Political Science International Institutions Yukari Iwanami 330 Harkness Hall [email protected] Office Hours: TBA Course Description This course will address questions such as why international organizations exist, whether they affect the behavior of states, how members’ domestic factors affect the decision-making process of an organization, and how power differences among states influence policy implementation of an international organization. The ultimate goal is to help students form their own opinions on the roles of formal organizations in international politics, the influence of major powers on interna- tional organizations, and their problems and limitations. We will read existing literature ranging from traditional approaches to empirical analyses, and focus on the problem of cooperation under anarchy, availability of outside options and lack of enforcement power, the issues of delegation, and the effects of voting rules and organizational membership on the decision-making process. Required Books • Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, 1984 • Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons eds. International Institutions. MIT Press, 2001 1 Introduction • J. Martin Rochester. 1986. “The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” International Organization 40(4), 777-813 • Cheryl Shanks, Harold K. Jocobson, and Jeffrey H. Kaplan, Inertia and Change in the Con- stellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992, in Martin and Simmons 1 2 Problems under Anarchy This section addresses problems inherent in world politics. We discuss issues such as collective action problem, availability of outside options, power differences among states, and lack of en- forcement power. • Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, chapter 1 and 2 • Garrett Hardin, 1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, 1243-48 • Eric Voeten, 2001, “Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action”, American Political Science Review, 95, 845-858 • James D. Fearon, 1998, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” Interna- tional Organization, 52 (2), 269-305 3 Theoretical Approaches This section introduces students to theoretical approaches on international institutions. • Randall Schweller and David Priess, 1997, “A Tale of Two Realisms: Explaining the Insti- tutions Debate,” International Studies Review, • John Mearsheimer, 1994-95, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19, 5-49 • Robert O. Keohane, 1988, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, International Stud- ies Quarterly, 32, 4, 379-396 • Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” International Organization, 52 (4) 729-757 • Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization, 41, 3, 491-517 4 Cooperation under Anarchy In this section, we examine how institutions help states overcome problems in international politics and achieve cooperation among them. • Kenneth Oye, 1985, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World politics, 38, 1-24 • Robert Keohane, 1984, After Hegemony, Chapter 3-6 2 • Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 1986, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy, Princeton University Press, 226-254 • John G. Ruggie, 1992, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, International Orga- nization, 46 (3) • Lisa Martin, 1992, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, in Martin and Simmons 5 Formal International Organizations 5.1 Overview In this section, we closely look at the roles of formal international organizations in international relations. We examine the effect of voting and membership on decision-making process, issues of delegation, and the limitations of formal organizations. We also address historical and existing international organizations, including the League of Nations, the United Nations, NATO, and so forth. • Inis Claude, 1966, Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations, International Organization 20 (3), 367-79 • Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms, in Martin and Sim- mons • Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 1998, Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, 3-32 • Alexander Thompson, 2006, Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission, International Organization 60, 1-34 5.2 Institutional Structures This subsection explores institutional structures, such as voting and membership, and how they affect the outcome of decision making. • Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, 2001, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization, 55 (4) 761-799 5.3 Issues of Delegation This subsection addresses issues of delegation by exploring how they affect the implementation of policies. 3 • Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, Introduction, in Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney eds., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, 2006, Cambridge University Press, New York, 3-38 • Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney, 2003, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform,” International Organization 57 (2), 241-76. 5.4 Limitations • Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art and an Art of the State, in Martin and Simmons • Giulio M. Gallarotti, The Limits of International Organization: Systematic Failure in the Management of International Relations, in Martin and Simmons • Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of Interna- tional Organizations, in Martin and Simmons 6 Compliance In this section, we discuss states’ compliance behavior with international norms and the roles of international institutions in enhancing their compliance. • Beth A. Simmons, 1998, “Compliance with International Agreements,” American Review of Political Science, 1, 75-93 • Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, 1993, On Compliance, in Martin and Simmons • George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, 1996, “Is the Good News About Compli- ance Good News About Cooperation?” in Martin and Simmons • Michael J. Gilligan, 2006, “Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime,” International Organization, 60 (4), 935-967 • George W. Downs, and Michael A. Jones, 2002, “Reputation, Compliance, and International Law,” Journal of Legal Studies, 31 98-114 7 Domestic Politics and International Institutions This section explores relations between domestic politics and international institutions. • Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., 1996, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (4), 451-479 4 • Judith Goldstein, “International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the Leberalization of International Trade,” in Anne O. Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization, University of Chicago Press, 1998, 133-152 • Songying Fang, 2008, “The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics,” American Journal of Political Science, 52 (2) 304-321 8 Peacekeeping Forces In this section, we examine the principle of domestic noninterference, the effect of peacekeeping operations and their limitations. • Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 2000, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoreti- cal and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review, 94 (4), 779-801 • Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, 2003, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?” In- ternational Studies Review, 5 (4), 37-54 • Virginia Page Fortna, 2004a, “Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace, International Studies Quarterly, 48, 269-292 • Virginia Page Fortna, 2004b, “Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects, World Politics, 56, 481-519 • Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti, 2008, “Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3, 89-122 9 Human Rights Regimes Finally, we examine the formation and the effect of human rights regimes. • Andrew Moravcsik, 2000, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” International Organization, 54 (2), 217-252 • James Raymond Vreeland, 2008, “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictator- ships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture,” International Organiza- tion, 62, 65-101 • Oona A. Hathaway, 2002, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Jour- nal, 111, 1935-2041 • Eric Neumayer, 2005, “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 6, 925-953 5.