PERCEPTION AND REPRESENTATION IN LEIBNIZ by Stephen Montague Puryear B.S., Mechanical Engineering, North Carolina State University, 1994 M.A., Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 2000 M.A., Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2004 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY This dissertation was presented by Stephen Montague Puryear It was defended on December 5, 2005 and approved by Nicholas Rescher University Professor of Philosophy Robert B. Brandom Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy Stephen Engstrom Associate Professor of Philosophy J. E. McGuire Professor of History and Philosophy of Science Dissertation Director: Nicholas Rescher University Professor of Philosophy ii Copyright °c by Stephen Montague Puryear 2006 iii PERCEPTION AND REPRESENTATION IN LEIBNIZ Stephen Montague Puryear, Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, 2006 Though Leibniz’s views about perception and representation go to the heart of his philosophy, they have received surprisingly little attention over the years and in many ways continue to be poorly understood. I aim to redress these shortcomings. The body of the work begins with an exploration of Leibniz’s proposed analysis of representation (Chapter 2). Here I argue that on this analysis representation consists in a kind of structural correspondence— roughly an isomorphism—between representation and thing represented. Special attention is given to the application of this analysis to the challenging cases of linguistic and mental representation. The next two chapters concern what I take to be the central issue of the work: the nature of distinct perception. I explain the multifarious ways in which this concept figures into Leibniz’s system, and argue that the three most prominent accounts of distinct perception proposed in recent decades fall short of what we should expect from an adequate theory (Chapter 3). I then propose and develop an alternative theory, which I call the explicit content account (Chapter 4). It not only enjoys significant textual support, I contend, but sorts well with and sheds considerable light on the various uses to which Leibniz puts the concept of distinct perception. Finally, I argue that the explicit content account of perceptual distinctness also provides us with the correct account of the sense in which concepts (or ideas) are distinct, that is, with the correct account of conceptual distinctness (Chapter 5). In doing so I set myself against the received view that concepts are not distinct (or confused) in the same sense as perceptions. Taken together, these points paint a simpler, more comprehensive, and more enlightening picture of the Leibnizian mind than those suggested by previous work. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ......................................... viii 1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................ 1 2.0 REPRESENTATION .............................. 8 2.1 A Structural Account ............................ 9 2.2 Linguistic Representation .......................... 16 2.3 Mental Representation ............................ 23 2.3.1 Terminology and Taxonomy: Perceptions and Thoughts ..... 24 2.3.2 Terminology and Taxonomy: Ideas, Concepts, Propositions .... 32 2.3.3 How Mental Contents Represent .................. 38 2.4 Representation and Inference ........................ 44 2.5 Conclusion .................................. 48 3.0 DISTINCT PERCEPTION: THE CURRENT SITUATION ........................ 50 3.1 The Significance of the Issue ........................ 50 3.1.1 Individuation of Substances ..................... 50 3.1.2 Soul-Body Unity ........................... 52 3.1.3 Understanding and Sensing ..................... 55 3.1.4 Freedom and Bondage ........................ 58 3.1.5 Action and Passion .......................... 59 3.1.6 Two Miscellaneous Doctrines .................... 64 3.1.7 Five Desiderata ............................ 66 3.2 Distinctness as Involving Awareness .................... 66 v 3.3 Distinctness as Inference Potential ..................... 73 3.3.1 The Leading Idea ........................... 74 3.3.2 Two Additional Senses of Distinctness ............... 79 3.3.3 Evaluation .............................. 83 3.4 Distinctness as Rational Priority in the Mind of God ........... 86 4.0 DISTINCT PERCEPTION: THE EXPLICIT CONTENT ACCOUNT .................. 89 4.1 The Textual Evidence ............................ 90 4.2 Elucidations ................................. 96 4.3 Applications ................................. 101 4.3.1 Individuation of Substances ..................... 101 4.3.2 Soul-Body Unity ........................... 102 4.3.3 Understanding and Sensing ..................... 105 4.3.4 Freedom and Bondage ........................ 108 4.3.5 Action and Passion .......................... 111 4.3.6 Awareness ............................... 112 4.4 Concluding Remarks ............................. 115 5.0 DISTINCT IDEAS ................................ 117 5.1 The Standard View ............................. 117 5.2 An Alternative Proposal ........................... 122 5.3 The Arguments for the Standard View Revisited ............. 132 5.3.1 First Argument ............................ 133 5.3.2 Second Argument ........................... 133 5.3.3 Third Argument ........................... 134 5.3.4 Fourth Argument ........................... 139 5.4 Leibniz’s “Confusion” ............................ 140 5.5 The Redundancy of Ideas .......................... 145 5.6 Conclusion .................................. 152 APPENDIX ........................................ 156 ABBREVIATIONS ................................... 269 vi BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................... 271 vii PREFACE I began doctoral studies at the University of Pittsburgh with only a casual interest in the great German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). During the course of Nicholas Rescher’s Leibniz seminar in the Fall of 2001, however, my interest in the philoso- pher blossomed. Following that term, Professor Rescher was kind enough to supervise di- rected studies with me over the next three semesters, during which time I stumbled upon the topic of this dissertation. Throughout both this formative period and the following two years during which time the dissertation took shape and was written, Professor Rescher was an unrelenting source of encouragement, sound direction, and timely feedback. For all that, and for introducing me to the wonders of the Leibnizian philosophy, I wish to thank him. I am also deeply grateful to the other members of my dissertation committee. Bob Bran- dom, who served as second reader, provided both encouragement and penetrating feedback. But Bob’s most significant contribution to the project came through his important essay “Leibniz on Degrees of Perception,” which together with Margaret Wilson’s writings, gave my project direction. I would also like to thank Stephen Engstrom, who read a draft of the dissertation and provided detailed and insightful feedback. Finally, thanks to Ted McGuire for his support of this project. Outside of my committee, there are a number of individuals who deserve recognition. I am deeply grateful to Mark Kulstad for his friendship, for encouraging me to pursue my interest in Leibniz scholarship, for taking an interest in my work, for valuable feedback both in writing and in conversation, for introducing my dissertation to his early modern read- ing group in Houston, and for other things too numerous to list. Among my colleagues in the graduate program here at Pitt, Joshua Stuchlik and John Morrison (now at NYU) deserve thanks for reading at least parts of the dissertation, asking penetrating questions, viii and offering helpful comments. I also benefitted from a number of highly stimulating con- versations with Sasha Newton on the subjects of perception and representation in Leibniz, as well as in Descartes and Kant. Karsten Worm of InfoSoftWare deserves special thanks for making available his Leibniz im Kontext, a CD-ROM containing many of the most sig- nificant philosophical writings of Leibniz in a searchable format. This remarkable resource proved a tremedously valuable research tool, one that allowed me to discover all manner of texts related to my research that might otherwise have gone undiscovered. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wonderful wife Melissa, who supported me fi- nancially, emotionally, and psychologically, not only through the writing of this dissertation, but through the entirety of my now ten-year old pursuit of a Ph.D. in philosophy. She has encouraged me at every point, and lovingly made sacrifices time and again to allow me to achieve this goal. For that, and much more, I will be forever grateful. ix 1.0 INTRODUCTION The most interesting and deepest, and at the same time the most important concept of the Leibnizian monadology—the one without a full understanding of which a deeper penetration into that monadology would be impossible from the start—is the concept of representation. — E. Dillmann, Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizschen Mon- adenlehre auf Grund der Quellen, 1891 The notions of perception and representation (expression) play a central role in Leibniz’s philosophy, according to which the world comprises at bottom an infinity of perceiving substances which, having been endowed with a “representative nature,” cannot be limited to represent or perceive