<p>United States v Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992).</p><p>Facts: Mr Alvarez-Machain is a Mexican citizen accused of participating in the torture and murder of a US DEA agent. Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped from his medical office in Mexico, then flown to Texas where he was arrested by US officials. The kidnappers were not US government personnel, but appear to have been operating under the instructions of the DEA. The United States has an extradition treaty with Mexico, but informal negotiations to gain the accused's presence in the US had failed. Alvarez-Machain argues that the manner of his detention deprived US courts of any jurisdiction over him.</p><p>Judicial History: Both the trial court and the US Court of Appeal held that the forcible abduction of Mexican citizens was prohibited by the US-Mexico Extradition Treaty.</p><p>Issues: (1) Is the forcible abduction of Alvarez-Machain so outrageous and wrongful as to deprive US courts of jurisdiction over him? (2) Did the US-Mexico Extradition Treaty implicitly prohibit all other (i.e. non-treaty) avenues of compelling Mexican citizens to stand trial in the United States, including their forcible abduction? (3) Are forcible abductions for the purpose of trial prohibited by international customary law?</p><p>Holding: (1) No; (2) No; (3) No.</p><p>Reasoning: The Court was unanimous in rejecting all of Alvarez-Machain's defences. </p><p>(1) On the first issue, the Court relied on the line of cases known as the Kerr doctrine, holding that forcible abduction does not cause a court to lose jurisdiction. Their reasoning on this point is summarized by the following quote from one of the cases: "[The Kerr doctrine] rests on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will." Thus Alvarez-Machain can succeed only if he shows that his abduction was prohibited by the extradition treaty. </p><p>(2) On the second issue, the Court begins by noting that the issue of abduction is not explicitly mentioned in the treaty. Thus if a prohibition on forcible abduction exists in the treaty, it must exist by implication. In particular, Alvarez-Machain argues that the very existence of the treaty makes no sense if the United States is permitted to kidnap Mexican citizens at will. This argument is rejected out of hand. Another barrier to implying a ban on forcible abduction is that the US notified Mexico of the Kerr doctrine, and neither side chose to explicitly overrule this doctrine in the treaty. </p><p>(3) On the third issue, the court notes that Alvarez-Machain's argument on customary international law is intended to influence the interpretation of the Extradition Treaty, and is not a separate defence. Alvarez-Machain argues that because abductions are clearly prohibited by customary international law, there is no need for the treaty to ban them explicitly. The Court rejects this argument for being riddled with logical inconsistencies, including the following: "Respondent would have us find that the Treaty acts as a prohibition against a violation of the general principle of international law that one government may not 'exercise its police power in the territory of another state.' ... There are many actions which could be taken by a nation that would violate this principle, including waging war, but it cannot seriously be contended an invasion of the United States by Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the two nations." The Court concludes by stating that while the abduction may have been "shocking," it is not a bar to the criminal trial of the respondent; any further resolution of the question is a diplomatic question, and lies with the executive branch.</p>