Colonial Secretary were also -fruitless.The Colonial Office supported Milner and his officials; it agreed that there was "no truth in -the complaints" of the Transvaal Miners' Association. Both Milner and the Colonial Secretary dismissed the view of orgiinised labour that the miner was placed "in the unhappy position of either disobeying his employer or otherwise violating the regulations"; the miner's refusal to comply with management's directives led to o>=^ his summary dismissal. ~ In 1905, when convicting fifteen miners for breaking the Sundaiy Act, the Resident Magistrate of Johannesburg confirmed the contention of the miners' union. In passing judgement he stated; Under the eristing law the miners suffer a hardship, inasmuch as if they did not vjork they would be discharged, and if they did work they were prosecuted. Because of their prior experience as senior employees in the mining houses, the personnel of the Department of Mines were biased in favour of and actively supported the industry's need to reduce working costs. This priority influenced their dealings with miners. During Crown Colony rule of the Transvaal, officials of the Mines Depairtment generally viev;ed the needs of miners as being subordinate to the profit margins of the industry. In complying with many wishes of the Association of Mine Managers, mine inspectors often "liberally construed" the regulations to meet the "present circumstances". 589 This attitude was particularly evident in the conclusions reached by the commission which investigated the question o-f mining by single outlet. The commission, which included two mine inspectors, agreed to allow the Cinderella Deep, in contravention of the mining regulations, to continue producing temporarily with only one shaft. The rationale of the commissioners was that "the absolute prohibition of stoping might mean ruin to a mining company and a serious blow to the Industry".'^® In drawing this conclusion the commissioners were influenced both by the representations of the Cnamber of Mines and by the Government Mining Engineer, Weldon, "acting as an OO independent witness". The "present circumstances" also influenced the views of most of the Rand's residents towards the industry. They were well aware that the welfare of the community and of each of its individual members hinged on the prosperity of the gold mining industry. Many residents also believed, as did Thomas Leggett, the American consulting engineer for the B. Neumann group, that the material progress of the irfdustry in 1902 was vital to the "whole of South Af rica". In 1905 William Cullen, in his presidential address to the Chemical, Metallurgical and Mining Society of South Africa, summed up the prevailing moods 1 say directly advisedly, but indirectly everyone of us is dependent on that great industry; I go further, and maintain that not only we, as Transvaalers, but the whole of South Africa, including even the Portuguese province is in precisely the same 590 - position 101 This view did not merely reflect the "ideology of mining capital" as Belinda Bozsoli suggests; 1 it was a material circumstancBa Milner tried to balance the demands' of rural development with those of the •I mines. Nevertheless, the gold mining industry was the predominant economic force in the Transvaal. Even after Union, during the period 1911 to 1912, the contribution of gold mining to the national income of South Africa was 19,6 per cent as compared to the combined contribution of farming and fishing, which was 16,1 per cent 104 Medical doctors, too, were conscious that the advancement of the industry both directly and indirectly affected their livelihoods- After the British conquest of the Transvaal many doctors from the United Kingdom emigrated to the Wi tv-jatersrand, where they joined their colleagues, who had reopened their pre-war practices. -- Also, a number of doctors who had served as medical officers during the war, particularly in the detention camps, decided to remain in the Transvaal. But most of those who had hoped "to make thousands a year" were "sadly disappointed". Within a short time the profession on , the Witwatersrand was "overstocked"! there were too many doctors for the demand. ' As a result, doctors on the Rand were obliged to depend "either largely or entirely, on appointments, either Bovernment or mine".-^-° The few doctors who obtained government billets, including district surgeoncies. did 591 "wel 1". But most doctors relied on part-time appointments on the mines - until 1914 only a handful of mines employed doctors on a full-time basis, 110 - Some mine doctors attended to both Africans and whites on the mine, while others had racially distinct part-time practices. On mines where two doctors practised, the white mineworkers belonging to the mine benefit society chose their ovjn doctor, while the mine manager appointed, as "an unav'oidable evil", the black mineworkers' doctor ii: All the part-time mine doctors were unsalaried professionals who worked •j -j "3* for "so much per head"; and all depended on the "patronage" of the mine maneigers, 114 As a professional group, doctors in South Africa generally had a relatively low economic and social standing: they often bitterly complained about their relatively infer'ior status, jyut doctors on the Witwatersrand, where wealth and status tended to coincide, perceived their standing to be lower than that of their professional counterparts elsewhere in the country, The reliance of Rand doctors on mine appointments further diminished their independence and prestige: "the mine doctor w=\s "very much at the mercy of the M a n a g e r ^ D o c t o r s were responsible to the mine managers and not to the mining house directors. US In 1906, for instance, the Association of Mine Managers refused the Transvaal Medical Society's request for an increase in the rate "per head" paid to mine doctors. In terminating 592 negotiations the r.iine managers asserted arrogantly that "they could easily- get rid o-f their doctors i-f necessary and find plenty of doctors to replace them".119 Ely holding positions as health officers on the mines, doctors were in a conflictual situation. Management expected doctors to forgo their impartiality in favour of their loyalty to the industry. In private correspondence Sansom acknowledged that the public regarded doctors were employed in jobs directly associated with the industry, to be "not unbiassed"."^--- J. S Marwick's indictment of mine doctors, particulair 1 y those who cared for Africans, was much harsher than that of Sansom. In a confidential! letter to John X. Merriman, Marwick, an independent labour recruiter, provided the glaring example of the "ainomalous" position of Alfred Edward Miller: the district surgeon for Boksburg, Miller, was simultaneously chief medical officer for the East Rand Proprietary Mines, where he attended to 24 000 African mineworkers. ■ Marvjick further alleged that Miller was partial to the Rand Mutual Assurance Company, the insurance company, which the Chamber had founded and financed after it had agreed in 1905 to pay compensation to Africans involved in mine accidents. According to Marwick, in his state capacity Miller often rejected Africans' claims for accident compensation or adjusted their financial appeals in favour of the insurance company. — '=iOT: _ Doctors often compromised medical standards to accommodate the needs and costs of the industry in order to safeguard their jobs. They accepted positions in which management put no restriction on their case loads. On most mines doctors were responsible for the health care of a minimum of 2 000 black mineworkers. Undoubtedly the medical care of Africans on the mines v-jas worse than that of whites. Even so, because of their terms of employment, mine doctors, in general, provided medical services of a poor quality to both white and African mineworkers.In 1910 an inspector of mines, who understood the insecurity of mine medical officers, perceptively eKplained their predicament to one of his col1eagues: Hine doctors will rather accept existing conditions than-jeopardise their positions by suggesting drastic and expensive improvements- I have had complaints from mine doctors as to these conditions Cthe housing accommodation on the mines and the treatment extended to the miners in cases of sickness or diseasel, but such complaints have always been accompanied by the request that I should not state that the complaint, or the opinion expressed, came from them. As Jeeves has shown, the propaganda of the mineowners was successful in convincing the public that their welfare was tied not only to the successful performance of the industry as a whole but also to the profitability of the poorest and weakest low-grade producers. Doctors succumbed to the persuasion, too, as is evident in the way the medical profession handled health issues relating to the mines. Even 594 - doctors who held state appointments and therefore enjoyed an independence from mining house control could not escape the tentacles of the industry: in making decisions on health issues concerning mineworkers, the cost of health services to the industry, and particularly to the poorer mines, influenced the decisions of almost the entire medical profession on the Witwatersrand. This is well illustrated bv the compound controversy in 1904. In terms of the Labour Importation Ordinance of 1904, which permitted the importation of indentured Chinese labourers, the mineowners were obliged to build suitable compounds, which would satisfy state requir ements. Also, the Randlords agreed that the same standards for the Chinese would apply to Africans. - Seorge Turner, the Transvaal Medical Officer of Health, stipulated that the compounds provide 300 cubic feet of air space per person. But the Chamber objected on the ground of expense. The difference between 200 and 300 cubic feet air allowance was £5 per person; the poorer mines could afford only 200 cubic feet per person.