) In January 1992, the leadership of the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the negotiating team of the right-wing Salvadoran government, joined at the last minute by President Alfredo Cristiani, signed a peace accord ending twelve years of civil war in El Salvador. Many analysts consider El Salvador’s transition from civil war to peace among the most successful implementations of a peace agreement in the post-Cold War period. Following the signing of the peace accord, the agreed-upon cease-fire between the two sides was never broken. Two years later, the guerrilla forces were demobilized and reconstituted as a political party, significant demilitarization of society and the state had taken place, and “founding” elections were held. In the mid-1990s the former guerrillas became the second most powerful party in the country. One study of post-civil war agreement elections rates El Salvador’s 1994 presidential and legislative elections as the only free and fair elections carried out without crises or contested results.1 The peace accords provided a catalyst for the incipient institutionalization of democracy in El Salvador. Despite the existence of elected civilian rule since 1984, sweeping institutional reforms negotiated as part of the accords permitted the country for the first time to be considered a procedural democracy.2 The United Nations played an important role throughout the negotiation and the implementation of El Salvador’s peace accords. The United Nations served first as the mediator between the two sides, then as the verifier of a series of peace agreements, and finally as “institution-builder” and reconstruction-agent through its coordination of financial and technical assistance. Although the principal “implementers” of the Salvadoran peace accord were the two 544 parties to the agreement -- the Salvadoran government and the FMLN -- the United Nations played a prominent and perhaps determinant role in the implementation process. The U.N.’s role in El Salvador was unprecedented in many respects: it was involved in the resolution of an internal conflict from start to finish; it emphasized human rights verification as an element of U.N. peacekeeping; it deployed U.N. observers before a cease-fire was in place; and, above all, it aimed at preventing future conflict through institution-building or “peacebuilding.”3 To what extent is El Salvador’s successful transition to peace the result of these unprecedented efforts by external verifying actors? In this chapter, I make two arguments. First, based upon the Salvadoran case, I argue that the character of a conflict and the conditions that facilitate its termination are at least as important as the role of implementing actors. More specifically, the class-based nature of the conflict, the presence of a strategic stalemate between the parties, the number and cohesion of the parties, the changing nature of the international environment and the shifting interests of major international actors all converged to foster a political will and capability for a negotiated settlement whose character facilitated successful implementation. In the Salvadoran case, the United Nations and other implementing parties made important contributions to implementation of the peace accords. However, analyzing the choices and strategies of the United Nations and other international implementers without tying them back to the conditions of the war and the process of negotiation would be misleading. Second, I show that El Salvador’s transition from civil war to peace was highly contested, and that the “success” of the Salvadoran peace process was not without important shortcomings or qualifications. These shortcomings do not mitigate the important achievements of the peace process; indeed, to a large degree the flaws of the process stem from the very same conditions that led to the agreement and paved the way to peace, political democratization, improved human Charles T. Call, "Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace." Chapter 14 in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (eds.) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. www.reinner.com 545 rights, and strengthened state institutions and legitimacy. However, the nature of the conflict and the negotiated agreement shaped the process of implementation in ways that continue to constrain “success.” Nature and Consequences of the Conflict In one of the few statements with which his leftist opponents agreed, President Cristiani stated in 1992 that the cause of El Salvador’s war lay in the absence of democratic political space and the lack of economic hopes in a country characterized by exclusion and authoritarianism.4 Civil war was rooted in class and ideological, rather than religious or ethnic, divisions, in an economic system whereby a small number of landed elites controlled the state in alliance with a powerful military. Despite the holding of periodic elections under a formal constitution between 1948 and 1979, authoritarianism reigned in El Salvador. The military guaranteed stability and order for the elite, and received resources and autonomy in exchange.5 Although five main guerrilla opposition groups had been formed by 1979, their disparate efforts did not pose a threat to the state -- and the situation did not constitute civil war -- until 1979 and 1980. Spurred by a desire to avoid an experience like Nicaragua’s July 1979 revolution and emboldened by U.S. support for reform, a group of junior officers executed a coup in October that resulted in a “Revolutionary Governing Junta” whose progressive members startled military hardliners and conservative elites. The junta, promising an era of openness and social and economic reforms, dissolved the National Democratic Organization (ORDEN), the paramilitary spy network, and the Salvadoran Security Agency (ANSESAL), a state intelligence agency involved in running ORDEN’s death-squad activities. However, death-squad killings and disappearances increased as the military showed its unwillingness to heed the junta.6 As the Charles T. Call, "Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace." Chapter 14 in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (eds.) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. www.reinner.com 546 junta’s lack of effective control over the armed forces became apparent, the more leftist members of the junta resigned in disillusionment, and a second junta gave way to a third in March 1980.7 A record number of political murders -- over 1,000 per month -- were recorded in 1980. Although kidnappings and killings by guerrilla groups increased, the bulk of these killings were conducted by right-wing death squads and the security forces, including the assassination of the country’s Archbishop, Oscar Arnulfo Romero, in March 1980.8 The military's wave of repression deepened polarization in the country, which strengthened and unified the armed and unarmed opposition. In 1980 the five guerrilla groups -- the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Communist party's Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), the National Resistance (RN) and the Workers Revolutionary Party (PRTC) -- formed the FMLN, which, despite internal tensions, would remain a united armed opposition until after the war. The government's repression focused principally upon peasant, worker, and Catholic church organizations associated with reform efforts rather than on the guerrilla combatants. Many members of these organizations joined the ranks of the FMLN, and in May 1980 almost all of the important leftist and centrist popular organizations and political parties formed a large coalition called the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR),9 which quickly formed an alliance with the FMLN that would last throughout the war. Between 1980 and 1983 the FMLN’s forces operated in rural areas in large units of dozens or even hundreds, driving the armed forces from what became known as FMLN “control zones.”10 From 1983 through the end of the war, the FMLN operated mainly in smaller units with a highly political strategy aimed at consolidating its support among the population through the provision of education and health services and the establishment of local “popular” governments. Charles T. Call, "Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace." Chapter 14 in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (eds.) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. www.reinner.com 547 The guerrillas’ relationship with popular organizations proved indispensable to its strength and strategy. The FMLN’s military ranks numbered about 12,300 at the war’s end.11 The United States played a decisive role in the conflict. When the FMLN was on the verge of winning the war in 1983, materiel provided by the United States helped prevent the government's collapse. Military aid per fiscal year rose from $6 million in 1980 to $35 million in 1981 to $197 million in 1984, staying between $80 million and $137 million per year for the remainder of the war.12 U.S. officials promoted the drafting of a new constitution in 1983, and pumped $1.8 million into the 1984 elections to ensure the victory of Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte, subsequently, using the centrist image of Duarte to convince a skeptical U.S. Congress to permit the provision of $1.2 million per day into the war against the FMLN. 13 All told, U.S. economic aid from 1980 to 1991 totaled $3.15 billion, and military aid totaled $1.1 billion.14 The government’s military strategy was rooted in isolating the FMLN from its logistical and arms supplies and attacking the civilian population perceived to be the support base for the guerrillas, a strategy that ultimately failed, though the armed forces gained experience and improved their fighting capability.