Hastings International and Comparative Law Review Volume 28 Article 7 Number 1 Fall 2004 1-1-2004 Descent into Authoritarianism: Barriers to Constitutional Rule in Belarus Eric R. Reed Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_international_comparative_law_review Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Eric R. Reed, Descent into Authoritarianism: Barriers to Constitutional Rule in Belarus, 28 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 147 (2004). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol28/iss1/7 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Descent into Authoritarianism: Barriers to Constitutional Rule in Belarus By ERIC R. REED* Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union has allowed the legal community to observe the creation and early trials of several new constitutions. One notable commentator referred to East-Central Europe as a "constitutional laboratory."' Few expected the rule of law to graft easily onto governments and peoples ruled for decades by authoritarian regimes. As expected, the progress made by these states in the last decade varies. Belarus arguably achieved least, and remains classified generally as a state reverting to authoritarianism. 2 President and former collective farm manager Alexander Lukashenka's political abuses deserve some share of blame for this backsliding. However, additional political, social, and judicial factors hinder Belarus' transition to the rule of law. This note analyzes Belarus' failure to reform and its reversion to Soviet-style authoritarianism. It first provides a historical synopsis of Alexander Lukashenka's election as President and his subsequent consolidation of constitutional power. It then explores the political, social, and judicial barriers to constitutional rule of law in Belarus. Finally, this note concludes that reform is not likely under the current regime, and would remain difficult under a new regime. * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005. 1. Ret R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions - Product of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (1998). 2. See Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under Post-CommunistDemocratization Programs, 2002 J.Disp. RESOL. 327, 342-43 (2002). Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 28:165 I. Brief Contemporary History of Belarus: Alexander Lukashenka's Election as President A. Election of President Alexander Lukashenka and the 1996 constitutional referendum The perceived failure of economic development led to the dismissal and indictment of the reform-minded Belarusian Chairman of Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich in 1994.3 Belarus subsequently held its first presidential election, in which voters elected parliament member and former collective farm manager Alexander Lukashenka, who ran on an anti-corruption platform.4 The international community recognized the election as "relatively free and fair."5 Lukashenka's relationship with the West floundered almost immediately. By 1995 the American media considered Lukashenka a "progressing paranoiac.",6 He accused the United States of playing a role in 7 the Soviet Union's breakup and conducting sabotage activities in Belarus. Belarus' domestic harmony fared little better under the new president. In 1995, Lukashenka suggested introducing direct presidential rule to circumvent his opposition, which he considered "entrenched" in parliament.8 The Belarusian parliament appreciated the magnitude of the impending constitutional crisis, and in September 1996 sought to compromise with Lukashenka. 9 At this time Lukashenka's parliamentary faction planned to increase presidential power through referendum and amendment of the 1994 constitution.1° The parliament suggested a "Conciliatory Constitutional Commission" as an alternative; the proposed body would decide upon and then present the amendments to the 3. Michael P. Malloy, Colloquium: Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1911, 1926 (1994). 4. Alexander Lukashuk, Explaining Lukashenko's Hold on Power, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 43, 44 (1998); Dario Thuburn, 14-Country EU Travel Ban on Belarus Leadership Approved, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Nov. 20, 2002, available at LEXIS News (summarizing Lukashenka's background and rise to power). 5. Human Rights Watch, Background: Republic of Belarus, at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/belarus/Belarus-03.htm> (visited 09/10/04). 6. Yuras Karmanov, Lukashenko Intends to Introduce Direct Presidential Rule, SEGODNYA, Nov. 1, 1995, at 3. 7. id. 8. Id. 9. Sergie Anisko, Parliament Makes Move to Settle Conflict with Head of State, SEGODNYA, Sept. 21, 1996, at 1. 10. Id. 2004] Descent into Authoritarianism parliament - not the voters - for approval.' 1 2 The proposed referendum alarmed the EU and United States.1 Even13 Russia attempted to broker a deal between Lukashenka and parliament, and hoped that "the art of political compromise [would] replace the ambitions and confrontations among politicians." 14 Meanwhile, the word "impeachment" had begun circulating in Belarus, and was the subject of a 10,000-strong democratic rally in Minsk in July 1996.15 Seven leading political parties decried the proposed constitutional amendments, and accused Lukashenka of attempting to establish a dictatorship through the referendum. 16 On the eve of the referendum a minority of parliament futilely attempted to impeach the president.' 7 But it was too late. Belarus held the referendum between November 9 and 24, 1996, with voters ostensibly amending the Belarusian Constitution in what Parliament8 Chairman Semyon Sharetsky called "a farce and abuse of the people."' B. Subsequent reversion to authoritarianism Since the Soviet Union's dissolution, Belarus slid into authoritarianism "after a good start."'19 Some now describe the current Belarusian government as "the one remaining ultra-authoritarian regime" in 2 Europe. 0 The country's relationship with Western powers deteriorated swiftly in the wake of Lukashenka's consolidation of power. After the referendum, the Parliamentary Assembly of Europe suspended Belarus' "specially invited" status over growing human rights abuses.2' The 11. Id. 12. Phil Reeves, EU Sounds Alarm at Belarus Showdown, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 20, 1996, at 16. 13. Helen Womack, Belarus Poll Paves Way to Dictatorship, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 25, 1996, at 11. 14. See Reeves, supra note 12. 15. Anatoly Kozlovich, How Would You Say "Impeachment" in Belorussian?, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, July 31, 1996, No. 31, at 2. 16. Id. 17. Vladimir Kuznechevsky, Politicians Put the Fat in the Fire; But What About the People?, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, Nov. 21, 1996, at 1, 7. 18. Mikhail Pastukhov, PresidentialAbuse of Powers in Belarus, 4 PARKER SCH. J. E. EuR.L. 479, 479 (1997). 19. Alkon, supra note 2, at 344. See generally Thomas Carothers, The End of the TransitionParadigm, 13 J. DEM. 5 (2002) (describes and analyzes the inherent challenges in democratization). 20. A Few Dinosaurs;Serbia, Belarus and Moldova, WORLD AND I, Dec. 1, 2002, at 26 (available at LEXIS News). 21. Sergei Glotov, BelorussiaBeing Driven Away from the Council of Europe, PRAVDA, Jan. 9, 1997, at 1-2. Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 28:165 European Union Foreign Ministers Council likewise expressed concern over Lukashenka's human rights violations when the Council imposed a mild political and economic blockade on Belarus Since the constitutional referendum, Belarus "has seen an alarming trend towards greater state intervention in religious affairs"23 and increased subordination of lawyers. 24 United States assistance to Belarus dropped 70% between Lukashenka's election in 1994 and the present.25 Belarus' relations with the West hit a new low in 1998, when Lukashenka evicted American, German, British, French, Italian, and IMF officials from the Drozdy diplomatic compound in Minsk.26 II. Barrier One: Lukashenka's Abuses of Power A. Freedom of speech abuses Belarusian slander laws restricting speech freedoms predated Lukashenka's rise to power in 1994. In 1992, a state enterprise sued Supreme Soviet (Belarusian parliament) Deputy Evgeniy Novikov, who earlier alleged corruption within the enterprise. 27 The court fined Novikov for making the corruption claim and the judge later personally sued Novikov when he criticized the judge's decision.28 Later, an Afghan war veteran, along with relatives of veterans who perished in the war, sued writer Svetlana Aleksievich when a local newspaper published excerpts of her book describing Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan.29 The Belarusian government also sued the Belarusian correspondent for Russian newspaper 30 Kommersant. Lukashenka's regime further restricted the freedom of the press after coming to power. The government currently owns almost all major newspapers, and most independent newspapers are "relatively small and 22. Anna Baneva, Europe Declares Cold War on Belarus, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, Sept. 18, 1997, at 4. 23. Alexander Vashkevich, The Relationship of Church and State in Belarus: Legal Regulation and Practice,2003 BYUL. REV. 681, 708 (2003).