City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 9-2018 The Fragmented Mind: Working Memory Cannot Implement Consciousness Javier Gomez-Lavin The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2755 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] THE FRAGMENTED MIND: WORKING MEMORY CANNOT IMPLEMENT CONSCIOUSNESS by JAVIER GOMEZ-LAVIN A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2018 © 2018 JAVIER GOMEZ-LAVIN All Rights Reserved Unless Otherwise Noted i The Fragmented Mind: Working memory cannot implement consciousness by Javier Gomez-Lavin This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ____________________ ____________________________________________ Date Eric Mandelbaum Chair of Examining Committee ____________________ ____________________________________________ Date Nickolas Pappas Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Jesse Prinz Eric Mandelbaum Shaun Nichols John Greenwood Felipe De Brigard THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK ii ABSTRACT The Fragmented Mind: Working memory cannot implement consciousness by Javier Gomez-Lavin Advisor: Jesse Prinz In both philosophy and the sciences of the mind there is a shared commitment to the idea that there is a center— the seat of consciousness, the source of deliberation and reflection, and the core of personal identity —in the mind. My dissertation challenges this deeply entrenched view. I review the empirical literature on working memory, psychology’s best candidate for the workspace of the mind, and argue that it is not a natural kind and cannot inform these central cognitive processes. This deflationary view directly imperils many naturalistic theories of consciousness that rely on working memory, which are reviewed in this project. This dissertation thus serves as the necessary first negative step required to begin the process of articulating socially-embedded accounts of many central cognitive processes that dominate the contemporary philosophical literature, including consciousness and reasoning. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Taking a minute to put some distance between myself and these last six years of graduate school, and nearly twelve years of higher education (with some small gaps interspersed in there and helpfully smoothed out by Tad Zawidski)—I am overwhelmed thinking about all the people who have contributed their time, resources, and mental and physical energy to ensure that I would be well prepared to, if not succeed by the discipline’s metrics, at least make a damn good go of this philosophy thing. Somehow—at least in this moment, standing on the precipice of another large transition, it’s worked! I owe the existence of this dissertation, and these opportunities before me that will allow me to continue my philosophical work, to all my mentors, peers, colleagues, friends and family that have not only put up with me, but have truly lifted me to where I am today. First, I must thank my incredibly supportive advisor, Jesse Prinz, who since he first attended a talk I gave as an undergraduate at the SSPP in Savannah, has tirelessly encouraged me and pushed me to generate new ideas, engage with philosophical issues from outside of my training, and taught me to silence my own self-doubt. Jesse has given me a model of what systematic, empirically informed, globally and historically situated philosophy can look like and just what it can achieve. Jesse dedicated the book that I have been grappling with for a while, The Conscious Brain , to Eary—a charming squirrel with a unique character. Working closely with Jesse over the last six years has shown me the depth of his empathy and compassion for creatures like Eary and me who don’t quite fit the mold of their more hylomorphic peers, and I am beyond proud to be called one of his students. Jesse, and everyone on this committee has contributed to one or more of the varied projects and interests that were formative of my philosophical training and, I hope, my own eventual contributions to the field. Sharing—to some extent—a College of Charleston background, Shaun iv Nichols not only supported me through the challenging trial and error experience of managing a large grant for the first time in my career, but has made me a far clearer thinker and better presenter (and I am sure he’ll have lots of excisions to recommend for future versions of the work contained in this dissertation). Because of Shaun and our experience presenting together in Norman, Oklahoma, I now know just how to distill a jumble of data and its implications into a single, coherent and clear point—an experience for which I am forever grateful. Eric Mandelbaum has been a second advisor to me, seemingly able to respond in an instant to calm my nerves, or return detailed feedback, or guide me through the difficult realities of the market. If I could move between an endless knowledge of detailed psychological studies to abstract conceptual debates even half as well as Eric, I will have far outstripped my own goals—and likely, my own capacities. John Greenwood has been looking out for and motivating my philosophical habits since before my first day at the Graduate Center. If it weren’t for John’s profound knowledge of how philosophy works at the institutional level and at CUNY, I likely would not have managed to stay in the program; and if it weren’t for John’s constant prodding, well then, I probably wouldn’t have much to show for my time here, either! Felipe de Brigard has served as my consistent neuroscientific foil— helping to keep my more excited claims in check, and without his sound advice I likely would have lost touch with my neuroscientific roots. Likewise, I am thankful for the time and energies of a whole slew of other professors and mentors at CUNY who haven’t minded my incessant intrusions, one-too-many incompletes, and constant stops to chat in their offices; my thoughts especially turn to Graham Priest and our fun conversations on topics ranging from the Ring Cycle to Meinong, Noel Carroll who has persuaded me to bring philosophy to bear on my aesthetic interests, Iakovos Vasiliou who taught me to love the chewing-on-sand-like quality of Aristotle, and of course Nickolas Pappas whose sage advice v and genuine compassion kept my mind afloat through the worst of the market season. My thanks also go out to David Rosenthal, whose many classes and caring mentorship have served as a cannon of my philosophical formation at CUNY. I have also been very lucky to have met and worked with many emerging scholars and other faculty who have provided substantial feedback on drafts of much of my work. In particular, I’d like to thank Joe McCaffery, Cameron Buckner, Manolo Martínez, Evan Westra, Dan Burnston, two anonymous reviewers, and Lisa Miracchi for their helpful comments on various parts of the dissertation. My colleagues at CUNY and beyond, particularly Matthew Rachar, Veronika Rachar, Shawn Simpson, Tyler Wilson, Matteo Ravasio, John Dyck, Jules Salomone, Nicholas Porot, Joanna Smolenski, Dana Grabelsky, and Julia Kolak, have also been a crucial support for me—buying a few rounds along the way!—over these past six years. During my graduate career, I’ve been fortunate enough to have had the opportunity to travel to and be a visiting researcher or lecturer at Georgetown University, and the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin School of Mind and Brain, and the College of Charleston. These have been formative experiences for me, and I am so grateful to all those who have helped make these appointments a reality. First, a special thanks to Bryce Huebner for hosting me at Georgetown as his visiting student in the Fall of 2016—and for the many delicious office-espressos brewed. Of course, I must thank Joerg Fingerhut who has been an unwavering champion of me and my work for the last three years—even when I probably didn’t quite deserve it (I promise I will get better at Slack, Joerg). Without Joerg’s consistent support, I would not have had the opportunity to meet a whole group of scholars in Berlin from whom I’ve learned so much over these past few years. In particular, Michael Pauen’s colloquium series has been a constant fixture of my stays in Berlin and I’m very thankful of the rigorous feedback I received having presented there a handful vi of times; especially from Richard Moore, Gina Eickers, Astrid Schom, Lena Kaestner, Nastasia Mueller, Dimitri Mollo and, of course, Michael. I’m also indebted to the hard work of our student workers, particularly Felix Binder and Claudia Winklmayr, and to the compassion and understanding of my labmate, Maurício Martins. Having had the opportunity to return and teach at my former undergraduate institution was both an eye-opening and heartwarming experience. Coming out of my mold and teaching a new preparation at a new institution was both a fun and challenging experience, and I’m thankful for all the help I had to get me on my feet and ensure a smooth process; especially from Todd Grantham, Kate Kenney-Newhard, Jennifer Baker, and Larry Krasnoff. Further reflecting on my time as a student at the College, I realize just how much of an impact my undergraduate mentors had on my thinking.