NIHILISM AND ARGUMENTATION: A WEAKLY PRAGMATIC DEFENSE OF AUTHORITATIVELY NORMATIVE REASONS Scott Simmons A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2020 Committee: Michael Weber, Advisor Verner Bingman Graduate Faculty Representative Christian Coons Molly Gardner Sara Worley ii ABSTRACT Michael Weber, Advisor Global normative error theorists argue that there are no authoritative normative reasons of any kind. Thus, according to the error theory, the normative demands of law, prudence, morality, etc. are of no greater normative significance than the most absurd standards we can conceive of. Because the error theory is a radically revisionary view, theorists who accept it only do so because they maintain the view is supported by the best available arguments. In this dissertation, I argue that error theory entails that it is impossible that there are successful arguments for anything, thus defenses of error theory are in tension with the view, itself. My argument begins with the observation that it is natural to think a successful argument is one that gives us an authoritative normative reason to believe its conclusion. Error theory entails that there are no authoritative reasons to believe anything. What are arguments for error theory even supposed to accomplish? Error theorists may respond that their arguments are solely intended to get at the truth. I argue that this reply fails. One problem is that it cannot make sense of why in practice even error theorists still want evidence for the premises of sound arguments. Error theorists may try to capture the importance of evidence by appeal to our social norms or goals. I argue that this answer is indistinguishable from the view that our social practices or goals generate authoritative normative requirements. Thus, attempts to defend the coherence of arguing for error theory are either unacceptably revisionary or they are inconsistent with error theory. While this result is a problem for error theory, it seems consistent with highly relativistic accounts of normative authority. In the future, I plan to explore whether my core arguments can be extended to defend authoritative, universal scope normative requirements (e.g. of prudence and morality). iii To Colin Anderson and Caroline Christoff, whose years of mentorship and friendship have shaped my life in more ways than any of us know. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to many people for their support and guidance on this dissertation. I would like to thank my committee. Michael Weber helped me succinctly express and clarify my ideas. Christian Coons gave me powerful objections, and pressed me to never settle for less than my best work. Molly Gardner guided me in the development of the overall structure of this project and its individual chapters, and provided an endless fount of emotional support. Sara Worley gave me insightful feedback and critiques. A special thanks to Terence Cuneo. Before he joined my committee, Terence had already paved the way for this project. If I have succeeded in advancing this intellectual conversation, it is largely through his feedback and vision. Innumerable thanks are also in order to my communities, especially the Bowling Green State University Department of Philosophy. Thanks to my peers who helped me develop my writing and ideas. A special thanks to those of you who did so as part of our graduate student writing group: Ben Bryan, Alex Rosenberg, Jacob Sparks, Tatiana Gracyk, Marcus Schultz- Bergin, Vassiliki Leontis, and others. Our department colloquia offered an invaluable forum for feedback, and I thank all of you who attended one of my talks. Thanks to my senior peers for being both important role models and friends: Mark Wells, Jacob Sparks, David Faraci, Peter Jaworski, and others. While I thank everyone in the department for providing a fertile environment for philosophical discussion and growth, I want to call special attention to Stephen Dundon, Mark Herman, Colin Manning, and Will Lugar for providing such an environment at home, as my housemates. A special thanks also to Ryan Fischbeck for years of productive (and engaging) conversation. Thanks to Michael Bradie for his firm push for me to finish. Thanks to Margy DeLuca for all that she has done to make sure that this project (and myself) stay on track. Thanks to those philosophers who provided me with feedback at the 2019 session of the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress. v My deepest gratitude to my beloved Rebecca Schleider, for the innumerable ways in which she has shown me what a true partnership is like. Rebecca has edited my work for me, served as a sounding board, and generally astounds me with her care and compassion. Finally, thanks to me family—Michael, Alice and David Simmons—for making this whole thing possible. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER ONE: A NEW DEFENSE OF THE INCOHERENCE OBJECTION TO METANORMATIVE ERROR THEORY ............................................................................. 1 1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Introducing the Incoherence Objection ................................................................ 7 1.3 Metanormative Error Theory ............................................................................... 10 1.3.1 The relationship between moral error theory and metanormative error theory..................................................................................................... 28 1.4 My strategy for defending the Incoherence Objection ........................................ 30 1.4.1 Argumentation and Reasons: why argumentative success depends on reason giving ............................................................................................. 34 1.4.1.1 Mere Persuasion & Argumentative Persuasion ..................... 37 1.4.1.2 True Persuasion & True Argumentative Persuasion .............. 38 1.4.1.3 Sound Argumentative Persuasion .......................................... 38 1.5 Soundness Suffices and the Problem of Dialectical Fallacies ............................. 43 1.5.1 Against biting the bullet on begging the question: Epistemic Agency and Philosophical Skepticism ........................................................................ 48 1.5.2 Why biting the bullet on begging the question is inconsistent with error theorist’s own perspective ..................................................................... 50 1.5.2.1 Defense of No Easy Defeaters ............................................... 51 1.6 Soundness Suffices and the Technology of Truth-Seeking ................................. 60 vii 1.7 Objection & Response: do my arguments beg the question against Soundness Suffices?................................................................................................... 68 1.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 71 CHAPTER TWO: HOW SOUNDNESS SUFFICES UNDERMINES GENEALOGICAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................. 73 2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 73 2.1.1 Premise 1 background: genealogical debunking arguments ................. 74 2.1.2 Premise 1 background: epistemic miracles ........................................... 78 2.1.3 Defense of P1: why genealogical debunking arguments are still of some argumentative merit in epistemic miracle worlds ................................ 82 2.1.3.1 P1 and epistemic humility ...................................................... 85 2.1.4 Premise Two: if Soundness Suffices is adequately motivated, then given Soundness Suffices, debunking arguments are not at all successful in actual epistemic miracle worlds ................................................................. 86 2.2 Objections & Replies ........................................................................................... 98 2.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 103 CHAPTER THREE: FORMALITY’S FINE AND THE TOO MANY NORMS PROBLEM ............................................................................................................................. 105 3.1 Formality’s Fine: another way to resist the Incoherence Objection .................... 105 3.2 Against Formality’s Fine ..................................................................................... 112 3.2.1 Formality’s Fine and the Too Many Norms Problem ........................... 114 3.2.1.1 Defense of P1 ......................................................................... 115 3.2.1.2 Defense of P2 ......................................................................... 120 viii 3.2.1.3 Conclusion One: The Too Many Norms Problem defended . 123 3.2.1.4 Defense of P3 ......................................................................... 124 3.2.1.4.1 First Parallel: normative privileging ....................... 126 3.2.1.4.2 Second Parallel: practicality and action guidance .. 127 3.2.1.4.3 Third Parallel: the possibilities of error and internalizing the wrong norms ............................................... 127 3.2.1.4.4 Fourth Parallel: strikingly similar mind- dependent accounts ...............................................................