CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by PhilPapers Minerva DOI 10.1007/s11024-009-9114-6 Implanting a Discipline: The Academic Trajectory of Nuclear Engineering in the USA and UK Sean F. Johnston Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract The nuclear engineer emerged as a new form of recognised technical professional between 1940 and the early 1960s as nuclear fission, the chain reaction and their applications were explored. The institutionalization of nuclear engineer- ing—channelled into new national laboratories and corporate design offices during the decade after the war, and hurried into academic venues thereafter—proved unusually dependent on government definition and support. This paper contrasts the distinct histories of the new discipline in the USA and UK (and, more briefly, Canada). In the segregated and influential environments of institutional laboratories and factories, historical actors such as physicist Walter Zinn in the USA and industrial chemist Christopher Hinton in the UK proved influential in shaping the roles and perceptions of nuclear specialists. More broadly, I argue that the State- managed implantation of the new subject within further and higher education cur- ricula was shaped strongly by distinct political and economic contexts in which secrecy, postwar prestige and differing industrial cultures were decisive factors. Keywords Discipline Á Nuclear engineer Á University Á Expertise Á Training Á National laboratory Introduction During the twentieth century, and particularly from the 1930s, nuclear physics was one of the most rapidly growing fields of scientific knowledge. Dramatically accelerated by the Second World War, this expertise was marshalled to develop not just the first nuclear weapons but also civilian applications. The post-war capabilities of ‘atomic energy’—copious production of radiation to transmute S. F. Johnston (&) University of Glasgow, Dumfries Campus, Glasgow DG1 4ZL, UK e-mail: [email protected] 123 S. F. Johnston elements, to create radioisotopes for medical applications and to generate power— grew in tandem with the new field of nuclear engineering. Owing to the strategic importance of the subject for military supremacy, national prestige, energy policy and international trade, the discipline, occupation and profession of nuclear engineering were driven by government definition and support.1 Accounts of the field have focused on its wartime origins, particularly of key historical actors (e.g. Compton 1956, Hartcup and Allibone 1984, Brown 1997; Bernstein 2004), policy-making (Gowing 1964; Hewlett and Duncan 1969) and the development of commercial nuclear power (Pocock 1977; Bothwell 1988). Comparisons of nuclear programs (de Leon 1979) and of the identity of engineering professions (Downey and Lucena 2004) have contrasted differing national contexts. However, nuclear engineering as a body of expertise has attracted relatively little attention, and studies of its academic origins are sparse. I argue that this lack of attention to its specialists is a consequence of the unusual context in which nuclear engineering developed. In an environment of secrecy and military urgency during the war and for a decade thereafter, practitioners were restricted from open academic discourse; indeed, apart from a handful of high- profile scientists publicly representing the new domain, the early historical actors and developing expertise were largely invisible. As a result, nuclear engineers were peculiarly voiceless, and the development of self-perception and shared identity was constrained. From the mid 1950s, though, national haste to demonstrate peaceful civilian applications pushed nuclear engineering into university curricula. A consequence for the historian is a relative dearth of documents relating to nascent community identity and aspirations, but more readily traced emergence of the academic discipline. This paper contrasts the distinct histories of nuclear engineering’s academic embedding in the countries that had first collaborated in the field as wartime allies: the USA, UK and (more briefly) Canada. It documents an atypical disciplinary trajectory in which governments played the key role in defining intellectual content, occupational categories and professional aspirations for the emerging field. Implantation of the discipline within further and higher education curricula was shaped strongly by political and economic contexts, and was configured differently in each country owing to distinct national goals and administrative cultures. Core Knowledge The root of nuclear engineering’s disparate trajectories lay in dissimilar conceptions of how the intellectual subject and its skills set should be constituted. The novelty of this engineering domain was disputed. Its proponents focused on new intellectual expertise supporting a novel occupational context: the design and operation of 1 By ‘discipline’ I mean the intellectual foundations, specialized skills, educational institutionalization and academic allegiances supporting a self-recognised coherent body of knowledge. I distinguish this from the aspects of ‘occupation’—the pursuit of productive activity—and ‘profession’—the community interactions and recognised status attaching to disciplinary and occupational expertise. This distinction follows the approach of Abbott (1988) and of Divall and Johnston (2000). 123 Implanting a Discipline nuclear reactors.2 But how was the nuclear reactor perceived by, and involved in the shaping of, its creators and users? On the face of it, the first reactors were mundane devices. Their original name, piles, mirrored their construction, originally a compact assembly or lattice-work mountain of materials. Their visible characteristics were also unexciting: such piles generated heat, which was removed either to keep them cool or to generate useful electrical power. For power generation, well-established engineering principles were applied—principles developed over the previous two centuries to collect and transfer the heat via an exchange medium such as water, steam or gas, and to convert it to mechanical motion and electrical power with turbines. Other design principles were just as traditionally established: how to package the materials in mechanical structures that were mechanically, structurally, chemically and thermally stable; and how to ensure reliable operation of these factory-sized environments of interlinked mechanical, electrical and thermal systems. But the first reactors had unfamiliar purposes and invisible characteristics, too. Their goal, specified by the Manhattan Project, was to generate a sustained chain- reaction of radioactive materials, and to use this controlled fission to transmute them into new elements, one of which (plutonium) would be used in bombs.3 This deeper function, revealed publicly after the war, was the source of their new name: chain- reactors or, soon after, reactors.4 Underlying the potential of the chain reaction lay rapidly expanding knowledge of nuclear physics, chemistry and metallurgy and a comparable wave of novel engineering expertise. A more sophisticated variety of reactor, the so-called breeder, further advanced prospects for a specialist discipline. Conceived during the war as a means of avoiding the predicted limited world supply of uranium, the breeder reactor produces more radioactive fuel than it consumes, but at the expense of greater technical complexity. Most designs relied on energetic ‘fast’ neutrons to transmute natural uranium or thorium into plutonium, for which efficient chemical extraction and reprocessing techniques were needed. Typical designs required high radiation levels and temperatures in the core—both conditions little understood initially—and sophisticated liquid metal cooling systems for removal of heat. Its novel regime of operation demanded theoretical understandings and practical solutions well beyond conventional engineering knowledge, and offered a perpetual resource that would benefit from continual development, thus boosting the prospects of a specialist discipline of nuclear engineering. 2 Indeed, institutions highlighted this new terrain. The UK Atomic Energy Authority vaunted its role to ‘design, build and operate new types of reactor’ (Jay 1956, p. v). Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd identified its business as ‘creation of atomic energy’ [Atomic Research Workers Union, No. 24291, Applicant—and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Respondent. LAC RG145 Vol 114 File 766:336:52]. 3 The Nagasaki bomb was based on plutonium generated in nuclear reactors designed at the ‘Metallurgical Laboratory’ (‘Met Lab’) of the University of Chicago. By contrast, the Hiroshima uranium bomb relied on the separation of the isotope U-235 from the almost indistinguishable U-238 in uranium-rich ores, for which processes based on gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation and centrifuges were developed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 4 An alternate etymology credits wartime chemical engineers, designers of chemical ‘reactors’, with making an analogy between chemical and nuclear production. The competing origins are significant, as they attribute authority over the new domain to different technical specialists. 123 S. F. Johnston As varieties of reactor systems proliferated, engineering knowledge developed alongside new scientific insights. For instance, the first plutonium production reactor, at Hanford, Washington, proved to be temporarily ‘poisoned’ by the production of an unexpected fission product which disastrously diminished