<p> 1</p><p>Germany and the Approach of War</p><p>Continuing the Internal Conflicts in the European States as the Cause of The Great War</p><p>"Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans," Bismarck predicted, would ignite a major war. For years, the Balkans had been a hostile ethnic and cultural maze straddling the three worlds of Europe, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. Austria controlled much of this area--what until recently was known as Yugoslavia. Dozens of Slav nationalist groups were clamoring for independence. As Bismarck had foreseen thirty years earlier, it was an explosive mix. </p><p>How right he was.</p><p>Germany: </p><p> a) This country faced the gravest internal crisis though. b) The Conflict in Germany was one between a political system rooted in Feudalism and Absolutism against the rising modern, urban, industrial world. This conflict was to lead Germany into taking actions in the World that frightened or threatened England, France and Russia. c) SHOW VIDEOTAPE ON THE GREAT WAR. i) Repeat it.</p><p>2) Why this was so. - Constitutional System - Designed to preserve the position of the old aristocratic orders that have aligned themselves with the industrialists to prevent change and a threat to their position. a) The 1871 Constitution was a sham. i) Prussia had a complete veto over both the Reichstag and the Bundesrat (1) As we will see the voting system put an even greater bias in favour of the Junkers b) The influence of the aristocracy and the army in Wilhelmine Germany was great. i) The two groups were very closely linked: in 1913, (1) For example, 80% of the Cavalry were noblemen and 56% of all officers were titled. (2) This social exclusiveness is emphasized by the fact that between 1878- 1910 not one Jewish officer was appointed. (3) The two groups only gained their influence from 2 main sources – the constitution and the personal influence of the Kaiser. ii) Lafore said that “Most States had armies. The Prussian army had a state.” iii) Ousby argued: “Germany reversed the usual process of European nations in taking its name, Deutschland, from its language; usually languages took their name from the countries where they were spoken.” 2</p><p>3) So, it is clear that this system that was resistant to change? a) Three class Suffrage i) based on Taxes ii) Large Taxpayers, (5% of population) elected 1/3 of Prussian Parliament. iii) Designed to keep the Social Democrats and liberal parties at bay. (1) To protect the position of the aristocrats. b) Reflected in the power, or lack thereof, of the parliament. (1) For instance in 1908 600,000 votes secured 6 SPD seats; 418,000 votes secured 212 Conservative seats. </p><p>4) Bundesrat - Upper house controlled by Prussia, in the interests of the Iron and Rye Coalition. a) Prussia held veto power. 17 seats out of 61. 5) Reichstag - Lower house of all the people. a) The most it could do was to refuse to pass the budget. b) But it could not stop it. i) Had no say over foreign policy or the military. c) As one person said: d) "The Reichstag was "a parliament without a government," condemned to deliver monologues." i) Revenues were often permanent rather than annual, reducing parliamentary control over government ministers and departments. For example, the Army Grant was debated only once every 7 years. ii) Kaiser had full executive power to appoint and dismiss ministers and to dissolve the Reichstag with the permission of the Bundesrat, reducing it to a weak debating body. iii) Chancellor was responsible only to the Kaiser. e) Key: It's chief significance lay in its claim of reflecting public sentiments. Will be very important by 1914.</p><p>6) The argument here is that it is a result of the internal problems and what actions that causes the German State to take in the international arena and what the outcome of that is. a) We’ve seen from Berghahn and Lafore that the German Imperial State acted as much to destroy the Social Democrats as it did to protect or extend its place in the world. b) In essence, the Junkers desire to protect and extend their position led them to: i) Fight to get rid of Bismarck and crack down on SD's and working class ii) In 1902 - Stopped the importation of Russian Wheat because it hurt the Junkers economic position. (1) These tariffs were reintroduced by Posadowsky in 1902 due to right-wing pressure. Although deliberately kept low to prevent foreign trade being seriously affected, they led the SPD to poll an extra 1 million votes in the 1903 elections. c) They ended the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. i) This had ensured that: (1) Germany would only fight against Russia if Russia attacked Austria- 3</p><p>Hungary. (a) Russia would fight against German only if Germany attacked France. (2) Naturally this led to suspicion on all sides about Germany's intentions, especially in Russia. ii) When the treaty with Russia needed to be renewed in 1890 they declined to do so, arguing that it contradicted some clauses of the Austro-German alliance. iii) As one Historian argued: (1) “They were right concerning the letters of the treaties, but slight contradictions had never bothered Bismarck, who believed that ambiguities would refrain a nation from going to war and attached more importance to a good understanding with other nations than to the exact terms of treaties.” iv) The Russians, who had hoped to renew the treaty with Germany, now negotiated an alliance with France, which was completed in 1894. v) This LED TO THE ENTENTE CORDIAL and the BEGINNING OF “ENCIRCLEMENT” OF GERMANY (1) Now, the two most powerful nations bordering directly on Germany became allies. Should German tensions with the French or Russians escalate, Germany would face a two-front war. It remains open to doubt whether the German government could have prevented the Franco-Russian rapprochement for much longer. vi) France was investing large sums in Russian industrialization and had so desperately been looking for an alliance partner that the fundamental difference of political systems did not matter (France was a democratic republic, Russia an autocracy). vii) Moreover, mutual dislike, fanned by growing Slavic and Germanic racism, made the alliance of Russia and Germany increasingly unpopular in both countries. </p><p>7) The State lived in constant fear of the Social Democrats and Parliamentarianism. a) The Kaiser, even in the 1890's saw the Reichstag as a hindrance. Wanted to find a way to rule without it and crush the SD's. b) The State came to a decision on ways of keeping the Working Class and those they viewed as a threat to the state happy. c) Remember the quotes: d) The Old Elites begin to think more and more in terms of the “Staatsreich” or a War as a way to get out of the Dead End. e) They look to the military “option” if the Reichstag became unmanageable. – f) This answers Dan’s Question of using war against “internal” enemies. i) P-257 “The Army was not merely an instrument against Germany’s external enemies, but the ultima ratio in a civil war against the working class that many officers believed to be imminent.” ii) P-255 “Wilhelm (1903) talked about “the coming revolution and its repression” and 4</p><p>(1) “I have to take revenge for 1848- revenge!” He bragged about a coming bloodbath among the SD’s, to be followed by a successful foreign war. iii) In 1913 he forwarded a memorandum to the Chancellor calling for a “violent coup against the working-class movement and the Jewish Minority” (1) Why?</p><p>8) To deal with this The Kaiser and his coterie embarked on “Weltpolitik.” – Some would say “Social Imperialism.” a) An assertive ‘world policy’ was embarked upon by Wilhelm to divert attention away from the troubles at home and partly to appeal to his own vanity. b) Powerful industrialists such as Woerman, Krupps and Stumm encouraged this search for new markets and new materials, as did influential ministers such as Tirpitz, Bulow, Holstein and influential “Leagues” such as the Navy League, the Pan-German League and the Colonial League. c) The search for a “place in the sun” necessitated an expansion of the Navy which resulted in the three Navy Laws of 1898, 1900 and 1906. By the time of the 3rd Navy Law, Germany was building 3 battleships and 6 cruisers every year and the Kiel Canal was being widened to accommodate Dreadnoughts. d) Kaiser Wilhelm II: Speech to the North German Regatta Association, 1901: i) In spite of the fact that we have no such fleet as we should have, we have conquered for ourselves a place in the sun. It will now be my task to see to it that this place in the sun shall remain our undisputed possession, in order that the sun's rays may fall fruitfully upon our activity and trade in foreign parts, that our industry and agriculture may develop within the state and our sailing sports upon the water, for our future lies upon the water. The more Germans go out upon the waters, whether it be in races or regattas, whether it be in journeys across the ocean, or in the service of the battle flag, so much the better it will be for us. For when the German has once learned to direct his glance upon what is distant and great, the pettiness which surrounds him in daily life on all sides will disappear… </p><p>9) Negative points: a) This policy greatly embittered Anglo-German relations. b) In particular one of the events that really poisoned things was the Daily Telegraph affair: 28 October, 1908</p><p>The interview of the Emperor Wilhelm II on October 28, 1908. London Daily Telegraph, October 28, 1908. </p><p>. . . "You English," he said, "are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my speech at Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word ? 5</p><p>Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you listen not to them but to those who misinterpret and distort them. That is a personal insult which I feel and resent. To be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes, taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your press --, at least, a considerable section of it -- bids the people of England refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will ? </p><p>"I repeat," continued His Majesty, "that I am a friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. My task is not of the easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements as it is in England with respect to Germany. That is another reason why I resent your refusal to accept my pledged word that I am the friend of England. I strive without ceasing to improve relations, and you retort that I am your archenemy. You make it hard for me. Why is it?" . . . </p><p>His Majesty then reverted to the subject uppermost in his mind -- his proved friendship for England. "I have referred," he said, "to the speeches in which I have done all that a sovereign can do to proclaim my good-will. But, as actions speak louder than words, let me also refer to my acts. It is commonly believed in England that throughout the South African War Germany was hostile to her. German opinion undoubtedly was hostile -- bitterly hostile. But what of official Germany? Let my critics ask themselves what brought to a sudden stop, and, indeed, to absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were striving to obtain European intervention? They were feted in Holland, France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers. But when they asked me to receive them -- I refused. The agitation immediately died away, and the delegation returned empty-handed. Was that, I ask, the action of a secret enemy ? </p><p>"Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German government was invited by the governments of France and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to put an end to the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I said that so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England. Posterity will one day read the exact terms of the telegram -- now in the archives of Windsor Castle\emdash in which I informed the sovereign of England of the answer I had returned to the Powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their adversity. </p><p>"Nor was that all. Just at the time of your Black Week, in the December of 1899, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction, and bearing manifest 6 traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. Nay, I did more. I bade one of my officers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants in South Africa on both sides and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With the figures before me, I worked out what I considered the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then, I dispatched it to England, and that document, likewise, is among the state papers at Windsor Castle, awaiting the severely impartial verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coincidence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts, and carried by him into successful operation. Was that, I repeat, an act of one who wished England ill ? Let Englishmen be just and say! </p><p>"But, you will say, what of the German navy? Surely, that is a menace to England ! Against whom but England are my squadrons being prepared? If England is not in the minds of those Germans who are bent on creating a powerful fleet, why is Germany asked to consent to such new and heavy burdens of taxation? My answer is clear. Germany is a young and growing empire. She has a worldwide commerce which is rapidly expanding, and to which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have a powerful fleet to protect that commerce and her manifold interests in even the most distant seas. She expects those interests to go on growing, and she must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Her horizons stretch far away." . . .</p><p>10) Weltpolitik also divided the country due to the “clumsy, rude and obsessive” method of doing it. 11) The army too disliked being neglected in favour of the Navy in the Naval Buildup</p><p>12) Two facets of this policy and they were interlinked 1898 a) Imperialism b) The Naval Buildup. c) Both would be expensive and both would be dangerous, i) The key point here is that instead of raising and collecting “Direct Taxes” the state, in order to protect the Junkers, paid the bills by short-term, high interest loans and indirect taxes. (1) It is not until right before the war that Direct Taxes get passed. ii) Both policies were geared not simply to secure Germany's position in the world. (1) They were geared as much to destroy the SD and subvert Parliamentarianism to protect the old elites. d) Imperialism- i) For Germany imperialism was to give it its Great Power stature. ii) It was also, in the words of one writer, the policy that Germany "was forced to adopt." because "the rising number of hungry stomachs and empty hands...forced us to adopt a global economic policy and to move out into the world market." iii) It also was used to bring in all classes, to integrate all classes into the nation and support for the State. 7</p><p> e) The Naval buildup i) - As much to facilitate imperialism, it was to divert the attention of the working class until Germany's empire was secure and prosperous. ii) It was also to create more jobs and to placate the working class in Germany.</p><p>13) What both did do was frighten the English into an alliance with Russia and France. a) England responded with a massive building program. b) This led to a naval arms race that Germany could not win. i) Especially with the tax system. All indirect taxes. ii) This seriously damaged the economy by 1914 and led to the stasis of 1914 and the search for a solution and way out. c) Moroccan and Agadir Crisis: - Both were arrogant and threatening actions taken by the Germany State not only for reasons of International Power, but also to rally around the Empire and the Emperor. i) This was proved in the 1907 elections when the SD’s were crushed in the elections. (1) However, as Berghahn points out the reality was that the SPD actually increased its vote total, but because of the anomalies of the system lost seats. d) The First Moroccan crisis grew out of the imperial rivalries of the great powers, in this case, between Germany on one side and France, with English support, on the other. France reached agreements in 1904 with England (April 8) and Spain (October 7) granting the French virtually protectorate control over Morocco. This was met with the hostility of Germany, which had been kept in the dark. Germany took immediate diplomatic action to black the new accord from going into effect, including Kaiser Wilhelm's dramatic arrival and "open door" speech in Tangier (March 31, 1905). Germany sought a multilateral conference where the French could be called to account before other European sovereigns. French premier Rouvier, initially interested in a compromise solution, refused as French public opinion turned against Germany and the English lent their support to the French position. Tensions reached a peak in mid-June, when the French cancelled all military leaves (June 15) and Germany threatened to sign a defensive alliance with the Sultan (June 22). On July 1 France with strong English backing, agreed to attend the conference, as it was apparent that Germany was becoming diplomatically isolated. (1) The crisis continued to the eve of the conference at Algeciras, with Germany calling up reserve units (December 30) and France moving troops to the German border (January 3). At the eight nation conference itself, the Germans found themselves with only Austria supporting their position. An Austrian attempt at compromise was rejected by all but Germany. The Germans decided to accept a face-saving compromise agreement on March 31, 1906. France agreed to yield control of the Moroccan police, but otherwise retained effective control of Moroccan political and financial affairs.</p><p>14) Then in 1911 The French military expedition to Fez prompted Germany to send a gunboat to the port of Agadir. Britain's support for France was expressed in a speech by Lloyd George, and following negotiations the German navy withdrew from Morocco. 8</p><p>The crisis strengthened the Anglo-French entente cordiale</p><p>15) In other words these policies – meant to quell the radical politics of the people in Germany and rally them to the cause of Germany actually increased tensions in the world as other states began to see Germany as a threat to their power and the stability and the Balance of Power on the continent.</p><p>16) At the same time: In the army: a) From 1898 they government restricts entry into the officer corps to keep it pure for the aristocrats. b) It attempts to restrict working class membership in the army because it feared putting guns in the hands of socialists. It also tried to indoctrinate the SD's in the army to make them more "German." c) As we’ve seen one government official was quoted as saying that “the Army existed primarily for dealing with internal crisis.” d) Berghahn viewed as “the school of the nation” and an integrative tool to solve the internal problems.</p><p>17) The Army Bill (1913) a) Strengthened the position of the Army still further by providing for an extra 4000 officers, 15,000 NCO’s and 117,000 men at a cost of a billion marks. b) However, this was only due to the support of the SPD, who accepted the Bill because it was to be funded by a progressive tax on wealth. c) Moreover, by 1914 only 52% of senior ranking officers were aristocratic, compared to 80% in the 1880’s. d) On the other hand, the dismissal of Eulenberg and other ministers saw him appoint more military men in their place. e) However, this led the Agrarian elites to fear the "bourgeoisization" of the officer corps and the influx of workers into the Ranks.</p><p>18) Again, this Bill naturally, this led to more international tensions a) France and Russia respond to the buildup. b) France passes a law that will force everyone to fulfill 3 years of military duty. c) Russia embarks on a massive buildup and reorganization of their army. d) GERMANY FIGURED THEY WOULD BE COMPLETED BY 1916 AND GERMANY WOULD NOW BE IN A VERY BAD POSITION. e) Like Morocco/Agadir and on and on Germany attempted to extend its influence while dealing with the internal crisis and only caused its own further isolation. f) All these actually facilitated the Triple Entente.</p><p>19) By 1912 the crisis really has matured. a) The SD's became the majority party in parliament. Still with little power. b) An alliance developed between liberals and SD's and the parliament began to act against the interests of the Prussian/Junker elites. i) The Tax issue - forced through the first direct taxes and thus threatened the position of elites. ii) Army and Finance bills – were it. Page 274-275 in Berghahn. 9</p><p> iii) Agrarians fought agains “Direct Taxation” and effectively brought governance to a halst. The system had deadlocked. c) “After 1912 it was not only the finances of the Reich and the Federal states that were coming apart at the seams, but the political system in general.” d) Stasis as the old order tries to hold back the future - It was to the point that the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, could introduce no new legislation into the parliament because there was no middle ground. </p><p>20) For the German Reich and most of the states of this period, war seems a viable way out of the stasis, and financial problems. a) Everyone expects the war to be localized. b) Everyone expects to win and so the other side will pay for the war. </p><p>21) By 1914 - DEADLOCK: a) Kaiser intent to holding onto power, unwilling to give any up i) Still the Kaisierreich b) The state of crisis was induced by the lack of ability among those in charge of the country to make important difficult decisions. i) Reality that conservatives still held control and moderate reform could have sorted the problems. ii) Govt. funding could have been increased by direct taxation or debt avoided by not reducing tariffs or reducing naval spending. iii) The govt. wasted money on naval problem – filled own pockets iv) Had the govt. introduced direct taxation, reduced naval spending, and given the SPD a greater say in the govt. of the country by negotiation, WWI, which ultimately resulted from this crisis, may have been averted. c) Emerging pressure from the SPD, increased influence – largest party in Reichstag. Stability of empire threatened and position of the Old Regime is threatened. d) Government had financial problems – not enough income. Increased naval expenditure worsened problem. e) No powerful leadership – succession of PM’s after Bismarck not successful, each sacked after short period. People dissatisfied and socialist support grew. f) Problems were so deep-rooted – right wing conservatives saw 2 solutions “either a coup by the Kaiser or a victorious war.” i) Germany was in a state of crisis by 1914, however, only to the extent that something needed to be done (1) – the conservative view that only a coup or a successful war could have averted the crisis is unfounded (2) Yet, that is the solution they chose. (3) Constrained by their inability to change.</p><p>As a result of all this missteps: g) Germany is surrounded on the borders and in a stalemate at home. The result of its own actions. h) It has become clear that the Monarchy and the Reich are at stake. War now to many becomes preferable to "slow political death." War, regardless of its cost 10</p><p> becomes the way out of the stasis. i) Quote Bethmann-Hollweg.- War in 1914 that could be won. j) The press: "a fresh and uninhibited war would decimate the 110 Social Democrats in the Reichstag and was the only remedy to cure Germany's ills. </p><p>22) So when the crisis in Serbia came Germany was ready for war. a) Germany as much as any nation was totally ready for war and saw in it a cure for all its ills. b) KEY- MUST BE READ!!!! Berghahn argues that: i) “Berlin began to consider cutting the Gordian knot with the help of a liberating war against the Reich’s external enemies. In 1914, the generals believed, such a conflict could still be won by the Reich, whereas such victory was less likely after the Russian and French military programs which had promptly followed the German Army bill of 1913 had been completed. The year 1914 offered a “window of opportunity” for the freed the Kaisserrich from its diplomatic dilemma and domestic gridlock at one stroke.” c) It hoped a short and local war but the interlocking alliance system ended that hope. However, the interlocking system had ended that hope! d) Even the Kaiser feared the General War that no one believed would happen, yet that is what happens. 23) If this true and they tried to localize the war why then risk everything. Well, it is obvious above why but there is something more and that is what we’ve worked on coming to this point: a) What Winter will say again in the videotape: b) BERGHAHN quoting Joll: “. . . ultimately identified “the mood of 1914” as the crucial factor behind Europe’s descent into catastrophe.” “At each level there was a willingness to risk or to accept war as a solution to a whole range of problems, political, social, international to say nothing of war as apparently the only way of resisting a direct physical threat.” c) BERGHAHN pg-292 – “However serious Germany’s international situation may have been, the Reich Chancellor and his colleagues were no less aware of the simultaneous difficulties on the domestic front. Surveying the state of the Prusso- Gennan political system in early 1914, It was impossible to avoid the impression that it was out of joint. The Kaiser’s prestige was rapidly evaporating. The Zabern Affair had further disillusioned many Germans about the military and the monarchy in general. The government was unable to forge lasting alliances and </p><p> compromises with the parties of the Right and the center — the only political forces that a monarchical Reich Chancellor could contemplate as potential partners for the passage of legislation. Meanwhile the “revolutionary” Social Democrats were on the rise and had become the largest party in the Reichstag. The next statutory elections were to be held in 1916/17 and no one knew how large the leftist parties would then become. Faced with these problems and fearful of a repetition of the 1913 tax compromise between the parties of the center and the SPD, Bethmann had virtually given up governing. The state machinery was kept going by executive decrees that did not require legislative approval. At the same time the debt crisis continued. Worse, since 1910 there had been massive strike 11</p><p> movements, first against the Prussian three-class voting system and later for better wages and working conditions. While the integration of minorities ran into growing trouble, reflecting problems of alienation among larger sections of the population who felt left behind and were now looking for convenient scapegoats, the working class became increasingly critical of the monarchy’s incapacity to reform itself. Even parts of the women’s movement had begun to refuse the place they had been assigned in the traditional order. So the situation appeared to be one of increasing polarization, and the major compromises that were needed to resolve accumulating problems at home and abroad were nowhere in sight. Even increased police repression and censorship was no longer viable.” 24) BERGHAHN p-293”And so the Kaiser and his advisors encouraged Vienna to launch a limited war in the Balkans. Their expectations that the war would remain limited turned out to be completely wrong. The Kaiser and his entourage, who under the Reich Constitution at that brief moment held the fate of millions in their hands, were not prepared to beat a retreat and to avoid a world war. The consequences of that total war and the turmoil it caused in all spheres of life were enormous” 25) As Lafore wrote: “Turkey the sick man of Europe had expired and then in July 1914 the whole of Europe fell into mortal illness.”</p><p>26) In essence what happened was that the classes which struggled so hard against change ceased to exist, or as one historian argued actually destroyed itself. </p><p>27) So in its quest to protect its own position, it, like all the other monarchies, went to war to save its political system and actually destroyed itself. </p><p>28) Show videotape of the beginning of the War from the Great War Documentary</p><p>29) Deal with the Schlieffen plan and Moltke. a) The battle between the diplomats and the soldiers. b) Nicky and Willy telegrams c) The “Blank Check”</p><p>30) What they could have done: a) Government funding – true funding had been scarce even in Bismarck’s era, hence tariff laws – situation worsened by naval spending under Hohenlohe, BÜlow, and Bethmann-Hollweg and loss of tariff income under Caprivi and Hohenlohe. i) Policies were feasible provided direct taxation was introduced. b) Solution was direct taxation – problem realised but not solved between 1890-1914. Added to crisis! c) Naval spending – policy introduced supposedly to “stimulate trade and industry… push stock market prices up, save many assets and bring about a consolidation of the economy.” i) The real motives are questionable – the building of the navy achieved little except an increase in govt. expenditure. Motivation perhaps a multiplicity of interests – “It would be very interesting to learn the connections which exist between the fleet fanatics and the manufacturers of the fleet. </p>