The Russian-Georgian War: Political and Military Implications for U.S. Policy Jon E. Chicky POLICY PAPER February 2009 The Russian-Georgian War: Political and Military Implications for U.S. Policy Jon. E. Chicky February 2009 © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, Stockholm-Nacka 13130, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org "The Russian-Georgian War: Political and Military Implications for U.S. Policy" is a Policy Paper published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Policy Papers Series aims to provide concise and accessible analysis of contemporary issues and events. The Joint Center is a transatlantic independent and non- profit research and policy center. It has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy- watchers, business leaders, and journalists. The Joint Center is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, February 2009 ISBN: 978-91-85937-51-6 Printed in Singapore Distributed in Europe by: The Silk Road Studies Program Institute for Security and Development Policy Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden Email: [email protected] Distributed in North America by: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel. +1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 E-mail: [email protected] Editorial correspondence should be addressed to Dr. Svante Cornell, Director for Research and Publications, at [email protected] Introduction1 The purpose of this Policy Paper is to examine some of the strategic implications resulting from the war between Russia and Georgia from a military and security perspective and in so doing provide some policy recommendations as one looks beyond the crisis and its immediate aftermath. Since there has been and will be written much on operational-tactical details of the conflict, this Policy Paper rather lays out some of the key aspects that the U.S. and NATO face with regard to Georgia, the South Caucasus, and the Euro-Atlantic security community. This is done from a defense policy and military strategy perspective with focus on Eurasian political military affairs. To this end, after a brief description of the geo-strategic context for the U.S. and NATO in the Caucasus and beyond, some analytical thoughts on the conflict itself are outlined. This is followed by implications and corresponding policy actions for Georgia, the South Caucasus and for the Euro-Atlantic community. The Geo-Strategic Context The recent war in Georgia is the latest manifestation of Russia’s attempt to change the European security architecture established over the past 18 years. President Medvedev last year laid out the underlying foreign policy principles of this restructuring attempt, which is not only directed at the Eurasian states but at the members of the EU and NATO as well. The aim is to drive wedges in the NATO Alliance in order to attenuate its collective security strength. Coupled with its development of an enemy image over the past couple of years, this war exemplifies the Kremlin’s desire to strengthen order and control in Russia. The United States and NATO allies are therefore required to reassess their 1 This Policy Paper is based on a presentation by Colonel Jon E. Chicky at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute on September 17, 2008, and has been slightly updated to reflect subsequent events. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U. S. Government. 4 Jon E. Chicky relations with Russia as well as their national and Alliance defense policies. There is no desire for a new Cold War or an adversarial relationship with Moscow. However, if Moscow’s actions are in fact adversarial to the U.S. and NATO states’ interests, friends, and partners, these challenges need to be addressed. The implications of Russia’s military action reach far beyond Georgia and its immediate neighborhood. Turkey, Iran, Syria, Ukraine, the Central Asian States, Central and Eastern Europe, Venezuela, China and Taiwan are but some of the states directly or indirectly affected by Russia’s action in Georgia. As Georgia had been the “poster child” for the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda, Russia’s actions affected the prestige of the United States as well. The U.S. also played a major role in assisting Georgia in training and equipping much of its tactical military capability. Moreover, the U.S. supported Georgia’s cause in receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). In this light, the Russian military action cannot be regarded as a simple punishment of Georgia aimed at rendering the country militarily impotent. It is rather to be seen as a message to the U.S. that Russia can act at will against Georgia or any other U.S.-interests in Eurasia with some confidence that there would be little action in return. Given this strategic context, the U.S. must show resolve in the face of this new Russian assertiveness. This is even more important as the U.S. is the “shining city on a hill” for aspiring democracies throughout the world and to those who desire democracy and freedom but live in un-free countries. Continuous support for Georgia’s democratic aspirations and its national desire to join Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security organizations is therefore essential. The U.S. has legitimate interests throughout Eurasia and its regional policies are not based upon zero-sum thinking. However, even if the U.S. has the desire to find ways to work with Russia, it should not shirk from achieving its interests despite their possible unpopularity in Moscow. Analysis of the Conflict This section provides for some general analytical thoughts on the war to preface the outline of strategic implications and derivative policy recommendations. The Russian-Georgian War: Political & Military Implications for U.S. Policy 5 In his seminal book On War the foremost western military theorist of 19th century Prussia, Carl von Clausewitz, famously wrote, “War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.” Additionally, when discussing the relationship between war and politics, he said, “The political object is the goal, war is the means [of] reaching it, and [the] means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”2 In other words, war is not separate from politics and military objectives are tied to political aims. That being said, the role that passion, prestige, pride, revenge, etc., play in the decision-making to go to war cannot be ruled out. Moreover, it should not be ignored how chance and probability also affect the decision-making and subsequent conduct of war. An important point is that the use of force by both sides, but in particular Russia’s military operations, demonstrates that the military actions of last August were neither random nor independent acts that incidentally happened, but rather extensions of the political interplay that preceded this war. This perspective was borne out by Russian preparations taken prior to August 7, such as the Kavkaz-08 exercise. Furthermore, military means were used by Russia as part of its political interaction with Georgia going back at least as far as 2007. Regarding Georgia’s decision to go to war, it is unclear where the primacy of politics is measured on the decision-making scale relative to the other factors of pride, prestige, and passion. Initially, Georgia’s political aims were declared as limited – to protect Georgian citizens in South Ossetia. The military contingent initially deployed into Tskhinvali was also limited. However, as much as the limited military size had to do with the short- notice of the decision to utilize military force and the limited availability of military units due to the Iraq deployment and the disposition of forces for Abkhazia contingencies, it was also linked to finding the right balance between political ends and military means. Hence, the Georgian decision on August 7 to utilize military force was both complicated and complex from a military strategy perspective (this view was later borne out in the Georgian parliamentary inquiry into the conflict). 2 Howard, M. and Paret, P. (eds. and trans.), Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 86ff. 6 Jon E. Chicky Concerning Russia, the picture is much clearer. Though pride, prestige, and passion had