Control + 1 Block Headings s11

05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 1 DDI 10 – CMR Generic 1NC...... 2 **********Uniqueness*********...... 5 Uniqueness – CMR Strong Now...... 6 Uniqueness – Brink...... 8 *********Links************...... 10 Links – Action Without Consultation...... 11 Links – TNW’s...... 13 Links – Iraq...... 15 Links – Afghanistan...... 18 Links – South Korea...... 20 Links – Japan...... 21 Links – Asym...... 22 **************Internal Links*******...... 23 Internal Link – Angering The Military...... 24 Internal Links – Modeling...... 25 Internal Links – Cooperation...... 26 Internal Links – Failed States...... 27 ***********Impacts**********...... 28 Impacts – Solvency...... 29 Impacts – Irregular War...... 30 Impacts – Irregular War (Iraq)...... 32 Impacts – Readiness...... 33 Impacts – Readiness (Civilian)...... 34 Impacts – Pakistan...... 35 Impacts – Pakistan Instability...... 36 Impacts – Terrorism...... 37 Impacts – Soft Power...... 38 Impacts – India...... 39 Impacts – Iraq...... 40 ***********Aff Answers*********...... 41 Aff Answers – Non Unique...... 42 Aff Answers – CMR Resilient...... 44 Aff Answers – Impact Inevitable...... 45 Aff Answers – South Korea...... 46 Aff Answers – Civlian Link Turn...... 47Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 1 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 2 1NC A. Civlian Military Relations Strong, Despite McChrystal AFP 7/14 [7/14/10, " Holbrooke: No US civilian-military split in Kabul ", http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iqaoyPndfXzRPMz-kHjc5kvE5hbA] Top US diplomats and military leaders in Afghanistan are "absolutely on the same page" in the wake of General Stanley McChrystal's removal, special envoy Richard Holbrooke said on Wednesday. "We are absolutely on the same page when it comes to the overall strategy a nd working together," Holbrooke told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing focused on the civilian front of the faltering campaign. The veteran diplomat had been asked by Democratic Senator Robert Menendez about a Rolling Stone magazine profile in which McChrystal and his aides heaped scorn on US diplomats and decisionmakers in Washington, including Holbrooke. The article led US President Barack Obama to fire McChrystal, replacing him with General David Petraeus, while some Republican US senators pressed the White House to clean house completely on the civilian side of the war effort. Holbrooke said the attacks on him in Rolling Stone -- an unnamed McChrystal aide said the general viewed the diplomat as a "wounded animal" fearful for his job and therefore "dangerous" -- "made no difference" to how he did his job. He called the article "extraordinarily unfortunate" in that it led to the end of McChrystal's career, while praising Obama's dismissal of the general as "a completely correct decision" that "was necessary to do." Holbrooke said he has "worked seamlessly" with Petraeus in the past despite some "tactical disagreements" and that the current civilian-military partnership in Kabul "is the best one I've ever seen." "We're in good shape here and I am fully satisfied about it," Holbrooke told the panel. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 2 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 3 1NC B.. Reducing foreign military presence sparks massive backlash that undermines CMR Kohn 8 - Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, Winter 2008, “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil- Military Relations,” World Affairs, online: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html Yet imagine the outcry any one of these proposals would provoke, and the resistance it would generate from the services, agencies, and congressional committees whose ox was being gored. The delegation or defense company about to lose a base or a weapons contract would certainly howl—and mobilize. Organizational change in any bureaucracy provokes enormous and almost always successful resistance. In the Pentagon, the battles have been epic. The world has a say in all this, too. The next administration will take office nearly twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet the American military establishment is essentially the same one created in the 1940s and 1950s to deter the Soviet Union. The United States today boasts four independent armed services with the same weapons, upgraded and more capable to be sure, as those known to George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, and Curtis LeMay. Not only are the ships, planes, tanks, vehicles, and guns similar, but they are organized similarly, performing virtually the same roles and missions assigned them in the late 1940s. The United States after 1989 did not demobilize. It “downsized.” Successive administrations cut the budget by ten percent and the size of the force by about 25 percent, while the Pentagon substituted regional threats for the Soviet menace in its planning. Even in the midst of a “Global War on Terrorism,” neither the generals nor their bosses in the White House and Congress have been able to rethink the purpose, organization, command and control, or even operation of the armed forces . Two decades is a long time. The decades between 1895 and 1915, 1935 and 1955, and 1975 and 1995 all involved paradigm shifts in America’s role in the world and in its national security requirements. Today’s security situation differs no less radically from the Cold War for which today’s military establishment was devised. Are these the armed forces we really need? Bitter fights over strategy, budgets, weapons, and roles and missions dating back sixty-plus years suggest the question may not be answerable in any practical sense. To understand fully just how difficult it will be to raise fundamental concerns about defense policies, consider the recent confusion over what exactly the role and purpose of the National Guard and reserves ought to be. A week before 9/11, I participated in a roundtable discussion of the subject for the Reserve Forces Policy Board. There was general agreement that reserve forces should concentrate more on homeland defense and less on backstopping active duty forces on the battlefield. Yet the former head of the National Guard Bureau insisted, without evidence and in the face of great skepticism, that the Guard and reserves could do both. The past five years have proved him wrong; reserve forces are underequipped and stretched thinner than the active duty army and Marine Corps. Today, a congressionally chartered commission on the National Guard and reserves still struggles with how to shape and organize the reserves (particularly the National Guard, which reports to each state governor unless summoned for federal service). Admittedly, the National Guard and reserves possess unusual political power and since 1789 have been more resistant to rational military policy than any other part of the national security community. Robert McNamara, who transformed American defense more than any other Pentagon leader, failed utterly to budge the Guard and reserve. None of his successors possessed the nerve even to try. But the problem cannot be avoided. As the commission wrote in bureaucratic understatement, in March 2007, “the current posture and utilization of the National Guard and Reserve as an ‘operational reserve’ is not sustainable over time, and if not corrected with significant changes to law and policy, the reserve component’s ability to serve our nation will diminish.” All the more so because Iraq and Afghanistan compose the first substantial, extended military conflicts the United States has fought with a volunteer force in more than a century. Today’s typical combat tour of fifteen months is the longest since World War II. Expensive procurement programs are underway, but sooner or later they will be robbed to pay for other costs, such as war operations, the expansion of ground forces, or medical and veterans costs. Already, the Project on Defense Alternatives has proposed cutting two Air Force wings, two Navy wings, and two aircraft carriers for a total savings of more than $60 billion over the next five years. Eventually, the bill comes due, either in blood, defeat, or political crisis. As the old Fram oil filter advertisement put it, “Pay me now, or pay me later.” Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 3 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 4 1NC C. Weak CMR destroys readiness. Cohn – Graduate Student in Political Science at Duke – 1999 (Lindsay, "The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate," www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohn_literature_review.pdf) There do seem to be a few positions which appear more often than others in the literature: one is that there is a necessary cultural gap between the military and the civilian, and that particular gap is positive. The military needs its distinctive culture, and as long as it is dependent on the surrounding society for recruits, funding, and services, the cultural divide cannot become dangerously wide.74 However, the lack of contact between military and civilian life - embodied in the dwindling numbers of veterans in the population and especially in government,75 in the tiny numbers of people who have any knowledge of or significant intercourse with military personnel, in the growing numbers of service-members who come from military families, and especially in the blatant political disagreement between the military and the civilian elite - is troubling. The divide is especially troubling because the military has developed a contempt for the society it is supposed to protect, and could possibly turn on or abandon that society in some way. Equally troubling are civilian officials who do not understand the military and its capabilities and limitations, and are apt to use it in inappropriate ways, straining it beyond what it can bear and threatening the national interest or security . The situation is troubling because it harms recruiting, leading to shortfalls in manpower, low morale, declining quality in the ranks, and reduced effectiveness .76D. Readiness deters war – lack of readiness means inevitable intervention Jack Spencer, Defense and National Security Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, 9-15-2K, “THE FACTS ABOUT MILITARY READINESS,” Heritage Foundation Reports, N. 1394, P. 1 TP U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by comparing America's armed forces with other nations' militaries. Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's national security requirements should be the measure of U.S. military readiness. Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once. America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower , has many enemies . Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States " must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat . A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 4 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 5**********Uniqueness*********Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 5 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 6 Uniqueness – CMR Strong Now CMR Is On the Uptick – Petraeus is Bending Backwards to Ensure It NYT 7/3 [Mark Landler, 7/3/10, " Let's, Er, Try to Work Together", www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/weekinreview/04landler.html] It is tempting to conclude that the arrival of General Petraeus will consolidate the supremacy of the Pentagon in the war effort. He certainly starts out with great prestige in Washington, drawn from his performance in Iraq, and his status as the intellectual father of the strategy. But there are reasons to believe that the State Department will continue to play a substantial role, if only because that is what General Petraeus wants. He has pledged a “unity of effort” between the civilian and military operations, and he met with Ambassador Eikenberry at a NATO meeting in Brussels so the two of them could fly into Kabul together on Friday. For all the parallels between Afghanistan and Iraq, there are key differences that will require robust diplomacy. In Iraq, General Petraeus was able to turn the tide by peeling away Sunni leaders who were willing to work with American forces against jihadi extremists. But in Afghanistan, any similar process requires Pakistan's cooperation. Afghanistan's neighbor has influence over powerful players like the Haqqani network, which is closely allied with the Taliban, and it is a sanctuary for leaders of the Afghan Taliban. Officials say that General Petraeus plans to shuttle between Kabul and Islamabad, conferring on issues like reintegrating Taliban fighters into Afghan society. But it easy to imagine that in the negotiations for a broader political settlement between Mr. Karzai and the Taliban, the general could turn to Mr. Holbrooke, whom he described last week as his “wingman.” Mr. Holbrooke, after all, played a central role in the Dayton peace accords, which ended the war in Bosnia. “One of the reasons the selection of General Petraeus was such a masterstroke was that he understands the importance of a civilian-military effort ,” said John A. Nagl, a retired Army officer who is now president of the Center for a New American Security, a Washington research group, and who helped write the counterinsurgency handbook under General Petraeus. “He'll bend over backwards to make it work.” Petreaus is Revitalizing CMR FOXNews 7/4 [7/4/10, " Petraeus Appeals for Military-Civilian Cooperation in Afghanistan ", http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/04/petraeus-appeals-military-civilian-cooperation-afghanistan/] Gen. David Petraeus, in a July 4 message to troops and diplomats in Afghanistan, called for a "team effort" between the military and civilian sides of the war as Sen. John McCain continued to question whether that's possible. Petraeus formally took command in Afghanistan Sunday after Gen. Stanley McChrystal resigned over divisive comments he and his aides made in a magazine article last month. The comments underscored the tension that exists between the military and civilian teams -- something the incoming general is aiming to smooth over immediately. "This endeavor has to be a team effort. We must strive to contribute to the 'Team of Teams' at work in Afghanistan and to achieve unity of effort with our diplomatic, international civilian and Afghan partners as we carry out a comprehensive, civil-military counterinsurgency campaign," he wrote Sunday. Petraeus made a similar plea in remarks to troops upon taking command. "Cooperation is not optional," he said. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 6 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 7 Uniqueness – CMR Strong Now McCrystal Humbeled Both Sides – CMR Strong NYT 7/3 [Mark Landler, 7/3/10, " Let's, Er, Try to Work Together", www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/weekinreview/04landler.html] That, at least, is one way to read the conversation, especially in light of the harsh comments about civilian officials that General McChrystal had allowed members of his staff to make in front of a reporter. But another is that the McChrystal episode — and rumors that Ambassador Eikenberry might be replaced — have chastened officials on both sides, and that both now want to avoid a zero-sum game between State and Defense in Afghanistan. There, more even than in Iraq , the military and civilian sides need each other.Obama’s cabinet decisions rebuilt CMR Desch, 09 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making at Texas A&M's George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, (Do the troops love Obama or hate him? http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/25/obamas_civil_military_relations]Despite the pessimistic tone of Kohn's article, he was surprisingly up-beat at our panel. The root of this optimism was his belief that both the senior military leadership and the Obama administration are eager to reestablish better relations after the acrimony of the last sixteen years. Kohn was impressed with Obama's pragmatism on this front: The new President had taken steps to cover his flank by appointing a number of retired senior officers to his cabinet and other high-level positions, including General James Jones as National Security Advisor, General Shinseki as Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and Admiral Dennis Blair as Director of National Intelligence. Also, Kohn thought that Obama's decision to keep on Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense was an astute move, not only given the secretary's success in rebuilding the bridges to the military that his predecessor burned, but also because having a Republican in this position will make it hard for Republicans to criticize Obama's draw-down in Iraq or conduct of the war in Afghanistan. Finally, at the purely atmospheric level, he commended the Obama for striking the right cord in dealing with the troops, sending the First Lady on her first official trip to visit Ft. Bragg and shying away from rekindling the military culture wars by taking a lower key approach to such hot-button issues as rescinding the gay ban. I agree with Kohn that both President Obama and the current military leadership have so far taken positive steps to try to heal the civil-military rupture. But I have an even simpler explanation for the apparent change in atmospherics: After the last eight years of the Bush administration's meddling in, and mismanagement of, military affairs, even a Democrat doesn't look too bad these days to our men and women in uniform. That's at least one thing for which we can thank the last administration. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 7 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 8 Uniqueness – BrinkCMR is dangerous, but obama’s concessions of troop increases are keeping it afloat Gerson 7-14 [Michael Gerson, journalist, 7-14-2010, “Orchestra of one man bands” Washington Post, posted on patriotpost.com, http://patriotpost.us/opinion/michael-gerson/2010/07/14/orchestra-of-one-man-bands/]The military-civilian gap on Afghan policy remains wide. There is little doubt that Biden and America's ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, remain skeptical of the mission. And there are reasons for skepticism, including Afghan corruption and lack of effective administration. But one of the largest reasons for pessimism is created, or at least tolerated, by the president himself -- the discord among administration officials. This was supposed to be the process presidency -- thoughtful, careful and deliberative. But Obama turns out to be a poor manager of people. Leaders such as Biden, Petraeus, Eikenberry and Mattis may be individually impressive. Together, they seem like an orchestra of one-man bands. A team of rivals requires a decisive president. But Obama had ended up splitting differences that ought not to have been sp lit. He supported the military's strategy and troop request , while accepting a deadline for beginning withdrawal that is now just 12 months away -- a deadline regularly reaffirmed by White House officials and Democratic congressional leaders. This approach has a contradiction at its core. One of the main military priorities in Afghanistan is to peel off that portion of the bad guys -- called by American strategists the "10-dollar-a-day Taliban" -- who might be won over by a combination of intimidation and outreach. But why should these rebels tie their fate to a retreating power?Changes in military power made by the white house has put relations on the brink Seymour M. Hersh, staff writer for the New Yorker, 7/7/08 (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?printable=true#ixzz0uNbc91NG) The law cited by Sheehan is the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, known as Goldwater-Nichols, which defined the chain of command: from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on to the various combatant commanders, who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations, including joint training and logistics. That authority, the act stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. But the Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror, instituted new policies that undercut regional commanders-in-chief; for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commands around the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support and equipment. The degradation of the traditional chain of command in the past few years has been a point of tension between the White House and the uniformed military. “ The coherence of military strategy is being eroded because of undue civilian influence and direction of nonconventional military operations,” Sheehan said. “If you have small groups planning and conducting military operations outside the knowledge and control of the combatant commander, by default you can’t have a coherent military strategy. You end up with a disaster, like the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.” Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 8 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 9 Uniqueness – BrinkMultiple causalities make the relations between Obama and the military on the brink Sarah Sewall and John P. White, staff writers for the Boston Global, 1/29/09 (http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge?mode=PF)President Obama has inherited a compounding set of problems - ongoing global military operations, long-deferred strategy and budget choices, and stark new economic realities. Anticipating the end of expanding budgets and unquestioned supplemental funding, the services will begin circling the wagons to defend programs and budget shares. All parties in the defense community will face enormous institutional pressure to protect their equities in the Pentagon and in the field with the help of allies in Congress. This is hardly an auspicious environment for building trust and cooperation. Obama must not only fortify a relationship that has accumulated significant strains and endured occasional malpractice, he must make it strong enough to withstand inherent frictions and tough decisions. Several problems require attention from senior leaders - and are key barriers to restoring strategic and fiscal discipline within the Pentagon. The changes needed will only be manifested if the senior leadership, military and civilian, work together.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 9 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 10*********Links************Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 10 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 11 Links – Action Without Consultation Without military involvement in civilian discussions, CMR deteriorates Cohen in 97 (Eliot A. Cohen is a professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University USA, Spring 1997, Science Direct-Orbis http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V- 45MCTRS-42&_user=4257664&_origUdi=B6W5V-45MCTW3- 4N&_fmt=high&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F1998&_rdoc=1&_orig=article&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_useri d=4257664&md5=ab4f40b1551d11312a3ef79a8795f60b)The American military faced similar dilemmas after the Civil War and World War I, for a brief time after World War II, and following the Vietnam War.’ At least one lesson clearly emerged from those experiences: the military profession dare not withdraw into an ethical cocoon and take on a defensive posture. Instead, it must make a prudent and positive response to the travails imposed on it and not shrink from articulating its views in the public square. In short, senior military officers must reshape the very notion of military professionalism by candidly admitting the impact of politics on the military’s ability to do its job and daring to practice constructive political engagement. This would appear to violate the sacred code of silence by which the U.S. military is strictly apolitical, offers technical advice only, and goes out of its way to honor the principle of civilian control. But only through constructive political engagement can military professionals legitimate their role in policy debates, provide a dear boundary between defense policy and merely partisan politics, and provide the American public with a clearer understanding of military life and culture. Nor are constructive political engagement and loyalty to the country, civilian leadership, and the Constitution in any way incongruous. Indeed, such constructive political engagement, far from threatening to make the military an independent actor, presupposes that the military is dependent upon a variety of political actors and the public at large. It is because the U.S. military is under such tight civilian control that it needs to make its voice heard in civilian councils. Any number of issues might fall within the scope of constructive political engagement, but the two most critical are the so-called “democratization” of the military (the convergence or divergence between the military and society) and the problematical utility of military force in the foreign policy contingencies of the century to come. These issues are interconnected and have a profound impact on the military’s operational effectiveness, To be sure, it has been an article of faith among military professionals and civilians alike that a wall exists in America between the military and politics. But that faith is not only historically invalid, it denies current reality. The American domestic landscape and the international strategic landscape are, and have always been, politically and militarily inextricable, while the use of military force has always been shaped by political considerations. If the skill, wisdom, and experience residing in our officers corps are to be tapped by our national leadership, the military profession itself must be philosophically broadened and encouraged to involve itself judiciously in the policy arena.’ This would include the development of a more comprehensive view of politics, greater sensitivity to the realities underpinning the American political system, and more assertive presentation of the military viewpoint within the parameters of American democracy.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 11 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 12 Links – Action Without Consultation Consistent decisions and involvement of military in decision-making key to CMR Sarah Sewall and John P. White, staff writers at the Boston Globe, 2009, “The Civil-Military Challenge”, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/01/29/the_civil_military_challenge/?page=2We interviewed several dozen former secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, service chiefs, and combatant commanders. While their views differed significantly depending upon their experiences, several themes emerged across six former administrations. One finding is that senior civilian and military leaders often lack a common understanding of roles and reciprocal responsibilities within the partnership. The traditional shorthand that "civilians make policy and the military executes" is overly simplistic, masking the intricate mutual dependence of the parties. For example, civilians may not see their policymaking role as accompanied by a responsibility to ensure that military concerns about policy implementation have been fully addressed. Military leaders may define their substantive advising role narrowly and perform it only in response to civilian inquiry. These misunderstandings have proven costly in national security decision-making. In addition, the parties largely fail to harness the inherent frictions in the relationship. The roles of various civil and military actors abut and overlap in practice, particularly when multiple civilian authorities (including members of Congress) are engaged. Managing the inevitable tensions without rancor or overreaction is a key responsibility of the civilian leadership. Transparent and consistent decision-making processes would also help clarify roles and build trust in civil-military relations, particularly in terms of reinforcing the importance and scope of military advice. When that process is inclusive, it is viewed by military actors as more satisfactory - even if the outcomes are not preferred by military actors.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 12 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 13 Links – TNW’s Nuclear reductions cause a civil-military split over irresolvable value issues. Megorden, 2k [Cadet Kima, United States Air Force Academy, “EPISTEMOLOGY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: MANIFESTATIONS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS” http://www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE01/Megorden01.html] As stated by the Triangle Institute of Security Studies, the civil-military gap appears to be wider in the realm of ideas and values than in specific policy issues. Civilians tend to propose reductions in the nuclear arsenal whereas military members tend to want to keep the force structure status quo. This diversion is a product of the Cold War mentality of effective deterrence. It is problematic on the part of civilians who, for the most part, fail to understand both the complexities and efficacy of nuclear deterrence strategy. However, it is problematic on the part of some members of the military community who think that a focus on nuclear deterrence alone can best provide for national security. The gap in nuclear ethics is rooted in the civilians’ discomfiture of the size of the military in the Post-cold war world. The civilian sector does not see nuclear deterrence as an element of US national security; it sees it simply as piece of military weaponry. Naturally, if there is no longer a monolithic enemy like the Soviets, then why have the weapons that were built up strictly for that enemy? The deterrence that is provided by nuclear weapons is seen as unnecessary by the civilian sector if there is no enemy. With a less visible, peacetime force, much of the civilian sector sees nuclear weapons as simply an instigator, not a deterrent to nuclear war. However, the civilian sector is stuck in a Cold War mentality just like the military sector. The Cold War nuclear paradigm was very numbers based. Retaliation naturally called for a numbers based philosophy. However, in a post-cold war world, it seems that the debate continues to focus on numbers. The civilian sector wants drastic reductions or even an elimination of nuclear weapons; the military sector wants to keep them. In a multi-polar world, is there a way to definitively say that we can set an exact number that will eliminate the moral dilemmas and keep national security? Both sides seem to be missing the fundamental nature and mission of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is a means to prevent other nations from questioning our power, thus creating stability and even saving lives. It does this by instilling fear into other nations. It is other our adversaries’ fear of the intention of our nation to pose nuclear retaliation if they violate a set of conditions that prevents certain horrific attacks. Political scientists define this fear as power politics or cost- benefit evaluations; most philosophers define it as a morally imperfect means to preventing an even more morally problematic end. However, in a post- cold war environment, it is feasible to say that we are in a time where other elements of national deterrence (dissuasion and denial) are more effective in instilling fear in other nations, therefore more effective and ethical in ensuring our survival. Members of the civilian sector that propose elimination of nuclear weaponry need to realize the lower emphasis of nuclear deterrence in national security strategy. They need to realize that the reason that nuclear deterrence had the lead role in Cold War was because it was the most effective avenue at the present time. However, a complete reverse is not possible. Pandora has been let out of the box, and cannot be put back in. The most moral way the United States has of reducing immoral intentions of national deterrence is to maximize other elements of fear instilled by denial and dissuasion. This puts the immoral intention of nuclear retaliation lower on the list of deterrence options. The military and civilian sides of the debate need to learn to extend their discussions beyond those of reductions – yes or no. If not, both sides will be stuck in a bi-polar debate over numbers while the opportunity to reduce nuclear retaliatory intentions pass us by.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 13 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 14 Link – TNW’s Military opposition—fears changes to one leads to slippery slope. Sauer 5 Tom Sauer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Politics, University of Antwerp, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005. [Nuclear Inertia: US Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War, p. 87-8] Changing one element of the nuclear policy could have had major consequences for the posture as a whole as force structure, declaratory, and operational policy are intimately linked. The military therefore feared that in case they would agree to change a minor element, they would open Pandora's box. The defence establishment was afraid that giving away (parts of) the nuclear business would stimulate demands for reductions in other domains as well. It wasextremely afraid that it had to reduce its size considerably as had been the case afterthe First World War and Second World War. The major premise of the CS defenceestablishment after the Cold War became to give away as little as possible. RichardKolus, chief historian of the Air Force in the 19BPs, wrote in 1994: 'By BillClinton's inauguration a year ago, the military had accepted "downsizing" andreorganization, but not changes that invaded too dramatically the traditionalfunctions of each of the individual armed services, or that changed too radically the[PAGE 88] snail composition of the forces, or cut too deeply into combat readiness, orotherwise undermined the quality and ability of the military to fulfill itsfunctions.. Powell's larger motives were to establish a floor for the defence cuts heknew to he inevitable, and to work nut a coherent strategy and force structurewhich would prevent the kind of helter-skelter debilitating reductions common toprevious demobilizations after American wars. A shift from maximum tominimum deterrence had to he blocked in order to prevent the further unravellingof the defence department as a whole. Defense industry ensures opposition – contracts and constituencies. Borger 9/20 [Julian, guardian staff, Obama faces battle with Pentagon hawks to achieve nuclear-free goal, 20 September 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/pentagon-obama-nuclear-arms/print] Joseph Cirincione, head of the Ploughshares Fund which sponsors debate on nuclear policy, said Obama was not just up against existing doctrine, but against a huge industry. "There is $54bn spent [annually in the US] on nuclear weapons and weapons-related programmes. That's a lot of contracts and a lot of jobs, and right now it's a battle for budgets," Cirincione said. "The new weapons programmes are seen as a way of guaranteeing funding and jobs in the infrastructure. Obama is trying to convince [the weapons establishment] that he is going to look after them in ways other than building new weapons." Pentagon would oppose the plan – posture review proves. Borger 9/20 [Julian, guardian staff, Obama faces battle with Pentagon hawks to achieve nuclear-free goal, 20 September 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/pentagon-obama-nuclear-arms/print] Five months ago in Prague, Barack Obama used one of his first foreign policy speeches to call for a world free of nuclear weapons. Ever since then the White House has been engaged in a race to turn that declaration into real-world policy. The first obstacle is the Pentagon. According to officials with knowledge of the inter-agency bargaining, the US defence department produced a draft nuclear posture review that did not just fall short of Obama's vision. In some ways it appeared to be moving in the opposite direction. The current Pentagon take on US nuclear doctrine envisages maintaining a stockpile of thousands of weapons for the foreseeable future, partly in the name of "extended deterrence". Supporters of that doctrine argue that without a large arsenal, allies abroad will lose confidence in Washington's willingness and capacity to defend them from attack. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 14 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 15 Links – Iraq Civilian micromanagement of military strategy in Iraq destroys the trust and CMR necessary in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, September 2008, “Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations,” online: http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdfIn both Afghanistan and Iraq there are questions about the quality of the planning to go vern either country. Part of the problem may have stemmed from defining the objective as regime change, with humanitarian assistance and reconstruction as potential missions, without asking the basic questions about who would govern the country, how they would do so, and who had the mission to govern at both the central and local level. Yet all might agree that, in the absence of clear objectives, it is easy to confuse military activity with progress and difficult to judge how military operations fit into the overall civil-military effort or how well they are contributing to resolving a problem consistent with national interests. Acknowledging both the difficulty and importance of defining goals and objectives, George Marshall once quipped that, if one gets the objectives right, “a lieutenant can write the strategy.” Not surprisingly, the development of goals and objectives is often the first point of tension in civil-military relations at the highest levels of government. Despite the positive developments in Iraq , questions remain over how labor should be divided and civilian and military activities coordinated to support counterinsurgency operations in foreign theaters. Today, the need for overall political leadership and coherence appears greater but achieving it more difficult. At the same time , a distant, top-down style of strategic management or micromanagement of the complex tasks in remote contested zones seems quixotic. So we ask ourselves, how does irregular warfare alter our thinking about civilmilitary relations? Is the putative decline in civil-military relations permanent, serious, and crippling? Or conversely, is it sui generis to a conflict such as Iraq or Afghanistan— and overblown in terms of the problems it presents—depending mainly on individual actors and therefore manageable, given the right set of personalities? To what degree does command and control structure contribute to, or detract from, the ability to integrate civil-military efforts? And at what levels and in what venues should civil-military efforts be integrated in an irregular war? The war that “we are in and must win” (to paraphrase Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) pits us against nonstate groups that seek to advance extremist agendas through violence. Accordingly, irregular warfare will be the dominant form of conflict among adversaries in the early years of the 21st century. To succeed in these messy and profoundly political wars, the United States needs a framework that appropriately and effectively balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the best use of their unique and complementary portfolios. CMR in Iraq high now but the Plan has the government ignore the will of the military, crushing CMR. Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, September 2008, “Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations,” online: http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/iwcivmilrelations.pdfPersistent irregular conflict poses difficult new challenges for command and leadership and civil-military relations in general. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate these challenges. The Iraq engagement began with a short, conventional war that aimed massive military power to defeat a hostile state and depose its leader. The Commander in Chief, with the approval of civilian leaders in Congress, authorized the action, and military commanders carried it out successfully. But after the initial goals were achieved, the engagement in Iraq rapidly devolved into a counterinsurgency. Similarly, as conflict in Afghanistan shows, in an irregular war against an asymmetric, non-state threat, the traditional lanes of authority no longer clearly separate the activities of the political leaders responsible for managing the engagement, the military commanders responsible for executing it, and the civilian officials responsible for diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction. As the war in Iraq progressed beyond the initial stage of regime removal, civil military relationships began to break down as the war transmogrified into a counterinsurgency operation. Beginning in 2007 with the so-called surge, a dramatic rapprochement occurred that featured greater collaboration between U.S. civilian and military authorities and a more constructive melding of military, political, and diplomatic means to achieve stability. Although there are questions about why that same degree of cohesion did not develop earlier, the surge offers insight into the level of cooperation and communication needed in irregular warfare between military officers—whose traditional duties to apply force spill over into peacekeeping and nation building activities— and civilian officials who bear the dominant role in building a framework for peace, good governance, and diplomatic ties that support long-term U.S. national interests. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 15 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 16 Links – IraqA leak shows that military officials think deployment in Iraq is keyFeaver 9/21 ‘9 [Peter, professor of political science at Duke University and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Foreign Policy: Woodward Discloses Troops Needed, 9/21/2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583] 4. The leak makes it harder for President Obama to reject a McChrystal request for additional troops because the assessment so clearly argues for them. The formal request is in a separate document, apparently, but it is foreshadowed on every page of the Initial Assessment. Presumably, the McChrystal assessment and request is shared by Petraeus and, I am told, also by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That does not make it irrefutably correct, but it does make this issue now the defining moment in civil-military relations under President Obama's watch. Obama has the authority and the responsibility to make a decision that runs counter to what his military leaders are requesting, but it is a very difficult thing for him to do. 5. The toughest part in the report from the point of view of the Obama White House is the twin claim that (i) under-resourcing the war could cause the war to be lost, and (ii) the resources need to show up in the next year. The former puts the responsibility for success/failure squarely on the desk of the President and the latter, because of the long lead times needed to send additional resources into the theater, says that failure could result from choices made or not made in the next few weeks. And it said that a few weeks ago. The military is anxious about withdrawl.Ackerman 8 [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,” http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible] One early decision that many in the military likely look to is whether Obama holds to his position on withdrawing from Iraq according to a fixed timetable. As with the country as a whole, there is no unanimity of opinion on Iraq within the military. But at the very least, the war is more personal to the military than it is to the civilian population. Many view this withdrawal with anxiety.Withdrawal from Iraq will put CMR at a new low.Brian Downing, published political and military historian, AT 6/11 ‘8, “Will it be ‘Obama’s War’?” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF11Ak01.html The US military will also oppose large-scale withdrawal. The generation of officers who learned hard lessons in Vietnam are almost all gone now, leaving successors who are only vaguely wary of foreign quagmires. The torch has been passed to a new generation that believes in one main lesson from Vietnam: future wars must be seen through. The military thinks it has turned a corner in Iraq and that General David Petraeus' troop "surge" is working well. It will ally with like-minded members of the US Congress, conservative media and think-tanks to argue the stay-put message. If a Democratic president were somehow able to overcome opposition to withdrawal, he would bring bitter enmity between the generals and his party, which is already disliked for its lineage to the antiwar movement of the Vietnam years and for trimming defense budgets. Leaving Iraq - cutting and running, as it is often called - would poison civil-military relations as never before in the nation's history. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 16 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 17 Links – Iraq Withdrawal Would Tank CMR Kohn in 08 (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina, winter 2008 “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations”,//http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil- military.html//) It follows that no candidate will be elected without promising some sort of disengagement. An American withdrawal would probably unleash the all-out civil war that our presence has kept to the level of neighborhood cleansing and gangland murder. Sooner or later that violence will burn itself out. But a viable nation-state that resembles democracy as we know it is far off, with the possibility that al-Qaeda will survive in Iraq, requiring American combat forces in some form for years to come. In the civil-military arena, the consequences of even a slowly unraveling debacle in Iraq could be quite ugly. Already, politicians and generals have been pointing fingers at one another; the Democrats and some officers excoriating the administration for incompetence, while the administration and a parade of generals fire back at the press and anti-war Democrats. The truly embittered, like retired Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who commanded in Iraq in 2003 –04, blame everyone and everything: Bush and his underlings, the civilian bureaucracy, Congress, partisanship, the press, allies, even the American people. Last November, Sanchez went so far as to deliver the Democrats’ weekly radio address—and, with it, more bile and invective. Thomas Ricks, chief military correspondent of the Washington Post, detects a “stab in the back narrative . . . now emerging in the U.S. military in Iraq. . . . [T]he U.S. military did everything it was supposed to do in Iraq, the rest of the U.S. government didn’t show up, the Congress betrayed us, the media undercut us, and the American public lacked the stomach, the nerve, and the will to see it through.” Ricks thinks this “account is wrong in every respect; nonetheless, I am seeing more and more adherents of it in the military.” If the United States withdraws and Iraq comes apart at the seams, many officers and Republicans will insist that the war was winnable, indeed was all but won under General David Petraeus. The new administration will be scorned not only for cowardice and surrender, but for treachery—for rendering meaningless the deaths, maiming, and sacrifice of tens of thousands of Americans in uniform. The betrayed legions will revive all of the Vietnam-era charges, accusing the Democrats of loathing the military and America and of wishing defeat. The resentments will sink deep into the ranks, at least in the army and the Marines, much as the Praetorian myths about Vietnam still hold sway today in the Pentagon. The response—namely, that the war was a strategic miscalculation bungled horribly by the Bush administration—will have no traction. There will only be a fog of anger, bitterness, betrayal, and recrimination. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 17 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 18 Links – Afghanistan Withdrawal from Afghanistan sparks military backlash Carter 10 – Sara A. Carter, National Security Correspondent for the San Francisco Examiner, May 4, 2010, “U.S. military growing concerned with Obama's Afghan policy,” online: http://www.sfexaminer.com/world/U_S_-military-growing-concerned-with- Obama_s-Afghan-policy-92723004.html The Obama administration's plan to begin an Afghanistan withdrawal in 2011 is creating growing friction inside the U.S. military, from the halls of the Pentagon to front-line soldiers who see it as a losing strategy. Critics of the plan fear that if they speak out, they will be labeled "pariahs" unwilling to back the commander in chief, said one officer who didn't want to be named. But in private discussions, soldiers who are fighting in Afghanistan, or recently returned from there, questioned whether it is worth the sacrifice and risk for a war without a clear-cut strategy to win. Retired Army Reserve Maj. Gen. Timothy Haake, who served with the Special Forces, said, "If you're a commander of Taliban forces, you would use the withdrawal date to rally your troops, saying we may be suffering now but wait 15 months when we'll have less enemy to fight." Haake added, "It plays into ... our enemies' hands and what they think about us that Americans don't have the staying power, the stomach, that's required in this type of situation. It's just the wrong thing to do. No military commander would sanction, support or announce a withdrawal date while hostilities are occurring." A former top-ranking Defense Department official also saw the policy as misguided. "Setting a deadline to get out may have been politically expedient, but it is a military disaster," he said. "It's as bad as [former U.S. Secretary of State] Dean Acheson signaling the Communists that we wouldn't defend South Korea before the North Korean invasion." SQ plans don’t link, they aren’t abrupt. Abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan angers Gates. Roxana Trion, writer for The Hill, December 2, 2009, “Gates opposes troop withdrawal deadline for Afghanistan,” The Hill, online: http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/70165-gates-clinton-and-mullen-defend-afghan-plan Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he opposed setting deadlines for U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan as he defended President Barack Obama’s new war strategy. Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen on Wednesday made their first rounds on Capitol Hill to publicly sell Obama’s Afghanistan war plan to conflicted lawmakers still trying to digest the president’s announcement. Obama announced on Tuesday he will send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, some as early as the next few weeks. The president also announced his goal of beginning a U.S. troop withdrawal by the summer of 2011. Gates said he agrees with the president’s July 2011 timeline but he would not agree with any efforts to set a deadline for complete troop withdrawal. “ I have adamantly opposed deadlines. I opposed them in Iraq, and I oppose deadlines in Afghanistan. But what the president has announced is the beginning of a process, not the end of a process. And it is clear that this will be a gradual process and, as he said last night, based on conditions on the ground. So there is no deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan,” Gates told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday afternoon. “July 2011 is not a cliff.” Pulling out of Afghanistan will deteriorate CMR. Michael Leon, staff writer @ Veterans Today, Veterans Today 6/27 ’10, “Nothing is Going Right for USA in Final Phase in Afghanistan” http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/27/nothing-is-going-right-for-usa-in-final-phase-in-afghanistan/ Although Gen McChrystal has been sacked and replaced with Gen David Petraeus but not without creating tension in civil-military relations. In case the situation in Afghanistan spins out of control and coalition forces are forced to hurriedly exit in disgrace, or fatalities mount up, it is bound to further aggravate civil-military relations in USA. However, prompt action by Obama has dispelled the lingering impression that Pentagon has become more powerful than White House. He has reasserted his authority by this act and demonstrated that he is in full command. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 18 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 19 Link – Afghanisan The military does not support withdrawal from Afghanistan Jim Mannion, staff writer at AFP, 6/10/2010, “US officials downplay July 2011 withdrawal from Afghanistan”, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hz33CLCwbhtiuwTXWaZkaPfvP4Xg US Defense Secretary Robert Gates rejected suggestions Sunday that US forces will move out of Afghanistan in large numbers in July of next year under a deadline set by President Barack Obama. "That absolutely has not been decided," Gates said in an interview with Fox News Sunday. His comment was the latest indication that the magnitude of the drawdown, if not the deadline itself, is the subject of an intensifying internal debate at a time when a NATO-led campaign against the Taliban is going slower than expected. Vice President Joe Biden, an early skeptic of the US military buildup in Afghanistan, was quoted as telling author Jonathan Alter recently: "In July of 2011, you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it." White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel did not deny the Biden quote when asked about it, but, like Gates, said that the size of the drawdown would depend on conditions on the ground. "Everybody knows there's a firm date. And that firm date is a date (that) deals with the troops that are part of the surge, the additional 30,000," he said in an interview with ABC "This Week." "What will be determined at that date or going into that date will be the scale and scope of that reduction," he said. General David Petraeus, the commander of US forces in the Middle East, said last week that in setting the deadline for the surge last year, Obama's message was "one of urgency -- not that July 2011 is when we race for the exits, reach for the light switch and flip it off." Petraeus told lawmakers he would be duty-bound to recommend delaying the redeployment of forces if he thought it necessary. In the same hearing, the Pentagon's policy chief, Michelle Flournoy, said a responsible, conditions-based drawdown would depend on there being provinces ready to be transferred to Afghan control, and that there be Afghan combat forces capable of taking the lead. Officials have said that training of Afghan security forces has gone slower than expected, in part because there are not enough trainers.Pull out from Afghanistan destroys military confidence in CMR Kurt Volker, senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and former Ambassador to NATO, June 26, 2010. ACUS, “Volker on Afghanistan Command Change” http://www.acus.org/highlight/volker-afghanistan-command-change TPKurt Volker, senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and former Ambassador to NATO, asseses the impact of the relief of Stanley McChrystal and his replacement with David Petraeus will have on the Afghanistan mission in Sunday's Washington Post. Two problems arose with the McChrystal flame-out: First is the challenge to presidential leadership, which President Obama dealt with swiftly and effectively by firing Stanley McChrystal and replacing him with David Petraeus. The second -- and bigger -- problem is that many inside and outside the military believe what McChrystal and his aides said. They feel our commitment lacks teeth: that they are not given the resources, time, rules of engagement and political/civilian backing necessary to succeed. The July 2011 pullout date -- even if it is explained away in clarifying comments -- remains an albatross on the whole operation. Enemies, allies and, apparently, our own military doubt our commitment to winning. The lack of trust between and among military and civilian implementers reveals that we lack the unity of effort needed for success. This is a huge rift in the execution of a vital U.S. strategy. Putting Petraeus in place can help tighten up the military side of the equation, including its cooperation with the civilians. But regaining the confidence of the military will require changes on the civilian side as well. Most important, we must end the mismatch between strategy and timeline. The president and every senior American official below him must convey an unshakable resolve to win. No qualifiers, no timelines: just determination.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 19 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 20 Links – South Korea The Joint Chiefs support status quo troop levels in South Korea---draw-downs are postponed until after the OPCON transfer Michael J. Carden, Army Sergeant 1st Class. October 23, 2009. US Department of Defense http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=56375 As South Korea’s military transitions to full operational control , it’s important to remember the past 60 years of U.S. commitment to the country and to not waver in that support , the chairman of the J oint C hiefs of Staff said. (Transcript I Video I Pictures) Navy Adm. Mike Mullen talked yesterday with servicemembers and defense civilians at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan in Seoul, Korea. He spoke about his earlier meetings with his South Korean counterpart, citing “tremendous change” on the horizon. The Korean military is expected to assume a larger defense responsibility there in April 2012. The alliance will only get stronger , the chairman said , with continued commitment from the United States. The U.S.-South Korea alliance dates to the Korean War in 1950. An armistice was signed in July 1953 with North Korea, unofficially ending the war. The United Nations and U.S. military have maintained a presence in South Korea since then. “Sometimes you don’t think about this, but you are here as a part of that, and sometimes we don’t think about how significant that alliance is in terms of preserving the freedom, preserving the democracy that is here in the Republic of Korea,” Mullen said. “We are very much supportive of executing and sustain that alliance.” Mullen spent the previous two days with his Korean counterparts reviewing the changes and specifics of their alliance. For the U.S. military stationed there, that means a smaller U.S. footprint. Within the next 10 years , the 28,000 servicemembers that make up U.S. Forces Korea will be cut roughly by 14,000. However, there will be more command-sponsored families and new infrastructure to accommodate them, he said. Military presence in South Korea is perceived as necessary. Ben Hancock, The Diplomat correspondent and staff writer, 3/2/10, The Diplomat “US Forces OK in ROK- For Now” http://the- diplomat.com/2010/03/02/us-forces-ok-in-rok-for-now/?print=yes South Korean Choi Jong-ho served with US soldiers in the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA)–a unit that acts as a sort of cultural bridge–from 2004-06. Though he is confident in the ROK military’s ability to fight North Korea and win, he says it cannot ‘contain’ the North the way the US military can.‘I think [US troops] have to be here, absolutely,’ he says. ‘Though maybe not in 20 or 30 years.’Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 20 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 21 Links – Japan The military, especially Gates, thinks involvement in Japan is important. McCormack 9 - Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor at Australian National University, coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, November 16, 2009, “The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama,” online: http://www.japanfocus.org/- Gavan-McCormack/3250 As the year wore on and as the new agenda in Tokyo became apparent before and after the August election, the confrontation deepened. Warnings became more forceful. Kurt Campbell told the Asahi there could be no change in the Futenma replacement agreement. [23] Michael Green, formerly George W. Bush’s top adviser on East Asia, though moved under Obama to the private sector at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, warned that “it would indeed provoke a crisis with the US” if the Democratic Party were to push ahead to try to re- negotiate the military agreements around the Okinawa issue.” [24] Gregson, for the Pentagon, added that the US had “no plans to revise the existing agreements. [25] Ian Kelly, for the State Department, stated that there was no intention on its part to allow revision. [26] Kevin Maher (also at State) added a day later that there could be no reopening of negotiations on something already agreed between states. [27] A “senior Department of Defense spokesperson” in Washington said it would be a “blow to trust” between the two countries if existing plans could not be implemented. [28] Summing up the rising irritation in Washington, an unnamed State Department official commented that “The hardest thing right now is not China. It’s Japan.” [29] The drumbeats of “concern,” “warning,” “friendly advice” from Washington that Hatoyama and the DPJ had better not implement the party’s electoral pledges and commitments rose steadily leading up to the election and its aftermath, culminating in the October Tokyo visit by Defense Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Michael Mullen. Gates is reported to have insulted his Japanese hosts, refusing to attend a welcoming ceremony at the Defense Ministry or to dine with senior Japanese Defense officials. [30] Gates’ message was no-nonsense: “ The Futenma relocation facility is the lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realignment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa.” [31] The military is against withdrawal from Okinawa Eric Talmadge, staff writer for the Associated press, Marine Times 2/19 ’10, “General: Okinawan troops a benefit, not a burden”http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/02/ap_stalder_okinawa_021910/ Lt. Gen. Keith Stalder, commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said the more than 13,000 Marines on Okinawa play a key role in securing the region from threats such as North Korea, and said the presence should continue. “I’m frequently concerned when I hear the word burden used as a description,” Stalder said. “I suggest that it is an obligation under the alliance to do the hosting and basing of U.S. forces. And for that, the government of Japan gets the services of one of the best and biggest militaries in the world.” The U.S. troops on Okinawa — and particularly the future of the sprawling Marine Corps Air Station Futenma — have become a contentious issue between Washington and Tokyo. Under a post World War II pact, the United States has about 50,000 troops in Japan. Most of the U.S. bases are concentrated on the island of Okinawa, which was a bloody battlefield during the war and was under U.S. jurisdiction until 1972. To lighten Okinawa’s load, both sides have agreed the Futenma base should be closed and about 8,000 Marines shifted to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. But Japan’s new coalition government is divided over calls that a replacement for Futenma should be located off Okinawa or outside of Japan altogether. Washington wants Japan to stick to an agreement made with the previous administration in Tokyo to relocate the base farther north on a less populated part of Okinawa, and says the transfer of the 8,000 Marines to Guam cannot move forward until the new site on Okinawa is finalized. Stalder, in an interview with The Associated Press, said the issue should not be looked at as a local problem, but should be seen from the regional strategic perspective. He said the troops on Okinawa continue to serve a key deterrent and stabilizing role, need to be close to potential hot spots like North Korea and Taiwan and are now well positioned to deal with other humanitarian or security contingencies in the region. “You’ve got to have forward-deployed ground forces. In our case, that happens to be the Marines,” he said. “Okinawa, if you look at the map, is strategically in maybe the perfect place in the region. From there, you deter a lot of potentially bad events, and you can get everywhere you need to get very quickly.” He said that moving the Marines off Okinawa completely would compromise the U.S. military’s ability to respond to crises because troops would have to be called in from Hawaii or the west coast of the United States. “Days lost truly equate to lost lives,” he said. “If you are trying to deploy from farther away, people are going to die because it took you too long to get there.”Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 21 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 22 Links – AsymGates is pursuing a strategy geared towards assymetrical warfare (Michael Klare , Defense Correspondent and Prof. Peace and World Security @ Hampshire College, The Nation, “The Gates Revolution”, 4-15- 2009, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090504/klare)The preliminary Defense Department budget announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates on April 6 represents the most dramatic shift in US military thinking since the end of the Vietnam War. Gates merely hinted at the magnitude of the proposed changes, claiming only that he seeks to "rebalance" the department's priorities between conventional and irregular warfare. But the message is clear: from now on, counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict will be the military's principal combat missions, while other tasks, such as preparing for an all-out war with a well-equipped adversary, will take a decidedly secondary role.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 22 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 23**************Internal Links*******Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 23 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 24 Internal Link – Angering The MilitaryAngering the Military Collapse CMR Ackerman 8 [Spencer, The Washington Independent, 11/13, “Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,” http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible] “ The single biggest mistake Obama could make would be to “completely discount the advice of the military senior leadership and those of his combat commanders who have the most experience dealing with the issues,” said the anonymous senior Army officer. “Even if he does not discount it, but is perceived to discount it, the relationship will be largely going back to the Clinton era, and will take years to repair. That’s not something you want to do in a time of war, which most of the nation has forgotten.”Obama’s military actions determine the fate of CMR suspicion among military leaders and politicians. Kohn in 08 (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina, winter 2008 “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations”, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil- military.html)When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one another with considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust for Donald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. The indictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; the absence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by the White House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments never-ending. Nearly six years of Donald Rumsfeld’s intimidation and abuse have encouraged in the officer corps a conviction that military leaders ought to—are obliged to—push back against their civilian masters. Egged on by Democrats in Congress—and well-meaning but profoundly mistaken associates who believe the military must hold political leaders accountable for their mistakes—some flag officers now opine publicly and seemingly without hesitation. Though divided about Iraq strategy, the four-stars unite in their contempt for today’s political class and vow not to be saddled with blame for mistakes not of their own making. For its part, the new administration will enter office mindful and jealous of the military’s iconic status in the public mind, even if, ironically, the rhetoric of politicians does much to inflate that prestige. In truth, increasing politicization of the armed forces has generated considerable cynicism and distrust among elected officials of every stripe, kept private only out of fear of appearing not to support the troops. The new administration, like its predecessors, will wonder to what extent it can exercise civilian “control.” If the historical pattern holds, the administration will do something clumsy or overreact, provoking even more distrust simply in the process of establishing its own authority.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 24 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 25 Internal Links – ModelingCivil-military relations are modeled globally – they are key to consolidate democratic transitionsPerry 96 (William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, 1996, The Trilateral Commission, “Preventive Defense,” 5/13, http://www.trilateral.org/nagp/regmtgs/96/0523perry.htm) We have long understood that the spread of democracy to more nations is good for our national security. And it has been heartening this past decade to see so many nations around the world come to agree with us that democracy is the best system of government. But as the nations of the world attempt to act on this consensus, we see that there are important steps between a world-wide consensus and a worldwide reality.Democracy is learned behavior. Many nations today have democracies on paper which in fact are extremely fragile. Elections are a necessary but an insufficient condition for a free society. It is also necessary to embed democratic values in the key institutions of the nation. And that is what is dramatically lacking in the nations of the former Soviet Union and in some of the former Warsaw Pact nations.I believe that our Defense Department has a key role to play in this effort, in virtually every new democracy—in Russia, in the newly free states of the former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, in the Asian “Tigers.” In all of those countries, the military represents a major force. In many cases, it is the most cohesive institution. It often contains a large percentage of the educated elite, and it always controls key resources. In short, it is an institution that can either support democracy or subvert it. We must recognize that each society moving from totalitarianism to democracy will be tested at some point by a crisis. It could be an economic crisis, it could be a backslide on human rights and freedom, a border or ethnic dispute. When such a crisis occurs, we want the military to play a positive role in resolving the crisis—not a negative role by fanning the flames of the crisis, or even using the crisis as a pretext for a military coup . In these new democracies, we can choose to ignore this important institution or we can try to exert a positive influence. We have chosen the latter. And believe me we do have an amazing ability to influence, if we’re only willing to use it. Every military in the world looks to the U.S. armed forces as a model to be emulated. That is a valuable bit of leverage and we can put it to use creatively in our preventive defense strategies. In addition, if we can build trust and understanding between the militaries of two neighboring nations, we build trust and understanding between the two nations themselves.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 25 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 26 Internal Links – Cooperation History proves – cooperation key to success Kohn in 08 (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina, winter 2008 “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations”,//http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil- military.html//)When the relationship works—when there is candor, argument, and mutual respect—the result aligns national interest and political purpose with military strategy, operations, and tactics. The collaboration between Franklin Roosevelt, his secretaries of war and navy, and the heads of the two armed services is considered the model in this regard. Each side kept the other mostly informed; the military were present at all the major allied conferences; Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall spoke candidly with the president and consulted daily with Secretary of War Henry Stimson. When the relationship does not work—when the two sides don’t confer, don’t listen, don’t compromise—the decisions and policies that follow serve neither the national interest nor conform to the bitter realities of war. The distrust, manipulation, and absence of candor that colored relations between President Lyndon Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and his senior military advisors offers a case in point; to this day Robert Strange McNamara arouses hatred and contempt among military officers who were not even born when he ruled the Pentagon.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 26 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 27 Internal Links – Failed States Domestic CMR key to success in failed state conflicts Frederick Barton and Noam Unger, ‘9. Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of the Foreign Assistance Reform project at Brookings. “civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity ,” http://csis.org/publication/civil- military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity.The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the understanding that strengthening the economy of states and ensuring social equity are in the short and long term interests of the United States. Stable states pose the United States with far fewer security challenges than their weak and fragile counterparts. Indeed, stable states with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade and represent potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing states pose serious challenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug production, money laundering and people smuggling. In addition, state weakness has frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can destabilize entire regions. While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near future by the U.S.), participants broadly concurred that the lessons of these challenges are that the United States must improve and expand its stabilization and development capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan and Nigeria, huge countries with strategic importance, make clear that a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely limited. As such, increased emphasis on civilian capacity within the U.S. government and civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States’ ability to respond to such crises in the future.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 27 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 28 ***********Impacts**********Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 28 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 29 Impacts – SolvencyLoss of CMR destroys plan implementation Sulmasy and Yoo, ‘7 [Glenn Sulmasy, Judge Advocate, Associate Professor of Law, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and John Yoo, Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Challenges To Civilian Control Of The Military: A Rational Choice Approach To The War On Terror, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1815 (2007), http://www.uclalawreview.org/articles/content/54/ext/pdf/6.1-10.pdfMilitary resistance to civilian policies with which military leaders disagree could take several forms short of an outright refusal to obey orders. Military officers can leak information to derail civilian initiatives. They could "slow roll" civilian orders by delaying implementation. They could inflate the estimates of the resources needed, or the possible casualties and time needed to achieve a military objective. And perhaps a relatively unnoticed but effective measure is to divide the principal-if the number of institutions forming the principal increases, it will be more difficult to monitor the performance of the agent and to hold it accountable. Deborah Avant argues, for example, that civilians exercise greater control of the military in Great Britain than in the United States, because the parliamentary system merges the executive and legislative branches of the government." Greater agency slack may result from information asymmetries that may favor the military, such as information and expertise about warfare, adverse selection that may cause the promotion of officers resentful of civilian meddling, and moral hazard in which the inability of civilians to directly observe the performance of the military may allow the military to pursue its own preferences.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 29 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 30 Impacts – Irregular WarCMR boosts irregular warfare effectiveness – complements in civil-military’s roles Patrick M. Cronin, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2008 Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations, http://www.stormingmedia.us/55/5548/A554884.html TPPersistent irregular conflict poses difficult new challenges for command and leadership and civil-military relations in general. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate these challenges. The Iraq engagement began with a short, conventional war that aimed massive military power to defeat a hostile state and depose its leader. The Commander in Chief, with the approval of civilian leaders in Congress, authorized the action, and military commanders carried it out successfully. But after the initial goals were achieved, the engagement in Iraq rapidly devolved into a counterinsurgency. Similarly, as conflict in Afghanistan shows, in an irregular war against an asymmetric, nonstate threat, the traditional lanes of authority no longer clearly separate the activities of the political leaders responsible for managing the engagement, the military commanders responsible for executing it, and the civilian officials responsible for diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction. As the war in Iraq progressed beyond the initial stage of regime removal, civilmilitary relationships began to break down as the war transmogrified into a counterinsurgency operation. Beginning in 2007 with the so-called surge, a dramatic rapprochement occurred that featured greater collaboration between U.S. civilian and military authorities and a more constructive melding of military, political, and diplomatic means to achieve stability. Although there are questions about why that same degree of cohesion did not develop earlier, the surge offers insight into the level of cooperation and communication needed in irregular warfare between military officers—whose traditional duties to apply force spill over into peacekeeping and nationbuilding activities— and civilian officials who bear the dominant role in building a framework for peace, good governance, and diplomatic ties that support long-term U.S. national interests. So it is that, more than 6 years after the publication of Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command, the command and leadership challenges emerging from Afghanistan and Iraq are providing plentiful new experiences on which to consider civil-military relations and leadership in the midst of what strategist Anthony Cordesman dubbed “armed nation building” but what may be more generally classified as “irregular warfare.” Clearly, soldiers are being asked to do far more than apply violence; they are expected to bring to the field a broad set of peacemaking and statebuilding skills in addition to their core combat experience. Modern warfare would appear to be less about direct combat and more about the larger ambit of seeking stability and peace in the midst of fighting. As Dr. Cohen wrote, the soldier’s ultimate purpose is to achieve political ends designated by statesmen. But because political objectives are just that—political—they are often ambiguous, contradictory, and uncertain. It is one of the greatest sources of frustration for soldiers that their political masters find it difficult . . . to fully elaborate in advance the purposes for which they have invoked military action, or the conditions under which they intend to limit or terminate it.1Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 30 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 31 Impacts – Irregular WarIrregular warfighting’s key to prevent escalation from inevitable conflicts---accesses every major impact Bennett 8 – John T. Bennett, Defense News, December 4, 2008, “JFCOM Releases Study on Future Threats,” online: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3850158 The study predicts future U.S. forces' missions will range "from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons." Some of these missions will be spawned by "rational political calculation," others by "uncontrolled passion." And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways. "Our enemy's capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile attacks," the study said. "The threat of mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks." The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in "an era of persistent conflict." During the next 25 years, it says, "There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy." The study gives substantial ink to what could happen in places of strategic import to Washington, like Russia, China, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Extremists and Militias But it calls the Middle East and Central Asia "the center of instability" where U.S. troops will be engaged for some time against radical Islamic groups. The study does not rule out a fight against a peer nation's military, but stresses preparation for irregular foes like those that complicated the Iraq war for years. Its release comes three days after Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed a new Pentagon directive that elevates irregular warfare to equal footing - for budgeting and planning - as traditional warfare. The directive defines irregular warfare as encompassing counterterrorism operations, guerrilla warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations. Leaders must avoid "the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s," the study said. "The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War." Irregular wars are likely to be carried out by terrorist groups, "modern-day militias," and other nonstate actors, the study said. It noted the 2006 tussle between Israel and Hezbollah, a militia that "combines state-like technological and war-fighting capabilities with a 'sub-state' political and social structure inside the formal state of Lebanon." One retired Army colonel called the study "the latest in a serious of glaring examples of massive overreaction to a truly modest threat" - Islamist terrorism. "It is causing the United States to essentially undermine itself without terrorists or anyone else for that matter having to do much more than exploit the weaknesses in American military power the overreaction creates," said Douglas Macgregor, who writes about Defense Department reform at the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. "Unfortunately, the document echoes the neocons, who insist the United States will face the greatest threats from insurgents and extremist groups operating in weak or failing states in the Middle East and Africa." Macgregor called that "delusional thinking," adding that he hopes "Georgia's quick and decisive defeat at the hands of Russian combat forces earlier this year [is] a very stark reminder why terrorism and fighting a war against it using large numbers of military forces should never have been made an organizing principle of U.S. defense policy." Failing States The study also warns about weak and failing states, including Mexico and Pakistan. "Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons," said the study. " That 'perfect storm' of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used." Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 31 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 32 Impacts – Irregular War (Iraq)Collapse of CMR destroys irregular warfare tactics – only way the US stays in Iraq Patrick M. Cronin, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2008 Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations, http://www.stormingmedia.us/55/5548/A554884.html TP The quality of leadership has always been a pivotal factor in the conduct of war. But in irregular warfare, the desired abilities and traits of military leaders may differ from past understandings of the nature of wartime leadership . Some observe that, in conventional warfare, military leaders have needed something akin to engineering “smarts” as they employ troops and the tools of war to systematically plan tactics, win battles, and build a victory. Irregular warfare, in contrast, puts a much higher premium on civil and political “smarts” in addition to the traditional skills of a military tactician. In the United States, top military officials and commanders on the ground serve at the pleasure of the President. The choice of those leaders is influenced by who is available in the chain of command as well as political, strategic, and personal considerations. As the demands of leadership in the Iraq War intensified, the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefly attempted to devise specific job descriptions for general officers and others in the highest echelons of the uniformed Services, again mirroring a common practice in business. Although that effort was ultimately set aside in favor of more pressing concerns, the exercise yielded a deeper understanding about the personality characteristics and skill sets needed to successfully prosecute an irregular war, both from Washington and in theater. According to one top military leader, effective leadership comes down to one thing: trust. As noted in the Army’s COIN field manual, those leading a war effort need the ability to work together—both among themselves in the “unity of command” 11 and with political and civilian officials in a “unity of effort.”12 A collaborative personality, flexibility, adaptiveness, innovative thinking, willingness to listen, and mutual respect are among the traits that come to the fore in the execution of an enterprise that is, in the end, more a political enterprise than a military one. Regardless of their respective talents, today’s military leaders up and down the ranks face a number of new pressures with which they must contend and that challenge the command and control structure on which an effective military force stands. These include the following: Politicization of War. How far political leaders should go to intervene in military matters is a question that becomes even more problematic in the uncertain environment of irregular warfare. Going back to Eliot Cohen’s notion of “prudence versus principle,” the question is raised whether prudence points in the direction of more or less civilian intervention in military decisionmaking. The most important function of civilian leadership is to ask the difficult questions. It is, however, rare for people to ask first-order questions that challenge underlying assumptions. Instead, there is a tendency to get distracted by details. The President and senior defense officials should vigorously examine the conclusions and advice of military leaders, and Congress should ask hard questions as well. Unfortunately, during the multiple congressional hearings on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the level of discussion needed for serious analysis is often reduced to partisan wrangling. Visits to the theater by groups of elected leaders have been helpful in developing perspective and providing an opportunity for more informed political debate. Although not a phenomenon unique to irregular war, elected leaders and civilian defense officials may believe that they have to use lofty rhetoric and articulate noble goals to “sell” the mission to a skeptical public. It then falls to military leaders to assume the role of pragmatists, putting events into perspective and tamping down unrealistic expectations. During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Petraeus engaged in this sort of management of expectations when he answered a Senator’s question about U.S. goals. Petraeus stated, “Ambassador Crocker and I, for what it’s worth, have typically seen ourselves as minimalists. We’re not after the Holy Grail in Iraq; we’re not after Jeffersonian democracy. We’re after conditions that would allow our soldiers to disengage.”13 In discussing an irregular war with political leaders and the public, the danger appears of a mismatch between the rationale stated by the President and civilian defense and finding a way to honestly gauge the output of the military and civilian work done in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other counterinsurgencies remains a sought-after objective 6 Strategic Forum No. 234, September 2008 national security officials and the pragmatic caution of military commanders. The result is confusion about whether the war is being “won” and an erosion of political resolve. The war in Iraq revealed a need for better articulation in the public forum that the military will help set the conditions for victory but will not win in the conventional sense—that a successful outcome depends on leveraging all the instruments of national power in a sustained effort that produces an enduring strategic partnership with the host country. Soldier’s Code. The Soldier’s Code embodies the common ethos that a military member expresses dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one’s superiors and away from the public eye. Once a tactical or other decision is made, the soldier must desist and implement the decision to the best of his ability, regardless of whether it reflects his dissent. Thus, the code provides an avenue for constructive dissent, but it is not open-ended. Many experienced military officers believe that the Soldier’s Code may need to be revitalized among both the leadership and the ranks. Seasoned military professionals believe the code is essential to maintaining discipline and is just as relevant in irregular warfare as in a conventional war or peacetime. If dissent is expressed openly, especially in the media, or is pursued beyond recognized boundaries, force morale and discipline may quickly break down.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 32 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 33 Impacts – Readiness Civilian embracement of military proposals key to preventing cyber, space, biological, economic, and nuclear showdowns that would devastate humanity(John Bennett, pentagon reporter, 2008 Defense News, “JFCOM Releases Study on Future Threats”, 12-4, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3850158)A new U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) planning document offers insights into planning for irregular conflicts, urges long-promised acquisition reform, and outlines potential threats and enemies. Released Dec. 4, the "Joint Operating Environment" document is a "historically informed, forward-looking effort to discern most accurately the challenges we will face at the operational level of war, and to determine their inherent implications," Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, JFCOM commander, writes in its foreword. "Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future." The study is meant to inform joint concept development and experimentation by the U.S. military and "other leaders and professionals in the national security field." The study is largely a response to three questions: * What future trends and disruptions are likely to affect the joint force over the next quarter century? * How are these trends and disruptions likely to define the future contexts for joint operations? * What are the implications of these trends and contexts for the joint force?" Its authors considered politics, military efforts, demographic changes, globalization, economic trends, energy competition, food and water scarcity, climate change, cyber threats, and pandemics. The study predicts future U.S. forces' missions will range "from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons." Some of these missions will be spawned by "rational political calculation," others by "uncontrolled passion." And future foes will attack U.S. forces in a number of ways. "Our enemy's capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to long-range precision- guided cyber, space, and missile attacks," the study said. "The threat of mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will likely expand from stable nation-states to less stable states and even non-state networks." The document also echoes Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other U.S. military leaders who say America is likely in "an era of persistent conflict." During the next 25 years, it says, "There will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the political stability and deny the free access to the global commons that is crucial to the world's economy." Loss of CMR hurts readiness and endangers domestic democracy Cohn – Graduate Student in Political Science at Duke – 1999 (Lindsay Cohn,"The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate," www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohn_literature_review.pdf)There do seem to be a few positions which appear more often than others in the literature: one is that there is a necessary cultural gap between the military and the civilian, and that particular gap is positive. The military needs its distinctive culture, and as long as it is dependent on the surrounding society for recruits, funding, and services, the cultural divide cannot become dangerously wide.74However, the lack of contact between military and civilian life œ embodied in the dwindling numbers of veterans in the population and especially in government,75 in the tiny numbers of people who have any knowledge of or significant intercourse with military personnel, in the growing numbers of service-members who come from military families, and especially in the blatant political disagreement between themilitary and the civilian elite œ is troubling. The divide is especially troubling because themilitary has developed a contempt for the society it is supposed to protect, and couldpossibly turn on or abandon that society in some way. Equally troubling are civilian officials who do not understand the military and its capabilities and limitations, and are apt to use it in inappropriate ways, straining it beyond what it can bear and threatening the national interest or security. The situation is troubling because it harms recruiting, leading to shortfalls in manpower, low morale, declining quality in the ranks, and reduced effectivenessLast printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 33 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 34 Impacts – Readiness (Civilian)Loss of CMR results in civilian control of military strategy Cohn – Graduate Student in Political Science at Duke – 1999 (Lindsay Cohn,"The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate,"www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohn_literature_review.pdf)Because the culture gap was considered the inevitable result of the divergent natures of a war machine and a free society, it was treated more as an ongoing management challenge than a crisis. If the gap grew too large, some worried, civilian control might be undermined by a recalcitrant or insubordinate military.14 On the other hand, a large gap might mean that the military would be mismanaged by ignorant or indecisive civilians.15 Huntington and his followers worried that the gap would cause civilian control to become more dependent on the relative power of civilian institutions and the officer corps, making civilian control both more difficult and less reliable.16 Some denounced the civilianization of some aspects of the military because it led to a dilution of military culture - a culture they considered essential to the effectiveness of the armed forces.17 Janowitz and others tended to be more concerned about the military simply losing touch with the society it was meant to serve and protect.18 Some were afraid that a too-large gap would reduce military effectiveness because the military would be sent on missions that were inappropriate, and would not know either how to caution their civilian leaders or how to handle the mission.19 Yet others foresaw a situation in which the civilian government could not trust the advice or reports of a military whose values differed so markedly from their own.20 A few said simply that some gap was normal, but that it should not be allowed to grow too large. Civilian control leads to the development of a hostile military culture Cohn – Graduate Student in Political Science at Duke – 1999 (Lindsay Cohn,"The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate," www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/cohn_literature_review.pdf)Feminists argued that the existing gap between the military and society should not exist œ either because the society should not need a military or because the military should be more like society.37 Most other commentators said that some cultural gap was inevitable (some thought that the social evil of demographic disproportion in the military was more than offset by other social benefits of the new system)38 but that the gap must not be allowed to reach the point where it caused problems. Clear articulation of where that boundary lay was elusive, but the problems that people anticipated remained much the same as those that had pre-dated the AVF. Those were: a civilian society ignorant of and therefore unsympathetic to the military‘s special needs and uninterested in electing officials who would be militarily prudent,39 a military œ increasingly isolated from and by indifferent civilians œwhich ceased to regard its obligations to society and may turn hostile,40 a military whose size or effectiveness might decline,41 and civilian officials with so little military understanding as to be uniquely unqualified to make intelligent military policy.42 The convergence theorists disagreed over whether the convergence was positive (the military ought to conform to liberal democratic society)43 or negative (military culture is necessary and it is being attenuated)Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 34 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 35 Impacts – Pakistan Now is key for Pakistani cmr (Richard Weitz, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 10-28-2008 Richard, “Pakistan: Analyzing Civil-Military Relations In Islamabad,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav102808_pr.shtml)Decades of formal and de facto military rule have instituted a problematic political pattern. "Whenever the civilian government has taken over from an autocratic government," Nawaz maintained, "it has found it extremely difficult to get rid of the autocratic powers that the previous government had.""The military is watching and waiting and, when it feels that things have gotten out of hand," it decides that "it is time for us to save the country" and seizes power again, Nawaz continued.Now is a time that the vicious cycle could finally be broken, Nawaz contended. "The ball is in the court of the civilian administration to assert itself," Nawaz said. "We have a great opportunity, yet again, with an army chief who is saying, yet again, that he wants to be professional and keep the army out of politics." Pakistani cmr key to American relations necessary to prevent nuclear war and terrorism (Richard Weitz, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 10-28-2008 Richard, “Pakistan: Analyzing Civil-Military Relations In Islamabad,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav102808_pr.shtml)Another featured speaker, Lisa Curtis, a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, stressed historical continuities in the Pakistani-American defense relationship. Curtis suggested that while the threats perceived by Washington have changed over time - moving from Soviet expansionism during the Cold War to Islamic radicalism in the post-9/11 era - the attention of Pakistan's generals has remained fixed on India throughout the past few decades. Another unwelcome continuity that Curtis pointed out is "the lack of accountability and transparency" in US-Pakistani assistance programs, which prompts members of the US Congress and of the Pakistani public alike to wonder "where is all this assistance from the United States is going?" [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At the same time, Curtis warned that recent history shows that making an abrupt turn away from Pakistan can have "extremely negative repercussions." To highlight her point, Curtis noted that in the 1990s, when Washington abruptly withdrew from Afghanistan and sanctioned Pakistan for its nuclear weapons tests, Pakistani leaders created the Taliban and transferred nuclear technology to Iran. "We need to engage in more serious and frank dialogue with Pakistani civilian and military leaders about the situation around the Pakistani border, as well as the situation inside Afghanistan," Curtis said. "This has to be a conversation. The United States needs to listen to Pakistan's geo-strategic concerns and demonstrate that it supports Pakistan's long-term success and prosperity." in tandem with substantive give-and-take, Washington "will have to use discretion in carrying out [unilateral] strikes" against suspected militants in Pakistan's tribal areas, since such attacks can "undermine longer-term US objectives of building partnership with Pakistan and preventing radical forces from strengthening in the country," Curtis said. The event's third featured speaker, Walter Andersen, associate director of the South Asia Studies Program at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, cautioned that while Pakistan's current military leaders might want to remain outside of the nation's politics, adhering to that aim will be challenging "in a country in which you have a well-organized army that operates in an underdeveloped political system." According to Anderson, what Pakistan most needs is "civil-military consultation to head off a confrontation." In particular, the two interest groups need to find accord on the role of the Inter-Services Intelligence and on parliament's oversight functions concerning defense issues. Without institutionalized cooperation, the political process stands to suffer "a loss of trust between civilian and military leaders that could slow down, and maybe even set back the transition to democracy that they all say that they want," Anderson said.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 35 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 36 Impacts – Pakistan Instability Perceived Pakistani instability causes nuclear war (Thomas E. Ricks, military correspondent and Pulitzer Prize-winner. member of Harvard University's Senior Advisory Council on the Project on U.S. Civil-Military Relations, 10-21-2001 “At Pentagon: Worries Over War's Costs, Consequences; Some Fear Regional Destabilization, Retribution Against U.S.” Washington Post, Lexis)The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war , said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games. Having both the United States and India fighting Muslims would play into the hands of bin Laden, warned Mackubin Owens, a strategist at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. "He could point out once again that this is the new crusade," Owens said. The next step that worries experts is the regional effect of turmoil in Pakistan. If its government fell, the experts fear, other Muslim governments friendly to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might follow suit. "The ultimate nightmare is a pan-Islamic regime that possesses both oil and nuclear weapons," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ullman argued that the arrival of U.S. troops in Pakistan to fight the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan could inadvertently help bin Laden achieve his goal of sparking an anti-American revolt in the country. Andrew Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University, said it is possible "that we are sliding toward a summer-of-1914 sequence of events" -- when a cascading series of international incidents spun out of control and led to World War I. Eliot Cohen, a professor of strategy at Johns Hopkins University, agreed. "We could find ourselves engaged in a whole range of conflicts, from events you can't anticipate now," he said. Both Bacevich and Cohen are former colleagues of the leading strategic thinker at the Pentagon, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, who previously was dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 36 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 37 Impacts – TerrorismTerrorism is only effective with a dysfunctional CMR Karen Guttari, Assistant Proff @ Naval Postgraduate School, 2003 “Homeland Security and Civil-Military Relations”, Strategic Insights, Volume 2 Issue 8, Google TPThe American strategic policy community—for example, the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century— was concerned with homeland defense prior to 9/11. After that fateful day, the Bush administration began using a new, more proactive sounding term: homeland security. The Pentagon, however, treated this new term not as a replacement for, but as separate from, homeland defense. A seemingly simple matter of semantics reveals a great deal about US civil- military relations. America's post-9/11 obsession with securing the "homeland" shifted the domestic political landscape, including American civil-military relations. The American model of civil-military relations has been characterized by a contract according to which the military defends the nation's borders while domestic police keep order at home. "On September 11," in the words of DoD Transformation "czar" Arthur K. Cebrowski, "America's contract with the Department of Defense was torn up and a new contract is being written."[1] This Strategic Insight describes some of the forces compelling military changes in the historical context of US civil-military relations. Although the military itself may resist change, institution-building (outside and within that organization) and attitudinal changes in response to massive terrorist attacks at home cannot but alter American civil-military relations. Much of the shift in American politics since 9/11 has to do with the nature and requirements of homeland security: it is both public and private, interagency (involving a number of government elements) and civil-military. Implementing the new national security strategy will require cooperation across sectors of activity and jurisdictions of authority.[2] Government-private sector coordination is vital to critical infrastructure protection. Agency-to-agency coordination is the foundation of any national response to security threats involving multiple levels of government in a nation consisting of more than 87,000 government jurisdictions.[3] Civil-military coordination is indispensable for ensuring adequate military support to civilian agencies responsible for homeland security. The quality of America's civil-military relations will be a factor in the effectiveness of America's "war on terror," while by the same token, the conduct of the war will irrevocably shape those relations. Given the US military's lead in homeland defense, civilian control of the military should be a topic of particular interest to anyone concerned with the function of democracy in wartime.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 37 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 38 Impacts – Soft Power CMR key to humaniarian aid created soft power Frederick Barton and Noam Unger, 09. [Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of the Foreign Assistance Reform project at Brookings. “civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity ,” http://csis.org/publication/civil- military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity.]The purpose of greater civilian capacity serves as a call for a strategy. Since one is lacking, it also calls for a process to devise such a strategy. Over the course of the workshop, numerous experts raised the possibility of crafting a National Strategy for Global Development (NSGD). Most current proponents of a NSGD seek a strategy that employs a broad definition of development as it applies to foreign assistance -- inclusive of humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction and good governance as well as poverty alleviation and economic growth. Within this vision, an NSGD would also address other relevant development policy areas such as trade and migration. The underlying understanding is that efforts in all of these areas shape the long- term progress of developing countries, including the prevention of conflict. The workshop discussions also reminded participants that “development assistance” can be interpreted more narrowly as long term aid programs to various less-developed countries. This definitional problem continues to be important as the government explores the scope of potential new strategies, but the feeling of the organizers is that the complementarities of crisis response and longer term development should be emphasized. There is a general consensus on the need to strengthen the capacity of the United States government’s civilian international affairs agencies as part of a “smart power” approach to global engagement. Clearly, it is a national security imperative to ensure that the United States government can effectively harmonize stabilization efforts with broader development approaches and institutions. At a strategic level, policymakers must identify steps that can set the nation on a course of greater reliance on, and sufficient investment in, civilian development expertise. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 38 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 39 Impacts – IndiaIndian CMR is tied to American CMR- Indian generals look to America to get a sense of boundaries Ahmed 10 [Ali Ahmed, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 7-14-2010, “CMR: under scan” IDSA, http://www.idsa.in/node/5651/495#comment-495]Mr. Sisodia alludes to an episode last year in which McChrystal overplayed his hand in using a speaking engagement at the IISS in London to press for the policy option for AfPak that he favoured over the one represented by Vice President Joe Biden. The bureaucratic politics indulged in then also included leaking of McChrystal’s operational assessment of the AfPak predicament. Both strategems resulted in McChrystal and the military receiving an admonition from Secretary Gates. In the event, Obama had decided to back McChrystal with the surge he desired and the counter insurgency strategy he favoured. It is apparent that the General, otherwise well regarded as a thorough professional, did not learn his lesson in civil-military relations and therefore virtually invited his marching orders on publication of his profile and that of his ‘Team America’ in the Rolling Stone magazine. This example is used for lessons closer home, possibly prompted by the sometimes controversial and possibly motivated media attention received by remarks of the top brass in the recent past. Such instances include: the earlier Army Chief’s remarks on integration of Maoists into the Nepal Army, on the military’s ‘two front’ strategic problem, on deployment against Maoists; and of the present Army Chief’s take on the petty political motivations of those against AFSPA, and on lost opportunities for political engagement in Kashmir. Likewise, the Air Chief’s remarks on the use of air power in Central India and that of his Vice Chief on the politics behind arms deals are other examples. The issue in debate is not that the military cannot have a position on a question with military implications, but the extent to which it can go in furthering its case or expressing its concerns. Indian CMR key to prevent Indian political collapse Singh 10 [ Sukhwindar Singh, retired Indian general, commenting on “CMR: under scan” 7-17-2010 by Ali Ahmed, IDSA, http://www.idsa.in/node/5651/501#comment-501] We need an Indian Model for Civil-Military Relations. This is necessitated for reasons of our being a comparatively ‘young nation’, emerging quality of political leadership and its ethos, self-serving attitudes all around, rampant corruption, under-development of about 40 per cent of our population, and tense security scenario in the sub-continent, amongst others.In order that the Indian Democracy develops and flourishes, all stakeholders in the country need to ensure effective and efficient Governance. Political Leadership should vow and act to provide it. Indian Masses cannot wait indefinitely, or else the vacuum in leadership will be filled by certain other type of leadership - Communists, Maoists, or worse by Indian Military to its peril.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 39 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 40 Impacts – IraqCMR vital to the cohesion needed to win Iraq Patrick M. Cronin, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2008 Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations, http://www.stormingmedia.us/55/5548/A554884.htmlDespite the positive developments in Iraq, questions remain over how labor should be divided and civilian and military activities coordinated to support counterinsurgency operations in foreign theaters. Today, the need for overall political leadership and coherence appears greater but achieving it more difficult. At the same time, a distant, top-down style of strategic management or micromanagement of the complex tasks in remote contested zones seems quixotic. So we ask ourselves, how does irregular warfare alter our thinking about civilmilitary relations? Is the putative decline in civil- military relations permanent, serious, and crippling? Or conversely, is it sui generis to a conflict such as Iraq or Afghanistan — and overblown in terms of the problems it presents—depending mainly on individual actors and therefore manageable, given the right set of personalities? To what degree does command and control structure contribute to, or detract from, the ability to integrate civil-military efforts? And at what levels and in what venues should civil-military efforts be integrated in an irregular war? The war that “we are in and must win” (to paraphrase Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) pits us against nonstate groups that seek to advance extremist agendas through violence. Accordingly, irregular warfare will be the dominant form of conflict among adversaries in the early years of the 21st century. To succeed in these messy and profoundly political wars, the United States needs a framework that appropriately and effectively balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the best use of their unique and complementary portfolios.Healthy CMR is a prerequisite to stabilizing Iraq Patrick M. Cronin, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2008 Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations, http://www.stormingmedia.us/55/5548/A554884.htmlRecent developments in the war in Iraq suggest that professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are essential to succeeding in an irregular war. This supposition has been borne out by the productive collaboration between General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Their offices were on the same hallway, and their physical proximity reflected a close partnership between the two leaders that produced a breakthrough in U.S. efforts to senior military officers have noticed a greater expectation among junior officers to participate in senior-level discussions about strategies and tactics and to have their views heard and considered 8 Strategic Forum No. 234, September 2008 stabilize the country, quell extremist activity, and restore a functioning government and society in the fifth year of the war. The importance of skillful integration of effort between the senior American official in country and the top military commander in theater has likewise been demonstrated in Afghanistan. Why the importance of civil-military relationships is elevated in an irregular war goes back to the mosaic nature of counterinsurgency operations. According to the Army’s Counterinsurgency field manual, “Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.”16 Participants in a COIN operation include not only military personnel but also diplomats, politicians, medical and humanitarian aid workers, reconstruction workers, security personnel, narcotics officers, contractors, translators, and local leaders. All these diverse players must share common overall aims and effectively communicate as they perform complementary and sometimes conflicting tasks. The interaction and coordination that must take place in irregular warfare require mutual respect and leadership from the top down, both in the field and in Washington. Achieving this level of cooperation between two fundamentally different cultures is one of the challenges of an irregular war. Following are some of the issues that are in various stages of discussion and resolution.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 40 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 41 ***********Aff Answers*********Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 41 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 42 Aff Answers – Non Unique CMR Tanked – Opposition to Obama’s Afghanistan Strategy Tampa bay Tribune 7/21 [7/21/10, " Support for Obama's Afghan strategy wanes in Congress ", http://www.tampabay.com/news/military/war/support-wanes-for-president-obamas-afghan-war-strategy/1110365] With military progress scarce and doubts remaining about the reliability of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, confidence in the Obama administration's Afgh anistan strategy is deteriorating on Capitol Hill, including among prominent lawmakers who had been firm backers of President Barack Obama's plan. Concerns are rising as lawmakers consider a $37 billion emergency war funding bill. While Congress overall still supports the U.S. mission and is unlikely to cut off funding, members may seek to attach conditions to the bill, such as requiring the administration to outline goals and fixed timetables to reduce the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. Leaders in both parties have said the lack of specific goals in Obama's plan makes it impossible to define success. Obama launched a lengthy review of the war in Afghanistan after taking office last year. He chose to increase the number of troops to about 100,000 and implement a counterinsurgency strategy to try to stem Taliban gains, but pledged that U.S. troops would start pulling out by the summer of 2011. The effort has been beset by disputes with Karzai over election irregularities, charges of systemic corruption, increasing casualties and halting progress on high-profile military campaigns. The firing this summer of the general in charge of the war effort, Stanley A. McChrystal, highlighted tension between U.S. civilian and military policymakers. Even among Obama loyalists, a lack of confidence is starting to bubble up. A year ago, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Massachusetts Democrat John Kerry, praised the administration's plan as a "comprehensive, considered path forward." Last week he wondered aloud whether it would ever produce results. Fights Over Troop Withdrawal and McChrystal Tank CMR Los Angeles Times 6/27 [Doyle McManus, 6/27/10, " On US policy in Afghanistan, who's running the show? ", http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mcmanus-20100627-use,0,604920.column] When I visited Kabul this spring, a diplomat from a country that has sent thousands of troops to our war there asked a simple question that was actually an indictment. "Tell me," he said, "who's in charge of U.S. policy on Afghanistan?" The same question came up in Washington last week as officials sorted through the impact of President Obama's decision to replace his commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, with Gen. David H. Petraeus. "We still have one problem," one official told me. "Who's running the show?" From the beginning, the Obama administration has had too many chiefs running its war effort in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, and too many voices explaining it. The president and his aides hoped to end the dissension by settling on an 18-month surge of troops in December, but different players interpreted the policy in different ways: Vice President Joe Biden said it guaranteed a significant withdrawal of U.S. troops in July 2011, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the policy meant no such thing. The U.S. ambassador in Afghanistan, retired Army Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, is brilliant and ferociously hardworking, but he has collided repeatedly with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, with McChrystal and with his own State Department staff. Obama's super-envoy for the region, Richard C. Holbrooke, is brilliant and ferociously hardworking, but he has collided repeatedly with Karzai, with Eikenberry and even with the White House. Who's in charge here? Nobody's sure. In order for Petraeus, the nation's savviest "political general," to succeed militarily, he will have to help the president answer that nonmilitary question. He's fixed a similar problem before -- in Iraq, where he served as U.S. military commander from 2007 to 2008. Before Petraeus arrived in Baghdad, the U.S. command and the U.S. Embassy frequently clashed. But Petraeus and a new U.S. ambassador appointed at the same time, Ryan Crocker, ended the chaos by working deliberately on a seamless partnership -- in adjoining offices. In Afghanistan, Petraeus actually faces three nonmilitary problems: First, he must help repair the military command's relationship with the White House, which was frayed by the disclosures of disrespect and dissension on McChrystal's staff. Second, he must persuade Obama to fix the unhappy military- civilian partnership in Kabul. That probably means replacing Ambassador Eikenberry, whose relationship with Petraeus has not been notably close in the past. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 42 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 43 Aff Answers – Non Unique Civil-Military Relations are Shot – The Chain of Command is Dead**Richard Greener, former broadcast industry executive, an award-winning essayist, and recipient of the coveted CEBA Award for excellence in business, 3/19/10 [The Commander-In-Chief Test: Failed?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-greener/the- commander-in-chief-te_b_506120.html] It is with great disappointment that I have unexpectedly come to see the sad truth that President Barack Obama is failing the Commander-in-Chief test. Recent events in Afghanistan now highlight how badly our current Commander-in-Chief has loosened the bridle. The stampede begins. Reports are widespread, from many sources around the world, that General Stanley McCrystal has lost control of the American Special Forces in Afghanistan. Our own men in uniform are not following the commander's Rules of Engagement. Substantial elements of American fighting forces, plus private soldiers who are hired assassins in the direct employ of the United States government, and are unknown and accountable to the public, are now apparently operating beyond the effective control of the Commander-in-Chief. The chain of command in Afghanistan is broken. That means the constitutional chain of command, which Harry Truman dramatically demonstrated ends in the White House not in the Pentagon, no longer exists. The Commander-in-Chief is not in command. If absolute civilian control over the world's mightiest military machine has been lost, whether surrendered voluntarily or involuntarily, the Constitution will have been abridged in a manner even Andrew Jackson or Abraham Lincoln could not have imagined. There is still time for repair. Barack Obama's term of office is four years. We are barely a quarter way through. But his current failure conjures up the worst fears of our Founding Fathers. Without a stout, firm, unflinching Commander-in-Chief who is without doubt in complete control of the US military complex, we stand in jeopardy - as Benjamin Franklin painfully predicted - of losing our republic and our freedom. Gates and Obama Are Targeting the Military Now – Shifting towards Civilian Control Washington Independent 2/24/10 [Gates’ Counteroffer to Rebalance Civilian-Military Aspects of National Security, http://washingtonindependent.com/77625/gates-counteroffer-to-rebalance-civilian-military-aspects-of-national-security]As reported on Monday, the Pentagon didn’t embrace Stuart Bowen’s proposal to create a new agency — the U.S. Office of Contingency Operations — to help plan and coordinate civilian-military operations in conflict and post-conflict zones and failed states. But that’s not to say that Robert Gates, the secretary of defense, thinks that defense, diplomacy and development are currently well balanced or that U.S. foreign policy doesn’t lean too heavily on the military . He made that clear enough in a speech tonight to the Nixon Center. Gates started out by outlining a new — or, viewed historically, restored — long-term core mission for the U.S. security apparatus: improving the capabilities of foreign partner militaries and security services. The general idea is that the more and the earlier the U.S. strengthens the ability of its partners to keep the peace, the lower the need for the U.S. military to be deployed to failing states in the future. That’s something of a consensus position among Washington foreign policy circles — especially after the training missions in Afghanistan and Iraq — but Gates criticized the Pentagon and the military services for not organizing themselves sufficiently for the scope of the task. “We are unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan anytime soon – that is, forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire,” Gates said. “But, as the department’s Quadrennial Defense Review recently concluded, we are still likely to face scenarios calling on a similar tool-kit of capabilities, albeit on a smaller scale.” Beyond that mission, Gates outlined a long-term vision for how the Pentagon and the State Department can collaboratively rebalance U.S. capabilities for foreign missions. It revolves around sharing money between the two agencies, which is a very big deal: the Defense Department budget, over half a trillion dollars annually, is literally an order of magnitude greater than the State Department’s. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 43 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 44 Aff Answers – CMR ResilientCMR is Resilient – Gates and high ranking Generals will respect any Obama decision and shield it from opposition. Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution and holds the Distinguished Chair in International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy, 9-4-‘9 (Kori, “So far so good for civil military relations under Obama,” Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/04/so_far_so_good_for_civil_military_relations_under_obama) Crucial to Feingold's argument is that the Afghan people resent our military involvement. Both McChrystal, and now Gates, are persuaded that is not true. They argue that how we operate in Afghanistan will determine Afghan support to a much greater degree than the size of the force. Gates for the first time yesterday signaled his support for further force increases on that basis, indicating he will not be a political firewall for the White House if McChrystal and Mullen advocate politically uncomfortable increases. Afghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because President Obama had campaigned and carried over into governance his argument that it was the "right" war and negligently under-resourced during the Bush administration. Even with domestic anti-war sentiment on the rise and a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats against funding the Afghan mission, Obama is seemingly trapped into supporting the military commander's troop requests. Hard to imagine the Houdini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that his predecessor neglected the most important war and then refuse troops to a commander who you put into position and who is supported by a well-respected Defense Secretary. Yet the President may -- and perhaps should -- do exactly that, and for reasons that are laudable in our system of civil-military relations. The American way of organizing for warfare has distinct responsibilities for the leading military and civilian participants. To work up the ladder, it's the military commander's job to survey the requirements for success and make recommendations. It's the job of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the military judgment of that strategy and resourcing, advising the Secretary and the President on its soundness and other possible courses of military action. It's the Secretary of Defense's job to figure out how to provide those resources from a limited pool of people and equipment, to identify and manage the risk it creates for other operations and objectives (e.g., Iraq, managing China's rise, deterring North Korea, etc). It is the Commander in Chief's job to establish the war's objectives and determine whether they merit the resources it would require to be successful. He may determine the objectives are too costly in themselves, or that achieving them would distract too much effort from other national priorities, or that we do not have the necessary partners in the Karzai government to achieve our objectives. It should go without saying that it is not the National Security Advisor's job to intimidate military commanders into dialing down their requests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what Jim Jones is reported to have done when visiting Afghanistan during the McChrystal review. Such politicization of military advice ought to be especially noxious to someone who'd been both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a Combatant Commander. When the Bob Woodward article recounting Jones' attempted manipulation as published, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen commendably defended McChrystal's independence. It is also curious that the one person invisible in this debate, as in the debate about relieving General McKiernan, is the CENTCOM commander, General Petraeus. But beneficially and importantly for our country, policy debates over the war in Afghanistan indicate that the system of civil-military relations is clearly working as designed. We owe much to Gates, Mullen, and McChrystal for shielding the process from politicization and providing military advice the President needs to make decisions only he can make.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 44 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 45 Aff Answers – Impact Inevitable Bad relations with the military is inevitable- budget cuts will always occur Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He was Chief USAF Historian, 1981-1991. Last year, he was the Omar N. Bradley Professor of Strategic Leadership at Dickinson College and the U.S. Army War College, 12/08, (http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/se/util/display_mod.cfm?MODULE=/se- server/mod/modules/semod_printpage/mod_default.cfm&PageURL=/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil- military.html&VersionObject=1E3CBE2DBBE563B822DCC0B0190CFBB9&Template=29E587BBB8D9DC25271BBCA69C2FF6 B8&PageStyleSheet=76CF36CE1FA93556BC999EC2A5F18260)The Democrats would surely prefer to finesse these dilemmas and, with them, charges of weakness on national defense. Hillary Clinton has labored assiduously to gain the trust of the military, mindful of how it nearly crippled her husband’s administration. Yet escape will be impossible, particularly when it comes to Iraq and the budget. Significantly, Clinton has made no promises to the military, not even a ritualistic pledge to maintain a strong national defense. Civil-military relations under Democratic administrations, from Truman to Kennedy to Johnson to Carter to Clinton, became more toxic with each. The leading Democratic contenders today have no military experience or feel for military culture. All would find themselves under extraordinary pressure from their constituencies to exit Iraq, cut the budget, allow gays to serve without prejudice, and apply the separation of church and state with rigor. None would wish to expend political capital on less sexy, but more consequential, questions related to the proper roles, missions, scope, and resources of the military establishment. Nor would the Congressional Democrats. Yet if they don’t set the terms of the debate, the military will do it for them. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 45 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 46 Aff Answers – South Korea The military supports withdrawal from South Korea Eric Schmitt, New York Times staff writer, 6/4/08, NYTimes, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/washington/04gates.html? _r=1&em&ex=1212724800&en=616e073aa51f13ea&ei=5087%0A Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Tuesday that he supported extending the tours of thousands of troops stationed here to three years and allowing their spouses and children to live with them during their assignments. His endorsement adds momentum to a policy shift favored by commanders to improve the quality of life for most of the 28,500 troops assigned to South Korea on unaccompanied 12-month tours because South Korea is considered a combat zone. Such a change would also reverse decades of Pentagon policy for South Korea, acknowledging that the threat of an attack from the North has declined in the face of an unwavering American deterrent force and the growth of an increasingly capable South Korean military. “I don’t think anybody considers the Republic of Korea today a combat zone,” Mr. Gates told reporters here on the final day of a weeklong Asian trip, which also had stops in Guam, Singapore and Thailand. But Mr. Gates, elaborating on comments he made on Monday, noted that extending tours and allowing families to join soldiers here would require building more housing and consideration of other financial and logistical details, suggesting that such a step was still years away. Aides to Mr. Gates said that with broad agreement to align the policy in South Korea with that in Germany and other overseas bases, the next step will be for each of the armed services to determine how to incorporate three-year tours in South Korea with other personnel duty rotations worldwide. “Our goal is to rapidly reach the point when all U.S. service members can bring their families to Korea and stay here for a normal three-year tour,” Gen. Walter L. Sharp of the Army said Tuesday. He spoke at a ceremony at Yongsan Garrison in which he assumed command of American forces on the Korean Peninsula from Gen. B. B. Bell, who is retiring. Only about 10 percent of the forces in South Korea, mostly senior officers, are authorized to have their families with them. Extending the length of tours would be another major change to the American military presence here. Over the past few years, United States troops have been moving from bases near the demilitarized zone to new posts farther south, leaving South Korean troops to take over the major responsibility along the front. Moving the American troops away from the border with North Korea — where they are within easy range of 12,000 artillery pieces and rocket launchers — would make them better able to absorb and respond to a North Korean offensive. The shift of American forces has the added benefit of defusing tensions with South Koreans. Many American bases built decades ago in rural areas have since been swallowed up by the sprawl of Seoul, the capital. Mr. Gates said that in a meeting on Tuesday with South Korea’s defense minister, Lee Sang-hee, he reaffirmed the realignment plan and a transition of wartime control of allied forces to a South Korean joint military command by 2012. Mr. Gates said they discussed broadening security relations beyond the Korean Peninsula to regional and global issues. The American military presence in South Korea has declined by about 9,000 troops in five years, with some of those soldiers now used in Iraq and Afghanistan. To offset the drop in American troops, United States commanders plan to rely on a new generation of sensors, precision-guided bombs and high-speed transport ships, Pentagon officials said.Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 46 05017297c95ecbe9e8080d525ddfaca9.doc Dartmouth 2K10 47 Aff Answers – Civlian Link Turn Top Military Leaders Support Broader Civilian Role Gordon Lubold, @ Christian Science Monitor, 3/3/10 [ln] Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Wednesday evening that there are limits to American military power and diplomatic efforts must be just as important if not more so. But despite recognition of this, the military has become the default for American foreign policy. “It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders, quite another to always have to be the fire chief,” Mullen said in prepared remarks at Kansas State University. Time to invest in other departments Citing a speech delivered by President Obama late last year, Mullen said it’s time to invest in other departments, such as homeland security, intelligence, and the State Department, whose budget pales compared to massive Pentagon funding. “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard,” he said. “US foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands and not enough on the State Department.” As critical as the admiral’s remarks appeared to be, he’s not the first one to make them. Mullen is reinforcing an appeal that his boss, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, made when he appeared at the same lecture series at Kansas State University in 2007. Mr. Gates told the audience that there are limits to American military power, and that agencies such as State and USAID must be resourced properly. He highlighted the lopsidedness of how Congress funds the defense and state departments. Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 47

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