DiegoE.Machuca Does Pyrrhonism HavePractical or Epistemic Value? 1Introduction My purpose in this paper is to examine whether Pyrrhonian scepticism, as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’sextant works,has practical or epistemic value. More precisely, Iwould like to consider whether the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension of judg- ment (epochē)and undisturbedness (ataraxia)can be deemed to be of practical or epistemic value. By “practical” value Imean both moral value and prudential value. Moral value refers to moral rightness and wrongness; prudential value to per- sonal or social well-being.Hence, when Iask whether the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension and undisturbedness have practical value, Imean whether they make us behave in amannerthat is morallyright or wrong,and whether they allow us to attain those goals thatwould make it possible to live well. As for “epistemic” value, it ba- sicallyrefers to the values of attaining truth and avoiding error. Hence, when Iask whether the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension has epistemic value, Imean whether it allows us to attain truth and avoid error.Mymain focus will be the practical value of both suspension and undisturbedness, because this is the value thatscholars of an- cient philosophycritical of Pyrrhonism have emphasised. The reason for examining the epistemic value of suspension is thatdoing so will enable afuller assessment of the significance of Pyrrhonism as akind of philosophy, which is my primary concern. Iwill begin by brieflydescribing the states of suspension and undisturbedness and their connection, and by succinctlyconsideringsome objections to the effect that,despite claiming to suspend judgmentacross the board, Pyrrhonists actually hold anumber of beliefs. Thiswill provide the necessary framework for the subse- quent discussions. Iwill then criticallyengagewith interpreters who have called into question the practical value of undisturbedness and suspension. Next,Iwill ex- amine what the epistemic value of suspension might be.Iwillend by considering whether,from acontemporary vantage point,one must conclude that Pyrrhonism has no practical or epistemic value, and hence thatitisofnophilosophical interest.¹ This paper is asubstantially revised and expanded versionofanarticle originally publishedinDutch as “De praktische en epistemische waarde vanhet pyrronisme,” Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (2016): 73‒98. Fortheir comments, Iwould like to reiterate my thanks to the anonymous reviewer forthat journal and to Jan Willem Wieland, and to express my gratitude to the anonymous reviewer for the present volume. Sextus employs “sceptic” and “Pyrrhonist” (and their respective cognates) interchangeably. Iwill do the same. Iwill also follow him in usingthe term “dogmatist” to refer to anyone whomakes as- OpenAccess. ©2019 Diego E. Machuca, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. Unauthenticated https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-004 Download Date | 9/3/19 9:36 PM 44 DiegoE.Machuca 2Suspension and Undisturbedness When someone with even aslight familiarity with ancient Pyrrhonism thinks of it, two notions invariablycome to mind, namely, epochē and ataraxia. Thisisperfectly reasonable. Consider,for instance, the definition of scepticism that Sextus offers at the beginning of his best-known work, the Pyrrhonian Outlines: The sceptical [way] is an ability to set up oppositionsamong things that appear and things that arethoughtinany waywhatsoever,anability fromwhich we come,through the equipollencein the opposed objects and arguments,first to suspensionofjudgment and after that to undisturb- edness (PH 1.8).² At PH 1.10,Sextus defines equipollence or equal force(isostheneia)as“equality in respect of credibility and lack of credibility,sothatnone of the conflictingarguments takes precedence over anyotherasmore credible” (cf. PH 1.190,196,202); suspen- sion as “astandstill of the intellect owing to which we neither denynor affirm any- thing” (cf. PH 1.192, 196); and undisturbedness as “lack of perturbation and calmness of soul.” Undisturbedness is not onlythe mental state at which the Pyrrhonist has arrivedafter suspending judgment,but the goal thatprompted the Pyrrhonist-to- be to engageinphilosophical inquiry in the first place. Indeed, Sextus tells us that the hope of becomingundisturbed is the “causal principle” (i.e., the initial mo- tivation) of the sceptical philosophy(PH 1.12), and that so far the Pyrrhonist’saim is both undisturbedness in matters of opinion and moderation of affection (metriopa- theia)inthose thingsthat are unavoidable (PH 1.25,30; cf. PH 1.18, 215; 3.235). Ac- cording to Sextus’sdescription of the Pyrrhonist’sphilosophical itinerary (PH 1.12, 26,29; cf. AM 1.6), the Pyrrhonist-to-bewas disturbed by the variation (anōmalia) he found in both perceptual and intellectual appearances and was in astate of apo- ria as to which of them he should assent to. Forinstance, the same object appeared to him to have conflictingperceptual properties depending on different spatial and quantitative variables,orthe same moral view appearedtohim to be both convincing and unconvincing depending on the vantage point from which it was considered. To removethat state of disturbance, the Pyrrhonist undertook philosophical investiga- tion in order to determine which appearances are true and which are false. However, he was unable to do this owing to the seeming equipollence of the conflictingap- pearances,and so he suspended judgment.Tohis surprise, by suspendingjudgment he attained the state of undisturbedness that he was seeking all along—there being thus acontrast between the wayundisturbedness was initiallyexpected to be at- sertions about how things reallyare on the basis of what they regardasobjective evidenceand sound arguments. References to Sextus’sworks are supplied in parenthesis in the bodyofthe text,usingthe follow- ing abbreviations:PH(Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes), AM (Adversus Mathematicos), and AD (Adversus Dog- maticos =AM7‒11). All translations aremyown. Unauthenticated Download Date | 9/3/19 9:36 PM Does Pyrrhonism HavePracticalorEpistemic Value? 45 tained and the wayitwas in fact finally attained. Sextus emphasises that undisturb- edness has closelyfollowed suspension of judgment by chance (PH 1.26, 29) and as a shadow follows abody(PH 1.29). Sextusdoes not limit himself to reporting thatundisturbedness has in fact fol- lowed suspension. In the first and third booksofPH, and aboveall in Against the Ethicists (AD5=AM11), he also explains whyholding beliefs about how thingsreally are prevents one from becomingundisturbed,offering at the same time an account of how suspensionleadstoundisturbedness, and also to happiness. His explanation focuses exclusively on evaluative beliefs:the presenceofthe thingsone believes to be good and of those one believes to be bad produces perturbation. Forwhen a person lacks what he regards as good, on the one hand he intenselydesires to obtain it and, on the other,hethinks he is persecuted by thingsnaturallybad and restlessly tries to escape them. If he acquires what he considers to be good, he is nonetheless troubled both because he is irrationallyand immoderatelyelated and because he is afraid of losing it (PH 1.27,3.237,277;AD5.116‒17,146). Forthis reason, even when he is not directlydisturbed by the presenceofthose thingshedeems to be bad, he con- tinues to be troubled by his constantlyguardingagainst them (AD5.117,129). In ad- dition,those who believethat thingsare by nature good or bad are unhappy or can never attain happiness (AD5.111, 113,118, 130,144) inasmuchas“all unhappiness oc- curs because of some disturbance” (AD5.112; cf. 141). Unlikethe belief that thingsare by nature good or bad, suspension of judgment on the matter makes it possible to attain undisturbedness and happiness,and hencetolead asatisfactory life (PH 1.28;AD5.111,144,160,168;see alsoPH3.235;AD5.147,150), for thosewho suspend judgment “neither avoid nor pursue anything intensely” (PH 1.28). It should be noted that Sextus remarks thatundisturbedness supervenes upon suspension of judgment about all things(PH 1.31, 205; AD 5.144; cf. AD 5.160,168), which meansthat the at- tainment of undisturbedness has so far occurred onlywhen the sceptic has suspend- ed judgment about all the matters he has investigated—both thosethat concern val- ues and those that do not.The sceptic cannot of course rule out the possibility that others will attain undisturbednessbysuspending judgment onlyabout some beliefs, but givenhis past experience, it appears to him that undisturbedness will be attained onlywhen completesuspension is adopted.³ Despite what Sextus says in some of the passages just referred to,the Pyrrhonist is not free from all disturbance and hence cannot attaincompletehappiness, since not all disturbance is due to the intense pursuit of the thingsconsidered as good and the intense avoidance of the thingsconsidered as bad. Forthe Pyrrhonist is disturbed by certain thingsthat imposethemselvesupon him, such as thirst and hunger (PH Ihaveelsewhere argued that,inSextus’saccount of Pyrrhonism, one can identify three distinct causes of disturbanceconcerningmatters of opinion and that the holding of evaluative beliefs is the ultimatesource of doxastic disturbancebyreferencetowhich the other twocan be explained. See DiegoMachuca, “Sources of Doxastic DisturbanceinSextus Empiricus,” OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy 56 (2019). Unauthenticated Download Date | 9/3/19 9:36 PM 46 DiegoE.Machuca