Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds. JULY 2009 INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE Cover Photo: A view of Monrovia ABOUT THE EDITORS from a helicopter of the United Nations Mission in Liberia. CATY CLEMENT is Faculty Member and Co-Director for the December 13, 2008. ©UN New Issues in Security Course, Geneva Centre for Security Photo/Christopher Herwig Policy. Conference Photos: 2008 ©Elliot ADAM C. SMITH is Senior Program Officer at the Moscowitz - Elliot’s Images International Peace Institute. The views expressed in this paper represent those of the authors and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS rapporteurs and not necessarily those of IPI. IPI welcomes considera- The International Peace Institute (IPI) owes a great debt of tion of a wide range of perspectives gratitude to its many donors to the program Coping with in the pursuit of a well-informed Crisis, Conflict, and Change. In particular, IPI is grateful to debate on critical policies and issues the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, in international affairs. Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, IPI Publications Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Adam Lupel, Editor Ellie B. Hearne, Publications Officer Suggested Citation: Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., “Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations,” New York: International Peace Institute, July 2009. © by International Peace Institute, 2009 All Rights Reserved www.ipinst.org CONTENTS Meeting Note. 1 MANAGING COMPLEXITY: POLITICAL AND MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, rapporteurs Keynote Address . 14 MANAGING COMPLEXITY Alain Le Roy Discussion Papers . 19 “MOVING THE RAVIOLI AROUND”: MANAGING UN PEACE OPERATIONS IN A PERIOD OF CRISIS Richard Gowan 19 PLANNING FOR SUCCESS Cedric de Coning 24 LEADERSHIP ON THE LINE: MANAGING FIELD COMPLEXITY Pierre Schori 28 ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: MANAGING KNOWLEDGE Lise Morjé Howard 32 MANAGING TRANSITION: EXIT STRATEGIES AND PEACE CONSOLIDATION Richard Caplan 36 Annex ....................................... 40 CONFERENCE AGENDA 40 CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS 44 1 MEETING NOTE Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, rapporteurs EXECUTIVE SUMMARY responding to the highly unpredictable nature of “Overstretched,” “underresourced,” and “over- postconflict environments. Planning, due in large matched” are terms commonly used to describe UN part to the unique circumstances of each conflict, peacekeeping. The first is a result of the vast needs strong and sustained input from those in the number of conflicts the Security Council has field with the best knowledge of the situation on the chosen to address with peace operations. The ground. This field-based input must be sustained second is due to a lack of available specialized through the life of a mission because of changing equipment, highly trained personnel, and funds—a events on the ground, suggesting the need for a full- constraint compounded by global recession. The time, devoted field-planning officer or unit within final descriptor, “overmatched,” is, at least partly, a each peacekeeping operation (PKO). Planning consequence of the challenging, complex environ- must be coordinated on—at the very least—a ment in which the UN operates. The multiplicity of cursory level with the activities of the host govern- actors involved, the unpredictability of the environ- ment, bilateral donors, and nongovernmental ment, and the enormous obstacles to sustainable organizations (NGOs), and must address input peace all suggest a complexity through which the from ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes. UN—a large bureaucracy dependent on the will A second crucial aspect pertains to leadership, and capacity of its member states—is often which, like planning, is key to the success of unprepared to navigate. complex endeavors. To choose the right leadership In recent years, efforts to integrate UN organiza- for its peace operations, UN headquarters must tions and activities in the field, streamline decision inject more transparency into the SRSG (Special making, improve communication, and strengthen Representative of the Secretary-General) selection planning, monitoring, and evaluation processes, process, as well as give the individual SRSGs more implicitly acknowledged the challenges specific to room to hand select a complementary senior staff. complex operating environments. Management, as Most importantly, perhaps, the Special Repre- a field of study and of practice, attempts to do the sentative of the Secretary-General and his or her same: limit unpredictability, anticipate crisis and deputy bring coherence to the varied activities of response, improve efficiency, and measure and the UN mission, agencies, funds, and programs. He learn from the results to improve effectiveness. This or she works to overcome the structural and report, and the seminar on which it is based, resource challenges inherent in UN peace outlines the challenge of being “overmatched” by operations. To accomplish these goals, the SRSG complexity, while offering suggestions for must be provided with better analytical and understanding and dealing with complex environ- political support from headquarters and be given ments. clearer authority on budgeting and questions of conduct and discipline. Five key challenges, relating to planning, leader- ship, organizational complexity, interagency Third, flexibility and the capacity to adapt are cooperation, and exit strategies, were identified: essential to making missions effective. Managing a complex environment requires the ability to learn The first and possibly most important element of and adapt to changing circumstances and the a peace operation resides in its planning. Sound capacity to institutionalize those lessons learned planning processes are critical in forecasting and 2 MEETING NOTE into policies, procedures, and guidelines. INTRODUCTION Unfortunately, peacekeeping is at a structural UN peacekeeping celebrated its sixtieth birthday in disadvantage when it comes to organizational 2008. By the end of that year, more than 91,000 learning. Peace operations are temporary and ad uniformed personnel were serving in sixteen hoc by nature, contracts are often short term, peacekeeping missions. That number increases to training opportunities are limited, and, roughly 110,000 when local and international consequently, staff turnover is high. Exacerbating civilian staff are included.1 This second surge of UN this is the constant state of crisis and response that peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War equates typifies a peace operation in the field, making it to a more than six-fold increase from just a decade difficult to prioritize systematic learning. Dedicated ago. best-practice officers in every mission, increased In addition to the number, the scope of peace staff retention through harmonized conditions of operations has dramatically increased. service, defined career paths, and regularized Multidimensional peace operations can contain training would all assist the organizational learning more than twenty occupational sections, from process. administration and aviation, to civil affairs and Fourth, the UN does not operate alone in any security. Put simply, UN peace operations are environment, and in many ways, success or failure performing far more activities with many more depends less on the UN than on the other organiza- people and machines, and much more money than tional entities working around it. Regional organi- ever before. As the scale and scope increase, so does zations now operate side-by-side with the UN in the complexity of the terrain. Considering that some missions, while host governments, bilateral most of these tasks are performed by multiple donors, NGOs, international financial institutions, actors with varied goals in insecure environments and, often, spoilers together comprise the postcon- and tenuous political contexts, the challenge seems flict landscape. Success depends on the UN’s ability even more formidable. In a complex environment to leverage its partnerships with other organiza- predictability is low, unintended consequences are tions and groups, coordinate activities among many, and effectively organizing and managing them, bring spoilers into the political process, and resources becomes both more daunting and more enable and strengthen host governments. For this essential. to happen, a common strategic vision is required, The UN Secretariat and UN member states have developed in coordination with all key devoted substantial thought and effort to readying stakeholders. Some suggest that a broader compact UN peace operations for contemporary challenges. involving the major players at the UN—the Security The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Council, the Fifth Committee, and the troop- (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support contributing countries—as well as the international (DFS) have embarked on an agenda of reform financial institutions and other major actors, such involving several interrelated processes. The as regional organizations, is needed to support an guiding strategy of this agenda is based on “Peace operation from start to finish. Operations 2010,” which aims to clarify the policies Finally, to manage a successful exit, the handover