Canadian Civil-Military Relations, 1939-1941 A Case Study in Strategic Dialogue Paul Dickson Michael Roi Strategic Analysis Section DRDC CORA TM 2011-116 July 2011 Defence R&D Canada Center for Operational Research and Analysis Canadian Civil-Military Relations 1939-1941 A Case Study in Strategic Dialogue Paul Dickson Michael Roi Strategic Analysis Section Defence R&D Canada – CORA Technical Memorandum DRDC CORA TM 2011-116 July 2011 Principal Author Original signed by Paul Dickson and Michael Roi Paul Dickson and Michael Roi DRDC CORA Strategic Analysis Approved by Original signed by Greg Smolynec Greg Smolynec Section Head Strategic Analysis Approved for release by Original signed by Paul Comeau Paul Comeau Chief Scientist DRDC Advanced Research Program (ARP) on strategic military planning (PG 0, 10 ac). Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011 © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011 Abstract …….. Second World War political and military decision makers faced a complex set of issues; the success and scale of Canada’s wartime effort tends to obscure that reality. The ability of decision makers to understand and shape the future was constrained by a number of factors during the critical years, 1939-41. Two stand out, and will be the subject of two case studies in national security decision making. This Technical Memorandum looks at the impact of the fall of France in June 1940 on the established pattern of decision-making in Canadian civil-military relations. This episode lent credence to the views of military advisors and increased their influence in national strategic discussions. The second case study, and the subject of a companion Technical Memorandum, will examine the debates about military power in 1940 in the context of the strategic vacuum left by the new constitutional relationship with Great Britain, the growing importance of the United States and the upheaval in western geopolitics resulting from the collapse of France, perceived as the West’s foremost military power. In consequence, Canadian strategic planners engaged in what was probably the first substantive debate about how Canada should exercise its new constitutional independence in pursuit of strategic objectives in the world, a debate that manifested itself in discussions regarding the size and use of Canada’s military. The research for this Technical Memorandum falls within the existing DRDC Advanced Research Program (ARP) project on strategic military planning (PG 0, 10 ac). Résumé …..... Les décideurs politiques et militaires de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ont fait face à des questions complexes; or, la réussite et l’ampleur de l’effort de guerre du Canada a tendance à obscurcir cette réalité. La capacité des décideurs à comprendre et à façonner l’avenir a été limitée par un certain nombre de facteurs durant les années cruciales, c’est-à-dire de 1939 à 1941. Deux d’entre eux se démarquent et feront l’objet de deux études de cas dans le domaine de la prise de décisions sur la sécurité nationale. Le présent document technique examine l’incidence de la chute de la France en juin 1940 sur le régime établi de prise de décisions dans les relations civilo-militaires canadiennes. Cet épisode a ajouté foi aux points de vue des conseillers militaires et accru leur influence dans les discussions stratégiques à l’échelle nationale. La deuxième étude de cas, sujet d’un document technique connexe, examinera les débats concernant la puissance militaire en 1940 dans le contexte du vide stratégique laissé par la nouvelle relation constitutionnelle avec la Grande-Bretagne, de l’importance grandissante des États-Unis et des bouleversements dans la géopolitique occidentale par suite de l’effondrement de la France, perçue comme la principale puissance militaire de l’Occident. En conséquence, les spécialistes canadiens de la planification stratégique se sont engagés dans ce qui était probablement le premier débat de fond sur la façon dont le Canada devrait exercer sa nouvelle indépendance constitutionnelle afin d’atteindre des objectifs stratégiques sur la scène mondiale, débat qui s’est manifesté dans les discussions sur la taille et l’utilisation des forces militaires du Canada. La recherche effectuée pour le présent document technique relève du projet actuel de Programme de recherche avancée (PRA) de RDDC sur la planification militaire stratégique (PG 0, 10 ac). DRDC CORA TM 2011-116 i This page intentionally left blank. ii DRDC CORA TM 2011-116 Executive summary Canadian Civil-Military Relations, 1939-1941 Paul Dickson and Michael Roi; DRDC CORA TM 2011-116; Defence R&D Canada – CORA, July 2011 Second World War political and military decision makers and planners faced a complex set of issues; the success and scale of Canada’s wartime effort tends to obscure that reality. The ability of decision makers to understand and shape the future was constrained by a number of factors during the critical years, 1940-41. Two stand out, and will be the subject of two case studies in national security decision making. The first Technical Memorandum looks at the impact of the fall of France in June 1940 on the established pattern of decision-making in Canadian civil-military relations. This episode lent credence to the views of military advisors and increased their influence in national strategic discussions. The second case study, and the subject of a companion Technical Memorandum, examines the debates about military power in 1940 in the context of the strategic vacuum left by the new constitutional relationship with Great Britain, the growing importance of the United States and the upheaval in western geopolitics resulting from the collapse of France, perceived as the west’s foremost military power. In consequence, Canadian strategic planners engaged in what was probably the first substantive debate about how Canada should exercise its new constitutional independence in pursuit of strategic objectives in the world, a debate that manifested itself in discussions regarding the size and use of Canada’s military. Canadian civil-military relations are usually understood through the prism of Samuel Huntington’s “normal” theory of objective civilian control of the military. Civilian authorities develop policy and a subordinate but professional military executes that policy. Canadian civil- military relations rarely fit this mould, which suggests that either the relationship is flawed or that the theory is limited as a means of understanding what does or should occur. An examination of the role played by General H.D.G. Crerar, the Chief of the General Staff during 1940-41, in discussions with politicians and civilian counterparts during this critical period in world affairs illustrates a number of themes that animate Canada’s wartime civil-military dynamic, and suggests that a nuanced strategic dialogue is a more appropriate framework to understand the contemporary civil-military relationship than the simple dichotomy that elected officials and their civilian advisors do policy and the military executes it. When Crerar assumed the post of CGS, the government had determined on a modest military effort, focused on the air force, with its main energies directed towards industry and agriculture. Senior military leadership had, however, a different vision for Canada’s war effort, and the army leaders had by 1940 acquired the tools to ensure their advice was heard and frequently implemented. Wartime circumstances, particularly the crisis situation that the fall of France evoked, were important but they in no way dictated the shape Canada’s forces ought to take. Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King and influential cabinet ministers like Minister of National Defence for the Navy Angus MacDonald were still opposed to large ground forces and it took all the senior staff's political skill, plus British support, to win over the Cabinet to such a commitment. In the end, the army view triumphed and a two corps First Canadian Army of five divisions and two armoured brigades was approved by the government. The other services followed suit and Canada, a country of ten million, eventually put 1 million men and women into DRDC CORA TM 2011-116 iii uniform. This unprecedented expansion suggests that the Canadian civil-military relationship cannot be best understood through the prism of traditional theories of civil-military relations that focus on the subordination of the military strategy to political policy and a consequent sharp division of responsibilities between civil (including both political and bureaucratic civilian leadership) and military professionals (for example Huntington’s normal theory). Rather, it is better analyzed as a dialogue between elected officials (politicians) and their advisors, both civilian and military. At the strategic level, the policy, strategy, military plans and the consequent operations are interwoven, iterative not sequential, and the result of an ongoing dialogue, not just between two discrete bodies, but amongst all those who constitute the civil-military nexus. With its hard divisions between the civilian and military players, the normal theory of civil-military relations remains at odds, in fact, with the historical evidence of past examples of effective strategic level Canadian national security decision-making and the use of military power, including the case study discussed in this Technical Memorandum. Equally, however, the normal theory assumes both a certain maturity and type of military professionalism, not always evident in the still developing Canadian military profession and absolves, to an extent, the civilian and political authorities from a level of understanding of war and defence necessary to engage the national military as policy and strategy are discussed. The normal theory presupposes that the means and ways of implementing strategy are discrete activities, with minimal impact on the ends, and therefore safe in the hands of military professionals.