Document generated on 09/30/2021 7:36 p.m. McGill Law Journal Revue de droit de McGill Privacy, Corrective Justice, and Incrementalism: Legal Imagination and the Recognition of a Privacy Tort in Ontario Thomas DC Bennett Volume 59, Number 1, September 2013 Article abstract This article considers the nature of common law development as exemplified URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1018985ar by the recent privacy case of Jones v. Tsige. The author focuses on Jones, in DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1018985ar which the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the novel privacy tort of “intrusion upon seclusion”. Using a detailed analysis of the case as its basis, the See table of contents article explores issues which have much wider significance for the judicial development of privacy laws: the process of incremental elaboration of the law, the moral impulses at work within it, and the relevance of imagination to Publisher(s) its operations. By drawing out these discrete issues and analyzing the role that each plays in Jones, the article offers a framework for examining such McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill questions in future privacy cases. Moreover, this article argues that the judgment in Jones brings valuable clarity to the analysis of the process of ISSN common law development. In particular, the essay concludes that the novel privacy tort recognized in Jones is the result of a legitimate incremental 0024-9041 (print) development rather than an instance of undue judicial activism. 1920-6356 (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Bennett, T. D. (2013). Privacy, Corrective Justice, and Incrementalism: Legal Imagination and the Recognition of a Privacy Tort in Ontario. McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill, 59(1), 49–94. https://doi.org/10.7202/1018985ar Copyright © Thomas DC Bennet, 2013 This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research. https://www.erudit.org/en/ McGill Law Journal — Revue de droit de McGill PRIVACY, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, AND INCREMENTALISM: LEGAL IMAGINATION AND THE RECOGNITION OF A PRIVACY TORT IN ONTARIO Thomas DC Bennett* This article considers the nature of com- Cet article se penche sur la nature du dé- mon law development as exemplified by the re- veloppement de la common law, comme cent privacy case of Jones v. Tsige. The author l’illustre le recent arrêt sur le droit à la vie pri- focuses on Jones, in which the Ontario Court of vée Jones v. Tsige. L’auteur se concentre Appeal recognized the novel privacy tort of “in- sur Jones, où la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a re- trusion upon seclusion”. Using a detailed analy- connu un nouveau délit d’« intrusion dans sis of the case as its basis, the article explores l’intimité ». En s’appuyant sur une analyse dé- issues which have much wider significance for taillée de l’arrêt, l’article explore des enjeux qui the judicial development of privacy laws: the ont une importance beaucoup plus large sur le process of incremental elaboration of the law, développement judiciaire du droit à la vie pri- the moral impulses at work within it, and the vée, à savoir le processus d’élaboration progres- relevance of imagination to its operations. By sive de la loi, les impulsions morales qui y sont drawing out these discrete issues and analyzing à l’oeuvre et l’importance qu’a l’imagination the role that each plays in Jones, the article of- pour ses opérations. En soulevant ces enjeux fers a framework for examining such questions distincts et en analysant leur rôle dans Jones, in future privacy cases. Moreover, this article cette étude propose un cadre permettant argues that the judgment in Jones brings valu- d’examiner ces questions lors des affaires por- able clarity to the analysis of the process of tant sur le droit à la vie privée qui pourront se common law development. In particular, the es- présenter. En outre, l’article soutient que say concludes that the novel privacy tort recog- l’arrêt Jones clarifie l’analyse du processus du nized in Jones is the result of a legitimate in- développement de la common law. Il contclut cremental development rather than an instance notamment que le nouveau délit sur le droit à la of undue judicial activism. vie privée reconnu dans Jones est le résultat d’un développement légitime progressif plutôt qu’un cas d’activisme judiciaire injustifié. * LL.B (Hons), LL.M, LL.M, Barrister; Lecturer, BPP Law School, London, United King- dom; Doctoral Student in Law, Durham University. I am grateful to Richard Mullen- der, Gavin Phillipson, Paul Mora, Nathan Marshall, Chris Monaghan, and Wenying Li for their advice, comments, and input at various stages during the drafting process. Thanks are also due to Helen Fenwick, Aaron Baker, and Alexander Williams at Durham University, who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. The comments of the three McGill Law Journal referees were also most helpful and were gratefully received. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author alone. © Thomas DC Bennett 2013 Citation: (2013) 59:1 McGill LJ 49 — Référence : (2013) 59 : 1 RD McGill 49 50 (2013) 59:1 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL Introduction 51 I. A Global Privacy Context 54 A. Jones v. Tsige: An Overview of the Judgment 57 B. Legal Imagination 61 C. Qualified Deontology 66 D. Scrutinizing the Judgment in Jones 68 1. Charter values 68 2. Corrective Justice 71 3. Justice Sharpe: an Academic Judge 75 4. Incrementalism 80 E. Corrective Justice, Tort Theory, and Privacy More Generally 86 Conclusion 90 THE RECOGNITION OF A PRIVACY TORT IN ONTARIO 51 Introduction Elaboration of the law relating to invasion of privacy has been pro- ceeding apace in the common law world in recent years (for example, in England and in New Zealand). As such, we might see recent development in this area of the law in Canada as an instance of playing catch-up. Such a view would, however, be wide of the mark. For when I scrutinize the re- cent Canadian case of Jones v. Tsige,1 I find that it brings into focus issues that require more judicial and academic work across the common law world (and indeed beyond). These issues are the process of judicial elabo- ration of the law (“incrementalism” to common lawyers), the moral im- pulses at work in the law, and the relevance of imagination to its opera- tions. I will examine each of these matters in detail below. And, at the conclusion of this essay, I will use them to point up a contrasting tendency for judges and, in particular, the English academic community to get bogged down in matters of technical detail and to lose sight of these large issues that invest this branch of the law with politico-legal significance. Jones is particularly worthy of study because it represents a signifi- cant incremental step for the common law: the recognition of a novel head of tortious liability. That this has taken place in order to secure protection for a controversial interest, privacy, only adds to the case’s importance. By way of comparison, in England a (more limited, information- focused) tort2 of “misuse of private information”3 has been recognized in recent years, and the broad academic consensus is that this English tort is the result of the incremental development of the older equitable doctrine of confidence.4 The “intrusion upon seclusion” tort recognized in Jones, 1 2012 ONCA 32, 108 OR (3d) 241 [Jones]. 2 There is still some debate as to the precise nature of the new English cause of action. Some commentators label it tortious (see Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 18th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) at 42-002), while others consider it to be es- sentially equitable (see Anthony M Dugdale, Michael A Jones & Mark Simpson, eds, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 19th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at 28-01–28-03). The English High Court judge Eady J has, extra-judicially, expressed the opinion that “misuse of private information” might be neither tortious nor equitable, but instead a “new creature deriving from the [European Court of Human Rights at] Strasbourg[’s] way of doing things” (Mr Justice Eady, “Launch of New ‘Centre for Law, Justice & Journalism’” (public lecture delivered at City University, London, United Kingdom, 10 March 2010), [unpublished]). 3 Campbell v MGN Ltd, [2004] UKHL 22 at para 14, [2004] 2 AC 457, Nicholls LJ. 4 See Gavin Phillipson, “Privacy: The Development of Breach of Confidence: The Clearest Case of Horizontal Effect?” in David Hoffman, ed, The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 136 [Phillipson, “Privacy”]; Murray Hunt, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights Act” (1998) PL 423. 52 (2013) 59:1 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL however, has developed very differently; it has not evolved from a pre- existing cause of action. Key to this is the fact that in Jones, Justice Rob- ert J. Sharpe (who gives the lead judgment) makes an appeal to “Charter values” as a justification for extending the scope of tortious liability to cover intrusions upon the plaintiff’s privacy. Broadly speaking, this idea bears significant similarity to the notion of “indirect horizontality”5 under the Human Rights Act in the U.K.6 But Jones is not simply a matter of the indirect horizontal application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;7 that horizontality is supplemented by an appeal to another overarching principle which underpins tort law itself: corrective justice.