Draft Report for Long Term Storage Facility (Storage Working Group)

DRAFT REPORT FOR LONG TERM STORAGE FACILITY (STORAGE WORKING GROUP)IntroductionThe radioactive wastes in Cuba arrive from nuclear applications (medicine, industrial, research, etc) The National Center for Nuclear Safety (Regulatory body) is responsible for the licensing and supervision of radioactive and nuclear installations and for the control of radioactive waste. There are a well defined regulatory framework according international practices and recommendations. The Center for Radiation Protection and Hygiene (unique operator) is responsible for centralized collection, transportation, treatment, conditioning and long term storage of radioactive waste, as well as for developing new waste conditioning and containment methods. There is a Waste Treatment and Storage Facility adequately designed to accomodate the amount and types of radioactive waste generated in the country. A. SAFETY CASE CONTEXT- Purpose of the Safety CaseThis Safety Case (SC) has the purpose to evaluate the possibility to extend the lifecycle for the storage facility (Long term storage, LTS) in 80-90 years. This evaluation is relevant (according our national strategy) to evaluate the possibility to enhance/improve the current storage facility and delay the final RW disposal option, mainly for economical reasons. Also other possible purposes for LTS should be included in the GSG-3 Identification of uncertainties, his relevance and ways to handled for LTS.  Demonstration the safety of the storage facility or activity for LTS Scenarios.  Provide support for licensing or authorization process (LTS)  Evaluation and justification of the expected lifetime (LTS) of the facility;  Assessment of the maximum inventory of waste that can be accepted or handled in LTS conditions  Definition or revision of limits, controls and conditions. Identification of remedial actions, if needed, (design changes, procedures, etc) to improve the safety of CSF for LTS. Definition of new WAC for LTS. - Safety Case ScopeFor the evaluated facility (Waste treatment and storage facility), only are included in the Safety Case the storage facility with two separate rooms/chambers for treatment wastes and disused sealed sources.- Demonstration of safetyProvide an overview of the criteria that the safety case is aiming to meet. This can be a specific aspect; it does not have to be a synopsis of the whole. The text should explain why items are included/or excluded. Should be demonstrate that the storage facility meets the safety requirements to protect the environment and humans  The assessment impacts meet the dose levels defined for the regulations during the planned lifecycle of the facility.  Have been identified and evaluated a comprehensive set of PIE/Scenarios and impacts according the facility characteristics.  The relevant site characteristics have been evaluated and well documented to support the SC.  Have been identified the key issues (according the impacts to the design, management, etc) which are relevant for a safety and security long term storage.- Graded ApproachIn this preliminary stage (evaluation for Long Term Storage), the safety case scope was enough to identify preliminary scenarios, conservative models and according the impacts were provided recommendations which are necessary to meet the regulatory criteria. B. SAFETY STRATEGYThere is a centralized facility (waste treatment and conditioning), which is licensed to treatment and storage all the radioactive wastes from the nuclear applications in Cuba. In our RW national strategy is defined the final disposal of rw and also had been identified a favorable site for this facility. According the economical costs associated to the disposal the safety strategy was to evaluate with this safety case the possibility to extend the lifecycle for the current storage facility and delay the disposal options. Always should be meet the regulatory criteria.C. DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY OR ACTIVITY AND WASTE- Site ConditionsThe radioactive waste treatment and storage facility (WTSF) is managed by the Centre fro Radiation Protection and Hygiene (CPHR) as unique operator for activities of RW management in Cuba.The facility is placed in La Havana province, in South limit near to the Managua town (1 km away from facility), see figure 1. Figure 1. Facility site viewThe site relief is characterized by abrasive, abrasive- denudation and hilly plains with heights among 80 at 120 m. Also there are fluvial plains of the erosive accumulative, medium and lightly undulate types.The site geology is represented by four sedimentary rock formations: Guines, Chirino, Tinguaro and Capdevila. The main lithologies are: milestone, clay, loan and sadstone, also there are presence of karts activities on the site.The storage facility, see figure 2 is a concrete building with 2 storage chambers (21m x 6m x 4.5m) one for conditioned wastes and other for disuses sealed sources (DSS). Both storage chambers are interconnected and have independent entrance.Figure 2. Storage facility and plan sketch- Facilities and ActivitiesFor the safety case only storage activity was taking into account, all the wastes and DSS are properly conditioned. The main assumptions are; the storage facility is full capacity (closed), no more periodic activities of handling waste, only surveillance. - WastesSince only nuclear applications are available in the country, the main waste class are the LLW and VLLW, see figure 3. The more relevant inventory of wastes is associated to the DSS. Now according the legislation, the new sources should be returned to the supplier when they become disused.Figure 3. Reported RW in storage by year.For the Safety Case the waste components were conditioned wastes and DSS. All the Wastes and DSS are conditioned; the facility is full of capacity (about 100 m3). The relevant inventory for the safety case is listed in the table 1:Table 1. Main inventory of RW in the storage facility for the Safety CaseRadionuclides Activity, GBq Waste type Observation Cs137 13.73x10-3 Conditioned, solid 0.22 m3 container compactable volume Co60 70.0x10-4 Conditioned, solid 0.22 m3 container compactable volume H3 26.25x10-6 Conditioned, solid 0.22 m3 container compactable volume C14 26.25x10-6 Conditioned, solid 0.22 m3 container compactable volume Cs137 20.09x10-3 Conditioned liquid 0.22 m3 container wastes volume Co60 1.96x10-3 Conditioned liquid 0.22 m3 container wastes volume H3 2.0x10-6 Conditioned liquid 0.22 m3 container wastes volume C14 14.0x10-6 Conditioned liquid 0.22 m3 container wastes volume 60 -3 0.1 m3 container Co 3.2x10 DSS volume 137 0.1 m3 container Cs 667.1 DSS volume 241 0.1 m3 container Am 20 DSS volumeThe RW containers are placed in different rows and stacked until 3 levels, see figure 4. For the assessment associated to shielding considerations, only the direct impact for the worker from the first and second RW row was took into account during operational assessment.Figure 4. Emplacement of RW and DSS containers.D. SAFETY ASSESSMENTMANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTIESFor this specific safety case associated to a long term period (50-90 years) there are different uncertainties sources: • The behavior/evolution of EBS for the timeframe, expected waste streams. • Models parameters associated to EBS, … • Expected/predicted changes in the site (climatic change, socio-economical, etc) for LTSTo decrease the information gaps were carried out several site investigations (geology, hydrogeology, meteorological, etc) to complete models parameters and handle the uncertainties. Also conservative assumptions were adopted when specific information was not available.ITERATION & DESIGN OPTIMIZATIONAccording the safety case results has been optimized different aspects associated to design, procedures, etc. For instance:- Was modified the surveillance program trough the increased of the planned surveillance period (monthly), and change of the containers emplacement. - For the conditioned wastes, containing tritium wastes was modified the emplacement plan. - Recommendations were provided to remove the current soil cover of the storage facility to avoid the water infiltration and to initiate maintenance work for the facility. - Was enhancing the monitoring system of the environment through on-site measurements of natural radiation and monitoring wells. - Inclusion in the contingency plans for major safety events included in the scenarios evaluated.- Limits, Controls and ConditionsAccording to the safety case context were defined limits for individual effective doses to public members. 1 mSv/y up to 5 mSv in a year if the average of 5 consecutive years does not exceed 1 mSv/y. For occupational exposure, (worker) the dose limit of 20 mSv/y averaged for 5 consecutive years. It also took into account the value of the annual dose constrain on the practice of managing radioactive waste for CPHR (5 mSv/y).INTEGRATION OF SAFETY ARGUMENTS- Comparison against safety criteriaThe impacts obtained (doses) for the different scenarios were compared with the safety criteria to evaluate whether or not these met the limits. That was the basis to improve the SC or provide recommendations for the design of the storage facility.- Plans for addressing unresolved issuesThe lack of information was addressing trough structural and site researches carried out to the storage facility in order to complete the knowledge about relevant aspect in the SC. We obtain relevant data about the presence of fractures, water infiltration rate, details about geology, hydrogeology, etc.INTERACTING PROCESSESIn the SC preparation, besides the operator (CPHR) also the regulatory body was associated with the scenarios generation and justification stage and the results discussion and recommendations.RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTASSESSMENT CONTEXTFor the examples provide details of; the assessment purpose, the assessment philosophy, the regulatory framework, the assessment endpoints and the assessment time frame. In addition the following should also be included:The assessment purpose was: Safety Case to evaluate the possibility to extend the storage period (Long term storage) for radioactive waste - Assessment Philosophy and Approaches In general, cautious assumptions were used. We use generic data when site-specific information was not available. When was possible were carried out site specific researches (environmental, social-economical, geology, hydrogeology, etc) to collect relevant data for the SC.- Assessment EndpointsThe final endpoints are the dose for workers and public members for normal and accidental scenarios.- Facility staff (Worker) and - Public members living near the storage facilityDESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY OR ACTIVITY AND THE WASTEThe storage facility is a shallow construction located on a zeolite filling, with 1 m of thickness. The storage area is divided into two interconnected rooms and there is a local ventilation system located on the side of the storage place. The volume of the two storage rooms is about 1134 m³. The construction materials are reinforced concrete and prefabricated elements, the doors to the storage facility are steel plates. The design also included fire protection systems and against floods, all these elements were took into account in the SC. More details on the design are given in the SC context. DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTIFICATION OF SCENARIOSAccording the assessment context, system description were defined the scenarios to be evaluated. Were used several approach such as; expert judgment supporting for information about the facility and the site and also a FEPs database (modify ISAM FEPs list). With this information was carried out a hazards screening for each feature, events and process relevant for the safety. When we had uncertainties about the probability of occurrence and the expected impact was high, a cautions approach was adopted (human intrusion)Some events were phase out (seismic events, etc) when specific studies clarify the occurrence likelihood. Others were removed associated to the current facility design basis (floodings, etc). According this criteria and taking into account the preliminary status of the safety case, were identify a group of relevant scenarios for normal and accidental situations.- Operation scenarioThis scenario is associated to the normal radiological control program of the stored wastes. The worker spent 10 minutes to checking the RW containers in the storage facility. The main impact is related to external exposure.- Normal scenarioThis scenario includes the impact to the worker during periodic surveillance program. Associated to the long term considerations there are 7 degraded containers of conditioned wastes and radioactive wastes are released. Direct irradiation and inhalation are the main impacts.- Altered scenario. There are containers degraded, release of radioactive wastes and associated to the water presence by infiltration, there is a transport of contamination outside the storage facility in two ways. - Transport trough the drain water channel surrounding the facility, impacts related to food ingestion. - Transport to geosphere through the groundwater and there is presence of contamination in the aquifer, the impacts arrive from water consumption in a well.There is a release of radioactive wastes, direct intake trough water or foods. This scenario took into account the problems of water infiltration in the storage facility associated to presence of water in the soil layer covering the facility.- Accidental scenario. The assumption is there a fire in the storage facility affecting the conditioned wastes and the release of radioactive wastes are in the facility, on-site and outsite impact (near town and dam). The main impacts are associated to direct irradiation, inhalation and food consumptions. - Partial fire, (only compactable wastes) and affect to the worker and fire personal. Dose to workers from inhalation and external irradiation - Total fire, (besides compactable wastes and some DSS) and affect worker and public member. The released contamination affects a near town and recreational dam. Direct exposure, inhalation and food ingestion.- Human intrusion scenario. There is fault with the safety and security systems and a public member access to the storage facility in inadvertent way. A DSS container is open and the dose to public members is assessed.Despite the low probability of this event, was evaluated taking into account the planned conditions for the storage facility:- Partial closure of facility (completed inventories), - only monitoring activities, there are not operations of storing or handling and - the possible reduction of the security control with the time is expected.Also the GSGS provide a list of PIEs to support scenarios definition for LTS such as: Any natural events (flood, seismic, climatic changes, etc ) relevant for the defined timeframe  Loss of containment (associated to natural degradation, accident, etc)  Loss of confinement (associated to natural degradation, accident, etc)  Lack of maintenance (full capacity, complex maintenance activities)  Incorrect determination of characteristics of wastes, this could results in: degradation/corrotion in the barrier (EBS is not designed for LTS)  Ineffective personal monitoring;  Faulty or ineffective security monitoring; (in LTS maybe less personal available)  Maintenance activities not well managed; (full capacity, complex maintenance activities)  Loss of shielding  Improper inspection or inappropriate inspection frequency; (full capacity, complex inspection activities) FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MODELSAccording to the SC Context, facility/site descriptions and scenarios identified as relevant to the safety of radioactive waste storage were defined models to be implemented. These models were representation/simplification phenomena, features and processes involved in the evaluated scenarios and relevant for the safety. Taking into account the level of information available, the models adopted were more or less specific in order to evaluate the radiological impact in the environment and human of the long term storage facility. These models were obtained from previous studies, international documents; some of them were implemented in spreadsheets directly other using specific software. All the models were used under a program of verification and validation.The adopted models simulated the processes related to the radionuclides intake to human and its transport through different media.Dose assessment  External exposure  Ingestion (water, foods)  InhalationRadionuclide transport Unsaturated zone  Groundwater  AirborneThe parameters were obtained for the site and facility description, when was possible were carried onsite investigations to identify/clarify relevant process and to obtain more specific parameters. A conservative approach was adopted at this SC level for parameters definitions, when was necessary.PERFORMANCE OF CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS- Normal operation scenarioThis scenario evaluates the impact to workers associated to the surveillance activities for control of radioactive wastes in the storage facility.Only was taking into account the Cs-137 inventory and since the RW containers are placed in different rows and stacked until 3 levels, for the assessment, only the direct impact to the worker from the first and second RW row was took into account during operational activities associated to shielding considerationsThe final dose according these assumptions is 2.4 mSv/year for the worker, this values is below the dose constraint for the radioactive waste management activity at the CPHR (5 mSv/a).- Normal scenario The annual effective dose obtained by the normal scenario is below 1 mSv/y for all radionuclides involved, see table 2. The most important contributions are associated to the Cs-137 and Co-60, the dose levels obtained by inhalation and external irradiation due to release of radioactive material are not relevant compared to the dose for the Worker for normal operation. The maximum value (total) is below the dose constraint (5 mSv/a) for the practice of RW management at CPHR.Table 2. Doses assessment for the normal scenarioDext Radionuclides Dinh (Sv/y) Dtotal (Sv/y) (Sv/y)Cs137 2.94E-06 3.39E-05 3.69E-05Co60 2.05E-06 2.27E-04 2.29E-04H3 2.39E-08 0.00E+00 2.39E-08C14 5.80E-07 0.00E+00 5.80E-07Totales 5.59E-06 2.61E-04 2.67E-3 According the results a change in the location of the packages was proposed, to facilitate the surveillance activities and to prevent the occurrence of inadvertent phenomenon (container corrosion, release of radioactive materials). Also the frequency of the review was increased to 1 each month at least. - Altered scenario Released radionuclides are transported by surface waters (channels), doses from food ingestion to public members.The results see Table 3, show the impact associated for each radionuclide in the final dose. The main radionuclide is Cs-137 which slightly exceeds the annual individual dose limit for public members (1 mSv/y), this radionuclide does not reach its peak time dose evaluated (100 years). The Cs-137 overcomes the barrier of 1 mSv/y, 93 years after the starting stage; this excesses the planed storage lifecycle (40-80 years).In the impact of others radionuclide play a relevant role the occurrence of different chemical interactions, ion exchange, and sorption to the environment, this causes delay/retention in the movement during transport and the significant reduction of the activity and the impact (excepted tritium).Table 3. Doses assessment for the altered scenario by food ingestionDoses Peak Time of Radionúclidos (Sv/y) Peak, yearCs137 1.52E-03 99Co60 1.17E-09 99H3 5.33E-06 99C14 1.27E-07 99  Released radionuclides area transported by groundwater, dose from water consumption (well) to public members.In the second alternative for this scenario, the released material infiltrates to the groundwater and then is intake by the target group by water consumption. The radionuclide transport is affected by a clay layer included in the storage site. According the table 4, the most relevant radionuclide is the H-3, but does not exceed the maximum annual dose to the public members. This radionuclide had a peak value at 25 years, followed for C-14 but well below the dose limit. The role played by the clay layer with good sorptive capacity was important to decrease the final impacts.Table 4. Doses assessment for the altered scenario by water consumptionPeak dose Peak time, Radionuclides (Sv/a) year Cs137 2.51E-13 99Co60 6.35E-17 99H3 3.51E-05 25C14 9.17E-10 99Despite the assessed impact is not relevance (below dose limit) for altered scenarios, associated to the mobility of the H-3 in the water pathways scenarios (lower time for the dose peak), was proposed to change the location strategy for the H-3 wastes in order to improve its control.- Accidental scenarios Partial fire affecting only conditioned wastes (onsite), dose to workers from inhalation and external irradiationAccording the impacts the most important released radionuclides are U-238 and Ra- 226, the total dose (for the duration of the fire, 1 hour) exceeds slightly the general restriction of the practice of management of radioactive waste, which is 5 mSv/y. Although this scenario evaluates an intervention, the doses should be keep as low as possible to the worker associated with the fire extinguishing.Tabla . Doses assessment for partial fire scenario for worker and firefighting personalRadionuclides D inhalation (Sv/h) Dexternal (Sv/h) Dtotal (Sv/h)Disused Sealed SourcesCs137 - 10 E-6 10 E-6Co60 - 10 E-6 10 E-6Ra 226 - 10 E-6 10 E-6 Am 241 - 1.49E-15 1.49E-15Conditioned wastesH-3 4.68E-08 0.00E+00 4.68E-08 C-14 2.44E-07 0.00E+00 2.44E-07 Cs-137 4.99E-05 1.28E-04 1.78E-04 Co-60 2.15E-05 3.17E-04 3.39E-04 Sr-90 7.17E-05 1.27E-06 7.30E-05 Y-90 1.43E-04 0.00E+00 1.43E-04 Ce-144 2.86E-04 4.56E-07 2.87E-04 Eu-152 5.23E-04 1.19E-05 5.35E-04 Ra-226 1.02E-03 5.10E-04 1.53E-03 U-238 1.98E-03 1.65E-06 1.98E-03 Total Doses 4.10E-03 9.71E-03 5.07E-03 Complete fire affecting all the wastes (conditioned wastes, DSS), doses (offsite the facility, in a near town and dam) to workers and public members from inhalation, external irradiation and food ingestion (offsite scenario).The results show, see table 5, for the Ra-226 the dose limits are slightly above to dose limit for the public, mainly linked to the ingestion of contaminated food. This scenario took into account very conservative parameters for the model, associated with the type of release, wind direction, stability factors, etc. Always will be lower the impact in the population in real conditions.Table 5. Doses assessment for total fire scenario, doses at near town for public memberH Radionuclides. [S v/y ]H-3 1.11E-09C-14 2.67E-09Cs-137 7.86E-05Co-60 4.17E-06Sr-90 8.37E-06Y-90 1.23E-07Ce-144 1.10E-06Eu-152 2.44E-07Ra-226 1.20E-03 U-238 5.73E-06Total 1.30 E-3For the workers onsite the storage facility the obtained impacts is showed in the table 6, the Ra-226 is the most relevant radionuclide but the total dose is below the annual limit.Table 6. Doses assessment for total fire scenario, doses for workers Radionuclides H [Sv]H-3 1.14E-10C-14 3.62E-10Cs-137 1.19E-05Co-60 7.22E-06Sr-90 1.34E-06Y-90 2.27E-09Ce-144 3.70E-07Eu-152 4.98E-07Ra-226 6.08E-04U-238 1.94E-05Total 6.49E-4The impact to the public associated to the release of contaminated material from the total fire is showed in the table 7, the Ra-256 is again the more relevant impact and the more important pathway is the ingestion of contaminated food. The total dose is below the dose limit for the public memberTable 7. Doses assessment for total fire scenario, doses at recreational dam for public members Radionuclides H [Sv/y]H-3 1.18E-11C-14 5.69E-10Cs-137 1.54E-06Co-60 2.22E-08Sr-90 2.20E-08Y-90 1.70E-10Ce-144 1.54E-09Eu-152 5.57E-10 Ra-226 1.31E-05U-238 3.85E-09Total 1.47 E-5 Human intrusion scenario from inadvertent access to storage chambers, dose to public members Despite the low probability of this event, was evaluated taking into account the planned conditions for the storage facility:- Partial closure of facility (completed inventories), - only monitoring activities, there are not operations of storing or handling and - expected possible reduction of the security control with the time pass.According the results, see table 8 the doses exceed the dose limit (Cs-137), the high impact show the relevance of this event and countermeasures should be adopted to avoid this event in the facility.Table 8. Doses assessment for human intrusion scenario, doses for public members Radionuclides (DSS) Dext (Sv/h)Cs137 9.13E-03Co60 0.28E-03Conditioned wastes 9.39E-07Tota 9.13E-03RecommendationsThis preliminary safety case illustrated the possibility for the current storage facility to be improved for long term storage. The associated radiological impact generally was below the defined limits or does not significantly exceed the established limits. The SC results allow us to define a group of corrective actions or recommendations to take into account to use the facility for extended storage of radioactive waste. These recommendations include changes or improvements in design elements of the installation procedures and others. • Need for maintenance works for the facility, removing the soil cover around the building to decrease the moisture level in the storage and resolve the structural problems.• Storage of packages of radioactive waste in a manner that facilitates the surveillance activities. • Differential placement in the storage chambers of wastes according their activity radioactive waste composition, establishing additional protection measures for the most dangerous. (Tritium, spent sources, etc.) • Periodic reviews of construction status of the installation (walls, floor and ceiling), for early identification and timely take corrective actions in the presence of fractures, signs of moisture, water filtration or any other element or phenomenon that compromises the safety of the facility. • Employment protection systems type assets and liabilities in store that prevents or at least reduces the risk of inadvertent intrusion of staff at the facility. • Control and systematic maintenance of fire protection system for the duration of the prolonged storage of radioactive waste. • Design a system that allows control of releases to the outside, picked up by the piping system installation, preventing the escape without adequate radiological control of radioactive material. • Systematic monitoring of the environment through on-site measurements of natural radiation and established monitoring wells. • Inclusion in the radiation protection program installation at the point of contingency plans for major security events included in the scenarios evaluated.SPECIFIC ISSUESIf the examples used demonstrate any of the specific issues discussed in section 6, discussion should be included in the text. The areas to be considered are:- Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and interdependencies;For Long Term Storage the WAC is a relevant issue associated to the assumption of absence of a disposal facility. That means any modification to the wastes (treatment, re- encapsulation, etc.) could affect the compatibility with the WAC for the disposal facility. This situation could generate additional expenses related to conducting corrective actions. Cost-benefit, safety analysis should be carried out after make any action which affect to evaluate Our current Waste Treatment and Storage Facility already had defined criteria to the treatment and conditioning of the radioactive wastes, but these conditioned wastes maybe should be modified in the future when our disposal facility is available. ISSUES RELATED TO THE SAFRAN TOOL APPLICATION FOR LONG TERM SAFETYFor developing the Long Term Safety Case the SAFRAN release 2.1.3.0 was used, now the current version (10/29/2014) is the 2.2.16. Therefore is possible that some identified issues during the SC application have been already solved.Identified issues. • This version includes more wizards to support the tools application, relevant to identify models, parameters, etc.• A screening tool (DSS Borehole) is incorporated, this enhance the SAFRAN tool scope to be applied to evaluate disposal facilities.• Purposes: All included in the standard purposes for the safety assessment are relevant for long term storage facilities.• Scenarios/PIE: (relevant to identify linked scenarios and impacts)– Included: Fire, degradation of process material, etc– Not included as predefined PIE: Human intrusion** Despite the low probability for this specific PIE was evaluated, according its relevant impact and to support the security aspects and facility design. A partial closure of facility is expected (completed inventories), low level of activities, only monitoring, there are not operations of storing or handling and is possible to expect a reduction of the security control with the time.• The activities (storing, handling, etc) and the related waste streams are full supported in SAFRAN 2• There is not available specific models for groundwater or airborne* transport scenarios (conservative models), but can be added the assessment results and additional material (supported documents) may be included to the Safety Case as attached documents. * A simple gaussian model for the airbone transport of contamination taking into account parameters as: distance to target person, wind speed, etc.• The proposed models (preliminary assessment) could be included using the same approach applied in the screening tools (Borehole) with a set of parameters (site hydrology, geochemical, meteorological data, etc) to be defined.• The conservative models included often overestimate the impacts and should used as initial screening purpose, perhaps more specific models will be needed in the safety case.Additional recommendation: • Based in similarities between the Safety Case approaches for predisposal and disposal facilities, could be relevant to evaluate the possibility to enhance/improve the SAFRAN tool for SA/SC application for RW disposal facilities. (new models, scenarios, etc)• Should be compatible the available Test Cases examples (TINT and others developed during the CRAFT project) with the new releases. Possibility to open and handle the saf files.• To facilitate the tool usability for Spanish users (Latin-American state members) should be important to evaluate in the future the possibility to translate to the Spanish language the software and related documents (Safran tool, help off-line, tutorials and examples cases)

Draft Report for Long Term Storage Facility (Storage Working Group)

Details

Download

Copyright

We respect the copyrights and intellectual property rights of all users. All uploaded documents are either original works of the uploader or authorized works of the rightful owners.

Support