ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 35, No. 4 (EE) December 2020 Estonia external relations briefing: Estonian External Relations in 2020: The UN Security Council, the dilemma for Estonia, and the evolving international disorder E-MAP Foundation MTÜ 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Estonian External Relations in 2020: The UN Security Council, the dilemma for Estonia, and the evolving international disorder Remarkably, during the pandemic-raged 2020, the United Nations (UN) was one of the least ‘visible’ international organisations in Estonian media, when it would come to the context of global fight against the COVID-19. Certainly, one may argue that, during the pandemic, the role of the UN is ‘substituted’ by one of its agencies, the World Health Organization (WHO), which is assigned to be specialised on different issues related to international public health. At the same time, since the WHO-associated positive publicity deserves plenty of improvements for a number of obvious reasons, the UN’s image is suffering because of that as well. It was the year, however, when Estonia started its high-level international ‘journey’ having become a non- permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for a two-year term and for the first time in the country’s history. Back in June 2019, Estonia was awarded this position, having won the vote of the UN General Assembly, and, on 1 January 2020, the country’s President Kersti Kaljulaid decided to hoist the UN flag in front of her Office in recognition of Estonia’s new status in the international stage. On the day, the President noted: Estonia will be at the world’s hardest diplomatic negotiating table for the next two years. […] We are an equal country in a complex and fragile international family. But it comes with an obligation and responsibility to understand and to speak up on difficult issues that at first sight do not seem to concern us directly. We will help stand for a value-based and international law-based world order, without which we and many other countries and nations would have no place in the world.1 Contextualising a broader discussion with Estonia’s participation in the UNSC’s every- day work, International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), which is perhaps the most reputable think-tank in the country, published a notable material in April 2020, arguing that “European cooperation in the UNSC has increased, […] [and] Estonia has taken an active role in shaping the joint positions of EU states in the UNSC, for example on issues related to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Ukraine and Syria”2. At the same time, as the argument 1 Kersti Kaljulaid as cited in ‘Estonia starts term as member of UN Security Council’, ERR, 1 January 2020. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1019301/estonia-starts-term-as-member-of-un-security-council]. 2 Kristi Raik, ‘Estonia in the UN Security Council: The Importance and Limits of European Cooperation’ in ICDS, April 2020. Available from [https://icds.ee/en/estonia-in-the-un-security-council-the-importance-and-limits-of- european-cooperation/]. 1 goes further, “[t]he international environment, meanwhile, is becoming increasingly challenging for multilateral cooperation and a rules-based global order”, while “[t]he COVID- 19 pandemic has underscored the lack of global leadership, previously provided by the US, and inability of the UNSC to mobilise international cooperation”3. Therefore, such a volatile situation, in both conceptual and policy-making terms, places Estonia (and the whole EU as well) in front of a challenging dilemma – “how to work to maintain the rules-based order while simultaneously adapting to its erosion and change”4. This particular factor can frame the following brief on Estonia’s external relations in 2020. It appears to be that ‘the rules-based order’ starts for Estonia in the region of the Baltic states. Without establishing a proper as well as solid level of trust-bound communication with Latvia and Lithuania, it would be hard to imagine Estonian foreign policy. Therefore, it was not a surprise to learn that in May 2020, the Baltic trio decided to open their internal borders and allowed free movement for their citizens and residents, in order to establish the so-called ‘Baltic bubble’5. This framework had to be adjusted for a few times as the process went on, but when international cooperation in the peak of the crisis was resembling a total disarray, the Baltics managed to exhibit a credible ability to quickly establish a common ground. In addition, on the UNSC platform, the EU-bound coordination was also picking up its pace – as noted, “six joint stakeouts issued in February concerning Myanmar, the MEPP, Libya, Ukraine and (twice) Syria”, and Estonia was very active in “taking the initiative to make a joint stakeout, on Ukraine and Idlib/Syria”6. On Ukraine, for example, a stakeout by Estonia, Belgium, France, Germany and Poland, posted on 18 February 2020, supported “the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders”, while demanding that “Russia must in particular end its financial and military support to the self-proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk and Luhansk”7. In a significant addition, the document stated that “[b]y the use of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, Russia is clearly violating the fundamental principles of international law”8. 3 Raik. 4 Raik. Emphasis is ours. 5 ‘‘Baltic Bubble’: Rules for traveling from Estonia to Latvia and Lithuania’ in ERR, 15 May 2020. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1090243/baltic-bubble-rules-for-traveling-from-estonia-to-latvia-and-lithuania]. 6 Raik, p.6. Available from [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ICDS-EFPI-Analysis_Estonia-in-the- UNSC_Kristi-Raik_April-2020_cor.pdf]. 7 ‘Stakeout on Ukraine by Estonia, Belgium, France, Germany and Poland’ in Permanent Mission of Estonia to the UN, 18 February 2020. Available from [https://un.mfa.ee/stakeout-on-ukraine-by-estonia-belgium-france- germany-and-poland/]. 8 ‘Stakeout on Ukraine by Estonia, Belgium, France, Germany and Poland’. 2 In general, losing no time in the process of getting accustomed to its high-profile role in the UNSC, Estonia ended up being in the epicentre of crisis diplomacy for the first time. Portraying itself as what it is in reality – a small but highly innovative country – Estonia managed to bring the politically sensitive theme of cybersecurity to the discussional table at the UNSC. Considering the whole year, the Estonian delegation 1) convened 7 informal UNSC meetings; 2) attended 425 meetings in total; 3) took part in the process of adopting 58 resolutions and negotiating 45 press statements; 4) together with like-minded countries, composed and made 31 joint press statements9. On a more concrete note, in March 2020, Estonia, the USA and the UK “officially raised the cyberattacks against Georgia in October 2019”, and “[i]t was the first time specific cyberattacks were officially discussed at the [UN] Security Council”10. Furthermore, during an informal meeting held on 22 May, the UNSC discussed the issue of stability of cyberspace as a separate subject, for the first time in the body’s history, underling that cyberspace is “not different from other domains where international law is applied”11. As for the process of adapting to the rule-based international order’s erosion and change, the Estonian delegation at the UN had plenty of opportunities to experience it first-hand – different powers have different visions on how to see and operationalise the actuality, and that is why an Estonia-drafted statement that was calling for “greater international cooperation in tackling the pandemic, which ‘may constitute a threat to international peace and security’”12 was blocked. Back at home in Europe, in the second half of the year, the country’s Foreign Ministry spent plenty of time on discussing the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the heightened tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh. For example, in September, Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu (Pro Patria) approached his Cypriote and Turkish colleagues, correspondingly Nikos Christodoulides and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, over the phone – the major theme of the discussions was associated with “Turkey’s drilling activities”13. Both countries are Estonia’s partners in different geo-strategic frameworks, and the destabilisation in the Eastern Mediterranean is never in any positive plans for the future. Since Turkey also became a major strategic stakeholder in the process of solving the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, it was important for Estonia 9 ‘Estonia in the Security Council: the first year’ in Permanent Mission of Estonia to the UN. Available from [https://un.mfa.ee/estonia-in-the-security-council-the-first-year/]. 10 ‘Estonia in the Security Council: the first year’. 11 ‘Estonia in the Security Council: the first year’. 12 Raik, pp.8-9. 13 ‘Foreign Minister Reinsalu discussed the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Nagorno-Karabakh with the foreign ministers of Cyprus and Turkey’ in Välisministeerium, 30 September 2020. Available from [https://vm.ee/en/news/foreign-minister-reinsalu-discussed-situation-eastern-mediterranean-and-nagorno- karabakh]. 3 to deliver a particular message to the Turkish side that there was an urgent “need for Armenia and Azerbaijan to return to the negotiating table to resolve the issue”14. Reflecting on yet another destabilising factor of international significance, in October, Prime Minister Jüri Ratas (Centre) participated in the European Council’s extraordinary meeting, during which the leader of the EU’s Member States and key bodies approved sanctions against some 40 Belarusian officials who were/are “deemed responsible for election fraud and the violent suppression of peaceful protests after president [Alyaksandr Lukashenka] was re- elected for his sixth term in elections largely deemed rigged and undemocratic”15.