THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND ALLIED NAVAL FORCES’ OPERATION WITH THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE KOREAN WAR: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE OPERATION ON THE WEST COAST By INSEUNG KIM A dissertation submitted to The University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham May 2018 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation on the west coast during the final two and a half years of the Korean War, particularly focused on their co- operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more realistic picture of the United Nations (UN) naval forces operation in the west, which has been largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces. This thesis shows that, even though it was often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval campaign. It concludes that, to the British Commonwealth Commanders and Allied Naval forces on the west coast, a large part of the relationship with the guerrillas during the Korean War could be explained as that involving a compelled co-operation with unreliable partners. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In writing this dissertation, I had the privilege to be awarded the Republic of Korea Government Mid-Term Fellowship. I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the support of the Republic of Korea Air Force and its Air Force Academy, which granted me the fellowship. I am particularly grateful to Colonel Bonggyu Park, Lieutenant Colonel Changboo Kang and Donghan Kim of the Air Force Academy. This research would not have started without their administrative support and intellectual encouragement. This thesis would not have developed and completed without the professional guidance and valuable support of Air Commodore (Ret’d) Dr Peter W. Gray. His thoughtful help and encouragement was truly invaluable in what was for me, doctoral research in a foreign language and culture. Without his readily available tireless support, this thesis would not come to fruition. It was my biggest blessing to be under his supervision. I must also thank Dr James Pugh, who provided continuous valuable comments for the development of my thesis. Regardless of my sometimes imprudent and many enquiries, he always gave practical ideas for my progression. Furthermore, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Byung-Kook Kim of the Korea University for his past guidance in an earlier MA course. Through this course, I was able to adopt a more critical approach in my thinking and writing, and moreover, it laid an invaluable academic foundation not only in the field of social science, but also in general historian type academia. I would also like to thank friends and acquaintances. Notably, I am indebted to Ilhwan Ma’s family. They were a source of comfort and camaraderie for my family, and without this assistance, UK life would be much more lonely and challenging. I am also grateful to Rod Tracey, who has been my English tutor for almost three years. Largely due to his excellent tutoring and thoughtful encouragement, my English ability has been enhanced in both understanding and expression. Finally, my gratitude must go to my wife, Sujeong An and our two children, Jinhyeong and Hyerim. Their continual love and support was a priceless source in enabling me to remain strong and dedicated. Without their support, I would not have completed this doctoral research. Any language in terms of gratitude is insufficient for their unlimited love and support throughout this time. This dissertation was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Dr Sally Baggott, and accordingly a Third Party Declaration Form is included in the submission. CODEWORDS ASHCAN Demonstration landing operation May 1951 ARGONAUT Yalta Conference February 1945 BRICKWOOD Haeju Unit (TU 95.12.4) patrol area CHEERFUL Guerrilla raid operation to recapture Ung-do CIGARRET Chodo-Sokto Unit (TU 95.12.1) patrol area EUREKA Tehran Conference November-December 1943 GUINNESS Han River Unit (TU 95.12.3) patrol area PANDORA Naval evacuation plan from the northern islands ABLE Initial guerrilla operational plan QUICKSILVER Guerrilla unit integration plan into the ROK Army SEXTANT Cairo Conference November 1943 SMOKING CONCERT Naval Island defensive operation in the Chodo-Sokto area TASK FORCE WILLIAM ABLE Early Codename of the American guerrilla organisation TRIX Local evacuation plan of Operation PANDORA WORTHINGTON Paengyong-do Unit (TU 95.12.2) patrol area ABBREVIATIONS AFFE Army Forces, Far East (US) A/S Anti-submarine BCOF British Commonwealth Occupation Force CCF Chinese Communist Forces CCRAK Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CO Commanding Officer COMNAVFE Commander Naval Forces, Far East (US) CTE Commander of Task Element CTF Commander Task Force CTG Commander Task Group CTU Commander Task Unit FEAF Far East Air Force (US) FEC Far East Command (US) FEC/LD (K) Far East Command, Liaison Department, Korea EUSAK Eighth US Army, Korea GHQ General Headquarters HMAS His/Her Majesty’s Australian Ship HMCS His/Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship HMNZS His/Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship HMS His/Her Majesty’s Ship JACK Joint Advisory Committee, Korea JCS Joint Chief of Staff (US) JSPOG Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (US) KLO Korea Liaison Office LCVP Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel LST Landing Ship, Tank MHCI Military History Compilation Institute (Korea) NAVFE Naval Forces Far East (US) NKPA North Korean People’s Army OSI Office of Special Investigations ORO Operations Research Office (Johns Hopkins University) PIR Partisan Infantry Regiment POWs Prisoners of War RN Royal Navy ROK Republic of Korea SAU Special Activities Unit SO (I) Staff Office, Intelligence (RN) TARCAP Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Combat Air Patrol TNA The National Archives (Kew) UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNC United Nations Command UNPFK United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States (of America) USMC United States Marine Corps USN United States Navy W/T Wireless Telegraphy CONTENTS Chapter 1 – Introduction p. 1 1.1 The Literature 9 1.2 Content 19 Chapter 2 – The Emergence of the Anti-Communist Guerrillas on the West Coast p. 23 2.1 From Liberation to Division 25 2.2 The Establishment of a Communist Government and the Beginning of Anti-Communist Movements in North Korea 30 2.3 Anti-Communist Movements during the Early Stage of the Korean War 38 2.4 The UN Forces’ Advance towards the North and the Changed Anti-Communist Movement 41 2.5 Chinese Intervention and Evacuations from the Mainland 46 2.6 Concluding Comments 52 Chapter 3 – The British Commonwealth and Allied Forces’ Naval Operation on the West Coast: From Inception to the End of 1950 p. 55 3.1 Deployment of HM Ships in the Korean War 56 3.2 The Start of the West Coast Blockade and Emerging Problems 61 3.3 Successful Landing at Inchon and the Reduction of the Naval Forces 73 3.4 Chinese Intervention and the West Coast Operation 79 3.5 Concluding Comments 85 Chapter 4 – The Beginning and the Development of Co-Operation: From Mid-December 1950 to early July 1951 p. 87 4.1 The Beginning of Co-Operation with the Guerrillas 88 4.2 The Development of Co-Operation with the Guerrillas Controlled by the ROK Navy 95 4.3 Code Name ‘Leopard ’: Guerrilla Reorganisation under the EUSAK 109 4.4 The Development of Co-Operation with the Leopard Organisation 115 4.5 Conclusions 133 Chapter 5 – The Collapse of Co-Operation with the Leopard Guerrillas: From the Start of Truce Talks to November 1951 p. 136 5.1 The Start of Truce Talks and its Influence on the Leopard Guerrillas 137 5.2 Guerrillas Holding Back and Unsatisfactory Intelligence Supply 145 5.3 The Taewha-do Incident: Conflict between Leopard Headquarters and Donkey-2 150 5.4 Double Agents amongst the Guerrillas 153 5.5 The Guerrillas’ Conduct of ‘Private War’ 159 5.6 The Guerrillas Cry Wolf: Naval Forces’ Fruitless Demonstration 167 5.7 Leopard Headquarters’ Haphazard Screening of the Guerrillas 172 5.8 Conclusions 177 Chapter 6 – Island Warfare and Imposed Close Co-Operation with the Guerrillas: From November 1951 to November 1952 p. 179 6.1 The Communists’ Preparation for the Offensive over the Islands 180 6.2 The Truce Talks and the Beginning of Island Warfare 184 6.3 The Process of the Island Warfare during November, 1951 188 6.4 Naval Anti-Invasion Measures and Imposed Close Co-Operation with the Guerrillas 195 6.5 Tom Tiddler’s Ground on the West Coast 206 6.6 The Change of the Guerrilla Organisation during the Island Warfare 218 6.7 The Task Group Commanders’ Mixed Evaluation of Leopard and Wolfpack Activities 222 6.8 Conclusions 246 Chapter 7 – Alienation from Co-Operation: From December 1952 to the End of the War p. 249 7.1 The Start of Winter and Inactivity on the West Coast 250 7.2 Phase I and II: The Start of Special Missions of the Guerrillas 260 7.3 The Impending Armistice Agreement and the Preparation of Operation PANDORA 268 7.4 Delayed Armistice and Redeployment of the Guerrillas 278 7.5 The Signing of the Cease-fire and After 282 7.6 Concluding Comments 287 Chapter 8 – Conclusion: Compelled Co-Operation with Unreliable Partners p.