1 111TH CONGRESS " ! S. PRT. 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT AFGHANISTAN’S NARCO WAR: BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND INSURGENTS A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION AUGUST 10, 2009 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2009 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Nov 24 2008 15:57 Aug 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5012 Sfmt 5012 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB seneagle COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DEMINT, South Carolina ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID MCKean, Staff Director KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 15:57 Aug 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB CONTENTS Page Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 1. The Fruits of Neglect—Recent Rise of the Drug Trade .................................... 3 Unintended Consequences of the Invasion ..................................................... 4 See No Evil ........................................................................................................ 5 2. Why Eradication Failed—2001 to 2008 ............................................................. 6 Grounding Eradication ..................................................................................... 6 Gone Today, Here Tomorrow ........................................................................... 7 A Dramatic Change of Strategy ...................................................................... 8 3. How the Taliban Exploits the Drug Trade ........................................................ 9 Where Does the Money Go? ............................................................................. 10 The Scope of Corruption .................................................................................. 11 New Tactics in the Field .................................................................................. 12 4. Implementing New Strategies for Afghanistan ................................................ 13 ‘‘Remove Them from the Battlefield’’ .............................................................. 15 Responding to the Stalemate ........................................................................... 16 The Regional Spillover—Problems in Pakistan ............................................. 17 Beyond the Pakistan Border ............................................................................ 17 5. A Metaphor for War—The Battle of Marjah ..................................................... 18 A Surprise Attack ............................................................................................. 19 The Pluses and Minuses of Marjah ................................................................. 20 6. The Missing Civilian Component ....................................................................... 21 A Verdict on Kabul and Washington .............................................................. 21 Two Bright Spots .............................................................................................. 22 7. Recommendations for Afghanistan .................................................................... 23 APPENDIX 1. A Discussion of Alternative Crops—Poppy v. Wheat ....................................... 25 2. The Intricacies of Hawala—The Road to Nowhere ........................................... 27 Close Knit and Close Mouthed ........................................................................ 28 A Regional Perspective on the Money Flow ................................................... 29 (III) VerDate Nov 24 2008 15:57 Aug 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5905 Sfmt 5905 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB VerDate Nov 24 2008 15:57 Aug 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5905 Sfmt 5905 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, August 10, 2009. DEAR COLLEAGUE: The administration is several months into its ambitious new strategy in Afghanistan, and we are seeing the first effects of the increases in military and civilian resources. One of the emerging changes is on counter-narcotics policy. In the past, our emphasis was on eradication. Today, we are focused for the first time on breaking the link between the narcotics trade and the Taliban and other militant groups. To accomplish that important goal, the administration and our military commanders have made targeting major drug traffickers who help finance the Taliban a pri- ority for U.S. troops. In addition, a new intelligence center to ana- lyze the flow of drug money to the Taliban and corrupt Afghan offi- cials is beginning operations and plans are under way to create an interagency task force to pursue drug networks. The attached re- port represents the findings of research conducted by the com- mittee staff in Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. The report describes the implementation of the new counter-narcotics strategy and offers recommendations. We also hope that the report will provide new impetus for a national debate on the risks and rewards associated with our increasing commit- ment to the war in Afghanistan. Sincerely, JOHN F. KERRY, Chairman. (v) VerDate Nov 24 2008 15:57 Aug 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB VerDate Nov 24 2008 15:57 Aug 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB AFGHANISTAN’S NARCO WAR: BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND INSURGENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY At the end of March when President Obama fulfilled his pledge to make the war in Afghanistan a higher priority, he cast the U.S. mission more narrowly than the previous administration: Defeat Al Qaeda and eliminate its safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To accomplish these twin tasks, however, the President is making a practical commitment to Afghanistan that is far greater than that of his predecessor—more troops, more civilians, and more money. As the American footprint grows, so do the costs. July was the deadliest month yet for American and coalition troops in Af- ghanistan, and military experts predict more of the same sad tra- jectory in the coming months. As part of the military expansion, the administration has as- signed U.S. troops a lead role in trying to stop the flow of illicit drug profits that are bankrolling the Taliban and fueling the cor- ruption that undermines the Afghan Government. Tens of millions of drug dollars are helping the Taliban and other insurgent groups buy arms, build deadlier roadside bombs and pay fighters. The emerging consensus among senior military and civilian officials from the United States, Britain, Canada and other countries oper- ating in Afghanistan is that the broad new counter-insurgency mis- sion is tied inextricably with the new counter-narcotics strategy. Simply put, they believe the Taliban cannot be defeated and good government cannot be established without cutting off the money generated by Afghanistan’s opium industry, which supplies more than 90 percent of the world’s heroin and generates an estimated $3 billion a year in profits. The change is dramatic for a military that once ignored the drug trade flourishing in front of its eyes. No longer are U.S. com- manders arguing that going after the drug lords is not part of their mandate. In a dramatic illustration of the new policy, major drug traffickers who help finance the insurgency are likely to find them- selves in the crosshairs of the military. Some 50 of them are now officially on the target list to be killed or captured. Simultaneously, the U.S. has set up an intelligence center to analyze the flow of drug money to the Taliban and corrupt Afghan officials, and a task force combining military, intelligence and law enforcement re- sources from several countries to pursue drug networks linked to the Taliban in southern Afghanistan awaits formal approval. An equally fundamental change is under way on the civilian side of the counter-narcotics equation. The administration has declared (1) VerDate Nov 24 2008 15:57 Aug 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB 2 that eradication of poppies, the mainstay of the former administra- tion, is a failure and that the emphasis will shift to promoting al- ternative crops and building a legal agricultural economy in a country without one for 30 years. This marks the