AN ANTITRUST PRIMER Page 1 PREVENTING AND DETECTING BID RIGGING, PRICE FIXING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION IN POST-DISASTER REBUILDING PROJECTS AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR AGENTS AND PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS I. INTRODUCTION collusive conduct is discovered, the Antitrust Division stands ready to criminally prosecute the American consumers individuals and corporations seeking to unjustly have the right to expect profit from this tragedy. the benefits of free and open competition — the The Antitrust Division, FEMA, and other federal best goods and services law enforcement agencies have collaborated at the lowest prices. successfully in the past on several occasions to detect Public and private and deter anticompetitive conduct. For example, organizations often rely after Typhoon Paka hit Guam in 1997, leaving on a competitive thousands of people homeless, FEMA made more bidding process to than $70 million in federal funds available for achieve that end. The competitive process only disaster relief. The Antitrust Division conducted a works, however, when competitors set prices bid-rigging and public corruption investigation honestly and independently. When competitors jointly with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Guam and collude, prices are inflated and the customer is agents from the FEMA Office of Inspector General, cheated. Price fixing, bid rigging, and other forms of the FBI, the IRS, and the Department of Interior. collusion are illegal and are subject to criminal The investigation resulted in numerous convictions, prosecution by the Antitrust Division of the United including that of Austin J. “Sonny” Shelton, who States Department of Justice. was the Director of Guam’s Department of Parks and Recreation and was responsible for awarding As a member of the Department of Justice contracts to repair typhoon damage. Shelton was Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force, the Antitrust convicted after trial of organizing three separate bid- Division is committed to offering our expertise and rigging conspiracies, soliciting and receiving bribes assistance in the wake of the devastation caused by in return for the award of contracts, committing wire Hurricane Katrina. As FEMA and state and local fraud, and conspiring to launder money. Shelton was government agencies with whom FEMA is sentenced to serve eight years in prison. Following coordinating begin to solicit competitive bids for that successful partnership, the Antitrust Division rebuilding contracts, the Antitrust Division is also worked with FEMA to provide proactive prepared to provide assistance to these agencies to assistance to the State of New Mexico following the protect against bid rigging, price fixing and other Los Alamos fires in 2000. collusive conduct among companies competing for rebuilding contracts. Experienced Antitrust Division This Primer contains an overview of the federal attorneys are available to provide training to law antitrust laws and the penalties that may be imposed enforcement agents, auditors, and procurement for their violation. It briefly describes the most personnel in the affected areas to assist them in common antitrust violations and outlines those identifying and preventing potential bid rigging and conditions and events that may indicate collusion in the competitive bidding process. If anticompetitive collusion so that you might better identify and investigate suspicious activity. Page 2 AN ANTITRUST PRIMER II. FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT Under the law, price-fixing and bid-rigging schemes are per se violations of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits agreements This means that where such a collusive scheme has among competitors to fix prices, rig bids, or engage been established, it cannot be justified under the law, in other anticompetitive activity. Criminal for example, by arguments or evidence that the prosecution of Sherman Act violations is the agreed-upon prices were reasonable, that the responsibility of the Antitrust Division of the United agreement was necessary to prevent or eliminate States Department of Justice. price cutting or ruinous competition, or that the conspirators were merely trying to make sure that Violation of the Sherman Act is a felony each got a fair share of the market. punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and a $1 million fine for individuals and a fine of up to $100 A. Bid Rigging million for corporations. In addition, collusion among competitors may also involve violations of Basic Schemes the mail or wire fraud statute, the false statements statute, or other federal felony statutes, all of which One of the most common violations the Division the Antitrust Division prosecutes. prosecutes is bid rigging. In simple terms, bid rigging is fraud which involves bidding. It is an In addition to receiving a criminal sentence, a agreement among competitors as to who will be the corporation or individual convicted of a Sherman Act winning bidder. Bid rigging occurs when a violation may be ordered to make restitution to the purchaser solicits bids to purchase goods or services. victims for all overcharges. Victims of bid-rigging The bidders agree in advance who will submit the and price-fixing conspiracies also may seek civil winning bid. The purchaser, which depends on recovery of up to three times the amount of damages competition between the bidders to generate the suffered. lowest competitive price, receives instead a "lowest bid" that is higher than the competitive market would III. DETECTING CRIMINAL ANTITRUST bear. VIOLATIONS There are four basic schemes involved in most Most criminal antitrust prosecutions involve price- bid-rigging conspiracies: fixing, bid-rigging, or market division or allocation schemes. Each of these forms of collusion may be u Bid Suppression: In this type of scheme, one or prosecuted criminally if they occurred, at least in more competitors agree not to bid, or withdraw a part, within the past five years. To prove such a previously submitted bid, so that a designated crime, we do not have to show that the conspirators bidder will win. In return, the non-bidder may entered into a formal written or express agreement. receive a subcontract or payoff. Price fixing, bid rigging, and other collusive agreements can be established either by direct u Complementary Bidding: In this scheme, co- evidence, such as the testimony of a participant, or conspirators submit token bids which are by circumstantial evidence, such as suspicious bid intentionally high or which intentionally fail to patterns, travel and expense reports, telephone meet all of the bid requirements in order to lose a records, and business diary entries. contract. "Comp bids” are designed to give the appearance of competition. AN ANTITRUST PRIMER Page 3 u Bid Rotation: In bid rotation, all co-conspirators Payback submit bids, but by agreement, take turns being If a company agrees to intentionally lose the low bidder on a series of contracts. business, naturally it must be given some u Customer or Market Allocation: In this scheme, compensation by the winning company. That co-conspirators agree to divide up customers or compensation can take several forms including: geographic areas. The result is that the co- u The loser will be promised that it can win conspirators will not bid or will submit only another contract later (this is the most common complementary bids when a solicitation for bids payback); is made by a customer or in an area not assigned to them. This scheme is most commonly found u The winning contractor may give a subcontract in the service sector and may involve quoted or supply a contract to one or more of the prices for services as opposed to bids. losers; or Subcontracting arrangements are often part of a u There may be a direct payoff in the form of bid-rigging scheme. Competitors who agree not to goods, cash, or check, normally disguised as a bid or to submit a losing bid frequently receive legitimate payment. subcontracts or supply contracts in exchange from the successful low bidder. In some schemes, a low Suspicious Indicators: bidder will agree to withdraw its bid in favor of the r You receive identical bids from different next low bidder, in exchange for a lucrative companies either as to individual line items or subcontract that divides the illegally obtained higher lump sum bids; profits between them. r Bids come in way above the agency's estimate Almost all forms of bid-rigging schemes have one for the value of the contract or way above thing in common: an agreement among some or all comparable bids by the same companies in of the bidders which predetermines the winning other areas; bidder and limits or eliminates competition among the conspiring vendors. r A winning bidder subcontracts part of the business to one or more losing bidders; Determining the Winner r There is some indication of a physical alteration Participants can decide who wins a particular of bids, particularly at the last minute; contract using a number of allocation standards, r Particular line items for some bidders are much including: higher than for others (no relation to cost); p Rotating contracts so that each will win an equal r The range of bids shows a clear gap between dollar volume over time; the winner and all others (an indicator of a p Rotating so that each will win an equal number number-to-bid-above situation); of contracts over time; r You notice that the bids of all companies are p Allocating based on overall market share; very close (an indicator that bidders knew each others’ prices); p Dividing up by territory, such as giving each company the accounts closest to its headquarters; r You notice the same increment between the bids of each company; p Dividing up by type of customer, such as one taking federal accounts and the other taking state r All companies submit high bids when work is accounts; and known to be scarce; p On the basis of need -- splitting up the business r The company gives different bids for the same so that each company keeps its assembly line or line item on different contracts that are close in equipment fully occupied.