page 1 ICUS/INCEDE NEWSLETTER International Center for Urban Safety Engineering Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo VOLUME 3 NUMBER 2 International Center for Urban Safety Engineering JULY -SEPTEMBER 2003 ISSUES RAISED BY THE RCENT SUBWAY FIRE IN SOUTH KOREA By Makoto TSUJIMOTO* A train was set on fire with two passengers died because their prevention equipment on each floor liters of gasoline at the Jungangno escape routes were cut off by of the station and the figure shows Subway Station in Daegu, South flames and smoke, with the trains the general conditions surrounding Korea at about 9:53 a.m. on burning over an extended period of the incident at the Jungangno February 18, 2003. This incident time. However, the case in Korea Station. killed 192 people, which without was an incendiary fire caused by doubt accounts for the largest setting fire to gasoline, and Floor plan of the station number of deaths resulting from a ultimately the issue presented here The stairways that serve as fire in a subway train. It was is how to make disaster prevention escape routes at the Jungangno reminiscent of another recent plans for these kinds of intentionally- Station are very well planned, both accident involving a mountain train caused and rapidly-spreading fires. in location and width. Another in Salzburg, Austria (November 11, The table in the following page small station from which the author 2000). In both cases, the shows the items of disaster boarded a train has a single Front of the train No.79 , where the fire started (Photo by Atsushi Okajima) ICUS/INCEDE Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 2 page 2 stairway from the platform to the Area and apparatuses of different floors of Jungangno Station concourse positioned in the central Total floor Floor Apparatuses against fire area; however, Jungangno Station, area (m2) the location of this fire, has wide Concourse CO2 suppression systems, portable fire stairways at both ends of the Basement 1 3,847 platform, from which a smooth Office Room extinguishers, sprinklers, automatic fire detectors, smoke control installations, fire escape seems to have actually been Beasement 2 C6oncours 4,58 hydrants, direction lights, emergency lights, made. Many were found dead at fire alarms the ticket gates that provide exits Automatic fire detectors (by smoke), fire Basement 3 from the central stairway from P4latform 2,00 hydrants, fire alarms, emergency lights, (fire floor) platform B3 to concourse B2. direction lights The concourses on floors B2 and installed on both sides of the shutter, specifications for disaster B1 are large, although their extensive and these were activated to close the prevention equipment in the station size could disorient people when shutter during the fire (the author building are roughly equal to or filled with smoke, and are all saw the shutter close on a TV news exceed those in Japan. provided with stairways at either end show at approximately 10:00 a.m. Unfortunately the fire was started connecting to adjacent floors and of March 3, 2003 at Pusan Airport; in a train; however, such extensive there are no basic layout problems details unknown). A structurally damage would not have been (they do not, for example, narrow very complex access door is sustained if the fire had been started down immediately before coming installed at door 1; it is unknown in concourses B1 or B2 because the aboveground as seen in subway whether it was used during the sprinklers would have been stations in Japan). escape. Also, many people seem to activated. No-one at the site have died at the shutter because their commented on the smoke control Also, according to the data escape route was cut off when the system because it may constitute an provided by Mr. JAE Jim-Joo (at shutter closed suddenly. On the other issue in court. However, the 06:00 a.m. of February 28, 2003, Fire hand, the shopping area seems to concourses are divided into Fighting Situation Daily Report, have sustained no damage and was approximately 35-meter sections to Central Emergency Rescue able to continue operation because satisfy the requirement to extract Headquarters Situation Office), the shutter closed early on, and this smoke at a rate of 40,000 cubic concourses are required to have demonstrates that the shutter served meters per hour in each section. smoke barriers at each 40 m its primary purpose. However, the diameter boundary; for this reason, sudden loss of an escape route when There is no knowing under the concourses B2 and B1 are divided the shutter closed remains a problem. present conditions whether the into three sections with 50-meter smoke control system worked or high hanging walls, which Disaster prevention equipment had any effect; however, the ironically worked to effectively in the station building airflow volume according to concentrate the heat of the fire in As shown in the table, the basic regulations must be approximately the central section. However, there are problems with the passageway to the underground shopping area on floor B1. The underground shopping area runs perpendicular to concourse B1, and has a floor level approximately two meters higher than the floor of the concourse, which does not provide easy access either, although the reasons behind this are not clear. In addition, a fire shutter doubling as an access control point is installed across the entire width of the opening where the stairway from the concourse reaches the shopping area. Smoke detectors are Perspective of Daegue Jungangno Station ICUS/INCEDE Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 2 page 3 10 times the ventilation frequency, which is considered manageable by diverting the general air- conditioning equipment. It is necessary to wait for the results of the investigation on how the equipment operated during the fire, including how it was related to the supply/exhaust openings in the sidewalks aboveground. Subway cars The most significant issue may be the combustibility of interior materials in the subway cars. Japanese technical standards (Ministerial Ordinance Interpretation Criteria III-19 Front of the train No.80, most far from the fire defining technical standards for (Photo by Atsushi Okajima) railways) require: 1) the use of Japanese subway train would not burned uniformly and almost noncombustible materials; and 2) ignite the interior materials and completely. the use of noncombustible surface develop into an extensive fire. coatings for ceilings, outer panels Judging from the conditions of and linings. Noncombustible Furthermore, devices to manually the melted plastic in concourses B2 materials in this case must satisfy open platform access doors in and B1, the temperature was high incombustibility standards for emergency (hereinafter referred to as in the central area, and the severest railway vehicles stipulated by the emergency handles) are marked with scorching occurred to the tunnel Ministry of Transport (now the red borders to indicate their ceiling slab above the center Ministry of Land, Infrastructure locations; emergency handles are portion of train No. 80, exposing and Transport), in which a 182 mm located in pairs on the seat side cover two layers of steel reinforcing bars, x 257 mm sample may be passed at each access door in Daegu, while although the fire started in No. 1 as noncombustible if it meets they are provided in the cars but not car of train No. 79. These points criteria such as not igniting over an indicated in Japan, because Article remain big questions. Fire damage ethanol flame as small as 0.5 cc, 74 of the ministerial ordinance seemed to be fairly distributed as and carbonization or deformation stipulates an exception for cars a result of the firefighting efforts of less than 100 mm. Though traveling in the third rail line section, which continued over an extended referred to as noncombustible, etc., which allows them to be period of three hours starting from these materials are quite different inaccessible to passengers other than the tunnel side considering that the from the noncombustible materials those who are well-informed. fire was controlled in stages from specified by building codes the outside inwards; however, (included in the specifications are In the case of a subway train, it is thermal contamination was also the concrete, glass, rock wool, etc.; difficult to walk between the train severest in the central area on testing methods used are the corn and the tunnel (a gap of 50 cm) after floors B2 and B1 as mentioned alcohol calorimeter test, etc.), and exiting from an access door when the before, although the fire started at it may be more accurate to describe train stops between stations. Thus the end of the station. The fire them as not easily igniting with a the Japanese measure does not spread extremely fast in the early match or lighter. necessarily pose a danger; however, stages, and may have reached the it will reduce the possibility for rearmost car of the train by the time There is no knowing at this point passengers to escape from danger on the oncoming train had drawn into whether the interior materials in the their own if a train stops at a station the platform. It is therefore Daegu subway cars came up to the as in this incident. important to examine carefully level of performance required by what effect the draught generated Japanese standards for trains; Other Issues by the train played in spreading the however, it is not possible to say The six cars of the train No. 79, fire. that the high level of heat generated where the fire started, and the train *Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Nagoya by two liters of gasoline in a No. 80, that is12 cars altogether, University, Japan ICUS/INCEDE Newsletter Vol.