Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2011 Contemplation and the Human Animal in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas Edyta M. Imai Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Imai, Edyta M., "Contemplation and the Human Animal in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas" (2011). Dissertations. 205. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/205 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2011 Edyta M. Imai LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO CONTEMPLATION AND THE HUMAN ANIMAL IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY BY EDYTA M. IMAI CHICAGO IL DECEMBER 2011 Copyright by Edyta M. Imai, 2011 All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER ONE: CONTEMPLATION AND NATURAL APPETITES 30 CHAPTER TWO: SENSATION AND CONTEMPLATION 104 CHAPTER THREE: DESIRE AND CONTEMPLATION 166 CHAPTER FOUR: DELIGHT AND CONTEMPLATION 230 BIBLIOGRAPHY 291 VITA 303 iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ST Summa theologiae SCG Summa contra gentiles QDV Quaestiones disputatae de veritate QDA Quaestiones disputatae de anima In Boetii de Trin. In Librum Boetii de Trinitate Expositio In DA Sententia libri De anima In NE Sententia libri Ethicorum In Met Commentarium in XII libros Metaphysicorum In Ph Commentarium in VIII libros Physicorum SENT Commentarium in quatuor libros Sententiarum iv INTRODUCTION In this dissertation I examine the manner in which – according to Thomas Aquinas - the operations of the sensitive soul contribute to contemplation. Aquinas scholars writing about contemplation have traditionally focused their attention on the role of the intellect in contemplation. That is understandable, because contemplation is primarily an intellectual activity. However, contemplation also involves the operations of the sensitive soul, albeit in a secondary way. The act of contemplation is accompanied by phantasms 1 and the passions of love and delight. The acquisition of knowledge - which ordinarily precedes contemplation - requires the involvement of the outer and inner senses and of the sensitive appetite. This is so because a human being is an integrated and a composite being, made of body and soul, and all our faculties participate in contemplation, not to mention in the acquisition of knowledge, which typically precedes contemplation. The sensitive soul is the soul characteristic of us qua animals. Examining how the operations of the sensitive soul contribute to contemplation shows us what difference being animal makes to contemplation; how the contemplation of a rational animal differs from contemplation of a being who is rational, but not animal. Since, according to Aquinas, human happiness consists of contemplation, I argue that the operations of the 1 In Aquinas’s terminology phantasms represent a given thing as sensed and perceived. 1 2 sensitive soul are necessary for the attainment and the enjoyment of human happiness qua contemplation. Contemplation Is a Neglected Topic No other commentator on Aquinas has approached the question in the way I approach it. There is hardly anything in the literature written about the role played by our animality in human contemplation. There is very little written about our animality in connection with any problems of Thomas’s philosophy. Thomas Hibbs notes that contemplation is one of the topics neglected by Aquinas scholars. He says: “Given Thomas’s emphasis on the crucial role of contemplation in the good life, it is surprising how little attention has been devoted to the topic or to the role of the intellectual virtues. I might list the topic of contemplation and intellectual virtues among those features of Aquinas’s moral thought that remain neglected in the literature.” 2 It is interesting to note that Hibbs mentions contemplation along with intellectual virtues, apparently not even considering the possibility that one would discuss it in connection with animality. Even in connection with the intellectual virtues, which belong to the rational part of the soul, the topic of contemplation has been neglected; discussion of contemplation in connection with the sensitive soul is non-existent in the literature today. Hibbs mentions Josef Pieper’s book Happiness and Contemplation 3 as a conspicuous exception to the dearth of books on the topic of contemplation. Pieper writes about contemplation and happiness in Happiness and Contemplation and in Leisure the 2 Hibbs, Thomas, S. “Interpretations of Aquinas’s Ethics Since Vatican II” in Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002, pp. 412-425. 3 Pieper, Josef, Happiness and Contemplation, 1958, tr.Richard and Clara Winston, South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1998. 3 Basis of Culture. 4 These are classic works. However, his project is to defend the value of contemplation in the world of work and constant distractions; he does not closely examine what happens in the human soul when we contemplate, or when we engage in research leading to contemplation. He certainly is not interested in the role of the operations of the sensitive soul in contemplation. Furthermore, he does not analyze what Aquinas said about contemplation, but rather discusses contemplation as an essential component of a good life from the perspective of Aquinas’s philosophy. More recent works on the subject of contemplation also focus on the importance of contemplation for living a good life, 5 rather than on the way we engage in the contemplation. Types of Contemplation There are two sides to contemplation: the object of contemplation, and the subject who contemplates. The ultimate object of contemplation is God, 6 who cannot be known in the way material objects are known to us, and who, in fact, cannot be fully known. 7 As far as the object of contemplation is concerned, the animal side of human nature is irrelevant, since we cannot study God the way we study other objects. Aquinas tells us that we may also contemplate truth about God’s creation. 8 Created things of this world 4 Pieper, Josef, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, 1948, tr.Gerald Malsbary, South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1998. 5 For example, Dewan, Lawrence, “Truth and Happiness: Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 67, 1-20, 1993. 6 Aquinas, Thomas St., Summa Theologica, II-II 180, 4, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province , Allen, Texas: Christian Classics, 1948. Latin text: Aquinas, Thomas St., Summa Theologiae, Roma: Alba-Editiones Paulinae, 1962. Part One of Part Two, Question 3, article 8. Hereafter refered to as ST. 7 ST I 12, 7. 8 ST II-II 180, 4. 4 are material objects, but the truths about them are not material. Thus, from the perspective of the object of contemplation, the operations of the sensitive soul, i.e., sensory perceptions or passions, are not relevant. However, as far as the subject is concerned, namely, a human being, all aspects of human nature pertain to contemplation, for the subject who contemplates is a rational animal. A human being is able to engage in contemplation, because a human being is a rational creature. 9 But a human being depends on the operations of the sensitive soul, namely, sensory perceptions and the passions, for the acquisition of knowledge, because a human is an animal. Senses and passions guide us in the study which precedes contemplation. The inner sense of phantasia and passions of love and delight assist the intellect in the very act of contemplation. Thomas Aquinas also considered the role of the senses in contemplation in the afterlife. He believed that there will be a resurrection at which time the souls of the dead will be reunited with their bodies. After the resurrection, the whole human being is to experience delight in the contemplation of God, and that experience of delight requires the participation of the sensitive soul and the body, as well as the intellective soul. From the perspective of the human being who contemplates, the operations of the sensitive soul are necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and for the enjoyment of contemplation. A comprehensive work on the subject of contemplation is Garrigou-Langrange’s Christian Perfection and Contemplation. 10 Garrigou-Lagrange distinguishes two kinds of contemplation: ordinary and mystical. “Ordinary contemplation” is a term used by him to 9 According to Thomas, angels are also able to contemplate God, but angelic contemplation is not the subject of this work. 10 Garrigous-Lagrance, R., O.P. Christian Perfection and Contemplation B. Herder Book Co. 1951. 5 describe the kind of contemplation to which a person may be led as a result of study of the world around us. Mystical contemplation is beyond the powers of unaided human reason, for it requires God’s grace. 11 Most of Garrigou-Lagrange’s work is devoted to the discussion of the mystical type of contemplation. On the other hand, this dissertation treats of the ordinary contemplation, and specifically, it examines the role of the sensitive soul in the ordinary contemplation. Aquinas himself does not explicitly stress these distinctions in his discussion of contemplation, but he mentions them. It is up to Aquinas scholars to retrieve from his writings all that he has to say about different types of contemplation. Aquinas’s discussion of contemplation is two-fold: there is contemplation in this life on earth and contemplation in heaven. I shall focus on the earthly contemplation, but I will discuss briefly the heavenly kind of contemplation, because there is continuity between the two kinds of contemplation.