JOURNALISM DOWNUNDER mainstream media organisations. MATT MOLLGAARD is radio Consequently, the public sphere curriculum leader in AUT is routinely shaped by market University’s School of Communi- researchers, public relations cation Studies. He researched an practitioners and micro-managing honours thesis on East Timor. spin doctors. The reception accord- ed to Hager’s book illustrates this process. After initial controversy, Tenacious, sad Brash’s departure allowed John Key, Bill English and their advisers to rejuvenate the National brand in account of NZ a news world without political memory. complicity on References East Timor Miller, R. (2006, November 26). Brash would not have survived Hager’s Negligent Neighbour: New Zealand’s revelations, Sunday Star-Times, p. Complicity in the Invasion and Occupation A11. of Timor-Leste, by Maire Leadbeater. Nelson: Tucker, J. (2006). Hollow men, hol- Craig Potton Publishing, 2006, 280 pp. ISBN: low victory? Noted. Wellington: NZ 13: 9781877333590. Journalists Training Organisation. (Retrieved 18 April 2007): www.journalismtraining.co.nz/ HIS is an essential book for any n200703a.html Tone interested in the way that New Zealand formulates and carries out its foreign policy. It is also a stark reminder that New Zealand, a found- ing member of the United Nations, a vocal supporter of decolonisation and a country much-praised for its peacekeeping efforts all over the world has not always been willing to take a moral stance when balancing trade, security and human rights. Maire Leadbeater has produced the most detailed account so far of New Zealand’s involvement in the 204 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 13 (1) 2007 JOURNALISM DOWNUNDER ledge of and de facto acquiescence to Indonesia’s invasion and occu- pation of East Timor. They present New Zealand policy-makers as con- founded, complicit and even con- niving during the escalation of the crisis and in its aftermath. They also show the geo-political structures that informed New Zealand foreign policy during and after the invasion. New Zealand worked closely with Australia and other Western pow- ers to ensure the Indonesians could carry out their plans without overt crit- icism from its friends and neighbours (Mollgaard, 2002). Leadbeater has combined these documents and others released since with insightful interviews with former tragedy that engulfed East Timor New Zealand foreign affairs offi cials during and after the 1975 Indonesian and the recollections of the activist invasion of the former Portuguese community (of which she was a key colony. My interest in this story fi gure) that fought long and hard to comes from my own study of many bring the plight of the people of East of the previously unreleased or me- Timor to light. ticulously expunged documents de- This book diverges from the more tailing New Zealand’s involvement measured approach to New Zealand’s in the East Timor crisis of 1974-1976 policy towards East Timor that is during my post-graduate research. evident in writing by foreign affairs During this research, Leadbeater’s experts such as associate professor brother, Green Party parliamentarian Steve Hoadley from the University Keith Locke, managed to secure the of Auckland. Hoadley characterises release of the most damming and of- New Zealand’s policies as ‘tempered ten, disturbing, offi cial memoranda, by realist concerns about regional cables and policy recommendations instability, outside meddling, and relating to New Zealand’s know incapacity for self-governance’ along PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 13 (1) 2007 205 JOURNALISM DOWNUNDER with a realisation that the bilateral While the book criticises New relationship with Indonesia far out- Zealand’s deference to Indonesian weighed that of one with East Timor wishes, its links with the Indonesian (Hoadley, 2005). Leadbeater charac- military, its soft stance on the oc- terises New Zealand policy as ‘prag- cupation at the United Nations and matism over principle’, ‘high-level its attempts to ban opponents of the subterfuge’ as ‘not counting the cost Indonesian regime from speaking in to the East Timorese’ and that New New Zealand, no solid alternatives are Zealand ‘shamelessly put its good offered. Leadbeater does suggest that name to the service of Indonesia’ New Zealand could have called for (Leadbeater, 2006, pp. 12-73). the United Nations Security Council Leadbeater’s long involvement to take action, perhaps stimulating with the struggles of the people other countries to criticise Indonesia’s of what is now Timor-Leste, her activities in East Timor. However, as personal relationships with some of the book details, the United States them and her humanitarian back- was supportive of Indonesian poli- ground give colour and emotion to this cies and it is very likely they would story. This is an activist’s account, not have vetoed any serious resolution a dry textbook or theoretical treatise condemning them. about foreign policy formulation. It is wrong to criticise Negligent Leadbeater also grapples with Neighbour for this too harshly, but the ultimate impasse about New the context, both locally and inter- Zealand’s involvement in the story— nationally, in which New Zealand could we have prevented it? It is very formed its policies on East Timor is hard to determine what impact New vital to understanding what happened. Zealand opposition would of had on During the build-up to the invasion, Indonesia’s desire to incorporate East New Zealand politicians and the Timor. This conundrum is evident media where more concerned with in Negligent Neighbour. Leadbeater the 1975 election that would see Na- states that ‘I believe it was in New tional replace Labour and keep con- Zealand’s power to help stop the trol of the House until 1984. Unlike violence and support the right of East Australia, in New Zealand there was Timor’s people to self-determination’ little public knowledge of the plight but gives no real detailed policy sug- of the East Timorese. It took events gestions or other critical actions that such as the 1991 Santa Cruz massa- New Zealand could of taken (p. 14). cre, when nearly 1000 East Timorese 206 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 13 (1) 2007 JOURNALISM DOWNUNDER where killed, injured or ‘disappeared’ consistently failed to ask the questions by the Indonesian occupying forces that would of revealed more about for the New Zealand media to take New Zealand’s involvement in the notice of the tiny province. The 1999 East Timor story. riots and militia killings that followed This is an interesting nuance the overwhelming vote to forge an that deserves further investiga- independent Timor-Leste also focused tion. Would a more concerned, attention on the province. Apart from active and informed media have these major cataclysms, very little forced the New Zealand government news from East Timor reached the to reveal more about its role in the average New Zealander. occupation of East Timor, leading to There is also New Zealand’s a stronger public constituency on the preference for ‘quiet over megaphone issue and different policy outcomes diplomacy’, an approach that has in New Zealand? This lack of indepth endeared New Zealand to Indonesia foreign affairs reporting from New and smoothed the way for military, Zealand’s mainstream media outlets trade and aid cooperation. This private continues today. None of the major and gentle dialogue was developed media sources have specially trained during the years of the occupation local foreign affairs reporters who of East Timor and still serves New can penetrate what Leadbeater calls Zealand today. Indonesian politician the ‘diplomatic art of double-speak’ Sutradara Gintings has characterised and ask the questions about our the relationship between the two foreign policy that produce unequivo- countries as ‘quite different to that cal answers (Leadbeater, p. 15). of other Western countries’, as one Negligent Neighbour may be due of ‘fair and equal interactions’ rather some criticism for downplaying the than ‘dictating’ Western standards to role of the East Timorese themselves. Indonesia (Young, 2007). While the book acknowledges that the Much of New Zealand’s policy different factions that have fought for on East Timor was formulated in control and infl uence in the territory this vacuum, outside of public scru- gave the Indonesians and their sup- tiny and heavily infl uenced by New porters cover for some Indonesian Zealand’s desire to maintain good actions, there is more to be said relations with Indonesia. Leadbeater about how the economic, religious, does raise the issue of a ‘compliant geographical and political divides in media’ in New Zealand—one that East Timorese society have been and PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 13 (1) 2007 207 JOURNALISM DOWNUNDER are still now detrimental to a stable Indonesia and distanced themselves nation. Without making excuses for from the human tragedy visited on the Indonesian occupation and the the East Timorese by the Indonesian machinations of other nations behind occupation. Many will question what the scenes, the confusion generated else has been done in our name. by the factional fi ghting and politics Leadbeater reinforces this uneasy in Timor-Leste has helped foreign feeling by drawing comparisons nations wash their hands of the between New Zealand’s involvement situation before and more recently in East Timor and our reaction to the has led to signifi cant international repression of independence move- peacekeeping deployments, further ments in West Papua and Acheh by raising tensions. Indonesia (pp. 219-221). While Leadbeater characterises The reader will also get a sense criticism of Timor-Leste interfac- of the dedication and tenacity of the tional struggles as ‘blaming the New Zealand humanitarian activ- victims’, there is genuine concern ist community, who spent many in the region that Timor-Leste sorts years struggling against pragmatic through its problems (p. 227). It is government policies and a largely important now that stability and com- disinterested media to bring the mon cause drives Timor-Leste into the reality of East Timor and New future.