£cx?N.Mlc \MPUcfifCtoNS THE LIMITS TO STABILITY: THE AE3ERMAT-H OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM, JANUARY 1973 - AUGUST 1974. YVONNE TAN PHD. THESIS UNIVERSITY OF LONDON (EXTERNAL) 1991. 1 ProQuest Number: 11015921 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 11015921 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 ABSTRACT ECONOMIC (MPUcAHws THE LIMITS TO STABILITY : THE AFTERMATH OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM, JANUARY 1973 - AUGUST 1974. The Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973 was intended, at least by some of its authors, to end the war and to bring peace to Vietnam and Indochina. Studies on the Agreement have gen­ erally focused on the American retreat from Vietnam and the military and political consequences leading to the fall of Saigon in April 1975. This study will seek to explore a number of questions which remain controversial. It addresses itself to considering whether under the circumstances prevailing between 1973 and 1974 the Paris Agreement could have worked. In the light of these circum­ stances it argues that the Agreement sought to establish a frame­ work for future stability and economic development through multilateral aid and rehabilitation aimed at the eventual survival of South Vietnam. The main thrust of the study is the interraction between the US and the Asian protagonists, considered on their own terms. Special prominence is given to the role of Japan, who endeavour -ed to contribute, under the Agreement's auspices, the centre of gravity for the economic dimension. From the Indochina 2 perspective the protagonists include the communist power centres of North Vietnam and Cambodia and the government of South Vietnam. The consequences of the accord for East Asia are also examined where it complemented new realities emerging there in the form of the Japan-China dialogue, the assumptions of US strategy and the diplomacy surrounding them. The attempt is made to identify through the day-to-day course of events the different stages in the evolution of the intended design. Especially close attention will be paid to certain periods to identify major turning points when the conjunction of events had a crucial bearing on the final out­ come. Equal consideration is given to explain how and why the Paris Agreement lost all credibility and was no longer a possible framework for stability in Vietnam and Indochina. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE.......................................................................................................1 ABSTRACT.....................................................................:................................. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................... 4 LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES..................................................................7 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......... 8 A NOTE ON VIETNAMESE, CHINESE AND JAPANESE NAMES 10 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..............................................................................11 PART I INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................13 NOTES...............................................................................................................28 CHAPTER 1 : THE SETTING, JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1973 ................29 I : THE PARIS AGREEMENT, 27 JANUARY 1973 ........................31 I I : THE INDOCHINA PERSPECTIVE : VIETNAM.........................46 III: THE INDOCHINA PERSPECTIVE : CAMBODIA..................... 57 IV : THE EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE..............................................72 NOTES ............................................................................................................. 94 CHAPTER 2 : SIXTY DAYS & AFTER, MARCH - APRIL 1973 ........... 105 I: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS ..................................................105 I I : AID AS PART OF THE EQUATION ......................................113 m : JAPAN AT A CROSSROADS......................................................129 IV: CAMBODIA STILL AT WAR.......................................................148 NOTES............................................................................................................. 164 4 CHAPTER 3 : THE INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE I, MAY - JUNE 1973 I: VIETNAM ................................................. 173 II: CAMBODIA................. 194 HI: A ROLE FOR JAPAN................................................................212 NOTES........................... ,...............................................................................226 CHAPTER 4 : THE INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE II, JULY-AUGUST 1973 I : THE CAMBODIAN DEBACLE .................................................. 233 II: HANOI & ITS ALLIES.................................................................255 IH: JAPAN’S'BLUEPRINT............................................................... 265 IV: THE OIL FACTOR............. .278 NOTES...........................................................................................................289 PART II CHAPTER 5 : THE TRANSITION, MID-AUGUST - DECEMBER 1973 I: THESINO-FRENCHINITIATIVE.............................................. 297 H : JAPAN : NORMALISATION & AFTER............................... 304 m : THE SCENARIO CHANGES......................................................314 IV : CAMBODIA : 'SIDE ISSUE'....................................................... 328 V : TOKYO & HANOI : THE OIL INITIATIVE.......................... 335 NOTES............................................................................................................343 CHAPTER 6 : THE LIMITS TO STABILITY, JANUARY - AUGUST 1974 I : RECONSTRUCTION VERSUS CONFLICT..............................352 n : THE OVEREXTENDED COMMITMENT................................. 369 IE: INTER-COMMUNIST RELATIONS ..........................................388 IV : JAPAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGY.........................................399 NOTES 5 EPILOGUE ...................... .433 NOTES.............................................................................................................453 CONCLUSION..............................................................................................458 APPENDICES ...............................................................................................467 APPENDIX I ...............................................................................................468 APPENDIX II ............................................................................................... 487 APPENDIX III ............................................................................................... 499 BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................518 6 LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES MAP OF INDOCHINA: POLITICAL, 1973 .................................................. 56 MAP OF EAST ASIA : POLITICAL, 1973 ................................................. 71 TABLE 1, JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1973 ......... 92 TABLE 2, 26 FEBRUARY- 27 MARCH 1973 ...........................................146 TABLE 3, 2 - 28 APRIL 1973 ..................................................................... 147 TABLE 4, MAY - MID- JUNE 1973 ............................................. 225 TABLE 5, JULY- MID- AUGUST 1973 ..................................................... 288 TABLE 6, DECEMBER 1973- FEBRUARY 1974 ..................................386 7 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS US. JAPAN & SOUTH VIETNAM: ADB Asian Development B ank AID Agency for International Development ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam ASPAC Asian and Pacific Council DMZ The Demilitarised Zone ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) ICCS International Commission for Control and Supervision IMF International Monetary Fund JCP Japanese Communist Party JEC Joint Economic Commission JGS Joint General Staff JMC Joint Military Commission JSP Japanese Socialist Party LDP Liberal Democratic Party MTTI Ministry of International Trade and Industry NCNRC National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord NEC National Energy Commission (South Vietnam) NPC National Petroleum Commission (South Vietnam) OCCA Overseas Construction Cooperation Association (Japan) OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries PDC Petroleum Development Corporation (Japan) RVN Republic of Vietnam UN United Nations WSAG Washington Special Actions Group CHINA. CAMBODIA. NORTH VIETNAM & THE SOVIET UNION: CCP Chinese Communist Party COMECON Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) COSVN Central Office, South Vietnam CPK Communist Party of Kampuchea CPNLAF Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam FUNK National United Front of Kampuchea GRUNK Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea NLF National Liberation Front (South Vietnam)