FEBRUARY 2021 Whose Long Arm? Challenges Policy Brief to Understanding Turkish Diaspora Politics In October 2019, Turkey intervened in Turkish communities in European countries northern Syria, yet the effects were felt and intimidation of Gülen supporters. across Europe. As Turkey dispersed Kurdish militias and dismantled their fledgling This Clingendael policy brief seeks to explain administration, Kurdish protests against the these visible manifestations of Turkish Turkish offensive drew thousands of people politics in European cities. Why does Turkish onto European streets. In Rotterdam, they politics lead to unrest in Rotterdam and led to small but violent skirmishes, resulting Berlin and what institutional mechanisms in the detention of two dozen protesters facilitate this? The brief highlights various after clashes between Kurdish and Turkish drivers, institutional manifestations and protestors.1 In Berlin, the car of a Turkish historical changes, but also points out that diplomat was set on fire in a suspected there are a number of uncertainties and arson attack. In Nuremberg Kurdish questions about the motivations for, and protesters attacked a Turkish-owned shop modus operandi of, Turkey’s influence in and in Cologne a Turkish-German man was European societies. These questions are all stabbed, causing serious injuries. the more relevant as European policy-makers & Kars Bruijne* de Houtkamp Christopher increasingly seek to take measures in order October 2019 was not the first time that to curb this. Turkish politics spilled out into the streets of European cities. In March 2017, the Dutch The main argument developed in this brief is police clashed with Dutch-Turkish citizens on that effective policy ‘at home’ (in Europe) will the streets of Rotterdam. It was the climax of require better knowledge of socio-political a stand-off between the Turkish and Dutch developments ‘abroad’ (in Turkey). The first governments. Earlier, Dutch authorities had and second parts of this brief, therefore, blocked Turkish government ministers from show how the drivers of Turkish influence addressing political gatherings in The Hague on the diaspora have changed over time. and Rotterdam in the run-up to Turkey’s The third section highlights how present-day constitutional referendum, which aimed to diaspora politics is institutionally anchored give more powers to Recep Tayipp Erdogan. in Western Europe. Most of the practical AK Party politicians were out to win votes examples in this brief are drawn from the among the diaspora. A year earlier, in 2016, Dutch context, but the dynamics will be a coup in Turkey led to severe unrest in the familiar to those observing this phenomenon in other Western European countries.2 * The authors are grateful to Ana Uzelac and Engin Yüksel for their role in preparing this policy brief 1 Algemeen Dagblad (16 October 2019), ‘Nog vier 2 Ayca Arkilic, ‘How Turkey’s outreach to its diaspora verdachten grimmig protest in Rotterdam zitten is inflaming tensions within Europe’, Washington vast: meerdere agenten gewond geraakt’. Post (16 March 2018). Clingendael Policy Brief 1. Drivers of Turkish diaspora with the home country and to help them 1960-2012: remittances and on their return home”.3 Politically, Turkish citizens abroad were mobilised to safeguard monitoring the opposition the ‘national interest’, and to confront ‘hostile opposition’, such as Islamists, Kurdish Turkish policy towards its diaspora has nationalist and Kurdish left-wing groups, in changed significantly since the 1960s. Then, their countries of residence. many Western European countries recruited Turkish labourers on temporary contracts Around this time, Turkish opposition parties under guest-worker programmes. During mobilised their supporters in Europe. The those years, Ankara tried to maintain and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), for instance, strengthen ties with its diaspora in an made an effort to mobilise members of the attempt to secure a flow of remittances. Turkish diaspora against the military coup Assimilation of the migrants in their host in 1980. Ankara responded by consolidating societies was therefore undesirable, as it its bases in the diaspora communities: would weaken their loyalty to the Turkish umbrella organisations were set up to unify state. Similarly, Western European countries actors that could promote the ‘national had no intention of preventing this early interest’, including conservative, religious and manifestation of Ankara’s ‘long arm’, since nationalist groups. It was in this period that they ultimately wanted the migrants to return one of the more prominent Turkish diaspora to their home countries. The goals of Turkey associations, Diyanet, was founded. It was and its Western European counterparts originally a network of mosques founded seemed to be aligned. in several European states to offer Turkish communities abroad a state-sanctioned form At the end of the 1970s the Turkish of Muslim religiosity which would not pose authorities decided to expand their diaspora a threat to the secular nature of the Turkish policy, mainly due to two major developments. republic. Firstly, the oil crisis and the ensuing economic crisis in the mid-70s prompted Western During the 1990s and 2000s Turkey steadily European countries to end their temporary increased its involvement with its diaspora – labour migration schemes. Many Turkish although the motivation for doing so partly labour migrants realised that after returning changed. As the Turkish economy boomed, to Turkey it would be much more difficult to the importance of remittances for the Turkish remigrate to Europe, and thus opted to stay. economy plummeted in this period, especially Secondly, the Turkish government knew that during the mid-2000s (see graph 1). the growing flow of remittances contributed Nevertheless, the political motivations significantly to its gross domestic product remained relevant. The organisations were (GDP) (see graph 1). The two developments particularly useful for monitoring political seemed to come together harmoniously in opponents, helping Turkish citizens abroad the 1970s: the Turkish diaspora opted to to voice their demands to their Western stay in Western Europe, which was of great European home countries and maintaining economic benefit to Ankara. strong ties with the diaspora. These developments culminated in a major policy shift in 1982 – just after a coup in Turkey. Turkey passed a new nationality law, which gave its diaspora the right to acquire dual nationality. In that same year ‘diaspora policy’ was anchored in the Turkish constitution, dictating that the Turkish government should “take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of the children, the cultural needs, 3 An English version of Turkey’s constitution can be and the social security of Turkish citizens accessed via https://www.constituteproject.org/ working abroad, and to safeguard their ties constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en 2 Clingendael Policy Brief Graph 1 Personal remittances (Percentage of Turkish GDP) % 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: World Bank, accessed via https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=TR Hence, the Turkish government’s current a de facto arm of Ankara to combat political involvement with its diaspora is certainly opposition abroad. However, the Erdogan not a new phenomenon. Ever since the start government introduced a third, more of larger-scale labour migration to Western aggressive, driver for its diaspora policy: Europe, Ankara has attempted to keep its it made Turks abroad a key asset in the finger on the pulse of ‘its’ communities national vote in Turkish elections.4 abroad. One key take-away from this brief historical overview is that Turkish Until 1995, Turks abroad did not have voting involvement has had different drivers. This rights. Between 1995 and 2014 they could raises the question of what characterises the vote, but they had to travel to Turkey to cast present AKP involvement with its diaspora. their ballots. This constituted a significant barrier to participation. This barrier was taken down in 2014, when the Erdogan 2. AKP-style diaspora politics: government granted Turkish citizens abroad creating a voting bloc and the right to vote from their countries of residence. This process became much monitoring the opposition simpler over time: in 2014 they still needed to make an appointment with the embassy The rise of the AKP (AK Party) government in or consulate, in 2015 appointments were no the 2000s under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has longer necessary and by 2017 Turks abroad had a major effect on the extent and focus of could vote at any embassy or consulate in Turkey’s involvement with its citizens abroad. any country they wanted. The barrier to As the AKP continued to increase its control participation was thus lowered over time, of state institutions, it further cemented which partially explains the higher turnout the ties between the Turkish diaspora and among diaspora communities, as can be the state. To some extent, the drivers of seen in table 1. AKP engagement with Turks abroad were the same as previously: the diaspora was a valuable source of remittances (even 4 A final amendment in 2012 to the Law on Elections though its relative economic relevance had and Electoral Registers, which regulates the decreased significantly) and, in some cases, practical aspects of overseas voting procedures. 3 Clingendael Policy Brief Table 1 Turnout of overseas voters pro-referendum rallies in the Netherlands and other European countries. Erdogan Vote Year Turnout openly risked a confrontation with European in % states, which have become increasingly General elections 2007 8.88 dismissive of Ankara’s ‘long arm’. Referendum 2010 7. 6 8 General elections 2011 5.03 The turnout of the Turkish diaspora may Presidential elections 2014 18.9 not seem very high. But those that do vote General elections (June) 2015 36.84 primarily favour the AKP or the pro-Kurdish General elections (November) 2015 44.79 People’s Democratic Party (HDP), as can Constitutional Referendum 2017 47.