CHAD: A NEW CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK Africa Report N°144 – 24 September 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................I I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. A CRISIS OF THE STATE ........................................................................................... 2 A. 1990-2000: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR RECONCILIATION......................................................2 B. OIL, CLIENTELISM AND CORRUPTION........................................................................................3 1. Clientelism and generalised corruption ..............................................................................3 2. The oil curse .......................................................................................................................4 C. MILITARISATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND POPULATION ..................................................5 D. NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVIDES .........................................................................................6 III. THE ACTORS IN THE CRISIS................................................................................... 8 A. THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION .....................................................................................................8 1. Repression and co-option ...................................................................................................8 2. The political platform of 13 August 2007 ........................................................................10 B. THE ARMED REBELLION .........................................................................................................11 1. The rebellion in Chad .......................................................................................................12 2. The agreements between the government and the armed groups .....................................13 3. The rebel attack against N’Djamena in February and its consequences...........................15 C. DEBY AND HIS ALLIES............................................................................................................16 1. Internal weakening ...........................................................................................................16 2. Bideyat and Kobé loyalties...............................................................................................17 3. French brothers in arms ....................................................................................................17 D. AFTER FEBRUARY 2008..........................................................................................................19 IV. HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES ..................................................................... 22 A. THE REFUGEES IN DARFUR .....................................................................................................22 B. INTER-COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED...........................................24 V. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................... 25 A. SUDAN....................................................................................................................................25 1. Sudanese support for the Chad rebels...............................................................................25 2. Deby and the Darfur rebels...............................................................................................26 3. The peace accords between Chad and Sudan ...................................................................27 B. LIBYA .....................................................................................................................................28 C. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.................................................................................................30 D. AFRICAN UNION .....................................................................................................................31 VI. MINURCAT AND EUFOR – CHAD/CAR................................................................ 32 A. MINIMUM SERVICE .................................................................................................................32 B. THE NEED FOR A NEW MANDATE ...........................................................................................33 VII. A NEW CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK ............................................ 35 A. THE NEED FOR GENUINE POLITICAL PROCESS ........................................................................35 B. A NEW NEGOTIATIONS ARCHITECTURE ..................................................................................36 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 37 IX. APPENDICES A. MAP OF CHAD ....................................................................................................................................38 B. CHRONOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................39 C. KEY OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES AND ACTORS .........................................................................40 D. THE MAIN REBEL GROUPS AND THEIR KEY ACTORS ........................................................................42 E. ACRONYMS.........................................................................................................................................44 F. ABOUT CRISIS GROUP ........................................................................................................................46 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA ........................................................................47 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES..................................................................................................49 Africa Report N°144 24 September 2008 CHAD: A NEW CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMANDATIONS The political and security crisis Chad faces is internal, portraying himself as a key asset in the West’s strategy and has been exacerbated rather than caused by the of containment against the Khartoum regime. His meddling of its Sudanese neighbours. Power has been decision to back Darfur’s Sudanese rebels became a monopolised by a Zaghawa military clan with Presi- central element to his political survival strategy. It dent Idriss Déby at the top since 1990, leading to calmed the discontent of members of his Zaghawa increased violence in political and social relations, clan, the Darfuri branch of which was harassed by ethnic tensions and distribution of the spoils of gov- Khartoum, and helped strengthen him militarily ernment on the basis of clan favouritism. Neither against his armed opponents, supported by the National return to a multi-party system in 1990, enhanced gov- Congress Party in Khartoum. Further, the 250,000 Dar- ernment revenues from newly exploited oil reserves fur refugees living since 2004 in a dozen camps along since 2004, nor elections backed by Chad’s Western the border have brought in major international humani- allies have brought democracy or improved govern- tarian and security stabilisation efforts. The UN Mission ance. The international community must press for an in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINUR- internal reconciliation process focused on reforming CAT) and the European stabilisation mission (EUFOR) the Chadian state, particularly its administration and have been deployed to protect and police the refugee security sector, and ending the armed insurgency. At camps and secure their immediate environment. the same time, a regional process must be revived to address longstanding disputes between Chad and To address the political and security crises within Chad Sudan and eliminate the pattern of proxy war and sup- and the regional instability, a three-track process of port for each other’s rebels. dialogue and substantive action is needed. A first track should build on the August 2007 agreement by These steps require a new approach toward national launching new political negotiations with broadened reconciliation. The political agreement signed in August participation, including civil society. These should 2007 between the government and the political oppo- produce a political accord to address national revenue sition focused narrowly on electoral reforms and is sharing, decentralisation of state authority, security incapable of providing the basis for the fundamental sector reform, judicial reforms to ensure accountabil- shifts of governance required. Major rebel attacks on ity and combat human rights abuses and corruption, N’Djamena just six months later showed that the and restructuring of the state administration. A second agreement, signed without inclusive national consul- negotiation track should focus on the armed rebellion tations, cannot offer the way out of deep political crisis and lead to a genuine, permanent ceasefire, the can- and end the armed rebellion. The single-minded empha- tonment of rebel forces before their possible integra- sis on implementing that agreement by the European tion into the army and a joint verification mechanism. Union (EU), and France in particular, must be recon- Rebel groups adhering to this process would have a sidered. Chadians and the international community right to participate in