THE MISSION OF THE CHURCH: A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL FAHEY In responding to the paper, I will be guided by Herbert W. Richardson's genuine understanding "that every cultural epoch is characterized by a dominant intellectus, which undergirds not only the thought of an age but also its institutions."1 The dominant intellectus of our age is relativism, but of a special kind and with a very particular slant. It affirms that all judgments bear a socially relative character and, by their very nature, tend to eliminate divine transcendence. Furthermore, this relativistic intellectus both justifies and institutionalizes social differentiation, cultural pluralism, and even ideological conflict. Richardson also notes "that Christian faith has not opposed, but has accepted, the various cultural intellectus. But it has ac- cepted them only by qualifying them. That is, Christian faith has correlated an appropriate conception of faith with each of these intellectus in order to redeem them from their anti-human tendencies."2 The kind of faith coordinated with the defect of the relativistic intellectus of today is "faith as the power of reconcilia- tion which works to unite the many relative perspectives and to thwart ideological conflict"3 (fides reconcilians intellectum). 1Toward An American Theology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 36. He singles out five intellectus in the history of mankind: mystical rationalism, scientific naturalism, skeptical criticism, gnosticism, and relativism. The different cultural intellectus generate different types of idolatrous unbelief, and it is Christianity's duty to correlate each type with an appropriate type of faith. The five correlating types of faith are: fides quaerens intellectum, fides perficiens intellectum, fides formans intellectum, fides crucificiens intellectum, and fides reconcilians intellectum (cf. ibid., pp. 35-49). Our present interest falls on the fifth pair. 2lbid., p. 46. To demonstrate his statement, Richardson gives the following formula on the same page: "A secular intellectus plus a specific form of faith yields a Christian, or religious, intellectus. This can be illustrated as follows: a. mystical rationalism + humility—Christian Platonism b. scientific naturalism + belief—Christian Aristotelianism c. skeptical criticism + sense of the heart—Christian individualism d. gnostic wisdom + the foolishness of the cross—Christian fideism e. relativism + universal reconciliation—Christian sociotechnicism." 3Ibid., p. 44. He explains it further in the same place: "In our time, therefore, faith affirms reconciliation in opposition to the relativistic intellectus which denies its possibility. In intellectual discussion, faith expects agreement and not only dialogue. In war, faith expects and works for peace. In economic struggle, it calls for the common good. In the working together of the Churches, it anticipates ecumenical reunion. In all these acts, faith affirms something the intellectus of relativism cannot see, i.e., the power of divine unity working in all things to reconcile the ideological conflict generated by relativism itself. Quite concretely, 71 72 A Response to Michael Fa hey 72 Within this framework, I sum up the paper presented in two fundamental theses which reflect, by their very nature, the general theme of the discussion itself. Thesis No. 1: Divinization and humanization thought- patterns are unclear alternatives and need thorough overhauling. Though this overhauling is yet to come, it is clearly suggested that theologians abstain from using the category "the Church" in the context of mission and substitute for it terms like "Christianity," "Christian communities," or "the new humanity in Christ." Thesis No. 2: The responsible presence of the Church in the world does not originate exclusively from a particular mandate from Christ; it is also rooted in the human vocation itself. This fact is a clear indication that secular realities have to be handled as God-intended and God-given. In this perspective, it is suggested that speaking of the multiple munera or tasks rather than of the mission of the Church would be more intrinsic to the activity of the Church. Let us now analyze the nature and validity of these two theses. THESIS NO. 1 It is hardly debatable today that the radicality of the separa- tion between divinization and humanization often led, unfortu- nately, to sheer metaphysical dualism. Yet the attempt to entirely collapse distinctions between the "two poles" might be equally dangerous. Particularly, if, by trying to counterbalance the two extreme positions, one proposes not only a reexamination or re- formulation but also the complete elimination of certain terms of traditional theology, such as mission or church, that might be considered by some people as the main cause of the overemphasis on the disparateness between the divine and the human. Beyond such an orientation and effort might lie the supposition that the raison d'etre of the Church has nothing or hardly anything to do with the trinitarian missions. Contrary, however, to such a posi- tion, Christian theology has always claimed the Church as the too, faith as the affirmation of such a power of reconciliation also affirms that all those institutions and movements of our time which are working to overcome ideological conflict are special instruments of redemptive power. One thinks im- mediately of the United Nations, the Peace Corps, the worker priests, federal mediators, and ecumenism. These are the institutions where God is working m the world today, but only the fides reconcilians will have the eyes to see." A Response to Michael Fa hey 73 immediate, concrete result of the ad extra activities of the Word and the Spirit. I have always been puzzled by these and similar statements found so often in contemporary theological writings. I read, on the one hand, that' 'the truth is that the Church can only be understood in relationship to the world,"4 while, on the other, the questions always reverberate in my ears, mind, and heart: "How does he [Christ] still wield his power as the Lord, who internally dominates history, not merely as history's transcendental guarantor? Has not the process of secularization long ago put him in the corner, from which only the metaphysical acrobatics of theology can entice him out? How is his 'spirit' still poured out over the face of this secular world? How is the theology of history not merely an elaborate mystic to disguise the godlessness of our present situation?"5 This brings me to what lies at the heart of the first thesis, i.e., to the affirmation that though humanization-theology is a Christo- centric or, more accurately a Jesus-centered theology, it is so only in a very particular or limited way. It posits the divinity of Jesus and claims the fiill revelation of God in him. But this divinity of 4Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967), p. 72. Such an understanding led Robinson and Cox to the rejection of religion, metaphysics, and even God. Cox writes very characteristi- cally in The S ecular City, p. 1: " The effort to force secular and political movements of our time to be 'religious' so that we can feel justified in clinging to our religion is, in the end, a losing battle. Secularization rolls on, and if we are to understand and communicate with our present age we must learn to love it in its unremitting secularity. We must learn, as Bonhoeffer said, to speak of God in a secular fashion and find a nonreligious interpretation of biblical concepts. It will do no good to cling to our religious and metaphysical versions of Christianity in the idle hope that one day religion or metaphysics will once again regain their centrality. They will become even more peripheral and that means we can now let go and immerse ourselves in the new world of the secular city." 5Johannes B. Metz, "A Believer's Look at the World," in The Christian and the World (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1965), p. 70. The intricate nature of the problem is perceived very clearly by Cox as he responds to Michael Novak's criticism of The Secular City: "I would defend the need to extricate the Gospel from 'religion,' but only if Bonhoefifer's definition of the term 'religion' remains constant m the discussion, i.e., religion as dependency, inwardness and a metaphysical perspective which sees this world somehow subsumed within another one. Against this kind of 'religion' the Gospel calls men to maturity, away from a fascinated obsession with his own soul and toward this world and this saeculum as the appropriate sphere of Christian existence": "An Exchange of Views," in The Secular City Debate, ed. Daniel Callahan (New York: The Macmil- lan Company, 1966), p. 118. It seems to me, unless I have misread him, that Michael Fahey's preference for "the new humanity in Christ" as a replacement for "church" localizes the problem in the same way. He has opted for collapsing together the divine and human, but on the side of the human. 74 A Response to Michael Fa hey 74 Jesus means only Jesus as the man for others.6 Bishop John A. T. Robinson's words are representative in this regard: Jesus is 'the man for others', the one in whom Love has completely taken over, the one who is utterly open to, and united with, the Ground of his being. And this 'life for others, through participation in the Being of God', is transcendence. For at this point, of love 'to the uttermost', we encounter God, the ultimate 'depth' of our being, the unconditional in the conditioned. This is what the New Testament means by saying that 'God was in Christ' and that 'what God was the Word was'. Because Christ was utterly and completely 'the man for others', because he was love, he was 'one with the Father', because 'God is love'.7 This overemphasis on Jesus the man makes one wonder whether "Jesus-without-God did not receive too high a status among the secular Christians.