ALL OVERALL OVER AGAIN AGAINALL OVER AGAIN ALL OVERALL OVER AGAIN AGAINALL OVERALL OVER AGAIN AGAIN DéjàALL vu OVER all over AGAIN again ALL OVER AGAINALL OVER AGAIN ALL HoustonOVERALL T. Hawkins OVERAGAIN AGAIN ALL OVER AGAINALL OVERALL OVER AGAIN AGAIN ALL OVER AGAIN he Manhattan Project grew out necessary to make such anALL assess- OVERA team of scientists was AGAIN assem- of a chilling intelligence as- ment was so compartmentalized that bled at Los Alamos and charged Tsessment by scientists—many even Vice President Truman did not with providing the required assess- of whom would later work at Los know of the existence of our pro- ments and tracking of the Third Alamos—that the Third Reich was gram until he became president fol- Reich program. Relying on techni- ALL OVER AGAINactively pursuing the development of lowing the death of President Roo- cal literature published by the Ger- an atomic explosive. Indications sevelt. Albert Gore, Sr., who as a mans even in the throes of World were that researchALL was being carried OVERcongressman was AGAINtold by Speaker of War II, on information collected by ALLout by a team OVER headed by Werner AGAINthe House Sam Rayburn to hide mil- the AlsosALL Mission,2 and onOVER contacts AGAIN Heisenberg in the Reich Research lions of dollars in the budgetALL for a thatOVER a few Los Alamos scientists, AGAIN Council, which reported to Field “special project,” did not know or such as Niels Bohr, had had with Marshall Hermann Goering. Devel- dare ask about the project for which Heisenberg, the team determined opment of an atomic warhead for the the money was appropriated.1 that the Germans had grossly over- German V-2 rocket had the real po- Therefore, the function of assess- estimated the amount of highly-en- ALL OVER AGAINtential of changing the course—and ing the status of the Third Reich riched uranium required for an probably the outcome—ofALL the war .OVERprogram had to be AGAINtransferred to Los atomic explosive and had overesti- ALLTracking OVERthe Third Reich program AGAINAlamos because only scientists actu- mated the thermal-neutron cross sec- instantly became the single most im- ally working on our atomic-explo- tion of graphite. The team suggest- portant intelligence task for the sive project had the requisite clear- ed that the Germans would possibly United States and Great Britain. ances and knowledge to make the pursue heavy water in lieu of Unfortunately, when the question of crucial judgements demanded by the graphite as the neutron moderator in the status of the Third Reich atomic- enormity of the threat. their plutonium-production reactor. explosive program was posed to the Office of Special Services (OSS)— 1Private communication, 1986. Senator Albert 2The Alsos Mission was established by General Gore, Sr., said that money for the Manhattan Pro- Leslie Groves within his Intelligence Department the forerunner of the Central Intelli- ject was dispersed throughout the federal budget. to collect information on German nuclear- gence Agency—the probable re- He had no idea what the money was for until he physics programs. The mission operated within sponse from General Donovan, the read about the use of the atomic bomb in Japan. European areas liberated by Allied Forces. For He opined that the project was possible only be- more information about the Alsos Mission, see head of the OSS, was, “What is an cause of the trust and discipline that existed in the Alsos by Samuel A. Goudsmit (Henry Schuman, atomic explosive?” Information House of Representatives at that time. Inc., 1947). 70 Los Alamos Science Number 21 1993 Déjà Vu All Over Again As a result, the heavy-water plants deployment of U.S. military forces and high operating costs. However, in Nazi-occupied Norway were tar- and compounded by the dearth of in- the technique had provided top prod- geted for destruction by the Royal formation available on the Iraqi nu- uct enrichment for the uranium used Air Force and British commandos. clear-weapons program. However, in the “Little Boy” device. There was some uncertainty as to before U.S. forces landed in Saudi Considering the size of the Iraqi whether the Germans had knowledge Arabia, the U.S. intelligence commu- nuclear-weapons program, had the of the use of plutonium in atomic nity, relying heavily on assessments Iraqi invasion of Kuwait not oc- explosives or even knew of its exis- from Los Alamos and Livermore na- curred and had that invasion not pre- tence. Therefore the destruction of tional laboratories, had reached a cipitated a military response by the the heavy-water plants was only general consensus that the Iraqis Allies, Iraq probably would today added insurance that the Third Reich were still within several months to a possess material for one or more nu- never would be able to develop a year of having a nuclear weapon. clear weapons, forever altering the plutonium-production capability. Barring the diversion of highly-en- strategic situation in the politically Inspection of German facilities riched uranium from their research volatile Middle East. after the war by intelligence officers reactors at Tuwaitha, the Iraqis prob- Since Desert Storm, Los Alamos indicated that the Los Alamos team ably did not possess enough plutoni- scientists have served on several in- had provided very accurate assess- um or enriched uranium to actually spection teams under United Nations ments of the Third Reich effort. Ac- build a nuclear weapon. Moreover, sponsorship and have played a sig- cording to Samuel A. Goudsmit, his- inspections by the International nificant role in developing our un- torian of the Alsos Mission, because Atomic Energy Agency found the re- derstanding of the scope and nature of the lack of progress and direction, actor fuel still in place. of the Iraqi program to build nuclear support for Heisenberg’s efforts by However, our assessment of the weapons. Currently, as part of an the Third Reich had waned substan- status of the Iraqi program—although ongoing effort, the Laboratory is tially about the same time that our technically accurate—proved more heavily involved in developing new program was going into high gear. an example of good fortune than an nonproliferation-monitoring meth- example of good intelligence. Un- ods and negotiating more effective n 1990, as American troops were known to us at the time our assess- agreements on dual-use technolo- Ibeing assembled for deployment to ment was made was the sheer magni- gies. This process goes on today. the Persian Gulf, we were again con- tude of the nuclear-weapons program The major lesson learned in fronted with the chilling prospect being carried out by the Iraqis—in Desert Storm is that because of the that a despotic regime was on the violation of the Nonproliferation growing availability of plutonium verge of acquiring one or more nu- Treaty—under the cover organization and enriched uranium throughout the clear weapons. Like Adolf Hitler, Petro Chemical 3 (PC-3). world and because of the prolifera- Saddam Hussein—the regime's Borrowing the technology behind tion of nuclear-weapons know-how, ruler—had already demonstrated a the “calutrons” developed early in the we cannot afford to enter future con- capability to deliver weapons of Manhattan Project, PC-3 had built an flicts blind to the realities of any nu- mass destruction3 and had demon- enrichment facility and was in the clear-weapons programs in the area strated a resolve to use such weapons process of separating weapon quanti- of conflict. We cannot have any fu- even against his own people. In the ties of highly-enriched uranium. In ture déjà vu interrupted with an in- words of Yogi Berra, “It was déjà vu essence, these separators, which the opportune flash of blue light. It is all over again.” Iraqis called Baghdadtrons, were this realization that has provided the Coming to grips with that large mass spectrometers capable of real spur to nonproliferation initia- prospect was a frantic process made deflecting uranium ions of differing tives and programs within the DOE all the more urgent by the impending masses into graphite collectors. The and other federal agencies. basic technology, called electromag- 3Interestingly, the Iraqui AL ABBAS and AL netic isotope separation, had been HUSSAIN missiles were derivatives of the Sovi- abandoned by the U.S. as a means of Houston T. Hawkins is leader of the Laboratory’s et SCUD missile that was, in turn, a derivative of International Technology Division. He joined the the Third Reich’s WASSERFALLEN surface-to- separating large amounts of uranium Laboratory in 1988 after twenty-five years of ser- air missile. because of its relative inefficiency vice in the U.S. Air Force. 1993 Number 21 Los Alamos Science 71.