What Makes a Government Authoritarian?

3901f12-notesIntro▸ What makes a government authoritarian?▸ Is there only one kind of authoritarian?▸ How do authoritarian systems differ from democracies?▸ How do authoritarian systems govern?▸ What instruments and institutions do they use?▸ Are authoritarian systems a stop on the road to democracy or do they represent a durable regime type?▸ What do we mean by regime?▸ Authoritarian▸ Now any non-democratic government▸ Democratic = electoral democracy▸ Minimal definition (Schumpeterian)▸ Benefits and costs of this view▸ Dichotomous▸ Older version: 1 Democrats v. Totalitarians▸ Totalitarians: total control of economy, society, polity▸ Aspired to more than achieved▸ Police state; state terror▸ Often mobilizational party▸ Examples: Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini (lesser degree), Mao, the Kims, some satellites (DDR? Romania?), Pol Pot, José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia (much earlier), the Brothers Casto…▸ Older version 2: Non-democrats = authoritarians + totalitarians▸ Authoritarians1 ▸ Less totalizing: Some sectors remain relatively independent▸ Business and religion▸ Party to limit mobilization▸ Examples: Franco, Salazar, Pinochet, Mugabe, Bongo. Saudis, pre-’94 South Africa, many others; far more common than totalitarians▸ From 1950s and 1960s▸ Totalitarianism, see Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1956)▸ For authoritarianism, see Juan Linz (1964)▸ Moved from dichotomous to continuous▸ Not all non-democrats the same▸ Some less/more selectively repressive▸ Have done this again more recently by adding semi-authoritarian and hybrid regimes to mix▸ What does this suggest about how we conceptualize?▸ What are the advantages of dichotomies? What are their limitations?▸ Same thing from continua (pl. of continuum)▸ Regime▸ Current uses▸ Popular▸ Political science▸ IR▸ Public Policy▸ Comp. Pol/Pol Theory▸ What makes a regime a regime? Five things:▸ Structure of power▸ Basis of claim to rule legitimately2 ▸ Accountable to whom▸ Influentials▸ State-society relations▸ Could be other indicators▸ Per Brooker, students of non-democratic regimes have looked at▸ Who ruled: absolute monarch, personal dictator, military ruler, institutional military dictatorship, party dictatorship, party dictator▸ How they ruled: totalitarian, authoritarian, traditional monarch, short term military, transformational military▸ List of what makes up a regime leans a little more toward how than who, but has both.▸ Brooker also describes in some detail the key works of several different approaches to studying authoritarians▸ Syntheses of arguments and how views have evolved▸ Totalitarians▸ Start, Arendt, lots on personal dictatorship▸ Later, F&G, more on propaganda and indoctrination▸ Still later, Shapiro, stress mobilization▸ Most recent: more on how they govern; see mobilization and propaganda as not very effective▸ Meaning two things▸ Over time incorporated new concepts▸ Behaviour of supposed totalitarians changed▸ Authoritarians▸ Juan Linz on Spain▸ Demobilizing populous (populist authoritarians are exceptions)▸ Some limited pluralism ▸ More forms, incl. military rule▸ Guillermo O’Donnell on bureaucratic authoritarianism -- technocrats3 ▸ Military regimes: quite good▸ How do they rule: Role for civilians? Transformational? Juntas and institutional military dictatorships v. one-man military dictators – who often become just dictators▸ The one-party state▸ Some allusion to licensed opposition; too little▸ Basic question has been whether it is direct rule by one party or rule under the auspices or one party; latter have ano official party but govt is by one man▸ Personal rule▸ Literally by one person▸ Various options, as personal rule takes various forms▸ We will see that Jennifer Gandhi says a lot about these various dictatorial alternatives.▸ So what? What does this tell us?▸ Study of non-democratic politics is varied and has evolved▸ That it has been taken seriously by PS, though sometimes is falls well back behind the flavour of the monthFH & EIU▸ What they are▸ Classifications of countries by regime type▸ FH uses a measure of freedom: free, partly free, unfree▸ EIU’s more conventional: democracies, flawed democracies, hybrids, authoritarians▸ Each has strengths and weaknesses▸ And there’s substantial overlap▸ Exercises in classification and comparison▸ What are the attributes of different regimes?▸ How can regimes be classified?▸ Have policy impact4 ▸ Was especially true of FH – rankings used to isolate and castigate leftist governments who were arguably more democratic than rightists who scored higher; cold war stuff▸ Show how PS can move out of the academy and have an applied sideMethods▸ This is important▸ How do they get their information?▸ What information do they use? How do they use it?▸ What, in short, is the methodology of each?▸ Does one seem better than the other; more likely to yield more accurate results or are both essentially similar?FH-FIW▸ Big advantage▸ Been around: can trace back to1972▸ And can trace individual countries▸ Both may take some work but it can be done▸ What it measures: Freedom, not democracy▸ But has a special sub-category for electoral democracies▸ Focus is “real-world rights and freedoms” for individuals▸ Score on political rights and civil liberties▸ Three classes: Free, partly free, not free▸ Relies on experts, in-house + consultantsEIU-DI▸ About democracy▸ Breaks results into four classes: Full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrids, and authoritarians▸ Categories scored include: political culture and participation, and functioning of govt▸ Only gives scores for last two years▸ Use public opinion data where available5 ▸ Like FH, use in-house experts.▸ Do give a more thorough treatment of what they mean by democracy; more contested than freedomDemocracy▸ Minimum: Contested elections▸ But minimum has prereqs, per G. O’Donnell▸ Free media, freedom of expression, political culture that encourages participation and not just permits it.▸ Practically means▸ Free elections + prerequisites + broad personal rights effectively enforced + govt able to deliver policies benefitting most citizens + real possibility for marginalized to gain benefits (legal, material, social, cultural) via politics + govt accountability & responsiveness▸ Former easier to measure; latter more durable▸ Both give a sense of where different govts stand on measure related to freedom and democracy▸ Both have relatively subtle methods and both rely on expert opinion for scoring▸ One tries to assess govt effectives, pol. culture and participation▸ Both present a continuum and explain why they break at the points they do▸ Both are useful; FH is more used because it’s olderMilitary Rule▸ Not all forceful seizures of power are military coups▸ Coups d’état not all military▸ But all take state power by force▸ Can argue that not all rule by some armed force = military rule▸ Can put warlords, caudillos or Big Men in a different category (personal rule) if they did not use formal military to take power▸ What this leaves:6 ▸ Military as a formal organization; especially a professional military▸ Professional military: One based on specialized training, in which a career is possible and open to any qualified person, in a permanent force, and which is supposedly subject civilian control and not used as partisan instrument▸ Commissions not bought; not mercenaries for hire;▸ Product of 19th centuryCoups▸ Per definition, coups become military coups only with a professional military▸ Latin America, around 1870▸ Asia: most after independence; Thailand by late 1880s▸ Africa: most after independence; Ethiopia, 1899▸ Mid-East: most after independence; Turkey, 2 quarter, 19th c,▸ Professional armies aren’t supposed to politically active but many are. Why?▸ Often better educated and better traveled than many, even most politicians more sophisticated▸ Have sense of duty and service to country; see pols as self-serving or serving party interests at best▸ Also loyal to military institution and will defend it if it seems threatened▸ Have strong distaste for disorder; if pols, self-serving and not as well educated, can’t even keep order  military steps in▸ And they have the guns and tanks and troops…▸ Without a strong democratic tradition coups become a real option▸ Since 1900 there have been around 300 successful coups in the world▸ Few in developed countries and few in consolidated democracies, regardless of developmentNew model coup▸ Honduras, 2009▸ Mel Zelaya▸ Military ousts Mel but doesn’t take power▸ Hands it over to Micheletti, representative of anti-Zelaistas7 ▸ Who governs until the next election and stands down▸ Hondo elite has history of asking military to sort out its problems▸ This time military didn’t assume power▸ New model? Consistent with (quasi-)democracy?Old-style coup: Mali 2012▸ Capt. Amadou Sanogo overthrows Pres. Amadou Toumani Toure▸ Army felt it wasn’t getting troops & equipment it needed to fight separatist Touareg rebels of Azawad Natl Liberation Movement (MNLA)▸ Result has been instability, more loss of territory to MNLA, and many displaced people▸ A typical coup because it grew from army’s discontentMilitary rule▸ Often short-lived; musical coups; ▸ Short term military govts make few big changes▸ Toss a few pols out; boost military budget▸ Longer term can  big changes (and vice-versa)▸ Zia al Haq, Pakistan, 1978-88  Islamicization▸ Pinochet, Chile, 1973-89  shift to right; hobble democracy▸ Both leaders eclipsed institution▸ In Brazil (1964-85) and Argentina (1976-83) military leaders rotated through presidency.Individual military rulers▸ Can (should?) include any ruler who takes power at the head of an organized military force.▸ If the ruler is representative of and dependent on the support of the military it is military government with one public face.▸ Brazil, Argentina▸ Any place where a countercoup brings another military ruler▸ If he has his own base of support outside military it is personal government.8 ▸ Amin, Bokassa, Banzer (Bolivia), ▸ Mixed▸ Probably most Pakistani military presidents▸ Maybe the Thais, tooOne-party rule▸ Most literal: only one party is permitted▸ More flexible: only one party is permitted to win▸ By law or by practice▸ Don’t confuse with one-party dominant▸ One regularly wins but can lose legally and does not resort to systematic fraud▸ Lots of examples: Alberta, 1935-71, (Socred) 1971- present; (PC); Sweden, 1936-78 (Social Democrats); Italy, 1947-52 (CD); US, Solid South, 1876-1964 (Dem)▸ One-party dominant (also called one-party predominant) found in democracies; product of particular patterns of party competition▸ The others are authoritarian▸ Party = organizational weapon▸ Used to control society, not just state▸ More pluralistic if licensed opposition▸ One-party dominant (also called one-party predominant) found in democracies; product of particular patterns of party competition▸ The others are authoritarian▸ Party = organizational weapon▸ Used to control society, not just state▸ More pluralistic if licensed opposition▸ Vanguard parties▸ Lead revo/independence  know the correct line of march  only group ever qualified to lead9 ▸ Currently eight:▸ PRC, Viet Nam, Laos, North Korea, Cuba, Turkmenistan, Eritrea, Sahwari Arab Democratic Republic [ex-Spanish Sahara] (Polisario Front)▸ Ex: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, São Tome e Prncipe, all ex-Soviet Bloc; Somalia ▸ Non-CP examples▸ Nkrumah, Ghana, CPP, 1956-▸ FSLN, Nicaragua; dropped after three years▸ Not all do: ANC. South Africa▸ Sometimes allow licensed opposition: compete but not win▸ These are sometimes also called hegemonic partiesOther rationales ▸ Unity: Post-Independence Sub-Saharan Africa▸ Why? To counter potential for inter-ethnic conflicts▸ Only internal competition was rationale▸ How many? At least 25▸ Many turned into plain one-party dictatorships▸ Lots in Arab world, also Burma;▸ Longest-lived one-party state: Liberia, 1878-1980, True Whig PartyHegemonic party rule▸ Competition allowed within limits▸ Classic case: Mexico under the PRI, 1929-1997, 2000▸ Fraud became main instrument▸ Power-sharing pacts▸ Opposition accepts defeat in return for “quotas of power” = seats in legislature, a share of judicial and other appointments = patronage▸ Common in Latin America, late 19th and early 20th c.▸ Nicaragua, 1950-79, 2000-2011.10 ▸ Authoritarian? Yes, competition not free; not accountable▸ One-party rule fairly common▸ Can be democratic: one-party dominant (predominant)▸ Need to distinguish from rest; e.g., Alberta, 1935-71; 1971-now▸ Can be authoritarian but allow opposition to exist but not win (one-party hegemonic), Mexico, PRI, 1929-97.▸ Or can have a total ban on other parties▸ Many vanguards▸ Other one-party dictatorships: Franco’s Spain, Baathists in Syria and Iraq, ex-Burma, ex- Gabon, ex-Malawi, ex-LiberiaPersonal Rule▸ Probably the most common form throughout history▸ Tyrants and dictators▸ Trujillo, Amin, Bokassa and Macias go here; many more, too▸ Monarchs▸ Not the modern constitutional kind▸ Personal rulers not necessarily abusive if constrained▸ Law, custom or countervailing force▸ But most are constrained only by own reading of what they can get away with▸ Still lots, despite Third Wave of democracy▸ In fact, there are new opportunities within hybrids and re-styled authoritarian systems▸ Can & should be compared to executive-centred democratic states▸ Precisely because the two are not the same▸ Need to discover points of convergence and divergence▸ And are still first choice among many aspiring authoritarians▸ They matter11 We want to know▸ What forms do they take. ?▸ How many career paths are open to a wannabe dictator?▸ How important are personal regimes?▸ One person can’t really rule a modern state.▸ Shouldn't one-person rule be on the decline?▸ Has one-person rule changed over time?▸ Is the tyrant passing from the scene?▸ Do they take and lose power as before? Forms▸ Generic▸ Power officially in one person’s hands; may be delegated▸ Political choices determined by leader▸ There is, though, a clique of personal advisors▸ No autonomous state institutions, though some routinely function without interference; e.g. lower courts▸ No/few autonomous media▸ No checks on leader▸ No independent parties or civic organizations▸ Business may have some autonomy; religion too▸ Security forces under leader’s control▸ Can be benign or malign; depends on leader and his needs▸ This produces certain outcomes; more below▸ Absolute (Ruling) Monarchy▸ Pharaohs, Roman emperors, divine right monarchs; Shah or Iran, Emperor of Ethiopia12 ▸ Today: monarchs of oil states, Persian Gulf, SA, Brunei; + Morocco, Jordan; not traditional▸ Traits▸ Hereditary succession▸ Officially one-man rule, though with modern bureaucracy▸ Minimally limited by legislature (if present) or courts▸ Monarch determines what limits he accepts▸ Not many; not likely to be more▸ Residual category▸ Do add to list of authoritarians▸ Some liberalization in Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco▸ Point of interest is how earlier absolutist monarchies were transformed▸ A good few were overthrown: France, Russia, Iran and probably England (1688)▸ Some legislated out of existence: Germany, Portugal and Spain▸ Sultanistic rulers▸ Chehabi and Linz, eds, 1998, Sultanistic Regimes▸ Exercise power without restraint and usually without a guiding ideology▸ Most likely in more underdeveloped states▸ Tend to be patrimonial; i.e., treat state as their property▸ Private property not secure▸ Paternalistic and clientelistic▸ Patron-client relations▸ Examples▸ Trujillo, Batista (Cuba), Marcos (Philippines,), Somozas – two generations (Nicaragua), Duvaliers – two generation (Haiti), Pahlavis – two generations (iran)▸ All of these had an official political party that never lost but might share trappings of power13 ▸ Others▸ Nkrumah or Castro, want to restructure society▸ Some rely more on force than on clientelism▸ Those who came up through military▸ And a few use terror as main governing instrument: Francia or AminHow they rule▸ Political Science always interested in this question▸ Renewed since about 2000▸ Always known:▸ Corruption▸ Factionalism and playing factions off against one another▸ Clientelism▸ Purges and rehabilitations▸ Assassinations ▸ More recently discovered and confirmed▸ Personal dictatorships more robust, harder to change, than party or military dictatorships▸ The elites in personal dictatorship depend on the leader▸ Do not have an institutional base, as they would in military or party dictatorships▸ Harder to organize, easier to repressThree more dictators: Amin, Bokassa & Macias Nguema▸ These fit best with Trujillo and probably Gairy, though the latter was a labour leader who was instrumental in Grenada’s independence, and Gadhafi 14 ▸ But Trujillo was a very able businessman and Gairy not as cruel▸ A bit with Francia and Mugabe, though both of them were well educated individuals▸ Not so much with Ho or Franco▸ And Bokassa would find lots of friends in 19th c. Latin America▸ And Fidel Castro has had his share of nutty ideas▸ So there is a class of dictators who are not emotionally or intellectually (or both) well equipped to govern▸ They would have a hard time in an electoral democracy▸ Recent misfortune of GOP, for example: Peter Principle▸ How did the three Africans get a chance to be dictators?▸ And how did they differ from RLT?▸ Trujillo▸ From modest but not impoverished background▸ Had criminal record: fraud, robbery and gang leader▸ Still able to enter new Natl. Guard, formed by US, in 1918; military school; general by 1927▸ Coup in 1930  31 years of dictatorship by the Goat▸ Personality cult + patrimonialism – treats country as private domain▸ The three Africans▸ Origins?▸ Conditions for rise?▸ How they got power?▸ As rulers?▸ Their ends?▸ Where are they the least like RLT?▸ Where are they the most like him?15 Analyzing Personal Rule▸ Lots of descriptions of dictators▸ Some attempts to classify them▸ Jackson and Rossber, 1982, Personal Rule in Black Africa.▸ Chirot, 1994, Modern Tyrants▸ Chehabi and Linz, Sultanistic Regimes▸ Most recent stuff tries to look at all authoritarian regimes▸ Far more general and abstract▸ Case studies, grouped case studies, and macro analyses▸ Nothing really mid-range▸ Gandhi and Franz & Ezrow take the macro route.▸ F & E are nearly entirely macro in the reading you have – in other stuff they aren’t▸ Gandhi starts with case studies to show where her research questions come from and what evidence underlies her hypotheses.▸ Jennifer Gandhi▸ Looks at use of usual democratic institutions by dictatorships▸ Not just for show▸ Serve to include potential opponents in regime▸ JG asks if opting to include opponents helps dictators survive longer▸ Focuses on parties and legislatures tests a series of hypotheses▸ Interested that dictatorships have different sets of institutions▸ Monarchs rely on kin▸ Military dictators have the armed forces▸ Civilians have or create an official regime party▸ How they use these institutions is one question16 ▸ How these institutions help the dictator is another.▸ Two important things here▸ Dictatorships aren’t all alike; seen in their institutions▸ A dictatorship using parties and legislatures is not necessarily doing so for show▸ Erika Frantz and Natasha Ezrow▸ Elites in dictatorships▸ Dictatorships have elites▸ People in top positions▸ May have real responsibilities or not▸ May or may not have influence with dictator▸ But they are there▸ Two questions▸ Do different types of dictatorships – personal, military and party – produce different elite structures? Yes.▸ Military mainly from military and are influenced by command and control structures; first loyalty to the service▸ Party dictators draw their elites principally from the ranks of the party. So elites will be loyal to party in the sense that the good of the party > good of leader▸ Personal, loyal to leader, depend on leader; leader is the “one what brung ‘em.”▸ Does this make a difference to a dictator’s survival?▸ NB: Dictator’s survival not necessarily the same as a dictatorship’s survival.▸ Yes▸ Military dictators most likely to fall; usually to a countercoup▸ Second most likely to fall are party dictators; again to an internal coup▸ Least likely to fall are personal dictators▸ Why?▸ Presence or absence of unifying institution17 ▸ Do elites have some source of power outside govt?▸ Note that both studies are interested in the survival of dictators and dictatorships▸ And both centre their examinations on elements regularly studied in democracies▸ So they’re bringing dictatorships inside the PS tent. Oligarchy▸ What it is▸ Broadest definition▸ Rule by an elite▸ In its own interest▸ Elite can be▸ Economic▸ Religious▸ Ethnic▸ Whatever▸ Corrupt regimes: Ruler governs in own interest▸ Virtuous regimes: Ruler governs in public interest▸ For Aristotle oligarchs govern in interest of a specific minority▸ Not just any minority but their minority▸ Implies that rule will be authoritarian▸ Unaccountable and unresponsive to many▸ Opaque in its dealings▸ Disregards law when convenient▸ And were propertied▸ Oligarchy here parallels institutional dictatorships▸ Represent the interests of a definable group18 ▸ So would fit military or party dictatorships▸ Presumably oligarchs could substitute for their representative▸ Could govern through proxy▸ Manchurian Candidate option▸ Or in coalition with other institution▸ Military or official party▸ Military not unusual: Honduras, 2009▸ Party: Maybe the Colorados of Paraguay▸ Winters’s take▸ Oligarchy always class-based▸ Takes this back to Aristotle▸ Also much conventional usage assume this▸ Costs and benefits of his position▸ Clarity and simplicity, plus wide acceptance▸ Excludes other self-interested ruling minorities▸ Whites in Rhodesia or apartheid South Africa▸ Religious minorities: Saddam’s Iraq, Assads’ Syria, Bahrain▸ Power elite, C, Wright Mills (1956): Business + Military + Politics▸ And oligarchy can exist within a democracy.▸ Not direct rule, though conceivable▸ Rather influence▸ One of JW’s key points▸ But it means maintaining dramatic inequalities of wealth▸ Not just any elite=people in top positions.▸ But an elite with great material resources that belongs to those in this class19 ▸ Not linked to job, as with soldiers, state managers, or all but a few corporate executives Key Points▸ Wealth defence▸ JW sees this as “central political dynamic” for oligarchs▸ Use their wealth to defend their wealth▸ Use the resource they have the most of▸ Can be direct: active involvement in ruling▸ Where oligarch has to defend property directly▸ Or indirect▸ Where property is secure▸ Through other institutions▸ Power capacity—familiar concept; ▸ Oligarchs have material power▸ Others can have rights, positional, coercive, mobilizational▸ Argues the advantages of material power▸ Does not always carry the day▸ Not Winters but Fred Block, 1977, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule”▸ Not repeated this time round – oligarchs stronger? Comment▸ In practical terms – about what the 1% do to preserve their wealth and the system of inequality that generated their position▸ JW takes pains to underline that this conventionally happens in democracies▸ Thus democracy doesn’t disable oligarchy  civil oligarchies▸ Term used in other ways by other authors▸ Only some forms of oligarchy are authoritarian – warring, ruling and sultanistic – but all resolutely anti-egalitarian20 ▸ Hatfields and McCoys▸ How dominant they were▸ How they preserved their dominance▸ Their social origin: ▸ Were they really feudin’ mountain boys?▸ They also existed within a relatively, for its time, democratic order▸ Should that worry us? Ruling Oligarchies▸ Most interesting are Greeks and Romans▸ Note the Material Power Index (78, 92)▸ Relative wealth▸ Cf. the Athenians 2.4k times to Romans 400k And to US (217) 109k▸ Coercion▸ Who threatens oligarchs? Who protects them?▸ In Athens? Slaves threatened; oligarchs protected selves▸ In Rome? Slaves and urban poor; oligarchs against slaves on farms; the state against urban poor▸ In US and similar: state is both  Income Defence Industry▸ JW stresses that oligarchy is a political system used by the extremely wealthy to defend their wealth▸ Keep this in mind when reading his book▸ Also when looking at Gandhi and Levitsky & Way▸ Keep asking how what the latter two describe differs from the former▸ Are the tools used all dictators open to oligarchs? Certain classes of oligarch?▸ Can oligarchs be competitive authoritarians? ▸ Finally, ask how you get rid of oligarchs21 ▸ Has anybody done it? ▸ Who? ▸ How?▸ With what results?Authoritarians and Institutions▸ How we (PS + History + other SS + journalism + independent researchers) have studied non-democratic G&P▸ Treated as case apart▸ Totalitarians▸ Tendency to dichotomize democratic and non-democratic▸ Focused on policies and policy instruments▸ How the governed, with what tools, to what ends▸ Partly because that was obvious▸ Everything else hard to detect▸ We didn’t know a lot▸ Except by anecdote and rumour▸ Think of what Vargas Llosa tells us about Trujillo▸ Still don’t▸ One difference▸ Try understand not just what authoritarians do▸ But also how they do it▸ Frantz and Ezrow on what lets dictatorships persist or makes them fail▸ Gandhi on the specific role of institutions Institutions▸ What are they?22 ▸ Some attributes – conventional connotative definition▸ Bricks & mortar: physical presence▸ Legal charter▸ Table of organization: formal internal structure▸ Informal, too; not a concern for us now▸ Stable and long-lived – designed to be around when everyone now part of the institution has left▸ Examples▸ MUN, House of Assembly, Royal Bank, General Motors, etc.▸ Formal social science denotative definition▸ A repeated pattern of interactions▸ Very abstract▸ What does it call attention to?▸ Any of the stuff we normally think of?▸ Actually a lot of what makes up the observable constitutive parts ▸ What this has to do with authoritarian regimes▸ NB: Gandhi (and F&E) limit focus to dictatorships▸ No hybrids or semi-authoritarian/semi-democratic▸ Simplifies; minimizes fuzzy cases; makes a clear answer more likely▸ Formal social science denotative definition▸ A repeated pattern of interactions▸ Very abstract▸ What does it call attention to?▸ Any of the stuff we normally think of?▸ Actually a lot of what makes up the observable constitutive parts ▸ What this has to do with authoritarian regimes23 ▸ NB: Gandhi (and F&E) limit focus to dictatorships▸ No hybrids or semi-authoritarian/semi-democratic▸ Simplifies; minimizes fuzzy cases; makes a clear answer more likely▸ Maintain a functioning economy▸ Beyond material sustenance▸ Jobs▸ Produce material rewards▸ Various forms of infrastructure ▸ Money for government▸ ≠ functioning economy or $ for people▸ Control a valuable resource—coltan, diamonds, rubber, oil + monopolize trade▸ Rent seeking▸ Keep most/enough people happy▸ Unless ruling by utter terror▸ Then it’s only the security forces▸ Still want to limit opposition/discontent▸ Co-opt: cheaper in mid-term▸ Long run: Gaddafi? ▸ Benefits/mobility for key groups▸ No sure prescription for how ▸ Lots of ways have worked▸ Some overtly authoritarian▸ Some beneficent but not democratic▸ Some democratic▸ Democracy is not the only answer▸ For many & for a long time it was not the best answer24 ▸ We know what authoritarians do▸ Concentrate power▸ Unaccountable▸ Disregard law▸ Limit civil society and opposition▸ Monist > pluralist▸ Prone to use coercion▸ What institutions do they need to rule like this?▸ Sometimes very few▸ Guns and people ready to use them▸ Failed states, power vacuum▸ Fairly common in 18th c. Lat Am▸ Also appears to apply to Samuel Doe’s coup in Liberia in 1980▸ First African failed state▸ More often need administrative structure▸ Formal security forces▸ Financial administration▸ Public health—or else foreign investment flees▸ Public works “ “▸ Can be minimum needed to keep $ in country▸ Open airport—may have to leave…quickly▸ As time passes need more▸ Especially if ruler needs to win support of critical groups▸ More complex, developed country▸ More groups with political interests▸ More diversity  harder for govt to meet demands  25 ▸ Harder to generate support▸ But that may not be enough to save a leader or regime▸ Egypt▸ Chile, Pinochet; Brazil, military regime, 1964-85▸ But cf. PRC or VNReadings▸ Gandhi▸ What she focuses on: parties and legislatures▸ Why not elections or courts? ▸ Both can figure in power-sharing pacts that leave dictator in place▸ Link to clientelism – co-optatation▸ How she defines dictatorship and why▸ Her three cases▸ What does she show with them?▸ What determines the use of standard democratic institutions in dictatorships?▸ Note: Legislatures and parties (as organized factions)=pre-democratic▸ Elections too▸ Institutions to co-opt▸ What does this mean? Does it occur in democracies?▸ Latter matters▸ Granting concessions: Quotas of power ▸ Why these matter to opponents▸ Why these matter to dictators▸ Argues that personal dictators may have greater need to co-opt, Why?▸ Develops model, 82-100, to predict when dictators co-opt26 ▸ What she says in formal terms is basically a set of common sense hypotheses about how dictators act and how and why they use parties and legislatures▸ Based on her 3 cases▸ Winters▸ Sultanism, (135-136): Personal ruler; uses control over access to material rewards to control; also controls state coercive instruments as ultimate ruling instrument▸ Would this fit Trujillo?▸ Institutions Suharto, Indonesia, and Marcos, Philippines, used to govern.▸ Need not be formal, official institutions▸ Sultans, caudillos and big men all like to concentrate power in own person▸ Don’t build conventional institutions▸ Think Trujillo, his party and the DR’s Congress▸ Suharto –Breaks down old legal system: Why?  result?▸ Building support: How?▸ Is this like what F&E are getting at about elites?▸ Is this a co-opting mechanism?▸ An unarmed oligarchy▸ Why this matters▸ Are there elements of clientelism?▸ Suharto’s kids: A “loaded dice” faction▸ What did they do to the relation Suharto had with the oligarchs?▸ What did the oligarchs do?▸ What happened to Suharto▸ What happened to Indonesia and the oligarchs?▸ Marcos – different story (193): 2 reasons▸ First: Philippine oligarchs armed and used to defending selves▸ Even worked under electoral democracy27 ▸ Turns in office▸ Not unique; Spain, 1878-1923; many LA countries had one-term limits for presidency,▸ Second, Marcos violated non-re-election norm ▸ Imposed martial law & had main opponent assassinated▸ Used army to check oligarchs▸ Overthrown, 1986, by popular movement led by widow of man he had killed▸ What happened next? See Table 4.3, p. 205▸ Different style of sultanistic rule Levitsky & Way▸ JG and F&E don’t look at elections; JW does▸ Non-competitive elections have been studied for a while▸ More in last 12-15 yrs than before▸ L&W’s hypothesis: successful democratic transition w/fully competitive elections more likely when▸ Linkage to democracies is high▸ Democracies have significant leverage over govt▸ Authoritarians’ organizational strength is relatively low*▸ What’s behind their research▸ Transitions producing flawed democracies or hybrids, even new authoritarians▸ Look for an explanation that combines domestic + international factors▸ Central concept: Competitive Authoritarianism▸ Elections held – only way to gain power legitimately▸ Oppositions compete actively▸ But odds favour govt: playing with loaded dice▸ Case study chapters test hypothesis▸ Give background about specific transitions.28 ▸ Compare their stories to Gandhi’s and Winters’sVargas Llosa II • Put Trujillo into context as personal ruler • Recall the attributes: • Power in one person’s hands; may be delegated • Practically, always; officially, sometimes • Political choices determined by leader • There is, though, a clique of personal advisors • Dictator doesn’t trust them and keeps them insecure • No checks on leader • No autonomous state institutions, though some routinely function without interference; • e.g. lower courts or routine bureaucratic tasks • May use elections, parties, legislature to co-opt or for show • No independent parties or civic organizations • Unless licensed • Business may have some autonomy; religion too • No/few autonomous media • Security forces under leader’s control • Police and military • Secret police • Paramilitary • Party thugs • Use force freely • May use terror to maintain control • Generally patrimonial – state is theirs to loot • Often paternalistic and clientelistic29 • Sultanistic • Official political party that never lost • But might share trappings of power • e.g., the Somozas and their pacts • How does Trujillo, as depicted by Vargas Llosa, fit the model? • The model is abstract and doesn’t cover every dictator perfectly • How does reading this novel help us understand personal dictators? • Your Job: • Tell readers that • Plot and fictional characters • To the extent that they help explain dictators • Vargas Llosa’s depictions of Trujillo et al • To the extent that they help explain dictators • Not a book review for English • Not an academic book review – as for a journal • It’s a political book review• Authoritarians and Institutions – 2 Readings – Gandhi▸ Gandhi▸ Remember that she says▸ Dictators “hold power w/o the legitimacy of having been chosen by their citizens” thus need to “thwart challenges to their rule”▸ Is this latter point different from elected officials?▸ Other forms of legitimacy?▸ Autocrats need cooperation & compliance▸ Any surprises?30 ▸ To “organize policy concessions” need a forum▸ Parties and legislatures▸ Not elections, as they don’t facilitate deal-making▸ P&L aid dictator in co-opting needed support▸ May not apply to “totalitarians” like the Kims or Castros▸ We don’t know▸ Presumably they make deals inside the party▸ Recall further that JG▸ Argues P&L do NOT make dictatorships more democratic;▸ Just more open▸ They are inclusive authoritarians▸ Others have used term in similar way▸ And recall that her definition of a dictatorship is any government whose head – however styled – is not elected by the people▸ Too narrow? ▸ Too broad?▸ Why would she choose this? But▸ Do dictators need to make policy concessions?▸ Do legislatures in dictatorships make policy?▸ Would it make more sense to let co-opted MPs tend to pork and pocket-lining than to policy?▸ What are the benefits of having a opposition voice in policy-making?▸ Better policy  less discontent?▸ Being able to blame opposition for negative results? JG, ch. 4▸ JG tests more hypotheses31 ▸ Dictatorships w/legislatures and parties produce different policies than those w/o▸ Reasons that opponents would not participate if they had no impact on anything▸ Political survival? Patronage?▸ Remember what we said about pacts ▸ Look at where her data come from and how she constructs her indicators▸ Her findings re-influence of oppositions in authoritarian legislatures▸ Looks at▸ Rights and freedoms—free expression▸ Your hypothesis?▸ Military spending▸ Your hypothesis?▸ Social spending▸ Your hypothesis?▸ More freedoms, less defence spending, but not more social spending▸ Tries to figure out why and get hypotheses for next study▸ Very typical of social research▸ Frequently don’t get everything right▸ Try to puzzle out what some alternative “right” answers could be JG, ch. 5▸ Economic outcomes▸ Inclusive, “broadened”, dictatorships will produce better economic results▸ Institutions provide mechanisms to smooth relations between govt and non-govt groups▸ Yields more stability  conditions more favourable to economic growth▸ Intuitively sensible: ▸ Where there is instability investors won’t invest and economy won’t grow32 ▸ Hypothesis is sustained▸ Finding suggests institutions help produce compromise▸ Overall do better than single-party dictatorships▸ JG thinks that leadership/other non-institutional factors count in single party regimes econ fate▸ Spain, post-1958– no functioning legislature▸ S. Korea▸ How would we take non-institutional factors into account?▸ What would we look at?▸ Could we devise a strategy that would apply to many cases? JG, ch, 6▸ Regime survival▸ This is what she wants to know about▸ Does adopting institutions to include some opponents of the regime contribute to the regime’s survival?▸ She predicted it would▸ Inst let dictator manage key parts of society▸ Relay information about state of pub. opinion▸ So can even rigged elections▸ Let dictator adjust behaviour ▸ But she was wrong – they don’t stay in power longer – and her hypothesis was disconfirmed▸ She asks why the initially plausible explanation did not hold – What social research does.▸ What she proposes as possible explanations and starting points for future research▸ Maybe L&P don’t count for much in survival ▸ Dictators who offer L&P may face more problems than those who don’t, thus more prone to fall▸ But there is the counter-example of Ecuador33 ▸ If junta had built institutions it might well have lasted longer▸ Problem of survival of dictatorships is more complex than JG initially thoughtFurther Thoughts▸ Parties & what they can do▸ Official or Regime Parties (aka Parties of Power)▸ Mobilize citizens▸ Can warn opponents off – see high public support▸ Distribute patronage▸ Two-way info transmission mechanism▸ Jobs for militants: MPs + staff + officials▸ Spending – campaigns  money distributed▸ Opposition – Govt’s viewpoint▸ Legitimacy▸ Co-opt▸ Monitor▸ Opposition’s viewpoint▸ Access to resources▸ Patronage▸ Survival▸ Especially true if there is some freedom to act Legislatures and Authoritarians▸ Assume small policy role; i.e., like Canada▸ Patronage: MPs, staff, people who keep the building up▸ Legitimacy: especially if there is some debate and oversight – don’t have to change legislation34 ▸ Membership in IPU and regional PU▸ Can host foreign parliamentary delegations▸ Way to keep contact with opponents who tolerate the regime: co-opt or just have friendly contactsCompetitive/Authoritarian Elections▸ Three options▸ Without competition – mobilize voters to show support for dictator or single party▸ With licensed opposition: Can compete but cannot win▸ Proscribed either by law (vanguards) or practice▸ Opposition victory possible/imaginable but improbable▸ Loaded dice: electoral system manipulation ▸ Do all these belong together?▸ Is one concept – competitive or electoral authoritarianism – enough?▸ Would more be too much?▸ So what? Elections in authoritarian regimes Barbara Geddes, 2005, found that authoritarians that held elections lived longerRegular elections Some elections No elections (years) (years) Years Military dictatorship 20 9 6 Personal dictatorship 21 10 12 1-Party dictatorship 33 N<4 N<4Why elections matter so much▸ Follows Geddes▸ Can’t judge these like democratic elections▸ Though they look much the same▸ Parties35 ▸ Big expenditures▸ Intense voter mobilization▸ Even though the winner is nearly always pre-determined▸ Elections give govt a chance to mobilize its members▸ This shows strength▸ Even if support is bought▸ Being able to mobilize a lot of people send message to opponents▸ Even potential coupsters▸ Why ▸ For civilian opponents lots of mobilized says govt hard or impossible to beat▸ For military opponents lots of mobilized says a coup will meet mass opposition▸ Will military risk mass casualties and even civil war?▸ Will soldiers fire on civilians? ▸ This explains why parties of authoritarian govt roll up big margins in elections▸ Even if they are often manufactured▸ Can even apply to turnout, as mass participation seen as mass support▸ Starting a party is expensive and if there are elections costs rise more▸ But a party  lots of jobs and lots chances to link more citizens to the govt▸ May be totally opportunistic▸ But allying with govt to get jobs or contracts  identifies you with govt  you’re theirs Overall▸ Parties and elections work for authoritarians; elections do too.▸ It makes sense for a dictator to invest in these even if they won’t be used as they are in democracies▸ That’s a good thing, because electoral authoritarianism, with accompanying parties and legislatures, is a hard system to manage.36 ▸ Lots can go wrong but longer life expectancy seems to justify investment in time, money and energyCases Brazil▸ Nature of the system▸ Military▸ Rotate leadership▸ Transformational – long-term changes▸ Part of autocratic wave in ‘60s and ‘70s in South America▸ Grouped with Argentina (1966-73, 1976-83);Uruguay (1973-84) and Chile (1973-89)▸ Bureaucratic authoritarians▸ These last three all suspended parties, legislatures and elections▸ Though there were referendums in Chile (2) and Uruguay (1)▸ Brazil was different▸ Authorizes two parties in 1966▸ ARENA – Official, government, Natl Renewal Alliance▸ Created by govt▸ MDB – official opposition: Brazilian Dem. Movement▸ Pre-existing party▸ Legislative elections every 4 years, 66-82 (86=free)▸ ARENA won handily, 66-70; very tight 78-82▸ When MDB started to show strength military govt changed rules and reduced legislature’s powers to protect ARENA▸ Starting in ‘79L Distensão: relaxing restraints▸ Indirect presidential elections, 1985▸ Govt candidate loses 73-2737 ▸ 1986 free legislative elections▸ 1988: democratic constitutions▸ 1989 free presidential elections▸ Why would military govt allow parties and elections?▸ Nigeria tried the same thing under Babangida, 1989▸ National Republican Convention & Social Democratic Party▸ Abolished under next mil govt—Abacha, 1993 Mexico, 1929-1994 (2000)▸ The Official Party: 1928-38 – PNR; 1938-46 – PRM; now PRI▸ Lost first state in 1989, Baja Califonia; los control of Federal Chamber of Deputies in 1997; lost presidency, 2000; regainde presidency, 2012.▸ BeaPRI = hegemon: used fraud▸ But until 1977, at least, not to win but to roll up margin▸ Show strength to▸ Opposition▸ Voters who need party▸ Patronage▸ Value stability▸ Unhappy party elites ▸ They also used patronage▸ Huge state sector + friendly private sector firms▸ Stops after 1982  massive, open fraud in 1988 presidential election▸ Managed the electoral business cycle▸ Spending + infrastructure ▸ Reminded voters of PRI’s power▸ Huge campaigns38 ▸ Mobilize voters▸ Link them to party▸ Big vote margins  leg. majorities big enough to amend constitution w/o others’ support▸ Naming judges and the electoral commission, too▸ Breakdown starts in ‘82▸ Structural adjustment  sale of state firms  less patronage▸ Grows after ‘88 and especially after ‘94▸ Peso crisis  voters see PRI not such a good econ mgr▸ Assassination of PRI presidential candidate + Zapatistas  PRI not so great at security and stability▸ Post-94: Deals with opposition parties  independent electoral commission▸ Opposition parties growing stronger▸ Deal to keep them from protesting election results▸ Why it fell▸ Poor management since 1982▸ Opposition disposed to cooperate to some extent to oust PRI▸ Why it’s back▸ PAN governments not astonishing successful▸ Other alternative party, PRD, had leader who didn’t inspire confidence▸ So Enrique Peña Nieto is president-elect – only got 38% of vote▸ New ball game? Nicaragua, 1979-present▸ Evolution▸ Somocismo, 1936-79: Hegemonic; official party of dictators = PLN – Nationalist Liberal Party; licensed opposition parties – could run but never win; if a boycott entered its own opposition party▸ Sandinistas, 1979-90, 2006-: FSLN – Sandinista National Liberation Front; 5 stages39 ▸ 1 st, 1979-82: Leninist, licensed opposition▸ 2 nd , 1982-1990: Dominant; free competition; loses▸ 3 rd , 1990-2000: Opposition; effective mix of parliamentary, electoral, and mobilizational opposition; ▸ 4 th , 2000-2011: Junior members in pact with PLC, Constitutional Liberals; dominate courts, controller’s, electoral commission; electoral engineering to exclude 3rd parties; still competed electorally and often opposed each other in National Assembly (NA)▸ 5 th , 2007-now: Hegemonic; ▸ May have stolen 2008 municipal elections; final tally never published; won in places party was weak; used violence by party toughs to “defend the vote”▸ Probably inflated tally in 2011; enough seats in NA to amend constitution on own▸ Evolution: Functional One-Party to Dominant to Competitive to Pacted Dominance to Hegemonic▸ Thus from sure wins to possible losses to probable losses with some power assured back to sure wins▸ Electoral democracy not a good thing if you can lose!Two More Backsliders: Ukraine and Zambia▸ Ukraine: 2012 legislative election declared tainted by international observers.▸ Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe said it reversed democracy▸ In 2010 the same bunch declared the presidential vote “transparent, unbiased and an ‘impressive display’ of democracy” (BBC 2012)▸ What happened?▸ 1991-2004: Independent again▸ Kravchuk and Kuchma▸ First rapid economic decline (Kravchuck)▸ Recovery but with cronyism, restrictions on freedom and government power grabs (Kuchma)▸ 2004: Orange Revolution to 201040 ▸ Mass protests, media revolt against controls, electoral fraud  rerun election, Kuchma’s party loses, Yukashenko wins▸ Yukashenko, president, and Tymoshenko, PM, squabble  gridlock▸ 2010, Yankulovych, loser in 2004, wins cleanly▸ Then jails Tymoshenko▸ Strengthens ties to Russia▸ Fraud▸ Control legislature and electoral process▸ Does he have enough resources to keep buying and winning?▸ Zambia▸ 1964-1991: Era of Kenneth Kaunda▸ 1972-91: one-party state, United National Independence Party▸ 1990: rise of Movement for Multiparty Democracy; strong enough to convince Kaunda to hold competitive vote in’91▸ 1991-2001: Frederick Chiluba▸ Used massive parliamentary majority to engineer exclusion of Kaunda and UNIP in 1996 and win massively▸ 2001: moots const amdt to permit a 3rd term – bad idea▸ Stands down; backsliding halted at least temporarily▸ 2001: MMD narrowly wins presidency (controverted) and narrowly loses parliament; retakes via by-elections▸ New president, Levy Mwanawasa, allows Chiluba to be charged with corruption; died in office; emergency election returns his VP, Rupiah Banda▸ But in 2011 a new party, Patriotic Front wins elections marred by violence▸ Michael Sata, 74, populist and admirer of Mugabe is president▸ Defected from MMD▸ In Zambia there seems to have been enough room for opposition forces, parties and civil society to form and manoeuvre. ▸ Govt control less sure and extensive, at least ostensibly41 ▸ And cost of defection from governing party not too high▸ Should we expect backsliding? Or be surprised? Or see it as possible under some conditions?▸ If the last then what sorts of conditions?▸ A govt or leader that likes governing?▸ An opposition that is either too weak to win or so strong it worries govt/leader?▸ And with a govt that controls enough resources to pull off fraud?▸ A majority able to amend constitution to extend partisan control?▸ How much structure? How much agency?42

What Makes a Government Authoritarian?

Details

Download

Copyright

We respect the copyrights and intellectual property rights of all users. All uploaded documents are either original works of the uploader or authorized works of the rightful owners.

Support