<p> #3-175 Memorandum for the President [April 29, 1942] Washington, D.C. Secret</p><p>Subject: Our Memorandum from General Sikorski.1</p><p>I agree with your general observations concerning the points made by General Sikorski in his memorandum of April 13.2 With respect to his concrete suggestions concerning a general staff, he has proposed in almost exact detail, matters that we have been considering through two agencies. One of these is Colonel Donovan's organization, the other is the Psychological Warfare Committee of the War and Navy Departments. Without exhaustive study of the matter it would appear that the representative Staff Officers of the occupied countries could well be integrated with the machinery we have already instituted for the briefs General Sikorski outlines. This will be especially true if you should approve the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that recommends the placing of Colonel Donovan's committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.3 In the meantime I will have your memorandum, together with General Sikorski's suggestions, studied more thoroughly by the General Staff.4 G. C. Marshall</p><p>Document Copy Text Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President’s Secretary’s File, Safe, Marshall, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Document Format: Typed memorandum signed.</p><p>1. General Wladyslaw Sikorski, formerly prime minister of Poland and commander in chief of the Polish Army, headed the exiled Polish government in London. In an April 13 memorandum that Sikorski asked Marshall to give to the president, he reviewed the European military situation, recommended a cross-Channel attack under the direction of a supreme commander with a combined staff, if the Soviet Union neared collapse, and urged the creation of a military staff composed of representatives from occupied nations and the Allies to plan, organize, and coordinate subversive operations on the Continent. (Sikorski Memorandum, April 13, 1942, FDRL/F. D. Roosevelt Papers [PSF, Safe, Marshall].)</p><p>2. Roosevelt believed that Sikorski had overestimated the value of insurrections in occupied Europe, but thought that the creation of a staff to assess subversive activities should be considered. After pondering Continental politics, the president observed that no European officer could direct such a staff and that the exiled governments would more readily accept United States rather than British leadership. (Roosevelt Memorandum for General Marshall, April 28, 1942, ibid.)</p><p>3. The War Department wanted Coordinator of Information Colonel William J. Donovan's intelligence organization placed under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In contrast to Donovan's desire to expand his network using military and naval men, the War Department had insisted that intelligence and subversive activities be conducted by civilians and approved through civil government channels. (Papers of DDE, 1: 253– 54.) In June 1942 Donovan's group became the Office of Strategic Services. (See Marshall Memorandum for General McNair, June 11, 1942, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #3-222 [3: 236–37].)</p><p>4. Nothing was done to implement Sikorski's recommendation to coordinate subversive operations. (Papers of DDE, 1: 304–5.)</p><p>Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 179–180.</p>