Number 7 2014 ISSN 2196-3940 INTERNATIONAL Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia’s Muslims Amanda Kovacs Salafis, who defend a very conservative, literal interpretation of Islam and treat Shia Muslims with hostility, are not just a phenomenon in the Middle East. They are increasingly pressuring Shias and other religious minorities in Indonesia, too. Analysis Saudi Arabia is the world’s main provider of Islamic education. In addition to promoting Salafism and maligning other religious communities, Saudi educational materials present the kingdom in a favorable light and can also exacerbate religious strife, as they are doing in Indonesia. The Saudi educational program aims to create global alliances and legitimize the Saudi claim to be the leader of Islam – at home and abroad. Since switching to democracy in 1998, Indonesia has been shaken time and EDITION again by Salafi religious discrimination and violence, often on the part of graduates of LIPIA College in Jakarta, which was founded by Saudi Arabia in 1980. Domestically, Saudi Arabia uses educational institutions to stabilize the system; since the 1960s, it has become the largest exporter of Islamic education. After Saudi Arabia began to fight with Iran for religious hegemony in 1979, it founded schools and universities worldwide to propagate its educational traditions. In Jakarta, LIPIA represents a Saudi microcosm where Salafi norms and traditions prevail. LIPIA not only helps Saudi Arabia to influence Indonesian English society, it also provides a gateway to all of Southeast Asia. As long as Muslim societies fail to create attractive government-run educational institutions for their citizens, there will be ample room for Saudi influence. Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, education policy, Salafism www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus Salafism Is Polarizing Indonesia’s mildly penalizes, with just a few months in Muslims prison. On the other hand, Ahmadis in Indo- nesia have been forbidden to proselytize since Although Indonesia was a popular example 2008. Violators risk five years’ imprisonment. for the peaceful coexistence of the most var- Most of the violent acts against Muslim ied religions under Suharto’s military dicta- minorities are carried out by members of the torship (1967–1998), since democracy was in- Salafi3 Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pem- troduced in 1998, numerous religious con- bela Islam, FPI), founded in 1999. Wrapped flicts have come to the fore (Human Rights in white robes and turbans, FPI members set Watch 2013). While these conflicts were re- out with wooden clubs to attack what in their pressed by Suharto, the new room to maneu- view are dissidents and un-Islamic establish- ver means that in predominantly Sunni Indo- ments – people who belong to the Liberal Is- nesia conflicts are now erupting with great- lam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), er intensity.1 Since 2011, there has been a dra- and discotheques, nightclubs, and restau- matic increase in violence against and dis- rants that serve alcohol. The FPI is modeled crimination of Shia Muslims:2 In February on the Saudi religious police, who act as mor- 2011, a group of 200 Sunnis devastated a Shi- al guardians. FPI founder Habib Rizieq at- ite boarding school in Bangil and injured nine tended the Saudi Islamic and Arabic College pupils. That December, another boarding of Indonesia (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Is- school in Sampang was violently attacked. Its lam dan Arab, LIPIA)4 in Jakarta, then contin- 300 residents were driven out and are still liv- ued his studies in Riyadh with a Saudi gov- ing in emergency shelters. Tajul Muluk, the ernment scholarship. director of the destroyed Shia establishment, The Indonesian Salafi Warriors of Jihad was sentenced to two years in prison for blas- (Laskar Jihad, LJ) was founded in the year phemy. When he appealed, his sentence was 2000, when Muslims and Christians were vi- increased to four years. In 2012, the minister olently clashing on the eastern Moluccan is- for religious affairs, Suryadharma Ali, stated lands. Before it was disbanded in 2002, the that Shia Islam is a false interpretation of Is- LJ mobilized thousands of Indonesian Mus- lam. In this year’s presidential election cam- lims, trained them militarily, and led them to paign, conservative Sunni leaders like Cholil fight Christians. The group was identifiable Ridwan, who was trained at the Islamic Uni- by their broad white pants and shirts reminis- versity in Medina, called for crusades against cent of traditional Saudi clothing, and their the candidate Joko Widodo (Indonesian Dem- machetes. The founding of the LJ, its violence, ocratic Party of Struggle, Partai Demokrasi and its subsequent dissolution were justified Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), because it was by legal opinions of Saudi and Yemeni schol- rumored that if victorious, he might name ars whom the LJ founder Jafar Umar Thalib the Shiite intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat as consulted in consideration of the situation in minister for religious affairs (Vice News 2014). the Moluccas. These antagonistic attitudes among parts Like the FPI founder, Jafar Umar Thalib of the Indonesian population towards the graduated from LIPIA, the Saudi college in Shia minority, estimated at approximately 2.5 Jakarta. It is striking that many prominent In- million, are also transferred to other non-Sun- donesian Salafis attended LIPIA. LIPIA alum- ni groups. Ahmadis also suffer violent perse- ni Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, and cution and deadly attacks, which Indonesian Aunur Rafiq Ghufron are key actors in the law either does not punish at all or only very spread of Salafism through pesantren (Islamic boarding schools); LIPIA graduates Zain al- 1 The following information is the result of the author’s fieldwork in Indonesia and her source evaluations. 2 With more than 191 million Muslims, Indonesia has the 3 Salafism is understood as a literal reading of the Koran, world’s largest Muslim population; its 240 million inhabitants which, with the Hadith, is supposed to inform all aspects of make it the world’s fourth-largest nation by population. Six life. The academic literature distinguishes between political religions are officially recognized: Islam (approx. 87 percent and jihadist Salafists, who are ready to use violence, and the of the population), Protestantism (7 percent), Catholicism (3 quietistic, who are not interested in any political activities. percent), Hinduism (1.9 percent), Buddhism (1 percent), and For an introduction see: Said and Fouad 2014. Confucianism (0.13 percent). 4 See: <www.lipia.org>. GIGA Focus International Edition/English 7/2014 - 2 - Muttaqin, Nurcholis Ridwan, and Hepi Andi and the rights of religious minorities reflect founded the anti-West, anti-Semitic, Salafist its conservative tribal culture. These polit- magazine Sabili. ical and social contradictions are fodder for Guided by the values and traditions of the opposition, and especially for the Salafis, the “Wahhabi” Salafism of Saudi Arabia, who understand an Islamic state as one that these Islamist actors foment inter- and intra- renounces everything Western and consider religious tension in Indonesian society. Not the House of Saud to be illegitimate. With this only is their religious engagement Islamiz- view, in 1979 heavily armed Islamist radicals ing Indonesia with shades of Salafism, it is seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca, denounc- also Arabizing the country. ing the royal dynasty and criticizing Wahha- In the Saudi government’s effort to spread bi scholars for supporting it. In an attempt to Salafism, and especially its anti-Shia ideolo- prevent similar uprisings, Saudi Arabia has gy, transnational educational institutions like since sought to socialize its citizens in confor- LIPIA in Indonesia play an important role in mity with the state. Saudi educational insti- building alliances. Following the 1979 Shia tutions teach Wahhabism and peddle a posi- revolution in Iran and the Iranian/Saudi he- tive image of the royal family, describing the gemonic conflict that ensued, Indonesia took country as chosen by God to be Islam’s glob- on major strategic importance for Saudi reli- al center and the leader of the Muslim world. gious politics. With the world’s largest Mus- Saudi pedagogy generally opposes free and lim population, Indonesia is of particular in- critical thinking and teaches blind obedience terest to Saudi Arabia, which views it as the and submission to the existing religious-po- base and gateway for relations with the Mus- litical order. lims of Southeast Asia. Each year Indonesia Scholarly analyses (Center for Religious sends the largest share of Muslim pilgrims to Freedom of Freedom House 2006; Groiss the holy places in Mecca and Medina (hajj). 2003) of the ideology taught in Saudi school- This religious tourism brings money into the books find that it promotes an antipluralis- country, so Saudi Arabia also has a financial tic worldview with stereotypes of the enemy. interest in maintaining good relations with The teaching material is intended to cement Indonesia. loyalty to the supposedly single, true, and immutable Islam – an interpretation that sets apart the Saudi form of Islam, and preach- es hatred of atheists, Jews, Christians, Hin- Islamic Education Helps Legitimize dus, and all Muslim groups that do not fol- Saudi Arabia Domestically low the Saudi interpretation, especially Sufis and Shias. Textbooks also teach that the West Saudi transnational educational institutions is a permanent threat to Muslims – from the reflect the country’s self-image and export its time of the Crusades and continuing with in- educational content. Educational establish- ternational Zionism, which strives for world ments also serve an important domestic func- domination and is pushing Muslims into the tion for Saudi Arabia: spreading its own inter- defensive. Other threats come from Western pretation of Islam, and legitimizing and stabi- ideologies such as nationalism, communism, lizing the regime. Since it was established in socialism, secularism, humanism, and exis- 1932, the Saudi kingdom has had credibility tentialism.