Australia and the Asia-Pacific R

Australia and the Asia-Pacific R. James Ferguson © 2005Lecture 11:Regional Engagement and Competing RegionalismsTopics: - 1. Regionalism and Regionalization in the Asia-Pacific Area 2. Regional Processes: Beyond Values and Identity Politics 3. Environmental Cooperation: National and Regional Gaps 4. Asian Regional Cores Verses the Wider Asia-Pacific? 5. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading1. Regionalism and Regionalization in the Wider Asia-PacificAs we have seen, no single organisation or group of organisations, covers the governance of the entire Indo-Pacific region, with only relatively limited organisation such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum covering different aspects of trade and security cooperation. Even within Southeast Asia and South Asia, the construction of regional organisations (ASEAN and SAARC, see weeks 6 and 10) has been a gradual process with only limited integration and institutionalisation of these groups. A strong East Asian Summit (EAS) process based on the ASEAN- plus-three has begun to emerge through 2003-2005, but it remains to be seen how strong this will be in shaping the wider region.A clear-cut definition of a region can no longer be given on narrow geographical grounds, and is not merely based on physical proximity. Strong linkages and flows of information, money, people, affiliation or shared concerns and threats are needed form a region: -The literature on new regionalism stresses several key linkage factors as necessary conditions under which regionalism or regional integration can take place among a group of states, including linkage by geographical proximity and by various forms of shared political, economic, social, cultural, or institutional affinities. Regions are also defined by combinations of geographical, psychological, and behavioural characteristics. (Kim 2004, p40).Put simply, political regions are not ‘natural’: they are ‘socially constructed and politically contested’ (Kim 2004, p45), they can be built up on historical experience or destroyed by conflict and new trends. Just as modern nations and nationalism projects are partly ‘imagined communities’ (see Anderson 1991), regional grouping are also imagined and invested in by political leaders, domestic audiences, civil society, corporations, and governments (He 2004, p119). Shared security concerns and complexes can also drive regional processes to some degree (see Buzan &Waever 2003): this was partially the case of ASEAN and remains an important factor for the ASEAN Regional Forum. Likewise, multilateral and regional groups often increase the security and ‘voice’ of small and medium powers (He 2004, p121), part of the background ASEAN, APEC and to a lesser degree IOR-ARC.1 In part, this slow progress has been driven by the great diversity of the region, as well as by pressing national and sovereign needs by many Asian states still going through national-building processes over the last fifty years. For Southeast Asia, as noted by Mark Beeson: -Southeast Asia is arguably the most diverse region in the world. Whether it is measured in terms of differences in economic development, divergent social and religious traditions or differing political regimes, there are few places where such diversity is woven into the very fabric of national life. Indeed, there are considerable grounds for questioning whether what we think of as contemporary Southeast Asia constitutes a region at all. And yet, despite this remarkable difference at the level of individual nations, Southeast Asia has also given rise to some of the most enduring transnational and regional institutions in the developing world. This paradox is at the heart of one of the most distinctive features of modern Southeast Asia: despite the national diversity that is its defining feature, there are a number of region-wide processes that have given Southeast Asia both a particular identity and a set of additional political, economic, social and even environmental dynamics that have in turn shaped national outcomes. (Beeson 2004, p1)In turn, we can question how deep this integration as been, with limited supranational aspects, with sovereignty and decision making being retained at the level of national governments, and organisations such as ASEAN largely working through inter-governmental agreements, voluntary treaties, and an ongoing dialogue process. This has in part been maintained by the non-interference concept with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), but in reality the region is moving towards the understanding that shared action is needed on shared problems.Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia: Mosque in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (Photocopy copright R. James Ferguson 2002)2 The diversity of Southeast Asia is found within multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations often within one state, by diversity among nations as to wealth, developmental level, governmental style and religion, as well as sub-regional diversity among South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, the South Pacific, South American states (within APEC), and developed states with European cultural features such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Some of this diversity can be seen in Table 1 below, where even states with dominant religious groups also have significant religious minorities, e.g. Christians and Hindus in Indonesia. Even in Vietnam there are Christian minorities, Chinese sub-communities, and a small Muslim community.Table 1 (modified from Beeson 2004)Country Population (approx. Government Type Main Religion million) Brunei .344 Constitutional Islam Monarchy Cambodia 12.6 Constitutional Buddhism Monarchy (from 1993) Indonesia 208.9 Democratic Republic Islam (plus others) Lao PDR 5.4 Communist Buddhism Malaysia 23.8 Procedural Democracy Islam (plus others) Myanmar 48.3 Military Junta Buddhism Philippines 78.3 Democracy Christianity (plus others) Singapore 4.1 Procedural Democracy Taoism (plus others) Thailand 61.1 Constitutional Buddhism (plus others) Monarch/Democracy Vietnam 79.5 Communist Buddhism (plus others)One key point is that regional processes are not always driven by similarity and convergence, though this may be required in the long term. Rather, complementarity among economies, services and development level can also provide strong regional flows. Furthermore, regional organisations can also be driven by crisis and crisis management. Thus, the first phase of ASEAN regionalism from 1967 was driven by the need to reduce political tensions among member states, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, and the desire to reduce great power interventions in local conflicts (see lecture 6). The second phase of ASEAN regionalism after 1998 was driven in part by a reaction to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, and that East Asian states could not rely on a supportive financial and economic environment being generated by the U.S. and other Western states (for different phases of regionalism, see Kim 1998, pp41-42). Likewise, a web of bilateral ties, including free trade agreements under negotiation, have also begun to shape the region, e.g. Australian negotiations with Singapore, Thailand and the U.S., plus a range of proposed free trade agreements focused on Singapore, Korea, and Japan (see Kim 2004, pp56-57).It is important to distinguish between regionalization and regionalism: -To make sense of these differences, it is useful to make a widely employed initial conceptual distinction between processes of regionalization on the one hand, in which the private sector and economic forces are the principle drivers of regional integration, and regionalism, in which self-consciously pursued political projects drive3 closer transnational cooperation on the other. One of the most noteworthy comparative qualities of the Southeast Asian experience in this regard is that regional integration has primarily been uncoordinated and principally driven by multinational corporations and the evolving logic of cross-border production strategies. (Beeson 2004, pp7-8)Of course, there are strong interactions between regionalization and regionalism. Transnational regionalization processes will make regionalism projects more acceptable to political and economic elites. In turn, regionalism projects tend to create a more transparent civil and economic space, and promote free trade and other multilateral frameworks, e.g. AFTA, the AIA, plus ASEAN’s agreements with China, Japan (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and India (via and FTA with ASEAN) that are gradually making trade and standards more compatible through 2003-2012 (He 2004, p106), though the ASEAN-Chinese Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) seems most likely to lock into place first, perhaps causing some ‘angst’ in Tokyo (Kim 2004, p51). We should also note that the China-ASEAN FTA does not include Taiwan, unlike APEC (He 2004, p115). The ‘whole idea is to establish a comprehensive and close relationship between ASEAN and China involving an FTA, and cooperation in finance, regional development, technological assistance, macroeconomic cooperation, and other issues of common concern’ (Cai 2003). Individual agreements with ASEAN are likely to come into play before any formal, wider East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), which has now been shifted into the group of medium-range projects by the ASEAN-Plus-Three (Kim 2004, p56). Likewise, the ASEAN-India efforts to build a free-trade agreement will take time to move beyond a wide range of exceptions and limitations (see lectures 6 & 10). Political elites have accepted that a conscious regionalism also helps countries to cope with globalization, and give some economic and developmental support to regimes (Beeson 2004, p10) with limited democratic credentials, e.g. in Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Thus, ‘regionalization can be said to breed regionalism’ (Kim 2004, p40). However, in turn, regionalization make it possible for governments to consider developing shared values, norms, aspirations (Kim 2004, p40), and in cases of deep integration over the long term, a certain layer of regional identity or at least shared cultural processes may be developed. However, it may be dangerous to either to assume or mandate some notion of a shared identity when cultural system remain diverse, as in East Asia. Some general aspirations for minimum standards in terms of treatment of citizens and peaceful codes of conduct (e.g. in the South China Sea) have also begun to emerge, but has had only a limited impact on countries such as Myanmar. Likewise, pluralism and democratisation, though gaining regionally, e.g. Indonesia's transition, remain problematic norms for countries such as Vietnam and PRC, and have not yet become part of a more inclusive pattern of regional governance (see lecture 6). At present, neither Australia nor the US, even with the aid of Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, seem able to insist on a democratic-led form of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific (contra Terrill 2005). 2. Regional Processes: Beyond Values and Identity PoliticsIn the past, efforts have been made to built regional projects in Asia, either on the basis of some shared identity, on resistance to Western colonialism and power, and on the notion of shared ‘Asian values’ or at least a ‘shared ASEAN way’. One of the earliest models for this was the intense interaction among earlier kingdoms,4 mandala systems of prestige and influence and extended trading networks for over two millennia (see Wolters 1992; Higham 1989). Beyond this, however, there was an attempt in the early 20th century to shape a sense of Pan-Asian values and Pan- Asianism in contrast to Western colonial dominance, a trend of though influencing thinkers as diverse as Gandhi, Tagore, Aurobindo, Sun Yat-sen, Rin Kaito and Major General Kenji Doihara and others (He 2004, pp107-108; Duara 2001). Such ideas would soon founder on Japanese militarism through the 1930s, and come to be rejected in India, China and Korea (He 2004, p110).The Asian values debate would be revived through the 1980s and 1990s as part of the debate over the causes of revived ‘tiger’ economies in East Asia, leading to a reappraisal of the relationship of traditional values systems (including Confucianism and Taoism) to modern life (see Dupont 1996). Though a tempting move politically, and supported at time by governments resisting outside influence or seeking legitimation for governments with limited democratic credentials, this has been a problematic path for Asian regionalism. In the worst case scenario, support for ‘Asian values’ verses ‘Western’ human rights may be a way of justifying ‘soft authoritarian’ regimes with limited degrees of political freedom (Beeson 2004, p11), e.g. in Malaysia, Singapore, and in a different form in PRC. For a time this ‘New Asianism’ was given some support in Japan, e.g. via the search to create a new, shared contemporary Asian culture, thereby allowing a secondary and safe outlet for some Japanese nationalism (He 2004, p114), but this now seems a minor trend. In the long run, regionalism based on exclusive cultural systems or anti-Westernism may be a kind of ‘trap’ since modern and Western ideas and technology are freely used in much of urban Asia, and trade linkages into the U.S., Canada and Australasia remain important (adapting He 2004, p121). Likewise, emerging middle-classes throughout Asia share elements of modernism drawn from Western culture.The ‘ASEAN Way’ and Asian values did to some degree drive the proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) which would exclude non-Asian states on the basis of culture and identity (He 2004, p112), given most vocal support by former Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia from 1990 as at first an alternative to APEC. This project was attacked by the U.S. and not supported by Australia, while Japan and South Korea in the end were unwilling to effectively exclude or downgrade relations with major trade partners across the Pacific. This led to the subsequent downgrading of EAEG to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), a loose grouping within APEC (Kim 2004, p46). However, this grouping was reborn both as the Asian ‘table’ within the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meetings), and as the ASEAN-Plus-Three from 1997 (He 2004, p112), though now driven largely by economic and security concerns. The problem of founding East Asian or Southeast Asian regionalism on shared values or identity has been summarised: -Indeed, the defining feature of East Asia is not a singular set of “Asian values,” whatever that may mean, but linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity. Such diversity is pronounced not only between East Asian states but also within particular Asian states, mostly in Southeast Asia. Paradoxically, the most vocal and stringent rallying cries for “Asian values” have come from Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia (and also China), where multicultural, multireligious, and even multi-ethnonational fault5 lines produce deep fissures. . . . East Asia is defined by its plurality of cultural and historical traditions. (Kim 2004, p54).On this basis, it has been suggested that East Asian regionalism is largely driven forward by ‘intergovernmental collaboration’ on free trade and a security dialogue, but ‘lacks systematic thinking, an ethical foundation, and a region-centric framework’ (He 2004, p119). On this basis, too, regional commitment towards a truly participation-based regionalism, with strong inputs from civil society, and convergence on democracy, will remain limited (Acharya 2003).Rather, over the last two decades, regionalism in the Asia-Pacific has been driven in part by wider concerns over great-power dominance, and then by the impact of globalisation on relatively weak and developing states. In this sense, regional groups can be buffers preparing nations for wider globalisation trends (e.g. the ASEAN Free Trade Area and APEC preparing Southeast Asia and China for the wider opening of their economies to the world economy via WTO processes), but also act as conduits for ongoing trade and investment liberalization (as in the AIA, ASEAN Investment Area). Indeed, elite support for regionalism in Southeast Asia had already been conditioned by the transnational patterns of trade and production run via business and corporations: -Yet even the most cursory glance at the empirical data associated with ‘globalization’ reveals that global flows of trade and investment, and even the transnational production strategies of multinational companies, reveal a distinction regional bias. In other words, whatever we take globalization to be, it is powerfully shaped by national and regional forces as countries, companies and a range of other actors attempt to respond to the challenges of external competition and the transnational integration of edconomic and political activity. In this context, globalization is simply a convenient shorthand for that complex array of processes – economic, political, social and even strategic – that have transformed the context within which states conduct themselves and which have constrained their autonomy as a consequence. If this contention about diminished autonomy has merit as a general statement about the status of contemporary states, It is doubly true of Southeast Asia, where the modern, independent state is a relatively recent invention, and where the sovereignty of states has already been compromised to some extent. (Beeson 2004, p3) Put another way, the states of East Asia are ‘coping with forces and demands of both regionalization and regionalism amid the twin pressures of globalization from above and localization from below (so-called glocalization)’ (Kim 2004, p39). Thus, regional processes have been revived as conduits of change as well as ways of sustaining the decision making ability of groups of states (thus indicating that Thomas Friedman’s truism, “It’s globalization, stupid!’, may not always be true, see Kim 2004, p43).3. Environmental Cooperation: National and Regional GapsEnvironmental problems affect local, national, regional and global groups, depending on the particular problem. Many resource and environmental problems, e.g. the Haze, over-used river systems, polluted coastal waters, or over-exploited fisheries, are often transboundary in nature and require regional cooperation. Growing consumption rates, industrialisation, growing urban populations (40% of Southeast Asia lived in cities through 1999, a ratio that may double by 2025), and energy consumption rates that double approximately every 12 years have led to increased6 pressure on the environment and its resources (Elliott 2004, pp180-181). There have also been trends of intensified agriculture, great usage of pesticides and fertilizers, and overtaxing of soil fertility (Elliott 2004, p183). Possible GDP losses due to environmental and related health problems have been estimated in the order of 3%- 8% for Southeast Asia (Elliott 2004, p183). We can see this by looking at environmental problems facing one country, by looking at the opportunities for enhanced operation offered by ‘environmental security’ cooperation, and the limited regional governance of the environment that currently exists Southeast Asia.During the wars which plagued Vietnam through World War II, then in following decades against the French and the Americans, Vietnam suffered huge ecological damage, due to both the massive bombing and military campaigns, as well as the indirect effect of an economy in sustained crisis and thereafter rapid economic expansion from the mid-1990s. It took more than two decades after the end of this period of wars (ended in 1975) for the full ecological and social impact to become obvious (Kinh 1994).Since Vietnam (the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) had suffered such extensive damage in the Vietnam War, its government has become very proactive in its attitude to environmental policy, in spite of the desire for foreign investment and modernisation. Indeed, Vietnam's foreign investment code is now quite liberal and its market is becoming more, in line with a desire for modernisation and economical renewal which were developed from the mid-1980s, and with its prospects for joining the WTO perhaps as early as 2005, and a possible growth rate of 8% estimated for 2005 (Vietnam Investment Review 2004). In fact there has been increased caution on the part of Vietnam's leaders from 1996 onwards about excessive foreign investment leading to a decrease on the control of political affairs, as well as with cultural pollution, e.g. commonly used English business signs have been replaced with Vietnamese language signs, as well as concerns over pornographic or anti- establishment music and videos (Murata 1996). Likewise, a major international conference and meeting of Central Committee in mid-1998 was held to discuss ways of preserving Vietnam’s cultural identity as a means of ‘defending the socialist homeland’ (Economist 1998). The government view was that 'Vietnam will not be able to keep socialism intact unless foreign capital is brought under control' (Murata 1996). At the same time, the free market system is now entrenched and local business people feel that the business environment will continue to improve (Han & Baumgarte 2000). Vietnam has had to fight a new war against 'economic development and under- development' and has been willing to deal with former enemies in this new challenge (Sing 1999). Here Vietnam has recognised the linkage between economic development and domestic security, allowing the development of market economy while limiting political reform (Singh 1999). Within this time frame, too, the enormous ecological impact caused by poorly controlled resource exploitation in several south-east Asian countries has emerged, ranging from deforestation and soil erosion through to the problems of air and soil pollution. As a result, environmental concerns are alive and well in Vietnam (Lansbury 1994, p14). The country of Vietnam, even after the unification of north and south, faces several general factors which exacerbate ecological problems. Essentially, Vietnam has an underdeveloped resource base combined with a relatively high growth rate in population through the 1980s and 1990s (circa 21.1-2.3%).7 Furthermore, considerable ecological damage has been experienced by one third of the country, leaving a range of serious war legacies and contemporary problems to be dealt with. There been demographic drifts into cities with over-stretched infrastructures. During the early 1990s infrastructure limitations, such as poor roads, ports, telecommunications and electricity limited the rate of foreign investment, as well as attempts to develop a strong, modern economy (Hiebert & Awanohara 1993, pp68-69). Certain regions, such as the Red River Delta, to the east of Hanoi, suffer from extensive population pressure. In 1989, this region had 800-1000 people per square kilometre, and was a source of out-migration into virgin hill forests (Hiebert 1989, pp42-3). With a population growth rate of 2.3% the population could have reached 119 million in 2025 (Huynh & Stengel 1993, p269). Since that time, a strong population reduction strategy has led to a drop in growth rate to around 1.4% and ‘in its 2001-2010 population strategy, Vietnam has set the target of reducing its population growth rate to 1.1 percent and limit the population to 88 million in 2010’ (Xinhua 2001).Generally there has been considerable damage to forest areas, extensive soil erosion with subsequent silting up of dams and river systems, and related problems in agriculture and fishing industries. These problems have now begun to be exacerbated by recent economic development, including illegal logging and mining (for the illegal extraction smuggling of iron ore, of up to one million tons each year, and coal, see Energy CustomWire 2004), with the result that more resources are used and the risk of environmental degradation continuing. Hence, the issue of past and prospective environmental damage has emerged as a major national problem needing immediate action. Vietnam saw its open door policy to foreign investment as crucial to the further development of the country. This policy is part of a broader economic reform called doi moi, renovation, which has been running since reforms introduced in December 1986 (Hiebert 1991, p18).At the same time, even before opening up the country to economic reform, Vietnam began to develop legal guidelines to help control the negative impacts of such development. For example, each major project requires an environmental impact study, using guidelines and procedures being developed by the Ministry of Science Technology and Environment. These policies are needed to avoid further damaging an already ravaged environment. The issue here is not one of the aesthetic niceties, but of having clean water, intact soil and marine resources, and avoiding disease and severe health problems (Kinh 1994). Water resources around Ho Chi Minh City, in particular, are highly stressed (Duc & Truong 2003).A wide range of factors have led to ecological damage in Vietnam. One central factor was the last Vietnam War, in which the massive use of air power led to the spraying of 72 million litres of herbicides, and 13 million tons of bombs, with some 1.7 million hectares being affected. The use of saturation bombing also led to a loss of 20 million cubic metres of commercial timbers and over 300 million kilograms in food production (Kinh 1994). The pollution caused by the spraying of defoliants, in particular, has left serious soil damage and there has only been limited success in replanting these forest areas, especially in the central-western region. Toxic chemicals such as 'Agent Orange' created something of a scandal in the US and Australia where it now emerges that ' all veterans who served in Vietnam were exposed to Agent Orange, often at levels higher than those inflicted on the men who sprayed it' (ENV8 2000). Most of these studies, however, ignored the cumulative effect on the Vietnamese population, who were exposed most directly and for the longest periods. On this basis, the Vietnamese government made payments to 'government workers, soldiers and volunteers working or fighting in areas sprayed in August 1961-April 1975 and their disabled children.' (Associated Press 2000). Through 2002 these issues lead to fears that in some cases ‘agent orange’ may have entered local food supply chains, e.g. some fisheries (Economist 2002).The war, however, was only part of the problem for Vietnam's environment. Shifting cultivation patterns by certain ethnic minorities have been seen by the government to be problematic for preservation of forests and for soil and water conservation, especially in the rugged north-west of the country. The Meo people, for example, use rotating slash and burn forms of agriculture that require the use of extensive lands to feed a single family. The Vietnamese government has already excluded them from small sectors of the forest, hoping to ensure that certain segments remain unaffected, especially in watershed areas (Kinh 1994). Likewise, the government has tried to encourage the Meo to adopt a more sedentary village life style, and provide both food and fertilisers in order to make this shift easier. Although there is some concern about the impact this would have on traditional Meo culture, the Vietnamese government feels that the forest region is too crucial an ecological region to be left un-managed. Although such traditional shifting agriculture patterns may be viable, they can only support low population numbers and can impact on water catchment areas as well as lead to some deforestation (for cultural aspects of this debate, see O’Brien 2002).There has also been a serious agricultural encroachment of farming into forest areas in other parts of Vietnam. This is often due to spontaneous immigration from the coastal regions by poorer farmers who seek to improve their standard of living by clearing new land. The result has been some rolling back of forest. Unfortunately, some farmers engaged in these activities do not have sufficient knowledge to do this effectively. In the case of rainforest areas, there is no guarantee the soil will remain fertile once cleared of the ecosystem which supported it. Thus uncontrolled migration, and to a lesser extent, government-managed migration schemes, destroy forests and leads to conflicts with minority peoples such as the Montagnard groups of the central highlands. From 1975-1989 some 550,000 people had taken part in government sponsored migration into this central region, while a total 3.5 million people have been resettled from high population areas into 300 special economic zones located throughout underdeveloped parts of Vietnam (Kinh 1994). Through the 1980s most of these schemes were voluntary, and were aimed at reducing unemployment, increasing internal food supplies, and encouraging cash crops such as coffee, rubber and pepper (Heibert 1989, pp42-3). Generally too, these forest regions have suffered from over-hunting and the rivers from overfishing. At the same time, an illegal endangered wildlife trade has developed in Vietnam, linked to international smuggling operations, which depletes the rich genetic resources of the country through the export of rare animals and plants (see further Drollette 2000). Vietnam banns on the exporting of some rare examples of flora and fauna, for example, have been helped by international cooperation against the illegal shipment and sale of these species. Australia cooperation has been helpful in this area (Kinh 1994).9 Timber is a major industry in Vietnam, and the government has introduced laws requiring reforestation after logging. Unfortunately, these procedures are not yet fully regulated, while an estimated 7,000 hectares per year are logged illegally. A related problem has been fuel collection of wood from forest areas, which has gone beyond local use to collection for selling at village and town markets. The extension of electrical grids drawing power from hydro-electric power produced by dams in North Vietnam has somewhat reduced this problem (Lansbury 1994, p14). Lastly, forest fires have been a serious threat to natural resources, with some 20-30,000 hectares burnt out each year (with peaks of up to 100,000 hectares being affected), usually due to accidental fires which get out of control, e.g. fires lit while clearing land (Kinh 1994).Aside from these specific problems, a wide range of other issues remain to be dealt with: over-exploitation of coral beds from the intertidal zone for lime manufacture, urban air pollution, and the need to preserve intact freshwater and marine ecologies (Kinh 1994). The government, however, has made progress in the development of policies and laws to address these problems. This included the creation of the first National Park, and efforts to create reserves which cross nation borders to the north and west. More importantly, in 1986 a plan for the use of national resources and co- commitant environmental protection was adopted. The key emphasis was that development should proceed alongside environmental protection, not lag behind it and be dealt with much later on. In 1991 a National Plan for the Environment was ratified to cover planning and growth through the 1994-2000 period. In the long term, the forestry plan hoped create 6 million hectares of protected forests (there are only 1 million at present), while creating of 11 million hectares of sustainable production forests, with timber and oil being two main areas of foreign investment (Janssen 1991). In general, the plan aims to greatly increase the forest cover of the country, which had been greatly reduced in last forty years. It is hoped to improve forestation from the current 27-8% up to 40% (in 1943, it had a forest cover of 60%, Huynh & Stengel 1993, p273). Current land use, of course, is regulated by the state, but the government allows the long term lease of land to cater for foreign investment. It aims, however, to regulate environmental impacts, and to set effective guidelines for all investors, whether internal or international. Unfortunately, this has not stopped illegal and poorly planned logging. Through 2002, timber industry ‘posted a turnover of 410 million dollars, a 20 million dollars increase on 2001’, with 1,200 agro-forestry enterprises in Vietnam (Xinhua 2003).Within the cities of Vietnam there is also a very strong emphasis on recycling (Lansbury 1994), with virtually all reusable items being sorted and then picked up from households. The Ministry of Science Technology and Environment in Vietnam has also developed a wide range of curriculum and educational packages at all levels to increase environmental awareness, and has run numerous workshops. It has also developed programs to hire local peoples to protect designated forest areas. It sees international cooperation as crucial to the success of its environmental programs (Kinh 1994). Through 2004, $39.5 million was provided by the World Bank to support sustainable forest management, with the aim of supporting small scale forest plantations on poorly stocked land (World Bank 2004b).10 Although considerable progress had been made in all these areas, much more information needs to be collected on the Vietnamese ecology, and extensive research projects are essential if the outlined problems are to be solved. Likewise, it seemed clear that the implementation of these national policies would need further commitments of staff and resources. International cooperation at all levels, whether with foreign governments, research groups or non-government-organisations (NGO's) should be further encouraged. In summary, its seems that Vietnam has combined an open and progressive economic policy with the active protective of its diverse and valuable ecology. That the Vietnamese government has been able to mobilise a range of human resources is partly due to its socialist legacy, but in the new age of privatisation and foreign capital it may be that wildcat logging and corruption will undermine many of these government initiatives. In summary, Vietnam has needed to urgently boost development while protecting a rich but fragile environment. From 2000, international agencies (including the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank) had allocated $2.4 billion in support of Vietnam's poverty reduction and development programs (M2 Presswire 2000), with recent addition funds of $320 million allocated through July 2004 (World Bank 2004a).Yet positive attitudes towards the environment will also have to be revived. As noted in a Vietnamese government report discussing the current generation: -The people of Vietnam are not restrained in their consumption of natural resources for food and other purposes by the dictates of religion, moral or traditional taboos. The great respect which previous generations showed for the balance of natural forces and all living things including the forest spirits, has been lost or forgotten as a result of the terrible social upheavals that took place during thirty years of war and because of the sheer demands for more immediate production. (Huynh & Stengel 1993, p279)Environmental problems in the face of population growth, rapid investment and industrialisation are shared by most developing countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and are a major national and regional challenge.Regional cooperation on resources and environmental protection are also one avenue for aiding a more peaceful and sustainable environment in Southeast Asia. The ability of the culture of dialogue to effectively moderate behaviour and expectations in the South China Sea, either through ongoing multilateral dialogues, or through new regional initiatives which cooperate on less sensitive issues such as environmental, scientific research and eventually cooperative resource management (Lee 1999; Towsend-Gault 1998; Magno 1997). Water and river pollution remain a major challenge for most Southeast Asian countries (Elliott 2004, p185), excluding Singapore, which in large measure relies on reservoirs in nearby Malaysia. Likewise, the need to sustain access to fresh water and maintain food security in East Asia as a whole, which may be increasingly problematic through to 2015 (Dupont 2000), is another area where Southeast Asia and China could collaborate more widely.However, with some partial exceptions, environmentally-based regionalism has been slow to develop and is far from comprehensive in Southeast Asia and even less so in East Asia as a whole. ASEAN states have begin to cooperate in areas such as the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan (Rosenberg 1997) and to a lesser degree in11 cooperation over river usage, e.g. limited cooperation on the Mekong River water usage during dry seasons via the Mekong River Commission (, which has some dialogue with PRC and Mynamar) and support for flood management from the Asian Development Bank (Elliott 2004, p191; Environment Custom Wire 2004a). From 2001 a Regional Roundtable began to chart a vision for an environmentally sustainable Southeast Asia in its ASEAN Vision 2020 agenda, with most countries signing onto aspects of Agenda 21 for sustainable development (Elliott 2004, p188). On this basis the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME) meets every year (Elliott 2004, p189).Action plans formulated through 1998 and the Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment 1999-2004 (SPAE) called for ‘the strengthening of harmonized environmental standards, especially on ambient air and river water quality’, plans to protect coastal zones and marine environments, with a target year of 2010 (Elliott 2004, p190). However, ASEAN dialogue processes, its consensus approach and non-interference principles have meant that it is not strong in enforcing environmental policy (Elliott 2004, p197).Other institutions which have sought some rolling in reducing environmental impact in the region include the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the UNEP, the UNDP, and the Economic and Social Commission for Asian and the Pacific, ESCAP (Elliott 2004, p191). Yet key issues remain unresolved: thus the maxim of ‘user’ pays (or is taxed) for use natural resources is problematic in poorer societies, and in many cases poor land tenure systems and insecurity has mean that ‘peasant farmers and indigenous communities’ have no reason to reduce resource extraction from the lands they occupy or access (Elliott 2004, p193). Many of these agreements are voluntary, and only partially funded and unevenly implemented. Regional environmental activism, via NGOs, INGO’s and local civil society, e.g. in Thailand and Indonesia, has begun to improve political will in this area, but is often focused on a particular issue that affects local livelihood or a particular resource (Elliott 2004, p196).4. Asian Regional Cores Verses the Wider Asia-Pacific?One key question that has emerged through 1997-2005 has been the debate over whether Indo-Pacific processes will remain strongly mandated by U.S. policy, or whether stronger cores of decision-making and policy formation have emerged in Southeast Asia, East Asia (perhaps focused on future PRC initiatives), and to a lesser degree in South Asia. Here there may be differences in the vitality of the ASEAN and ASEAN-Plus-Three-Groupings verses the more diffuse ARF and APEC groups, partly based on ‘great power’ competition in the wider Asia-Pacific (see Bell 2003). Indeed, Samuel Kim has suggested that the ‘center of gravity for economic regionalism has already shifted away from the U.S. dominated APEC, which suffers from partial ‘paralysis and marginalization’, towards the ASEAN+3’ (Kim 2004, p51, p62). Thus: - . . . East Asian regionalism is on the rise. The new regionalism in the area is based on the shared embrace of economic development and well-being and the shared sense of vulnerability associated with the processes of globalization and regionalization. Greater regional cooperation is one of the few available instruments with which East Asian states can meet the double challenge of globalization from above and localization from below. Operating in a regional context, the East Asian12 states can “Asianize” the response to globalization in a politically viable form. (Kim 2002, p61)However, it must be noted that this is not based on deep integration, nor strong convergence. China, for instance, as used the idea of ‘finding common ground while preserving differences” (qiutong cunyi) in its diplomacy (Kim 2004, p60), suggesting some limit to community building in East Asia. This is a gradual process, rather than the construction of strong rule-based institutions with deep integration.Total GDP of East Asia almost reached that of Europe and North America form the early 1990s, accounting for around 30% of global GDP through the early 1990s, while through 2002, Northeast Asia held 48% of global foreign exchange reserves (Kim 2004, p44). However, this wealth has only begun to be translated into global power project and coherent regionalism, and does not yet have the ability to set global agenda, norms and regimes. Samuel Kim has suggested that one of the key organisations that can begin to translated this wealth into institutional power is the ASEAN-Plus-Three, with the grouping having ‘the broader strategic objective of enmeshing an increasingly powerful China into a regional financial regime in the making’ (Kim 2004, p48). PRC has become both a more forceful player in this type of regionalism, as well as promoting ‘continental regionalism’ into Central Asia via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), perhaps as part of wider Eurasian strategy (He 2004, p116; see further Xiang 2004).This is based on PRC’s willingness not to devalue its currency after the 1997-1998 crisis, and currency swaps among central banks through the ASEAN-Plus-Three (mandated after the Chiang Mai Initiative, CMI, and with the support of the Asian Development Banks) aimed at strengthening regional currency reserves to avoid any future financial collapse and contagion n the region (Kim 2004, p49). The CMI was designed as a measure to work alongside normal IMF operations: -At the ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers Meeting in Chiang Mai in May 2000, one of the main topics of discussion was how to develop a regional financing arrangement that could be utilized to maintain financial stability in the East Asian region. At that time, the discussion on the expansion of the ASEAN swap arrangement (ASA) to include all ASEAN countries and increase its size to US$1 billion by the ASEAN central banks was near its final stage. The ASEAN Plus Three countries decided to combine the expanded ASA with a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among the ASEAN Plus Three countries to establish the first regional financing arrangement called the "Chiang Mai Initiative" (CMI). The expanded ASA, while relatively small in size compared with other international financing facilities, is unconditional and designed for quick activation and disbursement. It became effective in November 2000 and allows member banks to swap their local currencies with major international currencies--such as the U.S. dollar, Euro, and yen--for a period of up to six months, and for an amount up to twice their committed amount under the ASA. (18) In line with its role as a rapid disbursement facility, a member's swap request for temporary liquidity or balance of payments assistance will be confirmed through the Agent Bank, (19) which will inform and consult with the rest of the members to assess and process the request as expeditiously as possible. (Manupipatpong 2002)By 2004, thirteen major swap arrangements had been made, with a total value of US$32.5 billion, indicating a degree of ‘monetary regionalism’ (He 2004, pp105- 106). Likewise, this broad level agenda and the November 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea has reduced hot conflicts in the South13 China Sea, even if the issue of sovereignty and boundaries has not been resolved (Kim 2004, p49).It is possible to envision several futures for East Asian regionalism. In one of these, ASEAN may be able to create its triple economic, security and socio-cultural community through 2012-2020, ASEAN Concord II (see Hew & Soesastro 2003) thereby beginning a process that deep integration that may well may it a strong core of regional process in the 21st century. This core could then moderate cooperation through outreach into South and Northeast Asia. However, as we have seen, serious progress on this triple community will be slow and has yet to face numerous developmental and democratic challenges (see lecture 6). Other possibilities include: -This opens up a variety of “futurible” scenarios for the emerging East Asian regional order: a hegemonic model (whether Sino-centric or U.S.-centric); an intraregional bipolar balance-of-power model (Sino-Japanese); a multipolar ‘concert of power” condominial model; a collective security model; an Asia-Pacific or East Asian economic community model; and a pluralistic security community model. (Kim 2004, pp61-62All of these models are partly in progress at present, leading to some internal competition among different patterns of regionalism, but also to decision paths in the future as certain options become more or less viable.In one view, Asian regionalism, both in Southeast and Northeast Asia, has been shaped by the recognition of the dominant power of the United States: -In addition, what underlies Asian perceptions of regionalism is the awareness of a dominant US power in Asia. The unipolar system, under which US power penetrates East Asia and maintains the fragmentation and division of East Asia, has made difficult and even impossible the emergence of a common Asian identity. With the presence of the US factor, Asian regionalism can only be achieved without Asian identity. Asian regionalism can only be a ‘supplement’ to the USA, rather than a force against it. Asian regionalism has to be Pacific-centric regionalism with its door open to the USA (He 2004, p107)This is partly true, especially of the Bush administration through 2001-2003, but realities have begun to change through 2003-2005. As we have seen, even Southeast Asian regionalism is problematic if based on a shared identity, and even more so for any wider grouping. On this basis, regionalism is more likely to driven by shared benefits, patterns of cooperation, and some sharing of culture, rather than some imagined identity. Here, ASEAN from 2003 has been driven towards creating a stronger economic and security process, explicitly set out in the ASEAN Concord II process from 2003, with good signs of deeper economic cooperation likely over the next decade.In turn, ASEAN and PRC in particular have found the ASEAN-Plus-Three as a strong venue for an active and progress international policy that has reduced some regional tensions, with India and New Zealand recently drawn more closely into this process (Straits Times 2005). China has found this a non-threatening forum from which to extend its foreign policy, while ASEAN has sought to moderate growing Chinese power through mutual engagement with South Korea and Japan. Through 2005 this has led to the beginning of a deeper East Asian Summit (EAS) process.14 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, already signed by the ASEAN states, China, Japan in 2004, and India has been viewed as a background norm for expectations in this summit process (Pakistan has also signed the TAC). The TAC has a set of loose but important principles: - a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; f. Effective cooperation among themselves. (in Heller 2005, p127)The agenda for the EAS has not yet been set, nor has its membership (Straits Times 2005). The EAS should promote strong political dialogue focused on Asian issues, but is not set to be the basis of a future 'Asian Union' (see Bowring 2005).This has lead to some shift in Australian policy, which has wanted to be part of this process, but has been reluctant to sign the TAC. Through July 2005 the Howard government that it would be willing to sign the TAC, but that this should not interfere with existing Australian alliances, especially with the U.S. Through July 2005: -Australia has been officially invited to join the first East Asia summit after it agreed to accede to the South-East Asian non-aggression pact.The invitation meant Australia would for the first time be involved in the evolution of the east Asian community, the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, said last night.He also revealed Australia had adopted a similar model to the one South Korea used for signing the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, by exchanging correspondence setting out Australia's and ASEAN's understanding of the pact. . . .Mr Downer said Australia's invitation would mean "for the first time ever Australia will be involved in the evolution of an east Asian community"."That's an enormous issue for Australia," he said.Australia's reluctance to sign the treaty was because of concerns it would conflict with its obligations under the ANZUS alliance and would inhibit its ability to criticise ASEAN countries on human rights issues.The move came as Burma finally bowed to pressure from its ASEAN neighbours yesterday and gave up the 2006 chairmanship of the regional forum, saying it needed to focus on national reconciliation.The decision closed the chapter on one of the most intensive lobbying efforts the forum has seen, and allows ASEAN to avoid messy confrontations with Western dialogue partners such as the US and the European Union. (Banham & Levett 2005)This nuanced shift also reduced the rhetoric of pre-emption in the region. Moreover, though the US has been concerned about its exclusion from the EAS, it has encouraged both Indian and Australian involvement (Kelly 2005). This probably improves Australia's diplomatic leverage, but once again it will have to avoid being seen as promoting US interests within a regional forum. In the long run, we may see two different 'cores' emerging in the Asia-Pacific, one focused on the US and one on15 China (Kelly 2005) - if so, Australia will need to balance its relations and move towards low levels of competition among its two major 'patrons'. In the long run, Australia and Japan may act as bridges to ensure that US interests are not totally sidelined within the EAS.Questions for further consideration include: -1) Should East Timor and PNG seek stronger dialogue processes with ASEAN and in the ARF in the short to medium term? Will they need financial and institutional support to be involved in the wide range of ongoing ASEAN processes? Would this have any cross-impact on relations with Australia?2) Has process in the ASEAN-Plus-Three, the East Asian Summit process and strong growth in PRC given China a pivotal role in future East Asian Regionalism? Can it moderate possible tensions with Japan and China over potential ‘leadership’ in some regional agenda? Will PRC be willing to take up such a strong regional and international role? (see Kim 2004, p58).3) Is ASEAN strong enough and coherent enough to guide wider ARF and ‘ASEAN- plus’ processes?4) Does the ARF need to expand to include Pakistan and generate a stronger institutional system? (Pakistan is at present only a ' Pakistan is a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN', see Yahya 2004.)5) Do new security organizations need to be created if the ARF remains relatively weak and unable to fully engage ‘preventive diplomacy’?6) Do middle powers such as Australia have sufficient influence on regional organisations, bearing in mind tensions through 1997-2002? If we list different groups, what leverage and influence does Australia have in them (APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, IOR-ARC, CSCAP, EAS, etc)?7) Can environmental cooperation provide a focus for regional resource management in the long term?8) Is there a clear split between East Asian regionalism and wider Asia-Pacific processes? Can these processes be re-linked constructively?9) Can democracy become more central to Indo-Pacific regional processes, or would this act more as a blockage if tackled too directly (for such proposals, see Terrill 2005).5. Bibliography, Resources and Further ReadingResources Asian studies on the Web with a wide range of links will be found at http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVL-AsianStudies.html16 Quite good coverage on political events in Asia will be found in the South China Morning Post, one of Hong Kong's leading newspapers, on the Web at http://www.scmp.com/ A wide range of political and governance issues are addressed in the East Asia and the Pacific Region, section of the World Bank Group Webpage at http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsfFurther ReadingBANHAM, Cynthia & LEVETT, Connie "Australia to Form Closer Asian Ties", Sydney Morning Herald, 27 July 2005 [Internet Access via http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/] BEESON, Mark (ed.) Contemporary Southeast: Regional Dynamics, National Differences, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004 BELL, Coral A World Out of Balance: American Power and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Sydney, The Diplomat magazine and Longueville Books, 2003 BUZAN, Barry & WAEVER, Ole Regions and Powers : The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003 DUC, Hiep Nguyen & TRUONG, Truong Phuoc “Water Resources and Environment Around Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam”, Electronic Green Journal, December 2003 [Access via Ebsco Database] HE, Baogang “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58 no. 1, March 2004, pp105-126 KELLY, Paul "Howard's Asian Balancing Act", The Australian, 29 June 2005, p13 KIM, Samual S. “Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia”, Journal of East Asian Studies, 4, 2004, pp39-67 [Access via Ebsco Database] MAIDMENT, Richard et al. (eds.) Governance in the Asia-Pacific, London, Routledge, 1998 PYE, Lucian W. "Civility, Social Capital: Stability and Change in Comparative Perspective: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia", The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 29 no. 4, Spring 1999 [Access via Infotrac Database] SHINN, James (ed.) Fires Across the Water: Transnational Problems in Asia, N.Y., Council on Foreign Relations, 1998 SUBRAMANIAM, Surain "The Asian values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy", Asian Affairs, 21 no. 1, Spring 2000, pp19-35 [Access via Infotrac SearchBank] BibliographyACHARYA, Amitav A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, Adelphi Paper 279, London, IISS, August 1993 ACHARYA, Amitav "Realism, Institutionalism, and the Asian Economic Crisis", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21 no. 1, April 1999, pp1-29 ACHARYA, Amitav “Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, Third World Quarterly, 24 no. 2, 2003, pp375-390 AISIN-GIORO, Pu Yu From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi, trans. W.J.F.Jenner, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1989 ALAGAPPA, Muthiah (eds.) 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