UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE RISE OF PSEUDOSCIENCE: CONTEXTUALLY SENSITIVE DUTIES TO PRACTICE SCIENTIFIC LITERACY A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in PHILOSOPHY by Abraham J. Joyal June 2020 The Dissertation of Abraham J. Joyal is approved: _____________________________ Professor Daniel Guevara, chair _____________________________ Professor Abraham Stone _____________________________ Professor Jonathan Ellis ___________________________ Quentin Williams Acting Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies Table Of Contents List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………………iv Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………....v Chapter One: That Pseudoscience Follows From Bad Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Injustice………………………………………………………………………………………………....1 Chapter Two: The Critical Engagement Required to Overcome Epistemic Obstacles……….37 Chapter Three: The Myriad Forms of Epistemic Luck……………………………………………56 Chapter Four: Our Reflective and Preparatory Responsibilities………………………………...73 Chapter Five: Medina, Epistemic Friction and The Social Connection Model Revisited.…….91 Chapter Six: Fricker’s Virtue Epistemological Account Revisited……………..………………110 Chapter Seven: Skeptical Concerns……………………………………………………………...119 Conclusion: A New Pro-Science Media…………………………………………………………..134 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………140 iii List of Figures Chainsawsuit Webcomic…………………………………………………………………………….47 Epistemological Figure……………………………………………………………………………....82 iv Abstract Epistemic Injustice, Responsibility and the Rise of Pseudoscience: Contextually Sensitive Duties to Practice Scientific Literacy By Abraham J. Joyal This dissertation explores the responsibilities of different individuals to agree with the scientific consensus of their time and place. It seeks to provide a normative response to the growth of pseudoscientific movements such as the anti-vaccination movement or climate change denialism. That said, this dissertation takes all scientific beliefs held by non-scientists to be based on some amount of luck. The level of luck different non-experts experience meanwhile, is evidence of certain epistemic injustices, as they've been described by the likes of José Medina and Miranda Fricker. I argue that these epistemic injustices can occur as a result of the non-expert being privileged or as a result of the non-expert being oppressed. But if both privilege and oppression can lead one to believe in pseudoscience, should privileged and oppressed people be held to the same standard of responsibility? Certain theorists have naively and tacitly approved of both being held to the same standards of culpability, particularly those who comment on the so-called “epistemic condition for moral responsibility”. I assert that a twofold conception of responsibility can explain this state of affairs, taking people to be culpable for what I call their “preparatory responsibilities” according to how privileged or oppressed they are, while taking people to be culpable for what I call their “deliberative responsibilities” according to whatever epistemic obstacles they face, regardless of whether these obstacles follow from privilege or oppression. I then reapply this twofold conception of responsibility to certain theorists of epistemic injustice, particularly Medina and Fricker, drawing on the former to flesh out my view of preparatory responsibilities and drawing on the latter to explore my view of deliberative responsibilities. I then consider whether these responsibilities can be judged for other people or whether they can only be judged v introspectively, and answer arguments for moral skepticism made on these basis’. Finally, I make recommendations for reforming pro-science media on the basis of my normative picture. vi Chapter One: That Pseudoscience Follows from Bad Epistemic Luck and Testimonial Injustice Introduction Pseudoscientific beliefs, which I’ll define shortly, are popular and very real harms result from the prevalence of these beliefs. Between 40% and 47% of Americans don’t believe in evolution1 , 49 senators voted against an amendment stating climate change is real and is human caused in 20152 , and 84% of the American Association for the Advancement of the Sciences were polled as believing that poor scientific literacy is a major issue for the scientific enterprise3 . Somewhere around 250 million children are Vitamin A deficient, with between 250 thousand and 500 thousand of them resultantly going blind annually4 . Meanwhile, Greenpeace still protests access to vitamin A rich golden rice5 , which was developed with an eye to combating vitamin A deficiency 6 . The President of the United States, Donald Trump, has claimed that vaccines cause autism7 --a thoroughly debunked claim8 . Proponents of homeopathy bring in over 9 million likes on facebook9 , while children of practitioners have died10 and a popular “cure” for autism consists of having children consume bleach11 . 1 Newport, “In U.S., 42% Believe Creationist View of Human Origins.” 2 Tang, “Here Are All the Senators Who Do and Don’t Believe in Human-Caused Climate Change.” 3 Funk and Goo, “A Look at What the Public Knows and Does Not Know About Science.” 4 World Health Organization, “Micronutrient deficiencies.” 5 Greenpeace, “Greenpeace and Golden Rice.” 6 Tang et al, “Golden rice is an effective source of vitamin A.” 1776-1783 7 Trump, “Healthy Young Child...” 8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Science Summary: CDC Studies on Thimiserol in Vaccines.” 9 Facebook, “David Avacado Wolfe.” 10 Adach, “Alberta parents whose toddler died of meningitis were told to visit doctor, trial hears.” 11 Food and Drug Administration, “FDA Warns Consumers of Serious Harm from Drinking Miracle Mineral Solution.” 1 This chapter endeavours to make the following claims concerning pseudoscience and my interest12 in it: 1) “Pseudoscience” as I plan to use it throughout this dissertation, is defined by four criteria. 2) Pseudoscientific beliefs are all at least partially caused by the believer’s level of epistemic luck, according to Wayne D. Riggs’ control oriented definition. This definition takes us to be lucky for beliefs if we hold them as a result of factors that are outside of our control and which we have not exploited13 . 3) At least some cases of pseudoscientific belief result from epistemic luck in a manner that is tied up in oppressive power structures, and constitute what both José Medina and Miranda Fricker refer to as “epistemic injustice”14 15 . 4) Pseudoscience, as a special case of epistemic injustice, raises an ethical problem that has gone unnoticed by theorists concerned with the epistemic condition for moral responsibility. Once I have shown all of this to be the case, I will say a little bit about why finding a solution to this problem is necessary to the improvement of pro-science media and the fight against pseudoscience. I fear that when pro-science media lays blame on those who believe pseudoscience, it unreflectively holds those who could not have believed otherwise responsible16 for their belief. If this is true, then those believers are in fact 12 This interest is broadly philosophical, due both to the fact that it invokes conceptual tools from both ethics and epistemology, and because pseudoscience provokes the question of how individuals come to hold beliefs. While I do not feel the need to reference a particular meta-philosophical view to argue that this question is worth the concern of philosophers, I do think it is worthwhile to point out that philosophy has asked how the subject influences what they think themselves to know since the Allegory of the Cave. 13 Riggs, “Luck, Knowledge and Control”, 204-221. 14 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 1. 15 Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, 3. 16 As this project endeavors to develop a potentially new theory of responsibility, it would be foolish to try to give a sufficient definition at this early stage, but at the very least I would like 2 victims of pseudoscience. I further fear that this victim blaming has been both immoral and counterproductive in the fight against pseudoscience. What Do I Mean By “Pseudoscience”? Pseudoscientific beliefs are beliefs that meet all four of the following criteria: 1) The belief is about a scientific thesis. 2) The belief is held by a lay person--meaning someone who is not a scientist working in that field. 3) The belief is thought to be scientifically correct--meaning that if the scientific methodology were properly carried out, the believer thinks that their belief would turn out to be true. 4) The belief runs contrary to the scientific consensus or lack thereof. Each of these criteria deserve some commentary. Regarding the first, that the belief is about a scientific thesis or topic, there is a certain temptation that I want to avoid. I do not here bother to demarcate what is or isn’t a scientific belief, as to do so precisely is a massive philosophical task. For my concerns, a “scientific thesis” is an empirical proposition that can be confirmed or denied via the methodology of scientists. The point of this criteria is to exclude beliefs that are not scientific--faith in religion, even though it could not be confirmed to be true by scientists, isn’t a scientific topic. The second criteria is that the belief is held by a lay person, which would be any person who isn’t a scientist