Identity Gerrymandering: How the Armenian State Constructs and Controls “Its” Diaspora by Kristin Talinn Rebecca Cavoukian A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Kristin Cavoukian 2016 Identity Gerrymandering: How the Armenian State Constructs and Controls “Its” Diaspora Kristin Talinn Rebecca Cavoukian Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2016 Abstract This dissertation examines the Republic of Armenia (RA) and its elites’ attempts to reframe state-diaspora relations in ways that served state interests. After 17 years of relatively rocky relations, in 2008, a new Ministry of Diaspora was created that offered little in the way of policy output. Instead, it engaged in “identity gerrymandering,” broadening the category of diaspora from its accepted reference to post-1915 genocide refugees and their descendants, to include Armenians living throughout the post-Soviet region who had never identified as such. This diluted the pool of critical, oppositional diasporans with culturally closer and more compliant emigrants. The new ministry also favoured geographically based, hierarchical diaspora organizations, and “quiet” strategies of dissent. Since these were ultimately attempts to define membership in the nation, and informal, affective ties to the state, the Ministry of Diaspora acted as a “discursive power ministry,” with boundary-defining and maintenance functions reminiscent of the physical border policing functions of traditional power ministries. These efforts were directed at three different “diasporas:” the Armenians of Russia, whom RA elites wished to mold into the new “model” diaspora, the Armenians of Georgia, whose indigeneity claims they sought to discourage, and the “established” western diaspora, whose contentious public ii critique they sought to disarm. While numerous studies have noted states’ recent penchant for reframing their emigrant populations as “diasporas,” this research suggests a closer examination of precisely whom the state includes in that category, and for what purpose. Specifically, it suggests critical attention be paid not only to attempts to maximize diaspora financial contributions, but also, to encourage public deference to the home state. iii Acknowledgments While it feels like the most solitary activity in the world at times, no one writes a dissertation alone. I was fortunate to have had so many people who, directly or indirectly, assisted me in this endeavour. I owe an great debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Edward Schatz, whose guidance, support, and superhuman patience helped bring this dissertation to fruition. Many thanks to the Turpanjian Center for Policy Analysis at the American University of Armenia, where I was a Visiting Scholar while conducting the Armenia portion of my field research, and to my colleague and friend, Dr. Nona Shahnazaryan, whose assistance was indispensible in arranging and conducting interviews in Krasnodar and Tuapse. My time in the field was both insightful and enjoyable thanks to new and old friends in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Russia, including Emma, Venera and family, the Mkrtchyan family, Stepan, Anna, Gevorg, Sasha, Zack, Garo, and Vova, who welcomed me into their lives and homes, and to South Caucasus fellow travelers Megan Dean Farrah, Leah Kohlenberg, and Joanna Zak. I am grateful to Nairi Hakhverdi and Adrineh Der Boghossian for occasional translation help, and to Stefan Sokolowsky and Leonard Rosenberg for their sage advice on sections of the comparison chapter. More generally, I benefitted from the support of colleagues and friends at the University of Toronto, especially Bill Flanik, Zack Taylor, Seth Jaffe, and Joe MacKay, and fellow “PhD Moms” Seika Boye and Elinor Bray-Collins. I was regularly cheered on by my enthusiastic aunt, Ann (the original Dr. Cavoukian), and cheered up by my steadfast, empathetic, and hilarious brother, Sevan. My mother, Kimberlay Kiernan, flew in to babysit when the going got rough, and Dr. Howard Gorman kept my head on straight through the most difficult moments of self-doubt. And finally, infinite thanks to my husband, Ivan, who tolerated the long hours and bad moods, who loved me at my best and worst, who pulled my share of the load more than I acknowledged, and who always believed in me; and to Lucie, the light of my life, and the best inspiration a mother could ask for. iv Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………..1 Chapter 2: Theorizing the State-Diaspora Relationship………………………...28 Chapter 3: The Armenian Diaspora Landscape, Past and Present………………58 Chapter 4: Armenia’s “Discursive Power Ministry”………………………….....99 Chapter 5: Russia’s Armenians: The New “Model” Diaspora…………............138 Chapter 6: Georgia’s Armenians: Decline, Division, and Disillusionment……180 Chapter 7: The Established Diaspora’s Slow Generational Shift……………....216 Chapter 8: Conclusion: Identity Gerrymandering and its Discontents…………260 Chapter 9: The Armenia-Diaspora Relationship in Comparative Perspective…277 Methodological Appendix……………………………………………………...313 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………342 v Chapter 1 Introduction In October 2008, the Republic of Armenia inaugurated a new government ministry, solely dedicated to “the diaspora.” In March 2010, I sat down to interview Armenia’s new Minister of Diaspora, Hranush Hakobyan. While I approached the interview with plenty of questions about the ministry, some of the more poignant moments were when she turned the questions around on me. In addition to regularly correcting my grammar, the minister scolded me for not having gone to see her when she had first visited my hometown, Toronto. Hakobyan: When I came to Toronto, you weren't there. Cavoukian: No. I wasn't there. Hakobyan: Well, how is it that you concern yourself with the diaspora and you didn't want to meet the Minister of Diaspora? Cavoukian: Frankly, I wasn't focusing on this topic at the time. [A face-saving white lie, I actually hadn’t heard about the visit.] Hakobyan: Ok, fine. But still, weren't you curious to meet your minister, to see what kind of person she was? Cavoukian: Well, I'm here now. I came to you. Isn't it better that we meet here in Armenia? Hakobyan: True, and those were big events with many people.1 The Armenian diaspora was replete with dedicated community organizers, historians, authors, artists, linguists, priests, scholars, and diaspora “experts” of all stripes. Hakobyan was not a diasporan, had seemingly spent little time outside the former Soviet Union, and had previously held government posts unrelated to the diaspora. She did not speak Western Armenian (the language spoken by most established diasporans), and had no diaspora-specific training (her education was in applied mathematics). In other words, she was by no means a diaspora expert. Minister Hakobyan may not have been as personally slighted as she feigned by my absence at her February 27, 2009 public 1 Hakobyan, Hranush. Interview, 18 March 2010. 1 event in Toronto. Still, her reaction to my non-attendance was telling. Hakobyan’s expectation was that, now that a state-appointed Minister of Diaspora existed, all members of the Armenian diaspora—and those who studied it—should attend her events and pay attention to her pronouncements. By virtue of her appointment as minister, she should now become the first mover on all things diasporic. So, what was this new Ministry of Diaspora, and what were its intentions toward ethnic Armenians abroad? More importantly, why would a state representative need to assert herself as a diaspora authority in the first place? The Republic of Armenia (RA) has struggled, since independence in 1991, to both attract its established (Western) diaspora’s2 financial and lobbying support and simultaneously keep it at arm’s length, and especially, out of Armenian politics. After 17 years of ad hoc and largely reactive diaspora relations, a decision was taken to formulate a more coherent diaspora policy, its centrepiece being the 2008 creation of a dedicated diaspora ministry. While this government body did implement small projects, such as youth exchanges, its main focus was on reframing diaspora relations, and the most important reframing was the expansion of the category of diaspora to include Armenians living in post-Soviet states, especially the approximately 2 million currently residing in Russia, virtually none of whom saw themselves as “diasporans.” Unlike previous efforts to temporarily engage the diaspora, such as conferences, the creation of a new 2 Following Panossian, this dissertation uses the term “established diaspora” to refer to Armenians abroad who were known, before the collapse of the USSR, as “the diaspora.” The majority of this population descended from survivors of the Ottoman Empire’s Armenian genocide (1915-1918), spoke Western Armenian (as opposed to the Eastern Armenian spoken in the RA), and lived throughout the world, but were especially numerous in the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Most had never lived in, and had no relatives in, Soviet or post-Soviet Armenia. Panossian, Razmik. 2003. “Courting a Diaspora: Armenia-Diaspora Relations since 1998.” International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, ed. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 141. 2 government body – by a state lacking in material resources – must