633 SAUDI ARABIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA James P. Piscatori* The Middle East, broadly defined, is Red Sea is important as the gateway to penetrated by five bodies of water, the the Suez Canal, which itself was eco­ five "fingers" of the Mediterranean, nomically and strategically significant Black, Caspian, and Red Seas, and the prior to 1967, because it reduces by Persian Gulf. The Red Sea and Gulf one-half the Gulf to London journey. have received particular attention in The recently reopened canal probably recent history. The significance of the will be highly significant again as it is Red Sea stems, first of all, \ from its widened and deepened to accommodate connection to the Arab-Israeli conflict. ships of the 150,OOO-ton range and Israel has one non-Mediterranean port, eventually of the 270,OOO-ton range? Eilat, which can only be reached Finally, the Soviet base at Berbera in through the Red Sea and then through Somalia highlights the vulnerability of the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Denial of entry to access to the sea itself. Israel through closure of the Straits of Of far greater importance is the Tiran was considered a casus belli in Persian Gulf. Indeed, the growing indus­ 1967, and in 1973 a blockade of the trial dependence on oil, even more than entire sea was carried out at the Bab the discovery and exploitation of the al-Mandab Strait to support the war aims of the Arab front. Some strategists *1 wish to acknowledge with gratitude the believe that in a long war similar action assistance of Professors K. Booth of the could offset the Israeli advantage in University College of Wales and R.K. Rama­ holding Sharm al-Shaykh.l Second, the zani of the University of Virginia. 634 resource itself, has helped to move the which also are converted into profits for Gulf to the economic, strategic, and the oil-consuming and technologically political forefront of world politics. The advanced countries. oil imported by the United States from This economic interdependence has the Middle East as a whole, for example, added to the strategic importance at­ constituted 15-17 percent of total tached to the Persian Gulf area since the American oil imports during the 1973 British withdrew in 1971. The Soviet Arab-Israeli war. American imports presence in the upper Gulf, symbolized from the region then were 877,000 by the 1972 Treaty of Cooperation and barrels per day and during the first 6 Friendship with Iraq,7 has been of months of 1976 the figures rose to concern to Western strategists. There is 2,124,000 barrels per day.3 Though the some evidence that Soviet influence was increase is substantial, American oil waning in Iraq,8 but recently there has imports from the Middle East do not been a strengthening of ties.9 In light of yet rival the present 80 percent level of the lingering Soviet presence, regional oil imports for Western Europe. This cooperation to exclude all external Middle Eastern connection is not sur­ powers is the American goal in the Gulf. prising since the area as a whole con­ Several factors overlap to account for tributes about half the total oil produc­ the position of the United States: fear tion in the world, with Persian Gulf not only of a forcible interruption of countries in particular producing one­ the oil flow through the Strait of third of the total.4 Hormuz but also of Soviet-inspired revo­ Given the sudden changes in the lution against the traditional, pro­ price of oil fixed by the Organization of Western, regimes; knowledge that the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), American presence itself is limited to the revenues that are accruing to these one command ship and two surface states have no less suddenly increased. combatants, forming the Middle East Iran is spending about $69 billion and Force at Bahrain;1o and sensitivity to Saudi Arabia approximately $140 bil­ the potential spillover effect naval com­ lion in their current Five Year Plans to petition in the Indian Ocean could have develop infrastructures and to provide because of its geographical proximity. new social services. Iraq is budgeting In light of this reliance on friendly, over $3 billion per year for investment regional policemen-mainly Iran11 but and development purposes. These also Saudi Arabia to a lesser extent, ambitious plans have stimulated a flurry American arms sales to the Gulf are seen of activity by European and American as valuable in more than the economic businesses competing to provide the sense. technical services and sophisticated It is against this background of inter­ equipment required. The wealth in the secting interests-economic, political, Gulf is also being used to build up and strategic-that law of the sea issues national armories. In 1974 alone, Per­ in the Persian Gulf and the positions of sian Gulf countries purchased over $4 Gulf States on those issues assume billion worth of arms from the United importance. Maritime disputes affect States, $1 billion from France, $500 regional stability, and, moreover, several million from Great Britain, and $340 of the littoral states wield such eco­ million from the Soviet Union.5 The nomic and potential military might that trend is accelerating,6 and it is already their views may influence the direction clear that military sales in the Gulf, like of the developing law. Saudi Arabia, at commercial sales and services there, first glance, would seem unlikely to constitute big business. Gulf countries, have any impact on the law of the sea. in short, are amassing great fortunes The predominantly desert character of 635 its landmass, the world's 13th largest, the scene of disputes over the delimita­ has given greater historical significance tion of offshore boundaries, several of to the nomadic Badu than to dhow­ which have involved Saudi Arabia. Dis­ equipped sailors. And the Saudi Navy is agreements persist between Iran and small, though growing: 1,500 personnel, Iraq, and Iran and the United Arab' about 2,000 officers and men in training Emirates. Additionally, there are at the San Diego Naval Training Center, boundary and territorial differences be­ two naval bases, three fast patrol boats tween Iraq and Kuwait, over Bubiyan (FPB), one patrol boat, and several and aI-Warba islands, and between Qatar landing craft and mine counter measures and Bahrain, particularly over the status (MCM) on order. 1 2 of the Howar Islands.14 Saudi Arabia There are, however, three reasons represents a Gulf state that has directly why the Saudi position deserves atten­ negotiated agreements with its neigh­ tion. First, Saudi Arabia's stature in bors, Bahrain and Iran, and that is world politics has dramatically in­ presently dealing with Qatar and Kuwait creased. With one-quarter of the world's in regard to outstanding problems. producible oil reserves, the Kingdom Finally, Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its possesses twice the reserves of the West­ location, is able to exert .some control ern Hemisphere and twice those of the over another important maritime area­ 1 Soviet Union. 3 In addition, Saudi the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Although Saudi Arabia, providing 25 percent of Ameri­ Arabia is not a "confrontation" state in can oil imports today as compared to 10 the Arab-Israeli conflict, its legal stance percent before the 1973 war, represents on this question of passage through the principal Middle Eastern supplier of straits has contributed to the general oil to the United States. The wealth of hostility and complicated the search for natural resources has been translated a modus vivendi. into political influence as the West generally and the United States particu­ Law of the Sea Positions. Saudi larly have realized that their economic Arabia prides itself on its Islamic herit­ well-being is in large measure due to the age and its policy is often shaped goodwill of the Saudis. This wealth has around principles of the faith. While the also allowed Saudi Arabia to exert daring exploits of Arab sailors are considerable impact on Arab states, historically well-known, the sea, how­ especially on Egypt which seems in­ ever, has been a comparatively less cessantly in search of a financial backer. important consideration to the largely That the Saudis themselves are aware land-based Arab Muslims. The Qur'an that their political role has expanded is itself displays an ambivalence on the seen by the recent rapprochement with subject with one passage indicating that Iraq and the People's Democratic Re­ men should be thankful for the liveli­ public of Yemen, both of which have hood, food, and riches the waters yield long been hostile to the "conservative" (XVI:14) and another suggesting that Saudi monarchy. International law and the devil inhabits the sea (XVIII:62). politics are intertwined, and if for no The Prophet Muhammad had little to other reason, Saudi Arabia's position on add save perhaps that Muslims who die the law of the sea should be examined in a seaborne jihad will be doubly because the Kingdom itself is poten­ rewarded in the afterlife. The rules of tially on the level of world politics a naval warfare were developed through major power, and actually within the qiyas or analogy and hardly differ from Middle Eastern subsystem, a great those of land conflict. They incorporate power. certain moderate principles: an enemy Secondly, the Persian Gulf has been ship in distress is to be issued an aman 636 or safe passage into coastal waters, and Decree 6/4/5/3711 of 2 Sha'ban 1368 in keeping with general practice, vessels (28 May 1949) that the term "territorial bearing diplomatic envoys are thought waters" was employed and precisely to possess a special status.15 It is clear defined.