Edice Qfwfq The Future of Philosophy Lukáš Zámečník (ed.) Olomouc 2014 The Future of Philosophy Lukáš Zámečník (ed.) Recenzovali Prof. PhDr. RNDr. Jan Štěpán, CSc. Doc. Marek Petrů, Ph.D. Mgr. Filip Tvrdý, Ph.D. PhDr. Petr Hromek Tato publikace vychází v rámci grantu Inovace studia obecné jazykovědy a teorie komunikace ve spolupráci s přírodními vědami, reg. č. CZ.1.07/2.2.00/28.0076. Tento projekt je spolufinancován Evropským sociálním fondem a státním rozpočtem České republiky. 1. vydání (ed.) © Lukáš Zámečník, 2014 © Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, 2014 ISBN 978-80-244-4316-4 CONTENTS The Normative Task of Philosophy (Lukáš Zámečník) 5 Conceptual Analysis as a Goal a Medium and a Tool 31 In Support of Segal’s Internalism (Ivo Dragoun) 33 Critical Thinking – an Effort to Increase the Competence of Philosophy (Martina Juříková) 51 Logic as a Toolbox (Ivo Pezlar) 73 Philosophy for Mathematics and Mathematics for Philosophy 87 Ethnomathematics: A Political Challenge to the Philosophy of Mathematics (Iva Svačinová) 89 Epistemology: The Probability Revolution Continues (Jan Votava) 121 Philosophy in Arms of Biology and Neuroscience 139 Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science ( Václav Kočí) 141 Philosophy of Biology (Selected Topics) (Vladimír Vodička) 155 Ethics between Naturalism and Normativity 187 Naturalistic Future of Ethics (Michal Stránský) 189 Introduction to Naturalized Ethics (Selected Topics) (Otakar Horák) 205 Summary 239 Index of names 243 Index of subjects 245 TE H NORMATIvE TASk of PHILOSOPHy | 5 The Normative Task of Philosophy The manifold various approaches to philosophical works remind us that in the history of philosophy over the past hundred years, that we have been faced with permanent differentiation. If we remain within the tradition of analytical phi- losophy, it becomes apparent that a major breakthrough occurred primarily in connection with Quine’s critique of empiricism. The originally normative role of analytical philosophy came under the significant pressure of naturalism. In some philosophical circles normativity became the next obsolete philosophical con- cept. Philosophy in the Czech Republic is particularly redolent of this naturalistic pressure over the last decade. The conflict between naturalized and normative philosophy is still alive in the spectrum of the entire tradition of analytical phi- losophy and is reflected in a recent series of texts.1 The studyThe Future of Philosophy emerges as one of the products of the pressure of naturalized philosophy on a new generation of philosophers, who in various postgraduate studies are striving to set the direction of philosophical dis- ciplines. ‘The Future of Philosophy’ represents a collective effort to evaluate the goals which should be philosophically investigated, either in general or specific areas of research. The study is a breath of axiology in philosophy, an assessment of meaningful goals and values in philosophy to restore, maintain or retain. 1 THE POVERTY OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY Philosophy suffers from many ailments, some of which are widespread and some specific to the Czech environment. One specific Czech malady is the insufficiently developed system of training students of philosophy, with post-grammar school concentrating mainly on the history of philosophy. This leaves students with an inadequately developed ability to apply philosophical methods. Hence the very skills that would make a philosopher valuable in interdisciplinary dialogue, the 1 Haug 2014; de Caro, Macarthur 2010. 6E | TH FUTURE of PHILOSOPHy competence of argumentation, conceptual analysis, critical thinking for example, remain predominantly average or even below average. If we merge the unmanaged method with historical sentiment that is in- herent in a large number of students of philosophy, then the result is not soaring philosophical exploration, but only mediocre exploring of the history of ideas. Departments of philosophy in the Czech environment over the past twenty-five years, could not decide if they wanted to be truly philosophical departments or departments of the history of ideas. A more general poverty of philosophy is poor mnemonics, that is the con- stant rebirth of traditional philosophical problems in new conceptual garb and with the same uncritical effort to promote their solutions. For example, we can observe the development of analytical metaphysics that animates (not only) scho- lastic metaphysics and recurring in places that until a few decades ago seemed permanently forbidden to the analytical philosopher. One positive review, however, of this effort to revive traditional philosophi- cal problems deserves is the application of philosophical methods. As is evident in Ivo Dragounʼs chapter: In Support of Segal’s Internalism, contemporary analytic metaphysics is, without irony, a spectacular conceptual game, that enables us to explore the compatibility, coherence and consistency of metaphysical concepts and systems. From there it is only a step towards the application of the same con- ceptual game to conceptual systems of modern science, especially physics, as we shall see. Resignation on its own philosophical method is actually one of the main characteristics of naturalized philosophy. This is not to deny the validity of log- ical argumentation, critical thinking and conceptual analysis. It is “only” about their levelling out. Typically, naturalists declare that these methods constitute the very basis of scientific work that is already implicitly present in the work of any researcher. According to naturalists, the philosopher does not have any exclusive method that would entitle him to separate and benefit scientific activity. Natural- ists admire the experimental methods of special sciences, resting on their success vis-a-vis comparison to the sterility of philosophical methods, and draw the firm conclusion of the need to deliver all problems into the arms of sciences. TE H NORMATIvE TASk of PHILOSOPHy | 7 Defending the normative task of philosophy does not prove that a philoso- pher has, or should have, some specifically philosophical methods that are not accessible to other researchers. Defending normativity only declares that the philosopher should be a specialist on the correct application of the methods that are related (see above) to conceptual analysis, critical thinking, the logical argu- mentation, etc. The normative task of philosophy requires the careful monitoring of changes of scientific inquiry and critical reflection on the development of con- cepts, theoretical systems and modes of reasoning inherent in the various special sciences. The greatest poverty of contemporary philosophy lies in philosophers not grasping this given normative task. Concretely, the philosopher is not directly able to use developed philosophical methodologies. If he tries, he either locks himself into self-serving conceptual games (analytical metaphysics), or he does not suppose the need for critical oversight sciences, because he blindly trusts in their self-regulating abilities. 2A NatUR LISM AND NORMATIVITY In recent years, in the context of the dispute between naturalized and normative philosophy, the question if it is possible to create a new form of naturalism sensi- tive to issues of normativity is regularly discussed. For this potential approach has been called simply: liberal naturalism.2 The main common feature of both scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism is rejecting the supranatural, whether with regard to existing entities or to cognitive abilities.3 The whole debate could be forgotten by simply pointing out that this is a mis- understanding. Naturalism need not be conceived as an ontological doctrine. 2 De Caro, Macarthur 2010 (NaN). 3 It is possible to define scientific naturalism by two doctrines: the ontological and meth- odological: “Ontological doctrine of Scientific Naturalism: The world consists of nothing but the entities to which successful scientific explanations commit us. Methodological doctrine of Scientific Naturalism: Scientific inquiry is, in principle, our only genuine source of knowledge or understanding. All other alleged forms of knowledge (e.g., a priori knowledge) or understanding are either illegitimate or are reducible in principle to scientific knowledge or understanding” (NaN, p. 4) 8E | TH FUTURE of PHILOSOPHy After adopting a naturalistic stance (i.e., methodological naturalism) a naturalist may admit the existence of whatever entities, but only scientific (empirical) meth- ods. In so doing a naturalist can also recognize normativity as a specific human dimension and which is fundamentally skewed from a scientific understanding. 2.1 Liberal Naturalism Many authors concede that liberal naturalism is rarely defined precisely. We con- clude that this approach seeks to emancipate the social sciences and humanities by adopting a plurality of forms of understanding (nonscientific but non-super- natural) and a plurality of existing entities (nonscientific but non-supernatural). Finally, they propose a negative definition: “Liberal Naturalism, as we have seen, is best thought of as occupying typically overlooked conceptual space between Scientific Naturalism and Supernaturalism. A necessary condition for a view’s being a version of Liberal Naturalism is that it rejects Scientific Naturalism, hence that it rejects the ontological doctrine or the methodological doctrine, or both.”4 Mario De Caro’s and Alberto Voltolini’s Is Liberal Naturalism Possible? try to examine if there is logical space for liberal