Islamist Party Mobilization: Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS Compared, 1989-2014 Chuchu Zhang Hughes Hall College Department of Politics and International Studies University of Cambridge The dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 2018 1 Declaration of Originality This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee. 2 Islamist Party Mobilization: Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS Compared, 1989-2014 Chuchu Zhang, Department of Politics and International Studies SUMMARY The study aims to explore how Islamist parties mobilize citizens in electoral authoritarian systems. Specifically, I analyze how Islamist parties develop identity, outreach, structure, and linkages to wide sections of the population, so that when the political opportunity presents itself, people are informed of their existence, goals, and representatives, and hence, primed to vote for them. The study adopts and expands the Political Process Theory, and adapts it to address North Africa, a region in which such theoretical scholarship has until now not been conducted. In- depth case studies focus on two Islamist parties in North Africa — Tunisia’s Ennahda and Algeria’s HMS, which both adopted the Muslim Brotherhood model, had charismatic leaders, and were both active on the political scene from 1989-2014, the period between their first electoral trial and their electoral participation after taking part in governance. On the supply side, this study’s main focus, are the key dimensions concerning the mobilizers — Islamist parties: their capacity to accumulate resources, and their approaches to ensure Islamic discourse is part of the political process. I analyze how these two elements interact with each other at those times when political opportunity is made available by those in government, whether through division among elites or in attempts to play party blocs off each other. The demand side looks at the parties’ political appeal to citizen sensibilities through various Islamist agendas. By presenting Islamic discourse as a means to gather large numbers to their cause, the parties seek to show themselves capable of incorporating popular views into their agendas, and thus to give voters alternatives when the opportunity presents itself for them to vote against the government. I contend that in North African political contexts characterized by electoral authoritarian or resilient authoritarian systems, demand is largely guided by cautious party calculation of benefits and costs. Benefits represent a rejection of the regime and the potential to change the status quo (through economic improvement, citizen engagement); costs involve the potential loss of citizen rights and of social stability. The cases of Ennahda and Hamas/Harakat Mujtami’a al-Silm (HMS) reveal that in responding to the constraints of electoral authoritarianism, which include controlled inclusion and informal tolerance as well as outright repression, the parties demonstrated efficiency in supplying Islamic debate, political locations of Islamic activism, and an alternative discourse to that of the regime. However, in doing so, they often failed to meet specific voter demands or expectations, or even to garner a protest vote. The study suggests that mobilizing Islamic politics served to engage the population and make the political realm culturally credible. Yet, the costs were very high, 3 affecting the parties’ organizational strength, credibility, and capacity to create cooperative alliances, and even their ability to retain political control over the use of Islamic discourse. 4 Acknowledgements This dissertation has been made possible thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Roxane Farmanfarmaian, and my second supervisor Prof. George Joffé. I have been lucky to have both with me and would like to express my sincerest gratitude to both for their insight, patience, and depth of knowledge. I am likewise indebted to Mr. Ashraf Ayadi, Ms. Kahina Bouagache, Dr. Robert Parks, Dr. Laryssa Chomiak, Prof. Mohamed Bensalah, and Dr. Laurence O. Michalak, without whom my fieldwork would never have been done. I would also like to thank Prof. Lilia Labidi and Prof. Quanan Ha for inspiring input at critical times. Finally, I would like to thank my mother, Ms. Yunxia Sun, and my father, Mr. Xiaodong Zhang, for their kind support and fortitude throughout this long process. 5 Table of Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 7 2 Theorizing Islamist Parties’ Mobilization at the Polls ........................................................ 22 3 Historical Background ........................................................................................................... 31 4 First Trial at the Polls ............................................................................................................ 59 5 Drastic Changes ....................................................................................................................... 87 6 Co-optation or Resistance? ................................................................................................... 110 7 Entering the 2010s ................................................................................................................. 138 8 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 170 Reference ................................................................................................................................... 179 6 Chapter 1 Introduction Almost three decades after the start of the Third Wave of Democratization (Huntington, 1991), North Africa experienced tremendous difficulties in getting rid of authoritarian systems. Interestingly, each time when the region experienced a real weakening in authoritarianism, whether in the form of top-down liberalization reform or bottom-up protest waves, Islamist parties rose concomitantly and seized strong positions to capitalize on political change. Such scenes took place in the 1980s and early 1990s as Tunisia’s Ennahda, Algeria’s Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), and Yemen’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) each cut a striking figure in elections. After a short collapse in the late 1990s when most Islamist groups in the Muslim world witnessed what Schwedler (1998, p. 27) called “modest changes” or even sharp declines in vote share, the rise of the “Islamist vote” seemed to reappear in 2011 as the Arab Spring brought to power Islamist parties at the ballot box in several North African countries. North Africa thus appeared to be a region in constant flux struggling with democratization, with little opportunity to experience over time the role of Islamists in democratization. This thesis adopts the definition of democracy proposed by the American and Italian political scientists, Diamond and Morlino (2016, p. 21): a form of government which protects citizens’ human rights, rule of law, free and fair elections, and citizens’ participation in political and civic life. To unveil the role of the “Islamist vote”, I explore what Islamist parties really mean to the electorate and opposition parties accustomed to living in authoritarianism where lack of democracy is highly politicized (Lust-Okar, 2003, p. 1). Observation of party politics and elections in North Africa cannot be based upon the common assumption that they “are integrally associated with democratic political systems” (Tachau, 1994, p. xiv). Though superficially sharing institutions called “elections”, the structure of rules in electoral authoritarianism differs dramatically from that in a democratic system where elections are freer because they are protected by the rule of law and pluralistic media. Yet, in the former systems where elections are controlled and manipulated, citizens can still reject the authoritarian regime whose misgovernment brings socio-economic and psychological grievances, and opposition parties including Islamist parties can cater to such demands by providing Islamic debate, political locations of Islamic activism, and an alternative discourse to that of the regime. This leads me to examine how citizens’ demands and Islamist parties’ interaction with each other in electoral authoritarianism change in different political settings. The Questions Posed The central question is: How do Islamist parties mobilize citizens in electoral authoritarian 7 systems? In unraveling the answer, two sets of questions arise regarding the two sides involved in elections, the mobilized, meaning the citizens, and the mobilizer, referring to the Islamist parties. The first is: What are the concerns of citizens in