NOUf f India without Mystification 1 387 regardedasadisvalue. This accounts for the preference for development— a desire for change. The process of change, in order to qualify as 'deve- lopment', must be assessed in terms of some pre-existing or external 27 ends. Thus to discuss development we have to discuss values. This has been called the 'value-relative' nature of the concept of development. India without Mystification The substratum of development is provided by a whole culture, where Comments on Nussbaum values are not simply 'economic goods', but much more broad-based. Besides, a culture or a tradition is like a living organism, an on-going and Sen thing, never a static or frozen piece. It seems also to be 'self-conscious': it considers, decides and rejects. Hence a rational criticism can very well be internalto it. For a change to count as development, we need some sort of evaluation of values. Many substantive issues arises here. As development can be a self- conscious choice should we let ourselves be blown off our feet by the stormy wind of technological development? Or should we let the wind ... it would be best of all if all human beings could come into an evident com- blow but keep our feet firmly on the ground? (a metaphor once used by munal agreement with what we shall say, but, if nol, lhal all should agree in some Mahatma Gandhi). The diversity, plurality and the dynamic (as well as way. (Aristotle EE 1216). evolutionary) nature of a culture (Indian culture, in particular) make the When I started reading the Sanskrit novel, Kddambari in college, our question of central ity of values further complicated. Development there- teacher gave one piece of advice. The text contains long Sanskrit sen- fore cannot avoid evaluation and ranking of values in a culture, or a fami- tences which sometimes cover a couple pages of the book. The first sen- ly of cultures. The first step in this process is therefore a deep under- tence was one of the longest. The :eacher's advice was: always start from standing of the culture itself, perhaps from the inside. the end to unfold the meaning. And it always worked. With this long The method of rational criticism suggested here is said to be Aristotelian paper (Nussbaum and Sen, 1989), I am going to followHhe same advice. as contrasted with Platonic. It should be internal immersed, rather than The paper is concerned with both substantive and methodological is- detached, and genuinely critical. This will fend against the objection that sues. Nussbaum and Sen come to dwell upon the knottiest of problems: a rational criticism is usually detached and icy cold and therefore in- the relationship between cultural values and technological development effective or insufficiently effective. Here a fundamental difference is in the third world, particularly in India. They outline the method of what underlined between the Platonic and the Aristotelian way, and it has im- they call 'internal* critique, by which old values may be rejected on the portant repercussions on ethical and political theory. basis of new knowledge or understanding of old facts. This is supposed Plato's model for truth and value was a mathematician's model. It is to fend against the fears of cultural conservationists about the undermining dispassionate, a completely detached search for true values. The 'pure of traditional values (ways of life, etc.). Such undermining may be in the light" of the philosopher's soul sees, through the "pure eye of reason', the form of "object failure' (where traditional craft is lost forever) or more true nature of values, justice, knowledge, good and the best life. The true seriously, in the form of a 'value-rejection1. values recommended on this view would be pure gold. But the criticism A Bengali couplet typifies "value-rejection". is that pure gold is never usable without some alloy. The closest analogy that comes to mind is the Samkhya recommendation of values and the Chede dUam patha, badle gala matta best life—one of complete detachment, fostered by the metaphysical *I gave up that way because I changed my view." knowledge ofCttmplele isolation of pure souls from 'material' entangle- The lenn development' is more evaluative than descriptive. It presup- :nt. Isvara Krsna (c. AD 400) argues in the opening verses of his Sam- poses a prior state of underdevelopment or non-development which is fya Karika that the three kinds of sufferings, physical environmental 388 / Philosophy, Culture and Religion India without Mystification I 389 and mental, are all caused, and hence if the cause can be removed, the Now, the Aristotelian method in ethics takes medical inquiry as the sufferings are removed—but not permanently. Hence there arises in us model, not mathematics.^There cannot be pure inquiries conducted in a a search for the means of permaneni:removal of suffering (for the best void. Communities of human beings constitute the substrata of ethical life), and that is why people turn to philosophy: virtues and values. Hence we cannot talk about values without 'human- izing' them. An 'unexampled' (aprasiddha) value is a non-value. Our From the torment by the three-fold misery arises the enquiry into the means of conditions, ways of life, hopes and desires, pleasures and pains, almost terminating it; if it be said that this (enquiry) is fruitless, the means being obvious weave together in our informal consideration and search for truth and tn us, we reply no, since in such means there is no finality. values. Rationality is here immersed in human society rather than de- The fruits of actions enjoined by the Scriptures (traditional social life) are tached and standing 'on the rim of heaven'. This internal critique, Aris- tainted with impurities, decay and hierarchy of gradation, and hence the best is totle has apparently claimed, can yield truth and objectivity by achieving what is the opposite (a completely detached life) effected by the knowledge of a degree of clarity, ordering and societal consensus. For in this way the (isolation of, matter and spirit, and of) the distinction between what is manifest and what is unmanifest. subjective intrusion of people's fears, hopes and desires, which may distort and deform objectivity (which Plato was particularly afraid of), All this requires comment. But the point is that moksa, the highest value can be avoided. The internal reflection process that assesses values gra- according to Samkhya and Yoga, is the goal of complete isolation. This dually reveals hidden inconsistencies, unclarities and confusions, and is irrespective of our desires and wishes, preferences and choices. It is pushes its way ahead, leading to self-discovery on the basis of shared where pure rationality leads. Another extreme example would be the and sharable beliefs. It will be a self-discovery. Nagarjunian idea of emptiness as the ultimate truth and the ultimate goal. One may worry about 'truth' and 'objectivity' in this case. According Reason reveals that everything is empty of its assumed ' own-character' to Nussbaum and Sen, this would be wrong, for 'Aristotle holds that all {svabhdva), and hence the highest goal of life is the understanding (per- truth is in some sense internal and value-laden.' They referto the Rawl- fect wisdom—prajndpdramita) and achievement of this pure truth the sian view that Plato was correct about 'truth' in natural science while essence of every r&ality or value is the emptiness of its assumed nature; objectivity in human science would be more relevant to an account of Under rational scrutiny, each object dissolves into emptiness' (yathd ethical inquiry. In fact, pure truth if it means a view from nowhere, is as yathd vicdryante vislryante tathd tathd). Ourhopes, desires and aspirations mythical as the round-square. Here Hilary Putnam's argument that do not matter, for this emptiness is the truest of the truth revealed by a ethics and science share almost the same notion of truth is recalled, rational process. As I have elsewhere (Matilal, 1986) shown, this be- which leads to 'internal realism'. This is also not without a parallel in the came a dominant preamble to mysticism with which India is so much cre- Indian tradition. The Sanskrit term satya means 'truth', and elsewhere I dited (or discredited). If it was non-rationalism, it was heavily prefixed have argued that the term has been ambiguously used for both factual by an overemphasis on rationality, it is the use of logic and dialectics to truths and evaluative exhortations (cf. satya dharma, satya-raksa). When debunk and demolish rationality as the end product (Matilal, 1977). the sarvam duhkham thesis, that everything, be it pain or pleasure, is This concept of 'rationality' has been challenged also in the Indian nothing but unhappiness, is regarded in Buddhism as the first 'noble tradition, and more so because in India it went to an extreme point at truth' (drya satya)—-it is more a prescription than a description (Matilal, which it became palpably unfeasible and hence false. This challenge is 1982). It is a truth which is value-laden. An exploration of this notion of found in the pramdna tradition and the nydya method, where issues are truth is necessary. discussed in the context of Indian epistemology and the concept of Another important component of the internal critique would be a con- knowledgehood. An internal, practical critique of knowledgehood and ception of selfhood in relation to which values are to be understood. The reason can be developed without giving in to the circularity or the reg- authors recommend that the self be understood as a relational entity and ress. Such was the conviction of thepramdna theorists in genera! and the its own ends as shared ends.