View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Durham e-Theses Durham E-Theses Realism, Truthmakers, and Language: A study in meta-ontology and the relationship between language and metaphysics MILLER, JAMES,TIMOTHY,MATTHEW How to cite: MILLER, JAMES,TIMOTHY,MATTHEW (2014) Realism, Truthmakers, and Language: A study in meta-ontology and the relationship between language and metaphysics, Durham theses, Durham University. 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Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 REALISM, TRUTHMAKERS, AND LANGUAGE A STUDY IN META-ONTOLOGY AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND METAPHYSICS A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by James Timothy Matthew Miller Department of Philosophy University of Durham 2014 i I confirm that no part of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for any degree in this or any other university. All the material is the author’s own work, except for quotations and paraphrases which have been suitably indicated. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent, and information derived from it should be acknowledged. J.T.M. Miller ii Abstract Metaphysics has had a long history of debate over its viability, and substantivity. This thesis explores issues connected to the realism question within the domain of metaphysics, ultimately aiming to defend a realist, substantive metaphysics by responding to so-called deflationary approaches, which have become prominent, and well supported within the recent metametaphysical and metaontological literature. To this end, I begin by examining the changing nature of the realism question. I argue that characterising realism and anti-realism through theories of truth unduly places epistemology prior to ontology, and is unwarranted in assuming a non-neutrality between theories of truth and positions within the realism debate. I therefore propose a characterisation of realism and anti-realism understood through truthmaking. This produces a suitable working characterisation of realism that will be used within the remainder of this project. In the second section, I trace the historical influences upon current deflationary approaches to metaphysics, most prominently those of Carnap, and Putnam. I argue that Quine’s supposed attack on Carnap’s anti-metaphysical thought fails, and show how current deflationary thought, most prominently exhibited by Hirsch, came to focus on linguistically derived concerns over the substantivity of metaphysics. In the third section, I outline a number of issues for the deflationist, and defend the coherency and legitimacy of the unrestricted existential quantifier. Focusing on the linguistic aspect of deflationism, I argue that the conception of language that the deflationist relies upon lacks suitable empirical and theoretical support within linguistics and other related domains. Furthermore, I suggest that linguistic analysis in fact supports the claim that the quantifier carries no inherent restrictions. This restores our ability to suitably posit the unrestricted existential quantifier, as a iii quantifier wherein the domain is only restricted by metaphysically substantive restrictions. Through this, I argue that metaphysics is a substantive domain of discourse. Lastly, I sketch a positive account of how, under an empirically and theoretically justified conception of language, metaphysics can be coherently held to be a realist, substantive enterprise, contra claims that hold that the nature of language inherently prevents metaphysics being considered to be a substantive domain of discourse. iv Acknowledgements The first thanks for any PhD thesis must go to the supervisors. Jonathan (E.J.) Lowe is the reason I am interested in metaphysics in the first place. Working with such a brilliant philosopher from my undergraduate all the way through to PhD has been an honour, and a continued source of inspiration to me. His passing shortly before submission of this thesis leaves a huge hole for all who knew him and philosophy more broadly; I only hope that he would be pleased with the thesis’ final state. Wolfram Hinzen, from our first meeting when he seemed surprised that I might wish to defend realist metaphysics, to the very last comments has provided invaluable support and advice. His thoughts on grammar, language, and the mind have greatly changed my thoughts on many areas in philosophy. Both of my supervisors’ endless willingness to comment on and discuss my ideas cannot be praised highly enough. Thanks must also go to Sophie Gibb and Matt Tugby for reading large sections of this work, and their excellent comments upon it. Durham, and its Philosophy Department, has been my home for the last 8 years, and this debt must be recognised. The academic climate in the department has always been fantastic, and very supportive of its members, and Durham’s own beauty cannot be denied. Thanks must go to the all of staff, both academic and just as importantly non-academic (we’d all be lost without them), in the Philosophy Department in Durham for their support both in my research and in my teaching duties; and to the students that I have had the pleasure of teaching over the last three years who have always provided me new ways to view old philosophical claims. I have benefited from discussions on many issues found in this thesis with Matti Eklund, Thomas Hofweber, David Liggins, Kit Fine, Jamin Asay, and all the speakers and attendees at the ‘Viability of Metaphysics’ workshop. To all, thank you. Thanks must also go to all my colleagues at the University Library in Durham, who have provided me with the stable basis without which this work would not have been possible. The Extended Hours Team have meant that long hours at work have been v more enjoyable than could ever be reasonably expected of evening and weekend work, and have been very forgiving and flexible around PhD writing, teaching, and conference schedules. I have been fortunate enough to have been part of two research groups in my time in Durham. First, the Language and Mind Research Group: thanks go to Dave, Tom, Andrew, Uli, Pallivi, Alex, and Josh, who allowed a realist metaphysician to join in their discussion about language and grammar. This thesis would not have the shape it does were it not for the support and comments of the members of this group. Second, the Metaphysics Reading Group, Alex, Richard, Olley, Henry, Tom, David, Donnchadh, and all other that have come along at one time or another – thank you for reminding me each week that there are still metaphysicians, and therefore that a thesis on its viability is worth my effort. Special thanks also go to all those who took time to proof-read and comment on sections of this thesis, including many of those already named above as well as Rune, and Mihretu. The mind of a PhD student can become very single-minded at times, so thanks must go to everyone who has endured me in this state and kept me going during difficult periods of research; and to all my friends that have put up with my endless talk of quantifiers, grammar, and metametaphysics, even during the countless, but all- important, games of darts. An acknowledgement must also go to the Tyneside Cinema, for providing so many breaks away to watch films all day when Durham began to feel a little small. It is not an overstatement to say that I would not be here were it not for the staff at The Royal Marsden Foundation Trust Hospital and the NHS more broadly. My treatment there was exemplary in every way, and it is a testament to them that despite periods of intensive treatment, this did not affect my education in the middle of crucial school years. That I have now reached the level of completing a PhD is, in no small way, due to them, and I hope that this might serve as some form of example vi that a cancer diagnosis need not stall or interrupt our aims in life when provided with such excellent medical care. Lastly, but by no means least, huge thanks must go to all of my family. My parents, brothers, and sister have all provided unlimited support, and this work would not have been possible without them. vii Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iv Introduction: On the Viability of Metaphysics 1 Section I Realism and Truthmakers: An Alternative Characterisation of Realism 8 1.1 What is the ‘Realism Question’? 11 1.11 The Historic Question: Aristotle, Idealism and the Rise of Epistemology 13 1.12 The Realism Question of Post Kant 19 1.121 Chalmers and Sider 24 1.122 A (Non-Quantificational) Alternative 30 1.13 An Initial Characterisation 32 1.14 Returning to the Metaphysical Thesis and the Epistemological Thesis 33 1.2 The Neutrality of Truth 36 1.3 Deflationism 45 1.4 Truthmakers