This Page Intentionally Left Blank The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap US-Taiwan Business Council October 1, 2012 This report was published in October 2012 by the US-Taiwan Business Council. The Council is a non-profit, member-based organization dedicated to developing the trade and business relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Members consist of public and private companies with business interests in Taiwan. This report serves as one way for the Council to offer analysis and information in support of our members’ business activities in the Taiwan market. The publication of this report is part of the overall activities and programs of the Council, as endorsed by its Board of Directors. However, the views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of individual members of the Board of Directors or Executive Committee. 2012 US-Taiwan Business Council The US-Taiwan Business Council has the sole and exclusive rights to the copyrighted material contained in this report. Use of any material contained in this report for any purpose that is not expressly authorized by the US-Taiwan Business Council, or duplicating any or part of the material for any purpose whatsoever, without the prior written consent of the US-Taiwan Business Council, is strictly prohibited and unlawful. 1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1703 Arlington, Virginia 22209 Phone: (703) 465-2930 Fax: (703) 465-2937 [email protected] www.us-taiwan.org Edited by Lotta Danielsson Printed in the United States The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ...................................................................................................................................... i Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 Threat Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 3 Learning from Our Lessons ........................................................................................................................... 3 The Missile Threat ......................................................................................................................................... 5 Potential Limitations ....................................................................................................................... 6 PLA Air Force Gaining Ground ..................................................................................................................... 8 Role of China’s Air Defense System ................................................................................................ 9 The PLA and Coercion ................................................................................................................................. 10 Taiwan Lives with Coercion .......................................................................................................... 11 Countering the Threat ............................................................................................................... 13 Air Defenses ..................................................................................................................................................13 Combat Air Patrol ...........................................................................................................................13 Defensive Counter-Air ....................................................................................................................13 Maritime Strike/Anti-Invasion .................................................................................................... 14 Passive Defenses ........................................................................................................................................... 15 Active Missile Defenses ................................................................................................................................ 17 Counter-Strike .............................................................................................................................................. 18 The Lack of U.S. Support for Counter-Strike Options ................................................................ 19 The Fighter Gap ......................................................................................................................... 21 The F-16A/B Upgrade ...................................................................................................................................21 The Upgrade Falls Short ............................................................................................................... 24 The Need Remains for New Fighters .......................................................................................................... 25 The Looming Numerical Shortfall ................................................................................................ 25 Impact on Training and Pilot Quality ......................................................................................................... 30 F-5 LIFT Retirement .......................................................................................................................31 Meeting Taiwan’s Air Defense Requirements ............................................................................ 35 The F-35 Conundrum .................................................................................................................................. 36 A Political Dilemma ................................................................................................................... 37 The Effect of Chinese Coercion in Washington .......................................................................................... 37 Congressional Support ................................................................................................................................ 39 What Will It Take? ....................................................................................................................................... 40 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 43 2012 US-Taiwan Business Council www.us-taiwan.org The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 45 Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................... 45 Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................ 49 TABLES & FIGURES Table 1: Chinese Intimidation Using Aerospace Assets .............................................................. 11 Table 2: Estimated Fighter Numbers Through 2023 ................................................................. 27 Figure 1: Estimated Fighter Numbers Through 2023 ................................................................ 28 2012 US-Taiwan Business Council www.us-taiwan.org The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap FOREWORD The US-Taiwan Business Council is committed to providing our members and the broader policy-making community with political, economic, and strategic insight into American interests in our relationship with Taiwan. It is part of our continuing efforts to offer value-added benefits to all our member companies, as well as to all those who are active in the bilateral relationship. In the period after the September 2011 notification to Congress of an upgrade program for Taiwan’s existing fleet of 145 F-16A/B fighters, the messaging from both Washington and Taipei would have us believe that this had been the intent for Taiwan’s air force modernization all along – for Taiwan to choose between upgrading its F-16A/Bs or to purchase new F-16C/Ds. Following this line of thinking, the upgrade program announcement in 2011 addressed all of Taiwan’s air power needs for the foreseeable future. This is simply not the case. Over the past decade and more, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force has made significant qualitative and quantitative improvements to its fighter fleet, a challenge that is driving Taiwan’s requirement for a robust and modern fighter force. Despite the clear need for more and modern aircraft, that Taiwan requirement was immediately plunged into the political realm in 2006 when the administration of former President George W. Bush refused to accept Taiwan’s Letter of Request (LOR) for 66 new F-16 C/Ds. Since 2006, Taiwan’s air defense requirement has served as a political football for the Bush, Hu Jintao, Barack Obama, and Ma Ying-jeou governments – with all four jockeying in an attempt to come out on top. As it stands right now, it is clear that the Chinese position has prevailed. Using its political and economic clout, China seems to have been able to persuade policy-makers in Washington that they have already done enough, and that no further action on the Taiwan fighter requirement is needed. Taiwan approaches the retirement of its F-5 fleet, and is facing declining availability for its Mirage 2000s and F-CK-1A/B Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs). By 2016, as Taiwan begins to withdraw portions of its existing F-16A/B fighter fleet for modernization under the upgrade program, Taiwan