ABSTRACT Title of dissertation: WHEN NATIONAL MINORITIES BECOME LOCAL MAJORITIES: FEDERALISM, ETHNIC POLITICS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT Molly Inman, Doctor of Philosophy, 2013 Dissertation directed by: Johanna K. Birnir Department of Government and Politics What explains the variation in ethnic conflict in federal systems? Existing theory and empirical evidence are mixed, with some saying it decreases violence, and some saying increases it. This puzzle also leads to a number of research questions: why does federalism fail to resolve the problem of violent ethnic conflict? Why does local ethnic politics in federal units frequently lead to violence within the ethnic group? What effect does federalism have on violence between ethnic groups? Why do central governments intervene with force into local interethnic conflicts rather than simply allowing the local government of the federal unit to resolve the issue? Conversely, why does federalism sometimes work in preventing violent conflict and session in countries where ethnic politics is salient? The theory presented here asserts that the level of intraethnic political compe- tition within the national minority/local majority and the political incentives created by devolving power to the local level determine the answers. I develop a new theory of local ethnic outbidding by minority groups in federal systems which explains how local ethnic politics turns violent when intraethnic political competition is high. Previous theories have focused almost exclusively on national level politics and vi- olence and have largely ignored the subnational level. I also explain how central governments become involved in local ethnic conflicts in federal systems, because local minorities being targeted call upon them for assistance. Existing theories do not explain why the central government would expend resources and political capital to intervene in a local conflict. Finally, I theorize that the presence and active com- petition of ethnic political parties in federal units does not increase the likelihood of rebellion or secession. Only when interethnic conflict results from ethnic outbidding and the central government intervenes with force does the politically mobilized eth- nic group in the federal unit respond with force in-kind. Existing theories try to link ethnic and regional parties in federal units with secession by theorizing that they reinforce local identities which makes an ethnic group want its own country. My theory asserts and the empirical analysis shows that the path to anti-regime violence by the local majority is much less direct and is contingent on central government actions. To test this theory using statistical analysis, I collected original data on intraethnic political competition for 112 ethnic groups in 21 federal countries from 1990-2006 and assembled a new dataset to test this theory about subnational vio- lent ethnic conflict in federal systems. Additionally, I use process tracing to test the theory using case studies of three ethnic groups in Indonesia. The analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative results lends substantial support to the theory. WHEN NATIONAL MINORITIES BECOME LOCAL MAJORITIES: FEDERALISM, ETHNIC POLITICS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT by Molly J. Inman, Doctor of Philosophy, 2013 Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2013 Advisory Committee: Professor Johanna K. Birnir, Chair/Advisor Professor Paul Huth Professor Jonathan Wilkenfeld Professor Daniel Corstange Professor Michele Gelfand c Copyright by Molly Jean Inman 2013 Table of Contents List of Tables v List of Figures vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Puzzle . .1 1.2 Background . .4 1.3 The Project . .6 1.4 The Contribution . .9 1.5 The Organization of the Dissertation . 10 2 Literature 12 2.1 Ethnic Identity . 14 2.2 Ethnic Outbidding . 16 2.3 Ethnic Conflict . 18 2.4 Ethnicity and Institutions . 22 2.5 Ethnic Politics . 23 2.6 Federalism . 24 2.7 Third-party Intervention . 29 2.8 Conclusion . 31 3 Theory 32 3.1 Why Ethnicity? . 35 3.2 Ethnic Politics: A Specific Form of Patronage Politics . 39 3.3 Part I: Intraethnic Political Competition and Ethnic Outbidding . 41 3.3.1 Government Structure: Unitary or Federal . 48 3.3.2 Group Size . 52 3.3.3 Why does local ethnic politics in federal units frequently lead to violence within the ethnic group rather than unifying the group toward achieving common goals? . 56 3.3.4 What effect does federalism have on violence between ethnic groups?? . 59 ii 3.4 Part II: Why do central governments intervene with force into local interethnic conflict rather than simply allowing the local government of the federal unit to resolve the issue? . 62 3.5 Part III: Why does federalism sometimes work in preventing violent conflict with the central government and secession in countries where ethnic politics is salient? . 65 3.6 Conclusion . 68 4 Methodology 71 4.1 Quantitative Methodology . 73 4.2 Selection Bias in the Original MAR Data . 75 4.2.1 The Ethnic Groups in Federal Countries Sample . 79 4.3 Weighting . 81 4.4 Explanatory Variable . 86 4.5 Dependent Variables . 93 4.6 Control Variables . 95 4.7 Time Dependence . 101 4.8 Latent Variable Model with Limited Dependent Variables . 103 5 Results 105 5.1 Violent Intraethnic Conflict . 107 5.1.1 Effect of Intraethnic Political Competition . 108 5.1.2 Effect of Discrimination . 112 5.1.3 Effect of Group Concentration . 113 5.1.4 Temporal Effects . 115 5.2 Violent Interethnic Conflict . 116 5.2.1 Effect of Intraethnic Political Competition . 116 5.2.2 Effect of Discrimination . 120 5.2.3 Effect of Regime Type . 122 5.2.4 Temporal Effects . 125 5.3 Central Government Violence against the Local Majority . 126 5.3.1 Effect of Intraethnic Political Competition . 126 5.3.2 The Effect of Discrimination . 131 5.3.3 The Effect of Regime Type . 132 5.3.4 Temporal Effects . 132 5.4 Rebellion . 134 5.4.1 The Effect of Intraethnic Political Competition . 135 5.4.2 The Effect of Group Concentration . 139 5.4.3 Temporal Effects . 139 5.5 Discussion . 141 6 Indonesia 147 6.1 Reformasi and Decentralization . 151 6.2 Types of Decentralization in Indonesia . 154 6.3 Powers Not Devolved . 158 iii 6.3.1 Security . 158 6.3.2 `Unity in Diversity' . 161 6.4 Political Parties . 162 6.5 Political Violence . 165 7 Cases from Indonesia 170 7.1 Case Study Methodology . 171 7.2 Dayaks in West Kalimantan . 180 7.2.1 Brief Historical Context . 180 7.2.2 Dayak People . 185 7.2.3 Madurese . 188 7.2.4 Malay . 190 7.2.5 Chinese . 191 7.2.6 Political Activity . 192 7.2.7 Violent Conflict . 200 7.2.8 Analysis . 204 7.3 Balinese in Bali . 208 7.3.1 Brief Historical Context . 209 7.3.2 Balinese People . 210 7.3.3 Non-Balinese in Bali . 211 7.3.4 Political Activity . 213 7.3.5 Violent Conflict . 220 7.3.6 Analysis . 224 7.4 Acehnese in Aceh . 227 7.4.1 Brief Historical Context . 228 7.4.2 The Acehnese People . 229 7.4.3 Non-Acehnese in Aceh . 230 7.4.4 Political Activity . 231 7.4.5 Violent Conflict . 237 7.4.6 Analysis . 239 8 Conclusion 242 iv List of Tables 3.1 Constituent Development Strategies for Ethnic Political Parties . 48 4.1 Frequency Tables for Sample and Universe by Region and Version . 84 4.2 Cell Weights by Region and Version . 84 4.3 The First Raking Iteration for the Sample by Region and Version . 85 4.4 Comparison of Intraethnic Conflict in EGFC and AMAR . 93 4.5 Comparison of Interethnic Conflict in EGFC and AMAR . 93 4.6 Summary Statistics for Variables . 97 5.1 Intracommunal Conflict . 108 5.2 Violent Interethnic Conflict . 117 5.3 Coding Version and Interethnic Conflict in EGFC Sample . 119 5.4 Central Government Violence with No Violent Interethnic Conflict . 127 5.5 Central Government Violence with Violent Interethnic Conflict . 129 5.6 Central Government Violence, Full Sample . 131 5.7 Rebellion . 136 5.8 Comparison of Group Concentration in EGFC and AMAR . 143 v List of Figures 3.1 Chart of Predictions of Political Behavior . 56 4.1 Sample of Non-unitary Countries Used for Analysis (EGFC Sample) . 80 4.2 Numbers of Groups in Non-unitary Countries in the EGFC Sample . 82 5.1 Predicted Probabilities for Intraethnic Conflict . 109 5.2 Predicted Probabilities for Intraethnic Conflict for Political Discrim- ination . 113 5.3 Hazard for Violent Intraethnic Conflict . 115 5.4 Predicted Probabilities for Violent Interethnic Conflict . 118 5.5 Predicted Probabilities for Interethnic Conflict with Political Discrim- ination . 121 5.6 Predicted Probabilities for Violent Interethnic Conflict with Eco- nomic Discrimination . 122 5.7 Predicted Probabilities for Violent Interethnic Conflict at High Levels and.