<p> Vocational Knowledge and its Specification12</p><p>John Stevenson Centre for Learning and Work Research Griffith University</p><p>I raise the question about the specification of vocational knowledge, because we seem continually to be involved in what I see as a pressure to put vocational knowledge down in verbal statements of one kind or another, e.g. industrial standards, competencies, learning outcomes, qualification statements. I am calling this tendency to put down knowledge in verbal statements, one of knowledge codification. </p><p>The value afforded codified knowledge Codified knowledge has occupied a privileged position in Western countries. For instance, consider the knowledge that is developed in schools and in universities. Learning in these settings consists very much in developing the capacity to say all kinds of things or to render them in some other symbolic form – e.g. to say languages, to manipulate mathematical symbols, to compose essays and arguments, to solve verbally or numerically stated problems in verbally or numerically explicit ways, to explain or criticise a design or a piece of art. Even in vocational education we have all kinds of capacities expressed in quite elaborate statements of learning outcomes. Of course, some areas of study include mastery and application of more than words – some involve mathematical and logical symbols and expressions; and a few involve unspecifiable knowledge, e.g. art, music and technology. These latter fields usually have to fight for legitimacy in school curricula, and vocational education often makes it, only in some kind of marginal way. </p><p>Indeed, the affording of value to the inexpressible is often viewed with suspicion – seen almost as embracing the barbaric. Even in such areas as industrial and technology education, attempts are made to pre-specify in some codified way the outcomes and/or processes of learning. Strangely, art and music usually retain their place in school curricula, with arguments that they should be accepted for their own merits – perhaps this has as much to do with the pastimes of the elite as a real acknowledgement of the value of non-verbal knowledge. Moreover, art and music can be verbally criticised, and music has a symbolic notation. </p><p>Of course, codification has tremendous advantages in the rendering and making explicit of knowledge. These provide especially for communication and inspection of knowledge. For example, it allows us to talk about our knowledge, to inspect it, to assist in sharing it with others, to assist others in acquiring it, to engage in an appraisal of its coherence and utility, to attest to knowledge development, and to give credit in subsequent studies for previous learning. </p><p>Against this continuing and pervasive knowledge codification movement, the purpose of my paper is to argue that we need to be wary of assuming that we can verbally express all of what we know, the most important aspects of what we know, or any of what we know, accurately.</p><p>Kinds of knowledge codification agendas The nature of desired codification for knowledge has been debated many times in various guises. For example consider debates about what should constitute the content of instruction in various fields. These debates relate to differences in what should be included – should instruction be</p><p>1Plenary Address, Biennial International Conference of Journal of Vocational Education and Training, Wolverhampton, 14-16 July, 2001 2 The comments of Georg Neuweg, Linz University, on an earlier version of this paper are gratefully acknowledged. concerned about topic A or about topic B and what should be the relative weight afforded to each (e.g. literacy vs. literature; technology vs. history; hand tools vs. power tools; use of tools vs. design and problem-solving; key competencies vs specific skills; theory vs. practice); as well as debates about how content should be specified – as topics, objectives, processes, behaviours, competencies, disciplines. We have had debates about the form of codification and the kinds of learning goals to which they should relate, e.g. behavioural objectives movements, expressive objectives movements, competency movements, back-to-basics movements, process objectives movements, and so on. In most of these there has been a strong codification element – specifying learning or its outcomes in observable and measurable terms; structuring of disciplines of knowledge, principles and maxims; or expressing learning processes e.g. “design-make- appraise”; expressing aims. These codes are aggregated into syllabuses, accreditation documents, training packages and learning materials; and are used in teacher lesson plans and assessment regimes.</p><p>Problems with knowledge specification or codification of knowledge So what are the problems? Firstly, consider the difficulties experienced by people engaged in formal curriculum development in seeking to convert their knowledge into codes, according to the framework imposed by one or more of these historic codification paradigms. For instance, this difficulty is manifest in curriculum development meetings when various stakeholders try to express what they think ought to be included in instruction. They seek to access their own experiences and needs, and then seek to render this in language. On top of this, they find that they need to translate such renditions into instructional content, according to the prevailing paradigm. </p><p>The unpacking of workplace activity into statements of assessable behaviour, knowledge and/or attitudes is usually quite difficult. Even when participants have managed to express their views and needs, and have made attempts to convert these into the style required for standards, syllabuses and qualification statements, one is left with questions of whether the statements “add up” to the desired abilities to undertake the roles that are involved. Similarly, when one seeks to identify the “underpinning knowledge” one is also left with an uneasy feeling – will those who can acquit themselves against this list be able to undertake the practical workplace roles that they will face? Again, when developing teaching materials one wonders if the learning experiences will prepare learners for their future roles. Consider, for instance, curriculum development for teacher preparation courses, where learning experiences and assessment are derived from content expressed from a discipline perspective (e.g. psychology, sociology, curriculum development, assessment, and adult learning). So too, there are concerns about mal-alignments when developing learning experiences from lists of outcome statements. </p><p>Secondly, the privileging of codified knowledge has contributed to various ineffective and inappropriate dualisms, e.g. practical vs. academic; theoretical vs. practical; technical vs. general; vocational vs. general, supposedly on the basis of qualitative and essential differences in the kinds of knowledge involved. These dualisms seem to serve to reinforce not only supposed differences in knowledge, but differences in the value afforded the educational experiences, qualifications, learning outcomes and even the learners themselves. For instance we have the idea that abstracted verbal propositions found in text books should be developed in schools and universities, as it is supposed that they have a “general” currency, can be applied in different kinds of specific situations, can be learned by individuals for widespread application; and that such knowledge is therefore more valuable than the technical expertise that characterises specialised skill in the work place. Then we have the view that to prepare for some vocations e.g. medicine and law) requires “higher” learning than preparation for others (e.g. plumbing and bricklaying); and even that individuals with such “higher” learning deserve higher status. In all of this we seem to place a higher value on knowledge that we can state or specify in symbolic (especially verbal) form, than knowledge that appears to be more implicit, tacit, procedural, physical, manual, “technical”, “specific” or “vocational”. </p><p>Thirdly, emphases on codified knowledge are now being seen to leave out knowledge that is increasingly being recognised as fundamental to thinking and practice, e.g. in a rapidly changing society. The capacities to contribute, innovate, create, adapt, solve problems, fit in, add value, ask and solve the “right” questions, and so forth are often difficult to express, and it is usually difficult to work out how they might be acquired and transferred. We do have system-approved verbal statements about capacities for working with others in teams, problem-solving, analysing information, and using technology, (e.g. Mayer, 1992; The Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills, 1992), but one wonders again if they add up to the target abilities or knowledge.</p><p>These problems are pervasive across most fields of learning and instruction. However, in this paper, I want to confine my attention to vocational knowledge. In the following paragraphs, I will outline the contemporary press for the codification of vocational knowledge. Then, I will go on to discuss the relationships between codified and tacit knowledge, from the points of view firstly of Polanyi, and then more modern literature on learning. Next, I will return to the exploration of the specification of vocational knowledge and then, finally, consider the implications for the codification of vocational knowledge.</p><p>The contemporary press for codification of vocational knowledge The contemporary emphasis on knowledge codes appears to arise from their commercial importance in managing knowledge: e.g. codes are used to derive and transmit the nature of required learning outcomes, to assess whether they have been achieved, to “purchase” clearly delineated training from a plural set of “providers”, to manage trainers and their efforts, to appraise different providers in a competitive market, to set the pay of workers, and so on. </p><p>Moreover, in the new knowledge-based or learning- economy (Lundvall & Borrás, 1997), there are said to be limits to global development caused by tacit knowledge. And this tacit knowledge appears to be crucial for the new learning-economies. According to Lundvall & Borrás, 1997, p. 30, in their report for the European Union, in “the learning economy crucial elements of knowledge remain specific and tacit, and rooted in specific organisations and locations”.</p><p>The distinction between tacit knowledge and codified knowledge is important because, if knowledge remains tacit, it flows less easily across organisational and geographical borders. If all knowledge were readily transformed into information to which everyone had easy access, there would be little incentive for firms, regions and nations to invest in R&D and technology gaps between regions and countries would be minor and temporary. Basically, knowledge remains tacit if it is complex or variable in quality: in situations where several different human senses need to be used at the same time, when skilful physical behaviour is involved and when understanding social relationships is crucial. This is especially difficult to overcome when the context undergoes rapid change. (Lundvall & Borrás, 1997, p. 13)</p><p>The need to look afresh at knowledge in productive use has also been identified in the work of Gibbons et al (Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott, & Trow, 1994). These authors argue that a new non-academic kind of knowledge is now being produced as organisations create their economic futures (Mode 2, below). “ … in Mode 1 problems are set and solved in a context governed by the, largely academic, interests of a specific community. By contrast, Mode 2 knowledge is carried out in a context of application. Mode 1 is disciplinary while Mode 2 is transdisciplinary. Mode 1 is characterised by homogeneity, Mode 2 by heterogeneity. Organisationally, Mode 1 is hierarchical and tends to preserve its form, while Mode 2 is more heterarchical and transient…In comparison with Mode 1, Mode 2 is more socially accountable and reflexive. It includes a wider, more temporary and heterogeneous set of practitioners, collaborating on a problem defined in a specific and localised context” (p. 3). </p><p>“ Knowledge is produced by configuring human capital. However, unlike physical capital, human capital is potentially more malleable. Human resources can be configured again and again to generate new forms of specialised knowledge. The ability to do this lies at the heart of many economies of scope which are currently regarded as crucial to survival in the workplace” (p. 13). </p><p>Tacit and Codified Knowledge For all of these reasons, then, it seems important to examine the nature of vocational knowledge in terms of its specifiability. Are there aspects of vocational knowledge that are tacit? Can vocational knowledge be codified? Should it? How would such codes relate to the mass of codified knowledge that is already the subject of instruction in schools and universities?</p><p>Polanyi’s Concept of Tacit Knowledge The idea of tacit knowledge can be traced to Polanyi (e.g. Polanyi, 1959, 1969ab, 1983; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). Polanyi’s main project was to develop a post-critical philosophy which would overcome the nihilism that he thought inevitably flowed from ideological extremism and positivist scepticism. Within his writings there is a substantial treatment of tacit knowledge, thought and articulation. Polanyi differentiated what we know from what we can say. </p><p>Although Polanyi attributed to language major credit for the advancement of humankind, he gave primacy to our personal tacit knowledge in creating language and in legitimating the outcomes we derive from use of language. He denied ideas of objectivity beyond our own tacit legitimisation that we afford what makes sense to us. For him, it is the appraising “personal coefficient” of our act of knowing that “bridges…the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity” (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 17).</p><p>For Polanyi, “Knowledge is an activity which would be better described as a process of knowing” (Polanyi, 1969b, p. 132). “All knowing is action – that it is our urge to understand our experience which causes us to rely on some parts of it subsidiarily in order to attend to our main objective focally” (Polanyi & Prosch 1975, p. 42). Tacit knowing has three centres: the subsidiary particulars, the focal target and the knower who “links the first to the second” (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 38). It is tacit knowing through which we derive meaning from particulars. We extend ourselves into the subsidiary awareness of particulars that compose a whole, much as blind people might extend their person through a stick. We don’t focus on the “subsidiary” or “instrumental” particulars, but on the whole that they constitute. The whole, which has our attention, gives the particulars their meaning. For instance when using a tool, we focus on what we are seeking to achieve, not on the various movements that we make in applying the tool to the task. If we focused on the particulars we would lose sight of the whole and the particulars would lose their joint meaning. “[When] we rely on [tools] as a probe,. … we pour ourselves into them and assimilate them as part of ourselves” (Polanyi & Prosch 1975, p. 36). So too for our use of theory and principles. They also become tacitly known when we use them, deriving their meaning from the whole to which we apply them. “We may generalize this to include the acceptance and use of the intellectual tools offered by an interpretative framework, in particular by the textbooks of science” (Polanyi & Prosch 1975, pp. 36-37). “The arts of doing and knowing, the valuation and the understanding of meanings, are thus seen to be only different aspects of the act of extending our person into the subsidiary awareness of particulars which compose a whole” (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 65). “Although the expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton classer can indicate their clues and formulate their maxims, they know many more things than they can tell, knowing them only in practice, as instrumental particulars, and not specifically as objects. The knowledge of such particulars is therefore ineffable” (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 88). In speech and thought, the tacit may predominate (the ineffable domain), it may be co-extensive with “the [easily intelligible speech] which carries its meaning” or it may fall apart from the formal (domain of sophistication) (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 87).</p><p>For Polanyi, “practical skill … consists in the capacity for carrying out a great number of particular movements [to achieve] a “comprehensive result”, and “skillful knowledge [consists in comprehending] a large number of details in terms of a significant entity”. “[The] two kinds of skillful knowing are actually always interwoven: a skillful handling of things must rely on our understanding them; and on the other hand, intellectual comprehension can be achieved only by the skillful scrutiny of a situation” (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975, p. 37).</p><p>Polanyi is explicit about the problems associated with the formalisation of our knowing in an articulate form. “[Symbolization] is effective only because it assists the inarticulate mental powers exercised by reading …” (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 83). “Like the tool, the sign or symbol can be conceived as such only in the eyes of a person who relies on them to achieve or signify something. This reliance is a personal commitment which is involved in all acts of intelligence by which we integrate some things subsidiiarily to the centre of our focal attention” (Polanyi, 1969a, p.61). </p><p>For Polanyi, judgement itself consists in a reconciliation among aspects of knowing. “The gap between the tacit and the articulate tends to produce everywhere a cleavage between sound common sense and dubious sophistication, from which the animal is quite free” (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 61). “Three things will have to be borne in mind: the text, the conception suggested by it, and the experience on which this may bear. Our judgement operates by trying to adjust these three to each other” (Polanyi, 1969a, p. 95).</p><p>Polanyi was writing well before the work that has led to learning theories, as we now know them. So it is worthwhile seeing how these ideas square with contemporary theories relating to learning and knowledge</p><p>Applying Recent Conceptions of Knowledge Representation to Vocational Knowledge Cognitive science usually posits various kinds of mental representations that would serve to explain observed capacities such as those which constitute vocational expertise (e.g. Stevenson, 1994). Expert knowledge is often depicted in terms of conceptual propositions and procedural rules, based on the cognitive differentiation of knowledge “that’ and knowledge “how” (e.g. Anderson, 1982). Cognitive theories of expertise can also be differentiated into those that focus on mental processes and those that focus on so-called knowledge (Sternberg, 2000), where the mental representation of such knowledge has been the subject of considerable theorising. </p><p>It is now generally accepted, in cognitive psychology, that knowledge may be represented in memory in many different ways. For instance, ten different kinds of theorised representations can be identified in seminal cognitive theories (Jorna, 1990): semantic, propositional, episodic, temporal string, pictorial, declarative, analog, digital, discrete and continuous. The relevant theories for Jorna’s study were Marr’s (1976, 1982) theory of perception, theories of mental images (Kosslyn, 1980, 1984), Tulving’s (1972, 1983, 1984) theory of episodic memory, Anderson’s (1982, 1983) theory of ACT*: Adaptive Control of Thought, Kintsch’s (1974) theory of propositional representation and Schank & Abelson’s (1977) theory of scripts.</p><p>In addition to the phenomena of tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1966; Sternberg & Horvath, 1999), implicit knowledge (Buchner, Funke and Berry, 1995; Kirsner, 1998; Long 1995; Schacter, 1987), multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1983, 1998) and “non-traditional intelligence” (Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg, 2000), the cognitive literature theorises a plurality of representational encoding and memory systems (Martin, 1993; Paivio, 1979; Tulving, 1984). At the same time, there is disquiet in the cognitive literature about the lack of explicit attention to analysing the meanings of these concepts themselves (Tulving, 2000). </p><p>In the conceptual change literature, it is also thought that individuals seem to have different kinds of representations of conceptual knowledge, and that they draw upon the representation that best fits the target purpose (eg Halldén, 1999; Pozo, Gómez & Sanz, 1999; Schnotz & Preuß, 1999). There is now considerable evidence that individual capacities and the cognitive representations that are posited as being involved are closely linked to the situation in which the capacity (and its representation) was developed, and encompass normative judgements, conceptual understanding, rules for action, personal epistemologies, and affect (Glaser, 1990; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nuthall, 2000; Perkins, Jay & Tishman, 1993; Schnotz, Vosniadou & Carrereto, 1999; Stevenson, 1999; Tobach et al 1997). Moreover, recently, Nuthall (2000) has adduced evidence for the embedding of social phenomena in schemata. In this sense, practical expertise may be seen as a highly situated form of knowledge. </p><p>Yet most of this literature theorises internatl mental representations to account for observed phenomena – which is not what Polanyi thought and is in direct contrast to the work of Ryle. Moreover, socio-cultural and anthropological studies indicate that knowledge is organised for doing rather than abstracted on purely logical or typological grounds (Bloch, 1998; Keller & Keller, 1996; Tobach, Joffe Falmagne, Parlee, & Scribner Kapelman, 1997; Wertsch, 1981)</p><p>Thus, from these theories and research outcomes, one can deduce that, while individuals often mange to express their knowledge in verbal form, use of language as verbal descriptions is only one form in which knowledge can be rendered. For instance, it can also be rendered in other ways such as in physical and mental activity, in music and art, and as diagrams and other forms of imagery. It is important then, in studying practical or vocational expertise, to recognise that verbal descriptions are not necessarily isomorphic with the capacity or the knowledge itself, or any mental representation of that knowledge or capacity. As Bloch (1998) concludes from his anthropological studies “(1) … much of knowledge is fundamentally non-linguistic; (2) … concepts involve implicit networks of meanings which are formed through the experience of, and practice in, the external world; and (3) … under certain circumstances, this non-linguistic knowledge can be rendered into language and thus take the form of explicit discourse, but chang(es) its character in the process” (p. 7).</p><p>Specifying Vocational Knowledge I think that, from Polanyi’s early work and more recent work on learning and even knowledge representation, there are considerable problems associated with a strict and exclusive codification of any knowledge, let alone vocational knowledge. Indeed skills are taken by many as the classic case of tacit knowing – we can perform them, but can’t say really how to do so; and the verbal physics explanation of why and how we do so (eg in riding a bike, juggling, swimming) is often obscure and inadequate.</p><p>I suggest that one way of looking at the “tacitness” of vocational knowledge is to examine it through the lens of de Jong and Ferguson-Heussler’s (1993, 1996) depiction of types and qualities of knowledge. One attractive feature of their approach is its epistemological emphasis whereby they start by examining knowledge-in-use, characterising knowledge in terms of its function. Although their work is in the field of physics, I would like to suggest that their ideas offer promise in examining vocational knowledge. These authors define knowledge in terms of two dimensions that they regard as independent: types and qualities or properties. So, for instance, procedural knowledge (a type) could be automated or controlled (qualities); conceptual knowledge (a type) could be surface or deep (qualities). They differentiate four types of knowledge: situational, conceptual, procedural and strategic; and five qualities: level, structure, automation, modality and generality. A table they use to elaborate this typology is reproduced as Table 1. </p><p>TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE</p><p>In Table 1, I have added emphasis to elements that seem to be related to Polanyi’s ideas of tacit knowing: e.g.  The ways in which particulars or specifics become subsidiary and develop their joint meaning from the entity that they jointly constitute  The contrast between the verbalisable and the tacit  The contrast between the automatic and the controlled / conscious step-wise  The contrast between symbolic representation and use, and meaning</p><p>I suggest that we can deduce from the table that a great deal of vocational knowledge might have the qualities of tacit knowing as Polanyi conceptualised it. Certainly many skills are tacitly known. But so too, it appears, are many principles that experts in all fields apply to their practice. Indeed this progression of experts from articulable or specifiable knowledge to compiled, automated or encapsulated knowledge is well known (e.g. Anderson, 1982, Boshuizen et al 1995). Thus, an equation of tacit knowing just with “know-how” is too simplistic. For instance Lundvall & Borrás (1997) pick out, as likely to be tacit, that workplace knowledge which involves skilful action, understanding of social relationships or the address of rapid change.</p><p>Thus, it seems inappropriate to dismiss tacitness as a characteristic only of skills. Tacit knowing also seems to have a central place in the situational, conceptual, procedural and strategic knowledge of experts. The unpacking of this knowledge is difficult and likely to lead to qualitative changes in the knowledge and its fragmentation. Polanyi refers to this as destructive analysis.</p><p>Scrutinize closely the particulars of a comprehensive identity and their meaning is effaced, our conception of the entity is destroyed… In [some] cases the detailing of particulars, which by itself would destroy meaning, serves as a guide to their subsequent integration and thus establishes a more secure and more accurate meaning of them. But the damage done by the specification of particulars may be irremediable [eg history, literature, philosophy]…The destructive analysis of a comprehensive entity can be counteracted in many cases by explicitly stating the relations between its particulars… But, my examples show clearly that, in general, an explicit integration cannot replace its tacit counterpart. The skill of a driver cannot be replaced by a thorough schooling in the theory of the motorcar…(Polanyi, 1983, pp. 18-20)</p><p>Implications So the question arises, How should we respond to the codification agenda? </p><p>Firstly, I think we should embrace attempts at codification whose motive is to make vocational knowledge more accessible – to unpack expertise for examination, for communication and for access. Secondly, I think we should embrace attempts whose motive is to evaluate and improve expertise. As Polanyi indicates, destructive analysis followed by attempts at re-integration may well lead to improvement –we may find better ways for proceeding. Thirdly I think that attempts whose motivation is acknowledgement, recognition and crediting vocational knowledge should also be welcomed. </p><p>However, in all of these are dangers. One danger lies in dis-aggregation so that the particulars are discerned but the whole vanishes. Another lies in believing that all knowledge is verbalisable, so that important knowledge is left out. A third is in not recognising that there are intimate connections among knowledge, doing, purposes and functions, artefacts, tasks and settings. In all of these cases the danger lies in a trivialisation of vocational knowledge. The fourth is in constructing mental representations to account for phenomena, believing that they actually exist in the form constructed, and losing sight of the phenomena themselves.</p><p>The codification agenda manifests in many ways – e.g. in determining what counts in accreditation documents, curriculum content and assessment; and in recognising learnings for subsequent life and educational pursuits. Here I think we need to be more cautious. To engage in teaching that relies solely on expressible particulars of vocational knowledge may be to seriously reduce vocational knowledge and learners. </p><p>What I suggest is needed is a holistic approach in teaching and learning, including:</p><p> A focus on plural types and qualities of knowledge (e.g. verbalisable and tacit conceptual vocational knowledge, verbalisable and tacit procedural knowledge)</p><p> Opportunities for plural types of learning experiences for accessing, acquiring and communicating vocational knowledge in plural, but connected, ways</p><p> Situated learning where there are rich artefacts, authentic culture, obvious purposes and explicit feedback.</p><p> Explicit valuing of non-expressible knowledge such as automatic procedures and encapsulated concepts</p><p> Explicit attempts to create, present and depict knowledge in ways that are functionally useful as opposed to, or in addition to being discipline-based</p><p> Opportunities for individuals to connect meanings that they construct on experiences in various life pursuits</p><p>Overall, I think the globalising economy will continue to need to rely on the idiosyncratic attributes of individuals learning from rich experiences and developing their meaning tacitly from among the various connections that they build in their lives (Stevenson, 2000). 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Table 1: Example descriptions of knowledge in terms of type and quality (de Jong and Ferguson- Hessler, 1996, p. 111) (based on studies of physics) (Emphasis added)</p><p>Types Qualities Situational Conceptual Procedural Strategic Level Case-based Symbols and Rules / recipes / Symbol-driven Surface  deep reasoning  formulae  algebraic search for translation into concepts and manipulation  formula  domain concepts relations meaningful analysis and action planning Structure Isolated features Independent Isolated Isolated actions Isolated  grouped concepts and algorithms   coherent set elements  together (i.e. laws  action related to of sequential structured models of meaningful concept or actions knowledge situations) (hierarchical) principle structure Automation Conscious and Verbalizable Conscious Step by step Declarative  stepwise  principles, choice an step choices and compiled automatic definitions, etc. by step planning  translation to  intuitive, execution  automatic domain concepts tacit automatic analysis and understanding access and planning; routine parallel execution checking Modality Words and Propositions Sets of Sets of Verbal  symbols  and formulae production rules production rules pictorial pictures and  pictures,  pictorial  pictorial diagrams diagrams (diagrams, figs., (diagrams, figs., graphs) graphs) Generality General General Define systems General steps General  properties e.g. structure of for application (analysis, domain specific homogeneous, domains  a of conservation planning, etc.) time indep.  specific domain, laws  check  specific steps domain specific & also: points of contact (thermo- characteristics conservation for forces dynamics, laws  specific interaction, cases thereof process, etc.)</p>